

# ROYAL CENTRAL ASIAN JOURNAL

VOL. XLII

JANUARY, 1955

PART I


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## NOTICES

THE Annual Dinner of the Society will be held at Claridge's, Brook Street, London, W.1, on Tuesday, July 12. Tickets 35s. per head, including waiters' tips but exclusive of wine. It is hoped as many Members as possible will attend.

Will overseas Members expecting to be in the United Kingdom at that time please inform the Secretary at 2, Hinde Street, London, W.1.

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The Council acknowledges with gratitude back numbers of the Society's Journal from Members. Back numbers are in constant demand for libraries in various parts of the world. Copies of all numbers for 1936 will be appreciated.

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The Council also acknowledges with gratitude the following additions to the library :

*Frontier and Overseas Expedition from India, the official account of the Abor Expedition 1911-1912.* Presented by the Officers, Gurkha Depôt, Lehra Bridgmanganj, U.P., India.

Thirty-seven volumes, mainly on India, Burma and the Nagas. Presented by Sir Robert Reid, K.C.S.I.

*The Aristocracy of Central Tibet. A Provisional List of the Names of the Noble Houses of Ü-Tsang* (from the work of the Third Danish Expedition to Central Asia). Presented by H.R.H. Prince Peter of Greece and Denmark, who adds: "It is my hope that, with its publication, criticism and additions will be forthcoming, allowing eventually for a second and more complete edition."

*Government of Bahrain Annual Report for the year 1372* (October, 1952-September, 1953).

*The Viet-Minh Régime*, by Bernard B. Fall. Data Paper No. 14, South-East Asia Program, Department of Far Eastern Studies, Cornell University, Ithaca, New York, April, 1954.

*Bibliography on South-Western Asia*, by Henry Field. Published by the University of Miami, Florida, 1953.

*Federation of Malaya Annual Report for 1953.* From the Information Officer for Malaya in the U.K.

*Essentials of Modern Turkish*, by Herman H. Kreider, Robert College, Istanbul, Turkey, 1954. Presented by the Middle East Institute, Washington.

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Responsibility for opinions expressed in articles published, and for the accuracy of statements contained in them, rests solely with the individual contributors.

## MARCO POLO'S SHEEP

(*Ovis Ammon Poli*)

THE Council of the Royal Central Asian Society were pleased to arrange for the magnificent head of Marco Polo's Sheep, presented to the Society through the good offices of Field-Marshal Lord Wavell, then Viceroy of India and later President of the Society, to accompany the remarkable collection of big-game trophies selected for the British Exhibit at the recent International Big-Game Exhibition at Düsseldorf.

This head is one of the greatest ever known and is also a perfect specimen in that the points of the horns are undamaged and that both horns are perfectly balanced and symmetrical; it is now known as the "Wavell" Poli. It aroused the keenest interest from the hundreds of thousands who visited the Exhibition, including many visitors from all parts of the world.

This wonderful animal, the greatest of all sheep, has come to be recognized as the "blue ribbon" for big-game hunters in Central Asia, not only for the size and splendour of the trophy itself but for the particular difficulties encountered and special perseverance demanded of the hunter.

The long and arduous journey to its habitat on the Pamirs—the "Bam-i-Dunya," or "Roof of the World"—and the fact that this very fleet and wary quarry has to be hunted at an altitude of 10,000 to 14,000 feet above sea level on the rolling wind-swept plateaux of High Asia cannot fail to stir the imagination.

But for Members of this Society it has a special significance in that the horns of the Ovis Polo, or Marco Polo's Sheep, are the very appropriate crest of the Society subscribed with the inspiring motto "*Cornua levat super terras*" ("He raises his horns above the world"). His habitat is at the very point where it has been said that "three empires meet" or where three great civilizations still happen to converge.

It was the great Italian explorer Marco Polo, who travelled from Europe across High Asia to distant Cathay in the thirteenth century, who first recorded the existence of this remarkable beast. Chinese savants such as Huen Hsien passed in their turn the same way from East to West. Many brave adventurers whose names are so closely associated with High Asia have passed on after them: to mention but a few—Prjevalski, Sven Hedin, Aurel Stein, Francis Younghusband and Mildred Cable.

Great hunters also followed, including from the Western world the brothers Theodore and Kermit Roosevelt.

It was Field-Marshal Lord Roberts who received as a present from the Amir of Afghanistan that enormous and almost legendary pair of weather-beaten Poli horns that are the device of the Society's crest.

And for big-game hunters in particular the horns of this greatest of all sheep, the very emblem of Central Asia, are such that the Shikar Club of Britain has adopted them as the pattern for its own silver badge.

It is not surprising, therefore, that our crest and motto should excite our admiration and stir our imagination.

If we may think of the achievement of this Society since its foundation and of its ever-increasing scope, are we not also tempted to think that Marco Polo's Sheep still looks down from High Asia upon the world with the destinies of the great civilizations of the Western nations, Greater Russia and China's millions supported in the weight and balance of those massive horns!

E. H. C.

[The head may be seen in the Society's Library.—EDITOR.]

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## CORRESPONDENCE

CASHIDING,  
KALIMPONG  
(WEST BENGAL),  
INDES.

TO THE EDITOR,

THE JOURNAL OF THE ROYAL CENTRAL ASIAN SOCIETY.

SIR,

In my article entitled "The Third Danish Expedition to Central Asia: Its Work in the Himalayas," published in your volume XLI, Parts III and IV, July-October, 1954, pp. 228 to 237, on this last page appears a note signed "H. W. T.," in which it is commented on my remark that "Sikkim, once the paradise of trekkers, is virtually inaccessible," that "This actually applies to Sikkim north of an east-to-west line through Gangtok."

Now, this is not correct, and even misleading, and I regret to see this note added to my article, thus giving the impression that things are not really as bad as I apparently am trying to make out they are.

The exact position is as follows (and it is perhaps useful to state the precise situation since the question has been raised): Permits to visit Gangtok for short stays are granted, but not to the east, to the passes (Nathu and Jelep) leading to Tibet. Permits are also issued, in certain circumstances, to visitors desiring to go to the south-east as far as Pemayangtse (Pamionchi). *And that is all.* There can be no question of a zone south of an east-west line through Gangtok being open. Only these two places remain accessible, the latter even only under exceptional circumstances. I have just been there myself for seven days (and am most grateful to the authorities for having permitted it), and I found that only three parties of Europeans before me had been there this year.

I am, yours, etc.,

PETER,

December 12, 1954.

PRINCE OF GREECE AND DENMARK.

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The following extract from a letter received from Colonel C. C. Graham, D.S.O., O.B.E., H.Q. British Gurkhas in India, Barrackpore, P.O. Palta, 24 Parganas, December 11, 1954, will interest some members:

THE SECRETARY,  
ROYAL CENTRAL ASIAN SOCIETY,  
LONDON, W.I.

In the meantime I would be happy to help those of your members who are interested to get information of Gurkha friends. If they would let me have the following information about individuals in whom they are interested I will do my best to send them news by post :

REGIMENTAL NO.	RANK	NAME	VILLAGE	DISTRICT	TAHSIL
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Of course I appreciate that it will be difficult to recall some of the above required details, but if your interested members could let me have what they do remember, it will be of help in my investigations. The Indian Gurkha Records Office at Kunraghat, which is not far from our western depot at Lehra, would provide information of those whose records are not with us. There is a very good liaison with the Indian Gurkha depot, and there is a constant exchange of visits between the officers of both depots. This is the pension-paying season, and there is a constant stream of pensioners to Lehra and Kunraghat, and I know too well how glad they would be to get news of their past officers.

The Brigade of Gurkhas is a very thriving concern. We shall be shortly building a combined depot inside Nepal. It will take four years to complete and will be of a permanent nature. A measure of this kind, which is going to cost about £1½ million, would hardly be undertaken if the British Government had not got confidence in the tenure and future of the Brigade. Your members may be interested in the signal quoted below, which was sent very recently by the Secretary of State for War, Mr. Head, after his visit to Malaya.

“ To Major-General Perowne, Major-General Brigade of Gurkhas,  
Malaya :

“ Please convey to all ranks of the Brigade of Gurkhas my admiration and appreciation of the way in which they are carrying out their duties in Malaya. During my visit I was particularly impressed by the smartness, bearing and high morale of all Gurkha units. I was also struck by the reputation which the Gurkhas have earned for themselves in Malaya. The skill, determination and perseverance in carrying out a task of considerable difficulty have won for them a very high reputation. This is only to be expected of regiments whose record in the past has been one of continuing and courageous service through many years. I can assure you that it is Her Majesty's Government's intention that this proud record shall be given every opportunity to continue far into the future.—  
ANTHONY HEAD.”

It is very stimulating to note also how well the Indian Gurkhas have settled down under the new régime. The battalions that I have seen in India, such as the 8th Gurkhas, are very smart indeed. Indian formation commanders always speak very highly of their Gurkha troops.

Yours sincerely,  
C. C. GRAHAM.



# ECONOMIC CRISIS IN JAPAN

By D. DUXBURY

(*Special Correspondent for "The Financial Times"*)

Report of a lecture to the Royal Central Asian Society on September 22, 1954, Admiral Sir Cecil Harcourt, G.B.E., K.C.B., in the chair.

The CHAIRMAN: Dr. Duxbury, who has kindly come to speak to us on the "Economic Crisis in Japan," is a journalist by profession. He was in Japan this spring for two months with the Foreign Manager of *The Financial Times* and on his return wrote a lengthy survey for his paper. Without more ado I call on Mr. Duxbury.

I AM very conscious that this is a great honour for me, and I trust that when I say that you will not think I am indulging in any formal customary remark of that nature. In these days too many tend to visit a country for a few weeks and then return to tell others all about the economic, political and social life and prospects of the people concerned. Some visitors spend, perhaps, a few days in a country and then produce a report on what they have seen. I was sent to Japan in 1951 by *The Financial Times* to make a study, so far as I was able, of the industrial development and reconstruction that had taken place since the war in the belief that Japan, along with Germany, would be the main contender for world trade against the British in the post-war years.

In 1951 I found an early study of industrial development confirmed that there had been a remarkable revival in industrial production and in the general reconstruction and prosperity of Japan. I found also a tendency among the occupation authorities, who were dominated, of course, by the Americans, to take a somewhat romantic view of Japan's prospects in the next few decades. I was told, for example, that Japan was going to take the place in Asia, in the industrial revolution of the new age, that Britain had held in the industrial revolution here 150 or 200 years ago. That perhaps seemed a little fanciful, although the prospect now is that Japan will be able to take up the opportunities that are offered.

When I visited Japan again in March and April, 1954, it was with the aim of producing a survey of the industry and economics of Japan rather more ambitious than we had attempted three years previously. I found on the second visit some astonishing contrasts with three years previously. In the first place, the really impressive difference was that the occupation authorities as a civil force had disappeared; that the Japanese were in full control of their own destiny, political and economic, whereas up to 1952, when the Treaty of Peace was signed, they had constantly been under the help and guidance, and sometimes perhaps the pressure, of their American friends.

Those are my few qualifications for appearing before you, and I mention them because you may be wondering why I have the temerity to

suggest the title "Economic Crisis in Japan." The word "crisis" normally brings to most of us the impression of something acute and tentative, but I chose the title deliberately because it seemed that the position of the Japanese economy, even when I was in that country in the spring of 1954, was sufficiently precarious to suggest that whatever they did in the meantime there would be continuing crises. As I see it from having studied the position on the spot, and having done all the reading one is expected to do in preparation for such a visit, Japan provides the basis for crises, political and economical, irrespective of any particular events during the last few years.

As you are all aware, Japan skirts the mainland of China closely enough to it to be very much part of it and yet just that little bit farther off than we are from the Continent of Europe, which means that Japan is, to some extent, isolated. The distance from Korea to Japan is about 100 miles, whereas we have some 20 miles between us and France. One of the results of her partial isolation has been that Japan not only has been and is very much divorced from Western contacts, but also that she was for a long time separated even from contact with Asia itself. The land itself is often described colloquially as "standing on its edge." The tremendous mountain ranges which dominate the whole of the four main islands are matched in the sea by an equally steep drop into what become the deepest parts of the ocean. Within those islands there is obviously a very heavy pressure against the population. The amount of land which is available for growing food, and in fact for normal living purposes, is very limited. All the time the population is being pushed towards the sea by the mountain ranges.

Japan, therefore, is a land of contrasts not only economically but in sheer physical conditions. There are now 87 million people all dependent for their livelihood on the four main islands. As during the war Japan lost all her overseas territories, the pressure of population is intensive because, apart from the limited amount of land available for growing food and industrial crops, if those were possible, the natural resources of the islands are meagre in comparison with the population. In minerals, in timber and in metals Japan is in very important sectors deficient. This lack of resources compels an outward projection into the modern world through exports. You may think, as many do, that in Japan more could be made of the agricultural possibilities. I do know that experts who have lived in Japan all their lives believe that more could be done to grow more food in Japan and thereby release some of the pressure to export, which is necessary, or to import food. In a general way it is true—and many who know Japan better than I do will probably agree—that in Japan every square yard of land which can be used for growing food is used. Even if you are a visitor travelling to any part of the country only for an hour it is obvious that every farmer is making the utmost use of every foot of land. On the slope behind his farm the farmer builds terraces of a foot or two feet wide on which he will grow some crop or another.

Within this setting in which both nature and economics are pressing upon a large population there is also the fact that Japan as an industrial nation has existed only for a very short time. Until one hundred years ago

the country was completely cut off even from Asia. There were very few visitors, and there had been no development of the kind which we would regard as industrial. That period of rapid development has telescoped into less than one hundred years the kind of progress and expansion of industry and of social conditions which arise from industry into a period much shorter than anything we in this country, or indeed in the United States of America, understand.

You may think I am speaking at random on some of the obvious things of which most of you are aware. I have, however, mentioned them because I believe that it is only in this setting that you can get an attitude of mind where reactions are very swift and sharp. The result is that having spent, as I did in 1954, two months in Japan one finds that almost every day somebody is suggesting that tomorrow there will be a real crisis; there is already a crisis, and if tomorrow Mr. So-and-so does this, or if something else happens abroad which affects the economic position of Japan, there will be a real crisis. That was true also politically. The Prime Minister, Mr. Yoshida, is expected to leave Japan this week-end for a trip to the United States and Britain. He was intending to leave when I was in Japan in the spring and I believe he postponed his departure. He later intended to come and once more had to postpone his visit because behind him in the political atmosphere of Japan there was a very difficult situation.

One of the most graphic examples is the swift reaction to events. There was the incident in March and April of the fishermen who were affected by radio-activity resulting from the explosion of the hydrogen bomb at the beginning of March. I sought the opinion of a good friend of mine, a reporter on a Japanese daily newspaper, who supposedly would be in touch with the likely reactions of his fellow-men on this subject. I said: "Surely as this has happened there will be a very strong reaction from the Japanese public; after all, they were the first people to receive an atomic bomb at Hiroshima and again at Nagasaki; they must be more acutely sensitive to this kind of event than we in Europe." My friend disagreed. He thought the Japanese in their new democratic situation in the post-war world had begun to realize that all these things were necessary, that scientific progress must be maintained, and that we must all on occasion make sacrifices to that end. He was utterly wrong. Within twelve hours there was a strong reaction throughout Japan against the idea of carrying out any experiments at all which were sufficiently under lack of control as to bring about results of this nature and endanger the lives of people who in Japan, incidentally, as fishermen, are regarded as among the prime producers because they provide the only animal protein which the Japanese have for food. That was an example of a sudden rush of objection which it seems to me would not have happened in this country of ours.

Within this general atmosphere of crises we can see in the post-war development of Japan's economy how a particular crisis has developed. When the Americans arrived in Japan in 1945 they found the economy in a state of collapse. Those of you who have read the sources will know that those in the United States who had studied the situation in Japan before the bombing began knew that Japan was already defeated. Her

fleet moved out of the ports only under the greatest provocation and on some occasions simply could not be provoked to come out. The reason was that there was simply not enough oil to run the ships. So that when the Americans arrived the economy had already collapsed; there was practically no industrial activity comparable with peace-time, let alone with war-time, and at the outset the directives to the occupation authorities had prevented them from giving any help to Japan towards her recovery. I am unable to quote the exact directive given to the Supreme Commander of Allied Forces, but in effect it said that he was not responsible for the well-being of the individual Japanese. However, in a short time it was realized that that was a policy which was not only of no benefit to Japan but was a definite detriment to the occupation authorities themselves. It meant that for ever the Japanese would have to be kept because it is not possible to starve 80 million people—not over a very long time. So help was given and the result of the reversal of the original policy, as you know, was quite remarkable. In the five years following the war, the Americans not only gave organizational and technical help to the Japanese industrially and in civil affairs as well as in public works, but they provided about 2,000 million dollars in direct aid. The pace of Japan's recovery was constantly increasing during those five years. I found that in 1951, from being almost collapsed, the economy had, in fact, recovered almost to the pre-war level from the point of view of industrial activity.

In 1950 there had come the Korean war with the boom in orders which affected all of us, however distant we were from that war, but which affected Japan most of all because when locomotives, steel track, railway lines and so on had to be transported to Korea, then obviously Japan was called upon. The Korean boom meant that there was a tremendous demand which Japan was quick to satisfy and which no doubt, as elsewhere in the world, induced manufacturers and workpeople also to imagine that they stood in an easy position which they hoped would continue. During all that period Japan was able to build up a considerable dollar reserve. It was, of course, all adventitious. All this aid which had been coming up to 1951 and all the orders which were coming through Korea or were directly associated with the occupation of Japan and Korea were temporary aids which economists were steadily telling the Japanese could not be depended upon for ever.

Austerity programmes were introduced even during the occupation, following the advice of Mr. Dodge, the American banker, who saw that Japanese planned economy was running away with itself. But after the Treaty the Japanese were self-confident and possibly over-confident. The result was that in the first year of freedom from occupation the Japanese rather let the lid off. In a general sense, economically and individually, they began to spend more, hoping in the process that prosperity would build up upon itself. By the middle of 1952 Japan had a reserve in dollars of probably well over 1,000 million. Between 1950, when the Korean war started, and 1953 the national income rose by about 30 per cent., wages rose by 35 per cent., while consumption rose by about 40 per cent. Obviously in such a situation imports were increased tremendously; they were, in fact, two and a half times what they had been in 1950, and at the

same time—this is the crucial point—exports had risen by only 20 per cent. as compared with the increase in imports. People were spending more and living a fuller life, but my observation suggests that the fuller life was being enjoyed by a rather smaller proportion of the Japanese population. For the most part it can be said that although the agricultural population has now a much better living than before the war, nevertheless the real cream of this luxury spending must have occurred in the middle and other classes to whom money had come fairly easily, possibly from trade and other directions. The result has been that the balance of payment situation has deteriorated steadily. In 1950, 1951 and 1952 there was a positive balance in Japan's balance of payments of about 300 million dollars, but in 1953 not only was there no surplus but there was a deficit of 190 million dollars. Taking the fiscal year 1953, up to the beginning of April 1954 the figure is a deficit of 300 million dollars as compared with a surplus of 300 million dollars in the previous few years, so that Japan is rapidly running down her currency holdings.

The only reasons for Japan showing a surplus were, at the beginning, because of aid from the United States and, later, the procurement of orders for the Korean war plus the cost of the occupation of Japan and Korea. Altogether in the few years following the Korean war Japan received something like 800 million dollars a year from these sources, from the sale of services and goods to Korea and for occupation of troops. About half of this was due to orders from Korea; the other half, roughly, was due to the occupation forces. So long as there are United Nations Forces in Japan reliance can be placed on, perhaps, 300 million or 400 million dollars of temporary aid, which will help to balance payments. Nevertheless, the Korean war orders have declined and, in the result, Japan has gradually had to eat into her holdings of currency. The fall, as far as I can give it in figures—and these are often difficult to secure—has been from well over 1,000 million dollars last year to under 800 million dollars this present summer. Of those 800 million dollars, about 160 million dollars are frozen holdings in Indonesia and elsewhere, which cannot be used if the need arises. Hence there is urgent need for Japan, firstly, to attempt a balance of payments on her current trade and, secondly, to take the utmost steps to prevent a further decline in her currency holdings. On her visible trade in 1953 Japan had an adverse balance of about 1,000 million dollars offset by the 800 million dollars from procurement orders. The situation is precarious because in the export world Japan is finding difficulties, just as we are. There are too many countries imposing tariffs or quotas and too many other countries where there are other barriers to Japanese influence.

During all this development of trade, inflation developed in Japan so that the city banks were taking heavy loans from the Central Bank, the Bank of Japan, and they as commercial banks were lending far too much to industry and commerce, partly for investment in machinery, but partly also to finance the day-to-day dealings which are inevitable, especially when handling stock which is rising in price. The result was that for 1953 and up to February, 1954, none of the commercial banks in Japan had excess deposits for the loans; they were lending far more than they ought, and they were able to do that only because the Bank of Japan was supporting

them. There were larger imports costing dollars and sterling which could not be afforded, and, as home consumption had increased, the Government finally, in the autumn of 1953, decided that an austerity programme must be introduced to correct the adverse balance.

That austerity programme follows the obvious lines: tight money, cuts in imports and the budget, which is limited in Japan's case to within 1,000 million pounds and in which it is hoped to prevent further deterioration. But of course in Japan, as in the rest of the world, austerity is a good thing—not for me but for you. Each individual says: I agree we should all be very austere, but I would still like a new suit, and so on. In Japan, things do not differ from those here in that respect. I remember my colleague and I being taken to lunch in a very attractive place. We were taken into a bar which was about as long as the bench from which I am speaking, and there must have been at least forty different kinds of spirits there, some of which I had never before heard of and all of which I was assured were very good. As we walked in, the managing director said: "You can see some of the evidence that we are not always austere in Japan." I remember another occasion when invited to a dinner I was told that the cost of it had been £35 per head. I do not pretend to understand as a mere Lancashire man how much it would cost to give you all a dinner in London. I am aware that it costs more than in my local fish-and-chip shop, but at any rate you would have to go quite a way to spend £35 per head on a dinner. A good deal of that type of luxury spending has gone on, partly fostered by the new democratic attitude to business and industry which has developed since the war. People now believe that there are executive members of staffs who must do nothing else but keep the customers warm and keep even the friends of the customers warm although the customers have not arrived with the friends. We can only assume we were the friends of the customers who might come later on!

To this austerity programme there is the natural opposition. Industry argue: We cannot afford that you should cut imports of this or that raw material, otherwise we shall run down, production will fall, unemployment will be created and a terrible situation will arise. Similarly, commercial houses who are having to finance business say: We cannot afford to finance this business unless the banks will help us out. As in Japan many of the vast trading concerns have a turnover which is very many times more than their available capital, this is an important deficiency. If the banks decline to make loans somebody is going to go without dividends. That has been happening since the early spring of 1954. The number of failures is increasing. You may have read in some newspapers here of the increasing number of bankruptcies and failures of small concerns. The impression I was given when in Japan was that these small concerns are not, in fact, in the ordinary way industrial producers, but traders, commercial firms, who are being forced out of business possibly because there are too many of them.

In February, 1954, the banks managed to reverse the position and secure that their loans were falling below the level of deposits, and even in March and April, when the austerity programme appeared to be well under way and when the Government and the Bank of Japan appeared to

be holding firmly to it, there were arguments among some of the leading industrialists and financiers that the Government was being quite short-sighted in its handling of the foreign exchange situation; that this 800 or 900 million dollars of reserve should not be kept in the Bank but used for the development of Japanese industry, used to help to increase trade and to increase efficiency. These people argued that, after all, Japan had no ambitions for the yen to become an international currency. Japan merely wanted to maintain her position and to live. Japan had no ambition on the currency side; therefore these reserves ought to be used to help industry instead of being kept tucked away, preventing industry from making a full recovery.

That view overlooked what is a fact, and an unfortunate fact: that outside opinion in the world becomes concerned even if the currency is not intended as anything but normal currency, if, in fact, a country's reserves are gradually falling. Japan's real need is to increase her exports in order to earn more, because obviously United States aid, at one time direct, and later in the disguise of procurement orders or as payment for troops—such aid cannot continue for ever. Japan's need for increasing her exports is hampered by two quite separate problems, one of which is the problem I have already mentioned, that of having too many barriers to trade; the other is that within all the development which has occurred during and since the war in Japan there is still a very great contrast in efficiency in industrial equipment and methods. That is obvious even to a layman like myself going through a single factory. In a single factory where there is the most up-to-date plant—plant which is post-war and may even surprise some here—you will also find relics of the craftsman age. Also there are companies in iron and steel which are ill-equipped and ill-organized, and at the same time others which are highly organized, equipped with the most modern up-to-date machinery and capable of meeting almost any competition. So efficiency and the need for re-equipment constitute a prime problem in connection with Japan increasing her exports.

The reason for this is, as has been said by traders in recent years, that in many goods, except textiles, Japan's prices have been well above world levels. It is true that in iron and steel engineering products, and also in shipbuilding, Japan has been quoting prices which are higher than those quoted by Britain, much higher than world prices. In Lancashire, of course, the view is taken that Japan produces at such a low level of wage relationship that it is not possible to compete with her. I have heard it said many times in Lancashire: "We should not allow Japan to export her population problem," the implication being that if a country is increasing her population and must keep it alive, then that country should not expect others to keep it. Speaking as a Lancashire man, that seems to me a kind of argument which is likely to rebound on almost every other trading nation one might mention. It does not seem to me a solution. Nevertheless a solution must be found, and Japan herself is trying urgently to achieve a solution. She is trying to improve her efficiency; she is trying to re-equip; she is trying—a crucial point—to get even more capital for this re-equipment and reorganization; she is trying to take her place in world affairs and organizations which will help her to earn her living.

It seems to me from the brief experience I have that it would be very much better if there were more people like ourselves who were interested at least in studying these problems instead of reacting pathologically to the Japanese as a nation. It would be very much better if there were more of us anxious to know more of the problems which affect not only the Far East but the whole of the world, and anxious that we should co-operate in securing some solution. The simple fact that emerges from my brief but very intensive survey of Japan is that it is not possible to confine for ever on those four islands a population of 87 million people. By that I do not mean one must provide for their living; I mean that they must be allowed to live. If not, the obvious result will be what it was before the war: we shall give leaders of doubtful political virtue an excuse for putting forward policies which are quite easy to put forward, difficult to put into practice and very dangerous for the rest of the world. It is in the belief that there should be a less antipathetic attitude to this problem in Japan that I agreed to subject myself here to your very serious criticism, which I hope I will now have.

Group-Capt. H. ST. CLAIR SMALLWOOD: Did the lecturer see any signs of the return of the big combine such as Mitsui and companies of that kind which, though they were not altogether desirable, seem to have been more efficient than the present collection of small companies? Is the combine system likely to return?

Mr. DUXBURY: That has already happened. There was clear evidence that the Mitsui concentration is being revived. There is some argument amongst economists as to whether that is good or bad. I offer the humble opinion that concentrations of equivalent size and power to the influence of Zaibatsu are not only regaining control of trade and industry but have in a large measure regained that control. The difference is that whereas the Zaibatsu before the war were dominated by particular families, today that is not so. I do not make a completely dogmatic statement as to that. There may be traces of family influence, but in general the capital which is utilized in these companies today comes from institutions rather than individual families. You may find a Mitsui firm amalgamated with another such firm but that the capital is not in the hands of those who are members of that particular family. We were taken to one of the great Mitsui households, now turned into a home for the staff of the group. There is no doubt that those concentrations are coming back. Friends who spent a longer time in Japan than I, and also understand the difficulties which Japan has, believe that because of present development in trade and industry that sort of concentration is essential in order that there shall be any rational trade of any kind.

Colonel CROCKER: Could the lecturer tell us something in regard to the conditions of work in the factories in Japan, particularly as to the hours of work and wages of the operatives? Secondly, are the manufacturing firms subsidized by the Government in any way? I understand that they were before the war; I do not know whether that is so now.

Mr. DUXBURY: Working conditions vary greatly in the factories. In general, the conditions have improved compared with what they were



pre-war. Many of the factories I visited, including those producing textiles, compared with any in the world; they compared favourably from the point of view of conditions, equipment and the general welfare of the operatives with the best textile factories in this country. Of course the Japanese—I am well aware of this—will show their best, but when we receive a visit from an American, Belgian or even a Japanese here in Britain, we naturally do not take him to the back streets—we let him see our show factories. But I was fortunate enough, by sheer luck and the interest of a reporter in Osaka, to be enabled to see one of the worst factories in Japan which is rightly described as “disgraceful” and as something which should not be allowed to exist. I admit that the conditions were inferior to those of textile factories which I know in this country. The lighting was bad, the atmosphere was bad. There was no attempt to clear the atmosphere of dust. The machinery was crowded and the building itself ramshackle. On the other hand, in the great textile factories the working conditions are very good indeed; some of the equipment is as modern as any that can be obtained. For example, two or three of the great Japanese textile firms are using processes which are sophisticated processes in other countries. There were similar contrasts between the new and the old—sometimes the two are mixed together.

As to wages, Japanese textile women workers will receive in a month about the same as a British textile worker receives in a week. Weavers will receive the equivalent of £6 a month, whereas, on an average, a weaver in a British textile factory receives £6 a week. There are the same kind of contrasts in other respects as you have between Britain and the United States of America. There is the highly skilled operator in the cogging mill of a steelworks, who makes £40 a week in the United States and in Britain £20 a week, while in Japan a similar operator will receive £20 a month.

As to whether the firms are subsidized, it depends what the questioner means by subsidies. Of direct subsidies there was no present evidence, but of indirect subsidies there were ample examples in Japan, as in other countries. In some industries raw material imports are made dependent on export performance. In some industries the import of a raw material which has nothing to do with the particular industry is made interdependent with exports from that industry itself. In the wool industry under the Anglo-Japanese payments agreement early this year provision was made by the Board of Trade in London for the Japanese to buy from Britain about £2 million worth of woollen and worsted fabrics. These can be seen in the great stores in Tokyo (and a surprising thing it is to see them on sale), but the import licences for those products are easily disposed of. Consequently, if I can secure some import quotas for this foreign cloth it pays not to import the cloth at all but to sell it to someone who will pay me two or three times what it is worth, with which I am able to subsidize my own production and export.

The Minister of International Trade and Industry, whom I had the opportunity of meeting, when asked deliberately by me whether the Government would continue what are regarded abroad as unfair methods of subsidizing trade—expressed the view—which he said was held firmly

by the present Government—that Japan should not attempt any kind of subsidies or dual pricing which would appear abroad to be a manipulation of currency. I have gathered from the Press that a recent report by the International Monetary Fund suggests that the Japanese should drop certain practices they have in this direction, but has not complained about the normal dual pricing which does occur in Japan as in many exporting countries—in other words, the policy of “soaking” the home consumer in order to export more goods at lower prices. I would not dare to say that that kind of dual pricing exists in this country, but it does exist in some exporting countries, and it is not regarded as unfair. If it is possible to get more from the home consumer to reduce the export price, well and good; but any of the other aids are frowned upon, and I should have thought the Japanese would be reluctant to allow them to continue because they need the help of international organization and finance not merely to enable them to develop, but to live at all.

Mr. BIGGS-DAVISON: Would Mr. Duxbury comment on the report that Japan is sending a delegation to the high authority of the European Iron and Steel Community in Luxemburg? I should welcome enlightenment as to what is behind that report.

Mr. DUXBURY: I can only think that, as in all other matters, the Japanese are anxious to make all the contacts they possibly can which might prove useful to them. They do realize that they have far too few contacts with the West; they realize also that they must make more contacts, irrespective of the social need for contacts; they feel they must also learn more in regard to iron, steel and coal, which are vital to Japan's economy. Their technique in the heavy industries is often much behind ours. Before the war Japan was already behind us in that regard and for virtually ten years she has been cut off; it may be that the particular delegation is intended to exchange information.

Colonel KEIGHLEY BELL: Reverting to the question of wages, to what extent do the wages paid in Japan level out with those paid in Britain? Do the workers in Japan have holidays with pay, which is a heavy overhead in this country? Are the hours of work the same in Japan, and do the employers have all those overheads which have to be met by firms here and which send up the price of our goods? My wife has a cigarette case of white metal, which before the war was given away with a packet of cigarettes. It is still a good-looking case. These cases were imported into this country from Japan at 4s. a dozen. There must be something to level up that sort of thing. Though we may sympathize with the Japanese and wish them to re-establish themselves, are we going to let their competition with us continue unrestricted, based as it is on factors with which we have to deal and they have not?

Mr. DUXBURY: It is true that the Japanese do not get as long holidays with pay as workers here, though they do, as I understood, have holidays with pay. It is true they work longer hours. Under the Labour Standards Law brought in by the Americans the hours of work are limited to forty-eight per week, but of course the Japanese work a shift system which we in this country will not allow, especially in industries where women are concerned, and there is no doubt that whatever you make of the standard

of wages and living of the Japanese worker, the labour cost is incredibly less than here. My own view would be that the labour cost is not perhaps as low as the wages suggest, in the first place because if, as in Japan, you have an ample supply of workers, if, for example, you need to do an extra bit of work which could be more easily done by ten workers than by five, you can easily bring in the extra five. In addition, the wages paid in Japan do not necessarily represent all that is paid out. There is the famous example of the Orni Spinning Company, where the workers live on the premises; they are maintained and provided with sleeping accommodation and with a certain amount of education in English, music, sewing and so on. So that there is a little addition to the wage on top of the labour cost. On the whole, I think there is no need to argue that the Japanese cost of production is vastly lower than our own—obviously it is. On the other hand, the argument that therefore one cannot allow anyone to buy their goods is a very risky one because our American friends are just as liable to turn round to us and say: "Your workers are getting only so much." Some countries have a lower wage rate than others. The most one can hope is that by international agreement, by gradually building up some kind of international give-and-take in these matters, it may be possible to enable all to live. Otherwise we shall have to give way to the Americans, who claim that they have the best, most prosperous and largest industries in the world.

Mr. ROBERTS: The lecturer emphasized the different standards of efficiency between the groups he observed in Japan. I wonder how it is that firms who are not efficient are able to compete.

Mr. DUXBURY: You mean how they compete with their own people? I can only think that there are some buffers, as in all trade operations. An efficient producer can sell me goods for export at a particular price; another less efficient sells me goods at a rather higher price, but in fact in the world markets—and this applies especially to Japan—I can get a price which is much better than even that which I pay the inefficient firm. All I need do is to take a little better profit on the cheaper goods and less on the slightly dearer goods, and my price in the world markets is still competitive. It is true, however, that many of the inefficient firms are being pushed out; where that is not happening they are carrying on, as many of our own firms here are doing. There are in this country companies operating at a profit industrially but which theoretically should be out of business; they are using machinery which is uneconomic, which in fact on a replacement value is not bringing any return, but they are managing for the time being. I have heard it said that a particular industry, or particular section of an industry, will soon be wiped out because it is so inefficient that Japan and other producers will cut it out of world markets and possibly out of the home market. That, however, takes time. Some such firms carry on for a little while. If a firm happens to go out of business, what is the result? You have seen that in Lancashire in recent years. When scrapping looms because new machinery is being put in, the firm has looms to sell. What can it get for them? With a loom worth only £5 it is still possible to make cloth. If a firm can get hold of machinery at such a low cost and in addition has cheap workers

or it can even make the working of the machine depend on a family unit, it is fairly easy then to potter along for many years.

MISS CARSON: Is there any possibility of steadying the increase of population in Japan?

MR. DUXBURY: The population increase has been due to the high birth-rate, but it has in recent years shifted from that to a falling death-rate, and that is typical of an industrially developed nation. The death-rate falls because the conditions of life are improved: diseases are reduced, accidents and so on reduced. But even so, in Japan the population will continue to increase for the next, possibly, twenty years. I like to think, in order to impress the fact upon myself, not that the Japanese will increase from 87 million to 100 million in the next few years, but that when my daughter, who is one year old, is taking her 11-plus examination there will be at least 15 million more Japanese in the world, and as far as we are concerned they will still be entitled to live.

THE CHAIRMAN: Mr. Duxbury has given us an astonishingly clear picture of a very difficult problem. Japan has to live, and what is also important is whether she is going to be able to live as a free nation or whether conditions will drive her under the Communist régime. We very much hope the first. I am sure you would all wish me to thank Mr. Duxbury very much indeed for an extremely clear talk. (Applause.)

Extracts from correspondence:

"The speaker made no reference to the question of China in relation to Japan, and, while I have no ready-made solution for Japan's problems, I am sure that they are inseparably bound up with those of China. As anyone who is familiar with Japan's meteoric rise to the position of a world power (in both the military and economic sense) knows, the chief reason why it was possible was that she had in China not only a store-house of many of the raw materials that she lacks, but also a vast and easily accessible market. As the result of backing the wrong horse in World War II she has lost both of these as well as much of her capital, all her colonies and all chance of being accepted as the leader of Asia. You may say that she can get her raw materials—especially the coking coal and iron ore on which her heavy industry depends—from other parts of the world, as she has to get oil and rubber; and that she can sell her exports to South-east Asia and Africa. This is true enough; but every hundred miles she has to go both to buy and to sell adds to her costs and wastes time, fuel and shipping space that could be put to better uses: what she really needs is the freest market in these areas *and* something like pre-war China.

"But there is more in it than this. China has long been held out as a wonderful market with her three or four or even six hundred million customers; but it has never come up to expectations, and the reason is, chiefly, that until the beginning of the nineteenth century China was self-sufficient, and even after that had ceased to be the case and all her economy had been upset by modern developments she failed to realize it and to reorganize herself accordingly. It is true that a great deal of trade has been done since the door was forced open a hundred years ago; but this was made possible only by the artificial system set up by the foreign, pre-

ponderantly British, mercantile community, which provided not only the machinery for collecting, distributing, processing, financing, insuring, etc., all goods, whether imports or exports, but also the security of extra-territoriality and the Concessions in which alone it could be carried on. Now this has all gone: this was primarily the consequence of the treaties of 1943, but the beginnings of a new system that were being worked out in the years immediately after the war were also swept away as soon as the Communists gained control, and we are back where we were 150 years ago. To British and most other merchants this does not matter very much because there is little that we must buy from China nowadays (compared with the tea and silk for which we were absolutely dependent on her then) and little prospect of being able to sell to her profitably because she has nothing to pay with. But to Japan it is a very different matter: she needs China, for the reasons given above, and there would appear little chance of Japan recovering economic stability until some solution of China's problems has been found.

“ALWYNE OGDEN.”

“Sir Alwyne Ogden is quite right: Japan's relations with China are linked inevitably with her economic problems, but as my lecture attempted to show the steady course of events rather than the basic causes of Japan's current problems, I left myself no time to deal with this complex question. For, as Sir Alwyne suggests, there is more to it than the simple choice between China and the more distant and more expensive markets and sources of supply. On the question whether Japan should trade with China, there can hardly be much argument, except by those who imagine that a great industrial country can be detached permanently from her geographic and natural economic environment. During the years of the occupation the Japanese yielded, though with increasing reluctance as the time approached to a restoration of sovereignty, to the Western view that the old ties with China had been dissolved for good, and that trade with the United States and other Western countries would be sufficient to make up for the loss. A few of the officials on the staff of the Supreme Commander, Allied Powers, were aware that the China problem was a serious obstacle to Japanese recovery and that American aid had so far masked this difficulty. But publicly, at least, there was a light-hearted optimism about the new economic ties with the United States, and this view was shared by some British officials. English merchants in Tokyo and elsewhere in the East, taking a more detached and experienced view, argued that trade with China was essential, and when I was in Japan in 1951 Japanese industrialists and traders were cautiously but firmly urging the need for raw materials from China to replace those obtained more dearly over the long haul from the United States, and for markets in China to supplement export earnings in more difficult markets. On my second visit, in the spring of 1954, I found that this need for China trade was not only acknowledged by both industry and Government departments, but had become accepted policy.

“Statistics prepared for me by the Research Section, Minister's Secretariat, Ministry of International Trade and Industry, showed that for major

raw materials China had been replaced by the United States as the important supplier during the post-war period, and that prices, as well as freight charges, were considerably higher. Estimates were made of the dollar savings possible if the embargo on trade with China were removed. These put total savings at \$312 m., or about 30 per cent. of Japan's total payments to the dollar area in 1953, and about 15 per cent. of her total foreign exchange payments in that year. Savings would include \$117 m. for coking coal, \$82 m. for iron ore, and \$45 m. for soya bean. These estimates may have been optimistic, but they were based on quantities presumed available from China, and are significant figures, even if grossly exaggerated. (See table below.)

"On the straight question whether Japan should trade with China there can be little doubt of the answer. The further question whether China is willing and able to trade to the extent required is more complicated. It is overlaid by the intriguing question suggested by Sir Alwyne—whether China is the wonderful market she seems, judged by her tremendous population. Under her new masters, China may have realized that as a modern nation she cannot be self-sufficient, and she may re-organize accordingly. Whether the Communist plans for development of industry will permit of trade with Japan in the kind of materials and goods suited to Japan's needs, and, granted this trade, for how long it could be maintained, are questions providing subject for long debate."

ESTIMATE OF DOLLARS SAVED IF EMBARGO WERE REMOVED

	<i>Peak Imports</i>		<i>Provisional Import Plan from Dollar Area, 1956</i>		<i>Switch to Imports from China and Sakhalin, 1956</i>	
	'000 Tons	Year	'000 Tons	\$'000	Available '000 Tons	Saving \$'000
Coking Coal ... ..	8,303	1941	3,900	117,000	5,000	117,000
Iron ore ... ..	3,728	1942	3,400	81,600	3,500	81,600
Salt ... ..	1,289	1941	700	14,000	900	14,000
Iron scrap ... ..	36	1942	200	11,400	50	2,500
Dolomite and magnesite	433.3	1941	0.3	30	400	30
Soya bean ... ..	648.8	1942	350	45,300	1,000	45,300
Bean cake ... ..	449.5	1942	250	20,000	500	20,000
Tung oil ... ..	1.16	1939	5	4,250	5	4,250
Timber ... ..	587.7	1934	26	2,400	200	2,400
Miscellaneous ... ..	216.4	1945	450	31,500	350	24,500
Total				327,480		311,580

Source: Research Section, Minister's Secretariat, Ministry of International Trade and Industry.

# DEVELOPMENTS IN KUWAIT

BY E. A. V. DE CANDOLE, C.M.G., C.B.E.

Report of a lecture delivered to the Society on Wednesday, November 3, 1954, Admiral Sir Cecil Harcourt, G.B.E., K.C.B., in the chair.

The CHAIRMAN: It is my pleasant duty to introduce Mr. de Candole, who has kindly come to lecture to us and illustrate his lecture with slides. He started his career in the Sudan Political Service and has had a great deal of experience in that Service and in other parts of Africa; but for the last two years he has been with the Kuwait Oil Company in charge of what he terms External Affairs, which I understand means a sort of Foreign Minister. It is from that point of view that Mr. de Candole is going to speak now on "Developments in Kuwait" since the oil company commenced operations. We await with interest what he has to tell us.

I SHALL be giving an exhibition of pictures of Kuwait accompanied by remarks based on what I saw at Kuwait during my various visits in the past two years and, in particular, during the summer of 1954, when I spent nearly three months in Kuwait.

Kuwait has a two-hundred-year-old connection with Great Britain, and this close association has been a prime factor not only in the remarkable rise of oil production but also in the great development programme which is being carried out by the Ruler, Sheikh Abdulla al Salem al Subah, whose portrait you see before you. He is a man of great vision and sincerity of purpose who is using the revenues from oil to develop his territory and eliminate ignorance, poverty and disease.

My talk deals very briefly with recent social developments in Kuwait, particularly in the field of education. I will also mention something in regard to the work being done by the company in connection with the training and welfare of young Kuwaitis in its employ.

First, a glimpse of old Kuwait and the nature of the country round it, for until the end of World War II Kuwait was an old-fashioned but thriving Arab town with an economy based upon its dhow trade, ship-building and pearling, with a desert hinterland sparsely inhabited by Beduin tribes. You see one of the town gates which probably a fair number of those present, having been to Kuwait, will remember; also the wall, five miles in length, which encircles the old town and was built as a defence against the Wahabis when they were active in the area. In another glimpse of the old town you see how the water was distributed in skins carried by donkeys before the modern developments took place. A view of the harbour when it was just the foreshore of the centre of the town, with old breakwaters to shelter the dhows which are seen even today, and they still make voyages right down the coast of East Africa as far as Zanzibar and to India. There are, of course, no longer the number there used to be, but Kuwait is still well known for its dhows, the building of which still goes on. A typical scene in Kuwait today is a falconer with his bird, the people still being fond of falconry and the Sheikhs and wealthy people having their own falconers.

When oil revenues started pouring into the coffers in a big way after 1946, the Ruler decided to convert the town into a modern city which would surpass any other in the Middle East. I now show the new lay-out of Kuwait, based upon the following plan which is gradually being carried out: the development of an efficient road system; the replanning of the central area to provide a spacious shopping and commercial centre with modern Government offices and public buildings; the expansion of the town outside the walls by the development of self-contained neighbourhood units; and finally the creation of industrial, educational and health zones at Shuwaikh outside the walls. The Sheikh has employed the best possible town-planning experts to advise him as to these developments.

An aerial view of Kuwait shows the good progress already made in redeveloping the town. Notice the widened main arterial road and large roundabout; there are a tremendous number of motor-cars; the Sheikh who deals with Public Works estimates that there are 30,000 cars in the town, which for a small radius is a very large number of vehicles to deal with. Traffic control has been instituted.

Another aerial view of Shuwaikh and the new port shows the development of the specialized industrial zone. This contains the new port, water distillation plant, main power station and vast stores depôts. It is connected with Kuwait by an impressive dual carriageway five miles in length. The new harbour has involved tremendous dredging operations which, unfortunately, have come up against a very tough reef, so that the harbour is not yet complete by any means, but when it is it will eventually provide sufficient alongside-quay space for large vessels to come right in. At present only small ships can get alongside. The development programme has brought about great shipping activity in the import of goods and materials.

The first time I met His Highness Sheikh Abdalla, the Ruler, I asked what he proposed to do with all the money coming in from oil. He replied that he was concentrating on two things—one, to provide fresh water, because in the past there had not been any at all in Kuwait, and that was the best benefit he could produce; secondly, on training of the young and the health and welfare of the general community. That seemed to me a good enough programme, and I must say the Ruler is pursuing it with tremendous energy and success.

There is no time to describe the public works projects, but these include the provision of sufficient electric power not only for all the needs of the town but also to serve outlying villages. Perhaps the most appreciated of all is the supply of fresh water by distillation to a population among whom fresh water has been in the past a rare commodity brought from afar. This will eventually be supplemented by the Shatt al-Arab project, of which the survey has recently been completed. The first stage of this is a 43-inch pipeline from the river at Basra to Kuwait to provide 25 million gallons per day. The final aim is 75 million gallons per day. About half the water will be for domestic needs; the other half for irrigation. There is also a longer-term project for a canal. At present there is virtually no cultivation in Kuwait; it is desert and a desert which maintains very small numbers of livestock because the rainfall is scanty and uncertain and the coast is saline. The Shatt al-Arab pipeline will permit a large area of land not far



from Kuwait to be developed and cultivated by irrigation. This is a very significant project and I am sure will be the real answer to the future of Kuwait.

The need for modern housing to accommodate the vastly increased population has not been overlooked, and a comprehensive plan has been prepared by town-planning experts which provides for eight self-contained housing estates outside the town, complete with light industries, shopping centres, mosques, schools and playgrounds. This by itself is a wonderful project far in advance of anything elsewhere in the Middle East.

Now for education, which comes second on the Ruler's programme. There is a new secondary school at Kuwait, just outside in the educational zone. This is the finest group of buildings erected as a result of the development programme. During my stay in Kuwait in the summer of 1954 I was able to see something of the wonderful new schools being built there. They are quite fabulous in the spaciousness and light of their design, the beauty of their construction and the lavishness of their equipment; in fact, they provide everything the educationist could desire. The new secondary school is foremost in the educational programme. It opened this year.

This great college is a magnificently conceived project on the most up-to-date and lavish lines—classroom blocks and laboratories, gymnasium, mosque, library and assembly hall, clinic, boarding houses, very pleasant bungalows for the teachers, swimming pool and playing fields. Its ultimate future has still to be decided, but it is well fitted to become the University of the Persian Gulf, attracting students from other lands. It already welcomes students from as far afield as Morocco and Algiers as well as Persian Gulf Sheikhdoms.

A few words in regard to education in general, as that was one of the developments of which I was able to see most, thanks to the energetic Director of Education, who put everything at my disposal and enabled me to visit the new schools. I was most impressed by them. Really remarkable progress has been achieved in education during the last few years under the enthusiastic direction of the Ruler and the Director of Education, Aziz Hussein.

In 1938 there were only four boys' schools with 600 pupils and 25 teachers and one girls' school with 140 girls and five teachers. Today there are 26 boys' schools catering for 8,642 boys with 509 teachers, and 13 girls' schools with 4,182 girls and 220 teachers. Six hundred of these teachers are foreigners, mainly Palestinians and Egyptians, as there has not yet been time to train Kuwaitis. The Palestinians are refugees who had to leave when Israel took over, and Kuwait is making a contribution to the refugee problem by employing Palestinians as teachers and in other capacities.

The educational system, based on the Egyptian Government system, is in three stages, each with separate schools :

1. Kindergarten stage.
2. Primary stage.
3. Secondary stage.

The kindergarten and primary schools are day schools and the secondary school is boarding. Midday meals are provided for all pupils, and the central kitchen when complete will provide 14,000 meals served by special vans to schools all over Kuwait. The meals are prepared in a central canteen set up under the advice of an experienced and well-known English firm. The meals are served in spacious dining-rooms on the cafeteria system in a very practical and hygienic way as well as being most enjoyable for the children. In addition to meals, clothes are provided for the children to wear at school. Secondary school boys wear European clothes, as these pictures show.

These pictures show a biology class at work in the old school and a handicraft class in a primary school. The new Technical College is not complete; it is hoped that it will be opened at the end of 1954 or early in 1955. On this the Sheikh has very sound views. He realizes the danger of concentrating entirely upon academic education and training up a large number of young men for "white-collar" occupations—men who will eventually be discontented because there will not be enough jobs for them. Hence the Ruler is going in for technical education in a big way. The Technical College will begin with 500 boys, but ultimately the number will be increased. In my view one of the most important needs is to train the young in skilled occupations, and one hopes there will be concentration on that rather than on producing a number of clerks.

It is in the educational sphere that the Ruler sensibly considers that Kuwait can be of most assistance to less fortunate Islamic countries. Kuwait State has built and maintains Arabic schools in Bombay and Karachi. It has also sent teachers to Sharja on the Persian Gulf. It has welcomed 30 students from other Arab countries, including Algiers, Morocco and Gulf Sheikhdoms.

All this means a tremendous expenditure. The education budget for 1953-54 will run into £3 million, leaving aside the capital cost of new schools.

There is no time to describe the medical projects. Kuwait already has a good hospital and mobile clinics and a new hospital, a T.B. sanatorium, a picture of which I show, and a network of rural clinics is included in the new projects. You will all, I think, agree that much credit is due to the Ruler for his wide and generous vision and concern for the welfare of his people.

We leave Kuwait and the State developments and go to the Kuwait Oil Company. I show aerial views of Ahmadi and the jetty and a typical gathering centre. The company's headquarters are at Ahmadi, 22 miles from Kuwait, and you see the residential and industrial areas coming along well; also the type of house provided for Indians, Pakistanis, Kuwaitis and other Arabs. There is a large Arab residential area, a self-contained village which the company is building at Ahmadi, which will provide eventually for a population of about 10,000, including the families and dependants of the company's Arab employees. There are usually four or six houses in a block, all furnished and equipped with electricity, water and gas. Each family house has the walled compound demanded by Arab custom. Already there are about 200 Arab families living in company

houses at Ahmadi, and about 2,000 bachelors. A mosque has been built by the company and a clinic and schools also in the Arab village. In fact, the company has concentrated on providing the best possible working and living conditions for its employees.

Now I come to the last point with which I am dealing today, and as illustration of it I show you the Industrial Training Centre. When the company commenced operations in a big way it was realized that there were no artisans in the area; they had to be imported, mainly Indians, Pakistanis and a certain number of Arabs. The company, however, quickly started its own training establishment for the training of local Kuwaiti youths. This Training Centre at Magwa deals with about 250 Kuwaiti boys each year who are taught skilled trades. These young Kuwaiti Beduins mostly come from the desert and many still have their long hair in Beduin fashion. They start in a basic class where they learn to handle tools and learn the names of the tools; also they are acclimatized to the workshop atmosphere. Having completed the basic course they are drafted into a trade course, according to their aptitude. The trade courses carry them on for about two years, until they are able to take on jobs in the company; many of them, in fact, go down to Kuwait, where they find extremely well-paid jobs.

The courses at present being taught include carpentry, painting, electrical installation and maintenance, plumbing and pipe-fitting, diesel and vehicle fitting, machine operating, welding, sheet metal working, mobile plant operating and motor transport driving. The trainees are under no compulsion to remain in the company when their training is completed. During training they learn, of course, to deal with blueprints; most of them have to be taught to read and write. Instruction is carried on mainly in Arabic, but English words are used for the technical terms, which seems to me very sensible.

This Industrial Training Centre is making an important contribution to the economy of the State, in that it is not only training employees for the company but at least half the boys trained here go down to work in the town. In this way a class of trained artisans is growing up which will be of immense value to the State and enable it to dispense with importing artisans from abroad; in fact, there will ultimately be a cadre of skilled artisans who will form a most valuable element in the development of their country. Boys trained on the actual jobs go into the workshops and are employed in all possible departments of the company. The number of Kuwaitis going into higher positions in the company is ever on the increase.

In conclusion, I want to add a word or two as to the way in which the country is developing, apart from what you have seen on the screen. A tremendous change is taking place in Kuwait which is bound to affect the people there, and particularly the system of Government, which is patriarchal; that is to say, the Ruler is the head of his Government; he appoints all the Government officials and directs what shall be done with all the revenue which comes in, which is very great in proportion to the size of the territory. That is a very good system on which to run a small and compact territory such as Kuwait, but with the spread of education and modern ideas there will be a demand for changes and the Ruler will

have that problem to cope with. It has not arisen in any big way so far because the effect of all the education is still ahead. The new Secondary School opened only in 1954, and the brainier boys who complete the secondary course are sent abroad for higher education. There are 182 Kuwaitis at present undergoing higher education abroad, of whom 121 are at Egyptian universities and 42 in England. Many of these young men will be employed in the Government.

Probably some here who have been to Kuwait and others who have not would like to hear a little in regard to the political atmosphere there. All that I can say is that it is good. There is a friendly relation with the British, based on long association and the very fine work which has been done in the Persian Gulf by the British representatives from the Indian Political Service or the Indian Army in the old days. There are very happy relations with the Sheikhs. It was a new area to me, but I was most impressed by that fact.

The task is not only to maintain that happy relationship but also to help the Sheikhs to cope with the trend which events are going to take in that part of the world. We have a big responsibility there because though independent they are all in the wider sense under British protection. Like all Arabs they are intensely proud and sensitive about any implied restraint on their liberty. It is necessary to deal with them on a basis of equal partnerships and extreme tact is necessary. There is, I am sure, a big field for British co-operation with the Sheikdoms not only in the sphere of Government but also in developments such as I have illustrated today. Very fine work is being done by British contractors in Kuwait, and one hopes that will continue and that schemes like that of the Shatt-al-Arab will be carried out by British enterprise.

If permanent co-operation is to be achieved it is essential that foreign enterprise shall associate with local enterprise on a basis of equal partnership. Foreign companies must integrate themselves into the life of the community in which they operate. Western staff must study the language, ideas and customs of the people among whom they live and work. They must shed all attitude of racial, social or cultural superiority and, above all, get to understand the other fellow's point of view. They must link their fortunes with those of the local people serving a common aim with an identity of purpose. Thus only can a permanent association be maintained.

Mr. LANGE: Kuwait has always been since ancient times one of the important points for the pearl industry in the Persian Gulf. I have recently read that pearl divers are no longer interested in this ancient trade but are turning over to the oil industry, because they say they can earn better pay. Could the lecturer say whether that is actually the case?

Mr. DE CANDOLE: That is certainly the case. I was interested in pearling, having read a good deal about it. This summer when in Kuwait, knowing the pearling season was about to open, I made contact with some of the old dhow captains, the old sailors who used to sail out to the pearling banks, as some still do. They told me that there is practically no pearling now because anybody can get a good job without having to risk his life in

pearling. I do not think half a dozen of the small boats went out this year to the pearl banks which lie further south from Kuwait. Regrettable, but it is part of the change taking place there. The old crafts and association with the sea are gradually declining and not only the oil industry but all that comes from the money which flows from the industry is taking the major place.

Mr. WHITTERON: Apart from the natural growth of population an increase must have resulted from the very large influx because of the various developments taking place. Can the lecturer indicate what has been the change of population and whether that has had a substantial effect on the import of materials, seeing that so little is produced in the area?

Mr. DE CANDOLE: Obviously the population has greatly increased since 1946 when oil started to flow. Figures are always misleading because in any Arab country there is no census and owing to local feeling in that regard it is not possible to take a census. I had seen a figure of about 50,000 to 60,000 Kuwaitis pre-war. The estimates I was given for last year gave a population of 200,000 or more. From what I was able to see I should estimate something under 200,000 would be more accurate, but certainly something in that neighbourhood. A tremendous proportion of the increase includes those who have been attracted by these large schemes—Arabs from other parts of the Persian Gulf, from Iraq and neighbouring countries; a good many Persians also.

In regard to materials, had the questioner in mind the cost of living or supplies being adequate?

Mr. WHITTERON: I was thinking of supplies and a probable increase in the cost of living.

Mr. DE CANDOLE: Food supplies seem to be quite adequate. Sea trade is considerable; most of the food comes in by sea. From Australia, wheat, flour and so on. There does not seem to be any particular shortage. The cost of living seems higher than in some other Arab countries I have known, but not all that much higher. I would not say it is exaggerated out of all normal proportion.

Lord BIRDWOOD: In the past I believe the pipeline of fresh water for Kuwait from the Shatt al-Arab was held up because of difficulties with Iraq. What are the present relations?

Mr. DE CANDOLE: Present relations appear to be satisfactory on that particular issue, because I was told that an agreement had been achieved in principle with the Iraq Government for the pipeline. As far as I know there has been no snag since then.

Mr. LAW: Can the lecturer tell us whether the old indigenous method of building dhows is still indulged in or whether that is all mechanized now?

Mr. DE CANDOLE: The old methods are employed as far as I know in boat-building. Wandering along the shore at Kuwait one sees them building the dhows in the old fashion. The Sheikh and some of his relations are very keen sailors; keen on the sea. The latest boat which the Sheikh is having built he insists should be built at Kuwait by the local boat-builders in old dhow fashion; then he expects it to be equipped with the most modern and powerful engine so as to do about 35 knots.

Brigadier S. H. LONGRIGG: The relations between Kuwait and Iraq have been touched on. In 1938 King Ghazi had a private transmitting station in his palace in Baghdad and repeatedly demanded Kuwait itself as an integral part of Iraq. It was rather a strange method of conducting national propaganda, but the demand has persisted and today it is commonplace among Iraqi extremists that Kuwait, in fact, belongs to Iraq because in Turkish times it was an outlying and semi-detached nominal part of the country. There is also a point, not raised by the lecturer, in connection with Kuwait's old resources; besides its position as an entrepôt it really lived by smuggling into Iraq. This was a widespread and serious industry, and attracted a good deal of enterprise among the Kuwaitis very much more profitable than any other activity throughout the 1930s and before. It was carried on very vigorously and there were repeated clashes between the armed forces of the two countries, relations being as bad as could be; the British with some difficulty held them apart. I wonder whether the lecturer would comment on the smuggling trade, which is actually a very serious trade and a somewhat provocative type of enterprise? Would he tell us whether it still persists and whether it still has its bad effects?

Mr. DE CANDOLE: Brigadier Longrigg's knowledge of this question is so much greater than mine that I do not feel qualified to add to what he has said. It is most interesting because although I knew that in the past Kuwait's prosperity owed a good deal to the skill with which the Kuwaitis managed to induce traders to by-pass the Turkish Customs House at Basra, I had not realized that that had gone on in such comparatively recent times. It helps to explain the prosperity of Kuwait before oil came along. It was far more prosperous than people usually imagined it to be. They looked upon Kuwait as a miserable huddle of squalid houses before oil came, and that then it was suddenly transformed into a magnificent town. I gather from what the Sheikh and others have told me that it was always a very prosperous little town, but the Kuwaitis were not very informative about the question of smuggling. Probably it has now ceased.

Mr. HAMILTON: What, sir, is the revenue from oil, approximately, in Kuwait compared to Iraq?

Mr. DE CANDOLE: If the speaker has in mind the amount of money the Sheikh receives as his share under the 50-50 agreement, I am not acquainted with the exact figure. I believe in 1953 it was somewhere in the region of £50 to £60 million. The Iraq figure from oil may be round about the same. I do not think it is far behind, because Kuwait, Iraq and Saudi Arabia all run fairly closely in oil production and they are all run on similar agreements, which means their revenue from oil should be fairly even. I do not know the figures for Iraq.

Mr. TRIMMER: In the relatively near future it is conceivable that the revenue of £60 million may rise to £80 million or £90 million a year. With the completion of the social development schemes about which we have been hearing, have the Kuwaitis thought of agricultural development, or even of the export of capital to other areas?

Mr. DE CANDOLE: The industrial and agricultural development has been given a tremendous amount of attention. It is a difficult problem because the country has no natural resources other than oil. It has no tradition of

manufacture or anything of that nature, like most Arab places. It is difficult to build up any industrial economy, but various projects are under consideration for making prefabricated materials, perhaps cement, bricks and so on, though personally I do not see very much future for that activity. It seems, as Brigadier Longrigg said, that Kuwait in the past has been an entrepôt for trading and that it will be the same in the future, apart from the oil. There is its position in the pearling industry also. It is a very good port, well situated. I think that will be Kuwait's future rather than industrial. Agriculture, again, from what I saw does not look very promising, although the Shatt al-Arab scheme will provide an opportunity to get cultivation in a big way.

As regards exporting capital, I assume that the speaker was referring to investment. It is well known that the Sheikh has assigned a part of the large oil revenue for investment in Great Britain. As far as I know that is still proceeding. It might be something like 30 per cent. of a year's revenue from oil; another 30 per cent. might go to development and the rest for current expenditure. As far as I know, that is the only investment that has yet been decided on. There are a number of people who would like the Sheikh to invest money; I think he is being very careful.

PROFESSOR TRITTON: Popular report says that a good deal of money has been invested by Kuwait in the United States. What does Mr. de Candole say about that?

MR. DE CANDOLE: I do not know the details of the Sheikh's investments; in view of the fact that he has very good connection with the United States as well as with Britain—after all, the company which is operating his oil is an Anglo-American company—he may feel it good not to have all the eggs in one basket.

Asked by a lady MEMBER whether the Arab refugees received any help from the Government,

MR. DE CANDOLE replied: The Sheikh has given large sums of money to many deserving causes in the Middle East, but in the case of his contribution towards the general question of Arab refugees he is being very cautious, because all the Arab countries have a policy in this regard and he cannot get out of step with the rest of them. That is very well known. It is a large question which there is no time to deal with today. There has been a useful contribution in the employment that Kuwait has offered to a very large number of refugees. There are a large number of Palestinians employed in the Government and in business and other employment available; they are encouraged to come to Kuwait and given every facility and paid good wages when employed. I regard that as a very good contribution to the Arab refugee problem.

THE CHAIRMAN: Our time is up. We have listened to an extremely interesting lecture, followed by very helpful questions. It remains for me, on your behalf, to thank Mr. de Candole very much indeed for coming and talking to us and showing us the slides.

The vote of thanks was carried with acclamation and the meeting concluded.

# WAZIRISTAN

By DR. A. D. ILIFF, O.B.E.

Lecture delivered to the Royal Central Asian Society on October 13, 1954, Admiral Sir Cecil Harcourt, G.B.E., K.C.B., in the chair.

The CHAIRMAN: Dr. Iliff, who has kindly come this afternoon to lecture to us, has spent twenty years in or near Waziristan as a medical missionary, and is now working in the Church Missionary Society's hospital at Bannu on the N.W. Frontier of Pakistan. It is a great pleasure to introduce to you and, at the same time, to welcome Dr. Iliff.

**T**O those of you who know nothing about Waziristan, I am hoping that this short talk and film will prove, if not instructive at least interesting. Those of you who are already acquainted with the N.W. Frontier will, I am sure, be glad to refresh your memories of a part of the world which has a strange fascination of its own. I have met but few officers who have not been sorry to leave it. Some still regard the rather tough years they spent on the Afghan border as amongst the best of their lives.

Waziristan is that barren, mountainous strip of so-called tribal area, roughly 5,000 square miles in area (say a third the size of Switzerland), sandwiched between the N.W.F. Province of Pakistan on the east and Afghanistan on the west. My introduction to it was a somewhat dramatic one, fitting in with the character of the country. At the time I was in charge of a mission hospital in the settled district of the Province. One very hot summer night I had gone to bed on the roof of my bungalow when, at about midnight, I was given an urgent message from the South Waziristan Scouts, part of the Frontier Corps who police the tribal areas of the Frontier. Two of their sepoy had been wounded that day in an engagement with hostile tribesmen. Their surgeon was away on leave and no other was available. Could I come and see what I could do for them?

With a car and driver borrowed from a friendly Deputy Commissioner, for my own car was not too reliable, I was soon on my way to Scouts' headquarters, 70 miles away up in the mountains. Not driving myself, I was able to relax and appreciate the beauty of the scene. In the bright moonlight which made headlights quite unnecessary, the occasional mud-walled villages we passed at intervals, drab enough in daylight, now looked mysterious and attractive. Every now and then we sped past great heaps of melons on both sides of the road, awaiting the lorries to transport them to the markets of India. Away over to the south I could just distinguish that massive range of mountains rising to over 11,000 feet and known as the Takht Suleiman, or Solomon's Throne.

After some 40 miles we found our way barred by the gates of a frontier town. The inhabitants had long since bedded down for the night—indeed, so sound asleep were they all that we could get no reply from the sentries. To lose no further time, therefore, we cut straight across country, following the line of the floodlit perimeter barbed wire, until we reached



the road once more at the other side. A few minutes' further travelling and we picked up two armoured lorries, with their escort of Scouts, awaiting us by the road. We had now entered Waziristan, that strange tribal area where law, as it is known in the settled districts and elsewhere, is unknown, revenue and taxes are non-existent, there are no police as such, and only tribal law runs, a law which allows a man to commit murder in a blood feud, the only condition being that it must not take place on or near a Government road.

We were now nearing the end of our journey. For a few miles we travelled through the mountain pass, where the road climbs steeply up the side of a precipitous river bank, to drop almost as steeply down again the other side. And then suddenly we were entering the large headquarters fort. As we passed through the great armoured gates I could not help noticing the shadowy figures of quite a large number of armed sepoy covering our entry; a very necessary precaution. Not so many years ago some hostile tribesmen by a ruse persuaded a small frontier fort to open its gates after dark and then rushed in and stormed the place. These forts in Waziristan are manned by Pathan or Pushtu-speaking Government troops of the Frontier Corps, recruited from all over the N.W. Frontier, with a very fine tradition of their own. They exercise a loose sort of control over the local tribesmen, dealing as necessary with outlaws who have a nuisance value, and restraining the wilder Mahsud and Wazir tribesmen from troubling the villages of the adjacent settled districts. For raiding the rich, fertile villages of the Indus plains used to be quite a profitable business. Of necessity this leads to occasional action against them, and it was such an action which had provided me with my two Pathan soldier patients that night.

I found them in the small, well-equipped hospital within the fort. Both had bullet wounds in the abdomen, but whereas one consented to immediate operation, his only hope of survival, the other refused. "If it was his fate or Kismet to die," he said, "then no operation could alter it. If it was his Kismet to live, then no operation was necessary!" And no persuasion by me or by his friend could change his mind. He died, but his companion, by a miracle, lived. It was a difficult task, for I was a very inexperienced surgeon, not long out from home. I claim no credit for his recovery, for by all the canons of surgery he should have died. Yet over and over again I have been amazed at the extraordinary way these Pathan people of the frontier can survive injuries which would soon be fatal to you and to me. He had a will to live and did so, with a perseverance and cheerfulness that were good to see.

I have found these same qualities amongst the Mahsud inhabitants of Waziristan, who hold the greater part of the southern *bloc* of mountains in this tribal area, the rest being occupied by the Wazirs. These two originated from the same stock and are really closely related, though the Mahsud does not like to remember this fact. I do not blame him, for he is in my opinion definitely the better man of the two, the Wazir being particularly treacherous and untrustworthy.

Maybe I am biased when I say this, for, after this introduction of mine to Waziristan I soon got to know the Mahsuds well. During the war I

served in the I.M.S. as Agency Surgeon for this southern half of Waziristan and was responsible not only for the medical and surgical care of the three or four thousand men of the Scouts, but also for that of the civil population. This double job led to some queer situations at times. Our civil hospitals in Waziristan, in contrast to those in the Scout posts, were not too good. With the consent of the O.C. Scouts (freely given, provided my patient was not an active hostile, capable of treachery) I used to admit urgent cases amongst the Mahsud tribesmen into the Scouts' hospitals within the forts. One day an inspecting General came round unexpectedly and made a round of the headquarters hospital. All went well until he came to a surgical ward full of patients, each of whom had his bedsheet pulled up to his eyes. To find a surgical ward so full of patients, without a previous battle to account for it, was most unusual, and it was not long before the General had pulled back one of the sheets, thereby revealing not the clean-shaven face of a Scout sepoy he was expecting but the luxuriant black beard of a Mahsud tribesman. I had put all my overflow cataract patients from the civil hospital outside the fort into the better equipped Scout hospital within. However, the General took it well and decided to turn a blind eye to it. The only objection came from the Afridi subedar-major of the corps, who hated all Mahsuds and considered that the only good Mahsud was a dead one.

Then again, one day I happened to be out on patrol with a mounted party of Scouts when they were ambushed by a large force of hostile Mahsuds. It was a good opportunity to see these famed Frontier troops in action and they acquitted themselves well, under the leadership of a Pathan officer who has since risen to an important political post in his own State of Pakistan. Afterwards, as I was tending the wounded of both sides, both Scouts and Mahsud tribesmen, an English officer arrived on the scene and suddenly remarked: "You know, Doc, I often wonder whose side you are really on!" The answer was, of course, neither . . . or both!

But it was not so much in our hospitals that I really got to know the tribesmen, but out in their homes amongst these mountains of Waziristan. Seeing that country from the few, winding, at times precipitous roads which traverse it, there appears to be little life within it. Yet tucked away amongst those barren hills are pleasant fertile valleys watered by mountain streams. The tribes make the most of any land available. Wherever water is to be found, every inch of suitable ground is cultivated. Yet they have to contend not only with drought, intense cold and heavy hailstorms, but also with spates when, after a storm over the mountains, a great wall of water comes roaring down a hitherto dry river bed, sweeping away in a few moments the work of many months. Irrigation, too, is difficult in that shaly soil. Apart from agriculture, their livelihood comes from their flocks and herds, and their trade in timber, fuel, skins and clarified butter. Indeed, their trade in timber has had to be restricted to what they can bring down to the bazaars of the plains on camels. No timber is allowed to be transported in lorries, for indiscriminate felling of trees has led to deforestation on an immense scale, with subsequent erosion of the soil and diminution of rainfall.

These Mahsuds of Waziristan, famed, as a British Brigadier put it, as

“potentially the finest fighting men in Asia, with unsurpassed powers of endurance,” are of excellent physique. Intelligent and cheerful, they possess a sense of humour much like ours. A tribal patient in our mission hospital, recovering from wounds received in a blood feud, called the doctor over to him one day and asked him for some cartridges. He said that when he left hospital he wanted to have his revenge on his cousin who had done him these injuries, but had no ammunition left. The doctor said he could not help him in this matter and added: “Think of the time and trouble we have spent on getting you well these many weeks, and now I suppose we shall soon be seeing your cousin in here and have to spend all that time and trouble on him, too.” “There’s no fear of that, sahib,” replied the young man. “I am a far better shot than he is.”

As a doctor I fortunately have an entry to their homes and villages denied to others. At intervals, epidemics of disease break out, which give me my opportunities to go right into the heart of their country. A young Mahsud, enlisted in the army and stationed in the Punjab, hundreds of miles away, died of cholera. According to their custom, his relatives demanded his body for burial. This was therefore packed in ice and sent all the way to Waziristan on a lorry. All might have gone well had not his mother insisted on kissing the corpse of her son. An epidemic of cholera soon broke out and the Mahsuds, who are now sufficiently enlightened to appreciate prophylactic medicine, begged me to visit their villages to give cholera inoculations to all and sundry. This, and spasmodic outbreaks of smallpox, gave me many opportunities of visiting their homes and, in particular, their capital. Built on the side of a hill, it is a strange town of some 5,000 inhabitants. The main street through the middle frequently tunnels under the floors of the houses above, and in the bazaar can be seen the shops of those who make daggers and rifles, the latter being exact copies of British service rifles, though liable to burst after a few rounds. Incidentally, a British rifle now fetches Rs.1,000 (approximately £100) . . . the price of a good wife!

Wherever I go in Waziristan I am always impressed by the loyalty and kindness of the tribesmen themselves. Their hospitality is proverbial and sometimes embarrassing in its generosity. Even when I spent a night in a cave amongst the people of one of the poorest and most primitive of their tribes, during a vaccination “sortie,” they looked after me excellently. They gave me of their best for a meal and provided me with a comfortable bed and clean bedding, quite free from the creatures one is led to expect on such occasions.

During the seven years following the Partition of India and creation of the State of Pakistan, Waziristan has changed a good deal. To begin with there was a good deal of propaganda amongst the tribes for a separate State of Pukhtunistan, or a “land of Pathans.” But in Waziristan, at any rate, this propaganda had little effect. A few tribal leaders, it is true, seeing a chance of getting rich without much trouble, put up strange flags over their tribal towers. But the movement soon petered out and gained but few adherents among the Mahsuds. The Faqir of Ipi, the chief protagonist of this movement, is now a sick, ailing old man, a sufferer from chronic asthma, and has lost whatever influence he once possessed.

The tribesmen are content to stay under the flag of Pakistan, the largest Islamic State in the world. Qaid-e-Azam Mohd. Jinnah, the founder of this State, was wise enough to promise them that their allowances, given for the maintenance of peace and friendly relationships with Government, would remain unchanged. These allowances are not bribes. They are distributed among the leading men of the tribes in return for their co-operation and confer a certain status upon the recipients. Meanwhile many new schools for boys have been opened to meet the constant demand of the tribes for education, and this year the first girls' school has been opened in the Mahsud capital. This is a great advance, for girls are not much thought of in Waziristan and are regarded as existing simply to serve the needs of the men. When my first child was born, many of my Mahsud friends expressed their condolences with me that it was a girl; on the birth of my second, a boy, they not only called to congratulate me, but also demanded much entertainment at my expense! The very names these tribesfolk give to their children often express their longing for a boy rather than for a girl, for the girl's name "Bas bibi," meaning in short "No more girls, please," is a common enough one in their country.

Some of the old Scout forts have been evacuated by the Frontier Corps and are now loosely held by tribal levies. It is sad to see the gradual dissolution of those lovely gardens and orchards, for which these posts were famous, but it is inevitable, for with the garrisons went the pumps which supplied them with water. All regular troops have long since been withdrawn. Razmak, a big military garrison in North Waziristan, once dubbed as the largest monastery in the world, owing to the absolute bar to the entry of women into tribal territory, is now empty but for local Wazir levies, known as khassadars, who act as caretakers. Wana, too, is empty of regular troops, but this fortified camp near the Afghan border has been taken over by the Scouts as their summer headquarters. The officers' mess is as attractive and hospitable as it ever used to be, and the Pakistani officers of the Corps are maintaining those fine traditions for which the Scouts are well known. I have many friends amongst them and find they are ever ready to give me a helping hand when I need it.

In Wana both men and officers are now allowed to have their families with them. Here, too, we run a mission hospital for a few weeks every summer. I am now the only Englishman left in Waziristan, yet I find myself able to move about more freely than I did in the old days. The country is quieter and incidents are few, although armoured lorries are still used and escorts are provided for the stranger.

I have said little about the economic development of Waziristan, the great irrigation project the Pakistan Government is now carrying through, and the mineral resources of this area which are shortly to be surveyed. There is coal there, for instance. One political officer I knew used to use it for domestic purposes, and though it seemed a bit smoky to me, yet it may well prove worth while to mine it on a big scale. There is also iron and other materials which, if found workable, may well change the whole character of Waziristan in but a few years.

But I have approached my subject from the more personal point of view of a doctor who has had the privilege of working amongst these

attractive people for so many years. As such I cannot leave out any mention of the blood feud, for although it is slowly decreasing in incidence as the tribespeople become educated and see the futility of it all, is it nevertheless still there. Many of these feuds, arising perhaps out of a dispute over land or even from an insult, have now been going on for so long that their original cause is forgotten. It is because of the blood feud that homes are fortresses in Waziristan, every man and boy over 12 goes about armed with rifle and dagger, and many of the Mahsud boys attending our mission school have lost their fathers. It was a feud, too, which lay behind the strange request of a boy of 15 or so, who one day asked me for some chloroform. When I asked him why he wanted it, he replied that he had an enemy he wanted to get rid of, had heard that chloroform kills quickly, silently, and leaves no traces, and thought it was just the stuff he needed! Nowadays the tribesmen are using more modern weapons in their feuds—grenades, Sten guns, and on one occasion recently, vouched for by two of our schoolboys, even a bazooka!

The blood feud is still the curse of Waziristan and affects the lives of all its inhabitants. In their hills they live under its shadow at all times; almost every family is affected. Yet in hospital and school that shadow is lifted for a time. There seems to be a mutual truce in those two places, so far unbroken.

Two tribal patients were admitted to our Bannu mission hospital on the Waziristan border, each wounded in the same feud, yet from opposing sides. One had a dangerous head wound; the other a simple graze. It was not long before the latter was holding the head of his former enemy for the daily dressing to be done, and it was remarkable to see the gentleness with which he did it.

In our mission school nearby is a hostel for Mahsud youngsters from Waziristan. In my spare time from hospital I act as their Warden. I have often noticed that boys who are at deadly enmity with each other up in Waziristan soon become the greatest of friends at school. Up there, family honour demands that one should do his best to kill the other. Down at school they are learning a better way of life, in which "to love one's enemy" takes on a new meaning.

It's because the blood feud plays such a large part in the lives of these simple, primitive people of Waziristan that it has been taken as the background of this film I am now going to show you. It took three months to make and a good deal of it is filmed in rather inaccessible parts of Waziristan. Without the unstinted help of my Mahsud friends it could never have been completed. The two professionals who filmed it did a good job and the film had the unusual honour of being shown at the Edinburgh Festival.

Those taking part are just ordinary people with no experience of acting for films, but I think you will agree with me that the Mahsud youngster who plays the chief part gives a remarkable performance. His success has not spoilt him in any way. He is to be my senior prefect next term and the other day wrote me a typical schoolboy letter, in which he asked me to bring out a Parker pen for him when I return next month. Like any extravagant Pathan, he reckons little of the cost!

So now to the film. If it begins slowly, remember that this is but typical of life out there in Waziristan; it is only at times that the pace becomes hot and tragedy steps in. That seeming tragedy can be turned into something really worth while. The fact that these attractive people are no longer under a British administration surely absolves none of us from doing all we can to lead them into a fuller, happier and more satisfying way of life. The challenge of this film is just this: to what extent are we really co-operating to this end?

Then followed the Church Missionary Society's sound film, "Frontier Interlude," a tragic story of a blood feud on the N.W. Frontier which emphasized not only the futility of it all, but also the present vital impact of the mission hospital, school and church on the lives of these people and the hope for a new life in the future.

The CHAIRMAN: Although our time here is really up, I feel we should take a few more minutes, because Dr. Iliff has kindly said he will answer any questions.

Sir RUPERT HAY: Could Dr. Iliff say whether there is still anything in the nature of a pro-Afghan party amongst the Mahsuds and Wazirs? Also whether there is still any dispute between them over the boundary in the vicinity of Miram Shah?

Dr. ILIFF: There is still a pro-Afghan party, although it has lost most of its influence in Waziristan, especially as the Faqir of Ipi himself is now taking so little part in the affairs of the area. Hence the influence of the party is negligible. In reply to the second question, the Mahsuds have wrested a good deal of land from the Wazirs and still want to take more. Only a few months ago they sought to collect funds for that purpose. Razmak is next on the programme, but whether that programme will be kept to I cannot say.

Colonel DUNCAN: Have the Mahsuds any particular leader? How do they work?

Dr. ILIFF: Through the chiefs of the tribe; there is no particular leader, though one man is the hereditary chief of the tribe. Incidentally, his grandson has just come to the mission school, and I feel I am getting old when I see sons of my former Old Boys coming to the school. Most tribesmen in Waziristan are a law unto themselves. The chiefs in their *Jirga*, their own tribal council, arrange these matters and the ordinary man in the street says the money has gone into the chiefs' pockets. Where it has really gone nobody seems to know.

Colonel HAMILTON: (Referring to the film story.) Did not the law of the road itself protect the man who had been wounded and returned home from hospital and then was shot and killed on his way back?

Dr. ILIFF: On the road itself you are not supposed to murder your enemy—neither on the road nor 30 yards from it. Indeed, there was a subedar in the Frontier Corps who built a trench between his home and the main road so that when going on leave he could get to his house without being shot at; he crawled along the tunnel.

Colonel ORLEBAR : Is there any Communism among the tribes?

Dr. ILIFF : None at all. During the war, when there was a possibility of intervention by Russia against the British, I asked the Mahsuds which side they would be on in that event. They replied : " We will, of course, be on your side. You are the people of the Book " (they respect the Bible) " and we would never think of taking sides with a Godless country."

The CHAIRMAN : It now only remains for me, on your behalf, to thank Dr. Iliff for a most interesting talk and a most dramatic and extremely fascinating film. Both have given us a great deal of food for thought. We thank you very much indeed, Dr. Iliff. (*Applause.*)

## NOTICE

### SURVEY OF CURRENT RESEARCH ON THE MIDDLE EAST

THE Middle East Institute, a private organization in Washington, D.C., is preparing for publication an annual Survey of Current Research on the Middle East. The purpose of this Survey is to provide scholars and educational institutions with information on what research has recently been completed or is now being undertaken in the field.

*Definition of research* : (1) accumulation of original data; (2) classification of original data; (3) interpretation of data previously accumulated; (4) reinterpretation of data previously studied; (5) translation, bibliography, vocabulary, etc., with annotation.

*Geographical limits* : the Arab countries, Israel, Afghanistan, Iran, Turkey, North Africa, the Sudan, Ethiopia and Eritrea.

*Disciplinary limits* : emphasis on the social sciences, but including all related aspects of the humanities and natural sciences.

*Chronological limits* : none (ancient, medieval and modern).

All those who are currently engaged in research on the Middle East, or have completed such research since October 1, 1954, are urged to submit the following information : name, address, topic of investigation, sponsoring organization (if any), date of completion or estimated date if still in progress, and pertinent comments on the nature of the research, sources being used and method, of approach. Please address correspondence to :

Survey of Research,  
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# TURKEY TODAY

By LORD KINROSS

Lecture delivered to the Royal Central Asian Society on November 17, 1954, Admiral Sir Cecil Harcourt, G.B.E., K.C.B., in the chair.

The CHAIRMAN: Lord Kinross, who has kindly come to lecture to us today, is well known to many of those present as author, traveller and broadcaster. His most recent book is entitled *Within the Taurus*\* and deals with most of the subject about which he is now going to speak to us.

I FEEL that, before I start, I must say what a great honour and pleasure it is to me to address a society so renowned and so learned as the Royal Central Asian. I feel that I must also offer a word of apology for being here at all. I am here, really, under false pretences, as I have nothing to offer you, in the way of learning, about this Western outpost of Asia. My only excuse for being here is that I have during the past few years had the opportunity of travelling over parts of the Asia Minor Plateau which you know well enough already from the works of the historians and scholars and travellers, and very likely from personal experience—but which have been very little visited in modern times. Turkey—that is to say Turkey in Asia—was in a sense better known in the nineteenth century than it is today. From 1914 onwards it became more or less a closed country: firstly owing to the First World War, subsequently owing to Atatürk's period of internal reconstruction, when visitors were not encouraged, and thirdly owing to the Second World War. It is only today, after nearly a generation, that you have a régime in Turkey which is making things easy for the traveller. My journeys were relatively short ones, and my observations can only be superficial and somewhat at random. They won't add very much to what you must already know about modern Turkey. In fact all I can hope to do is to confirm or deny it from my own personal experience.

I referred just now to Turkey as the Western outpost of Asia. Well, today it might be more appropriate to describe her as the Eastern outpost of Europe. That is what she aspires to be, and what, at any rate in the military sense, she now is. In the days of the Ottoman Empire Turkey was essentially an Oriental power, centred, geographically, in Europe. Today, with her Empire liquidated, she is, paradoxically, a would-be Occidental power centred in Asia. In shifting his capital from Istanbul to Ankara, Atatürk confirmed the Turks in their natural habitat, which is Asia. In so doing he strengthened them, and gave them a new sense of nationhood, and began the process of modernizing them in the Western sense. What one wants to try to assess is just how far this process has gone—how far the Turks can really claim to be a European, and how far they are still an Asiatic nation.

In the political sense I think they can claim to have made a remarkable

\* See reviews.



advance. There is no doubt that political democracy in Turkey does, in its own way, work. It works on quite a different plane—an infinitely superior plane—to democracy in the Arab and other Asiatic countries. It works quite as well as it does in, say, Greece—in fact sometimes better, as the Turks are a more stolid, less excitable people than the Greeks. It doesn't perhaps work as well as it does in some of the Western European countries—simply because the majority of the Turkish people is still illiterate. Over the greater part of the country the literate population is not more than 20 or 30 per cent., and in the eastern and south-eastern provinces it falls much lower. Until a few years ago the people in some of these remoter regions had very little idea of what was happening in the world, and even in Turkey itself. There is a story, told by a parliamentary candidate in eastern Turkey just after the war, that one of his constituents came up to him and asked after the health and welfare of the Padishah—the Sultan—in Constantinople.

Now I don't want to imply that this rate of illiteracy in Turkey means that elections aren't free. They are, in the legal sense, strictly free. The ballot is genuinely secret and the count is open. There is no intimidation. The elections are supervised by an independent legal authority. But it is obvious in elections that where you have a largely illiterate population it is bound to be subjected to certain pressures.

On the one hand there is pressure from the big man of the village—no longer a pasha, but a rich landowner perhaps, or a rich merchant, who exercises considerable local influence, and whose views are thus bound to carry weight with voters. On the other hand there is pressure from the administration itself. It is a highly centralized administration, as it has been in Asia Minor ever since Byzantine times, and though it is certainly the most independent executive of any country in the Middle East, it inevitably has a certain political tinge. When I was in Anatolia three years ago the Democrat Party had just been returned to power, for the first time, with an overwhelming majority over Atatürk's People's Party. The result was that here and there, at least in the more important vilayets, the *valis*—the governors—were being changed. The administration was making sure of having men in these posts who could be counted on to carry out the Democrat policy with conviction, and was transferring the People's Party men to less influential posts. Thus in elections you are likely to get a certain amount of pressure from the administration.

All the same, in 1950 you reached in Turkey a very remarkable milestone in the history of democracy. You got men coming from the towns to the remote, primitive parts of the country: men with a modern education, with all sorts of new ideas, who talked to these peasants, and explained to them that for the first time they were to be free to vote as they wished. They were sceptical at first, knowing from past experience what to expect if they offended their *vali* or their *ķaimaķam*. But finally they realized that the ballot really was to be free, and they voted *en masse* against the party in power—the party of their *vali* or their *ķaimaķam*—and they let the Democrats in with a big majority. And no amount of pressure will prevent them from voting the other way, as soon as they feel like it. Meanwhile they are quite content with the Democrats, who are giving the peasants all

sorts of social and economic benefits, and have voted them back into power again with an even bigger majority, reducing the Opposition to proportions which are perhaps unhealthily small.

The effect of this is that, though you have in Turkey a two-party system, you have at the moment what in practice almost amounts to one-party rule. But the significant thing is that the people have voted for this party, instead of having it imposed on them, as in the days of Atatürk and İnönü. And this is healthy enough. The truth is that there is a genuine spirit of independence in the Turkish peasant. One senses this very strongly as one travels along the Russian frontier. These are a people who have never been oppressed to the same degree as the Slavs have oppressed their kinsmen opposite. Control from Constantinople was always rather remote control; the pashas who exercised it on the spot were sometimes good pashas and sometimes bad pashas, but as long as the people paid their taxes and did their military service they were left more or less alone and in possession of their own lands. There may have been officials, but there were few big landowners to oppress them, because the Sultans had always discouraged the growth of a large landed aristocracy, as a potential rival to their own power. By the standards of the time—and by comparison with the Russian peasantry—they were a reasonably independent, peasant population.

This spirit of independence, which has never been altogether crushed, is now released, and it is very interesting to notice it as one travels about the country. There is plenty of free speech in the coffee-shops. There is what one Turkish M.P. described to me as a Hyde Park atmosphere—an atmosphere in which anyone can say what he likes. I used to sit in them in the evenings, watching these hard-headed peasants as they listened to the radio from Ankara, or to the news from the local newspaper, read out to them probably by some literate member of the younger generation. And I couldn't help thinking that the Russians in their coffee-shops, just across the frontier, must have been listening to a very different story.

There are usually two coffee-shops in a Turkish village: a Democrat one on one side of the street and a People's Party one on the other, and you get a different party newspaper being read out in each coffee-shop. These are people who want to know what's going on, and, despite their lack of letters, are determined not to be put upon. They have considerable experience of war, usually with Russia, going back over several generations, and considerable political shrewdness. Sitting in a coffee-shop one day, in a small village on the Black Sea coast, I became the centre of a circle of villagers who asked me the most searching questions about international affairs. They wanted to know all about the Atlantic Pact, to which Turkey was on the point of being admitted. They asked about America's policy in China—why she didn't help Chiang Kai-Shek, and so forth. They wanted to know whether there really was such a thing as the atom bomb, and if so why didn't the United Nations drop it on Moscow straight away, without more ado. They spoke with pride of the Turkish Army, and wanted to know whether it wasn't better than all the European armies except the British. A lot of these peasants had worked in Russia before the Communist régime obliged them to clear out, so they knew all about it.

And that is one of the reasons why Turkey is almost the only country in the world where Communism virtually doesn't exist.

Not far away, up on the plateau, I travelled right along the Russian frontier, by the Araxes River, and it was impressive to see the dogged, impervious way in which these peasants cultivated their land right up to the frontier line. This caused occasional incidents, as when a Turkish cow or goat violated Soviet sovereignty, and was either shot or punctiliously returned with a protest. These people had been driven from their lands by the Russians once in every generation for a century or more, and were quite resigned to the fact that they would probably be driven from them again. But they were not in the least intimidated by the prospect. They would return to their lands, as they had always returned before. On the Russian side of the frontier, on the other hand, there was not a sign of life, except for a few military look-out posts. The Russians had moved all their villages five miles back from the frontier, and were urging the Turks to do the same, to avoid trouble. But the Turks refused, explaining: "We're a democracy! Our people's land is their own." The impression I got about the Russian frontier was that it was designed as much to prevent Russians from getting out as to prevent Turks from getting in. As the officer who was with me at the time remarked: "Do you know, when I look at Russia, barricaded behind that frontier, I begin to believe that she must really be afraid of us. I don't mean only afraid of our soldiers: I mean afraid of our democracy."

This brings us to the topic of the Turkish soldier, who is guarding the frontier so doggedly. The Turkish Army has been well trained, in the last few years, by the Americans and ourselves, and exceedingly well armed with the most up-to-date equipment. The Turks have never in the past been a race of mechanics. Indeed, I think I am right in saying that no word for maintenance exists in their language. But they are learning quickly. The Americans claim to have trained a force of 30,000 technicians, and certainly, as one travels about the country in lorries and buses, one sees that the Turks are beginning to develop a mechanical sense. Their drivers and mechanics are resourceful enough, and though there may be breakdowns, one does always get to one's destination in the end.

Certainly the Turkish Army is full of fighting spirit. The Turkish soldier is an intrepid fighter, as he always has been—especially against the Russians. His favourite type of story is of a frontier dispute over a water-point, in which a Turkish sentry killed five Russian soldiers single-handed. The Turks, of course, have not yet fought a modern war; but they have had some valuable experience in Korea. They now have a younger type of officer and a more flexible system of promotion from the ranks. The Turkish soldier is not, by Western standards, well paid. But he is well fed. He gets meat twice a day and he is not fed on black bread, like the Russian soldiers opposite. Above all he has a strong military tradition behind him, and he will fight to the last ditch for the defence of his country.

Atatürk's revolution was in the first place military and political. But it was also religious. As everyone here knows, he turned Turkey into a secular state, subjecting the Church to the state, whereas previously the

state had in effect been subjected to the Church. He broke the political power of Islam. On the other hand he did not eliminate Islam. The new Western-educated generation grew up as a largely secular generation, though still with the traditions of Islamic morality behind them. But the great mass of the people in the country as a whole continued to practise Islamic worship, whether openly or otherwise. Now they do so everywhere quite openly. The call to prayer is again recited in Arabic. There is religious instruction in the schools and there are religious broadcasts on the radio. You see framed religious texts, in Arabic, on sale on the pavements outside the mosques; and everywhere you see new mosques being built, often at the expense of the government. The war in Korea was fought in the name of Islam, the troops attended religious services before going into battle, and you saw war posters all over Turkey, showing an officer leading his men into the attack, carrying the Koran in his hand. This revival of Islam has extended to social customs. In the more primitive parts of the country the veil is returning. I saw veiled women in the streets of Erzurum—possibly in modest protection against the increasing number of foreigners—especially Americans—now in the city. In the streets of Trebizond I saw hardly any women at all: they seldom venture out from their homes. They provided a curious contrast to the streets of Ankara and Istanbul, where women are highly emancipated, just as in any European city, and follow the same professions as men.

Among the more primitive layers of the population the woman's position is still much as it has always been—though she has always, I think, been freer than in the Arab countries. Polygamy still prevails to some extent. A Turk whom I visited on the Black Sea coast told me the story of his servant, a peasant woman. She was, unfortunately, barren, so, very resourcefully, she found her husband another wife, who bore him children. But she remained his only legal wife, and enjoyed her position in the household as such, while the children were officially registered as hers. The three lived harmoniously together, and everyone was happy—especially the husband. Polygamy dies hard in a peasant country where wives are labour.

Along the Black Sea coast, where tea is grown, the labour is strictly divided: it is the job of the men to prepare the soil and plant the crop, and the job of the women to pick it and market it, besides looking after the vegetable garden and the cattle. And it is the job of the women to carry the loads: it is undignified for a man to be seen carrying anything. You see them trudging along the roads, carrying vast baskets of green tea, from the fields to the market, on their backs. But they look very cheerful, I must say—gay beasts of burden—and respected in their own sphere of life.

The women in Anatolia spend much of their time weaving carpets for the house. I was invited into a peasant's mud-built house near Kars, where not only the floor but the walls of the whitewashed living room were covered with carpets. They had been made by his womenfolk from the wool of his sheep, with the name of each one woven into the pattern. He told me that three women could weave a carpet in a month. I asked him how many children he had. He replied, "Two," and then, as an afterthought, "—and three girls"—a little ungracious, I thought, to the weavers.

In the neighbourhood of Mount Ararat the Kurdish women still wear picturesque costumes. I climbed up a part of the mountain—partly on foot, and partly on a cab-horse, the only horse which happened to be available. About halfway up I found an encampment of Kurdish shepherds with black tents. They invited me into a tent and gave me sour milk and glasses of tea. Their women wore a costume just like that of our Victorian grandmothers, only invented, I should imagine, a long time before them. They wore layers of flounced petticoats, with balloon sleeves, and bloomers, in gay, flowered cretonnes. Only the blue beads and cowrie-shells threaded into their pigtails struck a slightly outlandish note. The tent was strewn with rosebud cretonne cushions, and there was an old granny working away at her wool-work in the corner.

But I have strayed from the subject of religion—of the religious reaction which is said to be taking place in the country, and which some Turks view with disquiet. It was in the first place deliberately encouraged by the Democrat Party, for electoral reasons, and they continue to support it, thus giving back, at least to the local religious leaders, some of the power which they lost under Atatürk. It is, of course, a dangerous game, in a country with modern aspirations, to exploit religion for political motives. My personal feeling, however, is that these dangers can be exaggerated. Religious “reaction” is perhaps too strong a word for this process. All that is happening, I think, is that religious feeling and religious practices, which always prevailed to some extent underground, have now come up again into the open. The government of Turkey today is essentially a secular government and a sensible government, and it is certainly on guard against any form of fanaticism. A year or two ago one of the old Dervish orders, the Ticiani, reared up its head again, and started to deface statues of Atatürk in the cities. But it was quickly and vigorously stamped out. As modern education percolates throughout the country—as it unquestionably is doing—the dangers of Islamic reaction will recede, and Islam itself may well remain a force in the ethical and social rather than in the purely religious sense. A new form of Islam—rather in Protestant terms—may easily emerge.

The main problems of Turkey today are, of course, social problems. I referred just now to education. It is extraordinary what an appetite there is for education today throughout the length and breadth of Asia Minor. Travelling across the Armenian plateau between Ardahan and Kars, I was struck by the villages strung out along the road. The houses were the round mud huts which have prevailed for centuries. They are hardly more than burrows, huddling close to the earth, often without windows and with grass growing over their roofs. But in the centre of almost every village was a modern white building with a red roof. This was the primary school—the goal of every Turkish child. Everywhere the boys were wearing peaked school caps with a laurel badge in front—the proud badge of literacy: and the young men were wearing old school badges in their buttonholes. Money, unfortunately, still has to be spent on guns before books, and it may be another generation before Turkey can claim to be wholly literate. But at least the effort is being made, and in the right direction. The young Turks are being educated not only to be clerks but

to be good peasants. Some time ago the government introduced a series of village institutes for the training of teachers. These are not only schools but farms as well—sort of lay monasteries—which give them instruction not merely in the normal secondary school curriculum but in the practice of agriculture and rural trades. When they are qualified the young men return to their villages as teachers and are in a position to give valuable advice to the peasants on the improvement of farming methods.

But there are other ways in which the Turks are being educated. They are being educated by contact with each other. The backwardness of Anatolia, which prevailed until a few years ago—and of course still prevails to a decreasing extent—was due very largely to the extraordinary isolation of its villages. A terrifying picture of this isolation, and consequent primitiveness, has been drawn by a talented young Turkish schoolmaster, Mahmut Makal, in a Dickensian book called *Our Village*—called in English *A Village in Anatolia*.<sup>\*</sup> This book—in effect an exposure of existing social conditions—caused a great stir throughout Turkey, and was effectively used by the Democrats as a stick to beat the government with at the elections of 1950. Since then a very great deal has been done to improve the conditions of the villages of Turkey, in the way of better housing, and dispensaries and schools and so forth, but mainly in the way of communications. Thanks to a big programme of road-building, the villagers now have a contact with their neighbours and with other parts of Turkey which was formerly denied to them and are thus released from the isolation of centuries—an isolation which was as much mental as physical.

Travelling about Anatolia is still an arduous and not a very comfortable process, but at least it *is* possible to get about, on four wheels, in most parts of the country. Thanks to American aid and equipment, a network of roads is materializing. There are, of course, bad roads—but there is an increasing number of good roads. If anything, the Turks would appear to have been in too much of a hurry about their road-building. The Americans wanted them to take longer over the process: to make fewer roads but better ones. But they preferred to make as many roads as possible, as quickly as possible, and to re-make them in a few years' time if necessary. And they may well have been right.

It is extraordinary what a difference these roads make to the life of the average peasant. I drove up on one of the most precipitous, in a fruit lorry, from the Black Sea coast up through the Pontic "Taurus" to the plateau at Kars. It is some of the finest scenery I ever saw, in which forests of beech and chestnut give place to pine-woods and alpine pastures, and finally to the vast horizons of the sun-baked Asiatic tableland. Before the road was built the peasants on the coast had little market for their fruit, which simply rotted on the trees; and the peasants on the plateau led a fruitless existence. Now the peasants on the coast have money to spend, and the peasants on the plateau have fruit. It was extraordinary to see the enthusiasm with which they swarmed on board the lorry on our arrival at Kars, unloading the fruit and having it on sale in the market in a matter of minutes.

On the road to Lake Van I was given a lift in a lorry whose driver had

\* See reviews.

until lately been a mason in a village in the Black Sea mountains. He had paid £1,000 for his lorry, and now carried cargoes of sugar in it to all parts of the country. His petrol cost him as much as £17 the trip, but all the same he made a clear profit of £750 a year, of which he spent only half. In a year or two he proposed to hand the lorry over to his mate and buy another. Thus are capitalists made. These are simply two instances of the way in which roads are changing the life of the countryside, a revolution which is not merely economic but social and psychological.

Economically, thanks largely to American aid, Turkey has made very great progress during the past few years. Money is being spent by the government on a very big scale, and it is being spent largely on the peasant, in the form of subsidies to his crops, and loans, and grants of machinery, and so forth. The process has been helped by a cotton boom in those valleys and plains which are enriched by the silt brought down from the Taurus. Here you see the peasants, at week-ends, joy-riding along the roads in tractors, with their wives and families in trailers behind. I have even heard of peasants who are doing so well that they buy refrigerators and, since they have no electric current, have them fitted with locks, to keep their banknotes in them! Turkey aims at becoming a big exporting country in foodstuffs, especially in wheat, and is concentrating all her efforts on agricultural production. The country has no deserts—or at least no natural ones. Its soil is fertile and it has plenty of water. The problem is to get the water to the soil, and this is being energetically tackled by the building of barrages and the boring of wells.

But there is another problem, and that is population. Asia Minor is underpopulated. One hears the frequent cry, "Adam Yok," meaning "No Adams"—or "No men." I travelled through regions which once were rich, but which are now very sparsely inhabited—owing partly, I suppose, to the drain on the Turkish population of a century of wars, and partly to the expulsion of the minorities. The region around Lake Van, described by the nineteenth-century travellers as a well-inhabited paradise, is now, relatively speaking, an empty desert. It was the country of the Armenians, and the Armenians have gone. The Mediterranean coast of Turkey, once well cultivated, has now reverted, in places, to tangled hill-sides of scrub and wild olive. It was colonized by Greeks, and the Greeks have gone. A year or so ago the Communists, with the intention of doing the Turks an injury, started to push large numbers of Turkish Moslems across the frontier from Bulgaria. The Turks, on the contrary, welcomed the influx, and have profitably absorbed the Bulgarians, who are of excellent, healthy stock. There was some talk, at the time of my visit, of settling them around Lake Van, but an obstacle to this was the need for screening, so close to the Russian frontier. Now the influx has ceased. The Bulgarians have changed their policy, and are keeping the Turks at home and indoctrinating them as Communists instead.

Turkey has another shortage besides that of population. She needs capital. When the Democrats came to power they reversed Atatürk's process of state control of industry, and a number of industries were offered to private enterprise. But there was too little capital available in private hands, and the Turks have not in the past had the habit of investment.

The banks are doing their best to stimulate it, and carry out advertising campaigns throughout the country with colourful posters portraying the benefits of investment. They have gay shop-windows, brilliantly lit and dressed by experts, displaying the lottery prizes which the Turk stands to win for each sum invested: radio sets and washing machines and models of houses, and so forth. I even heard, from a Turkish friend, that one bank had offered, as first prize, a bag of gold. Investment is thus increasing. But Turkey still needs foreign capital to develop her resources to the full. So far foreign capital has been a little slow to respond. It has been frightened off in the past by confiscatory methods, and, moreover, Turkey is just a little too close to the Russian frontier to be regarded as a safe investment today.

But at least there is, in Turkey today, a new attitude towards the foreigner. The People's Party, in the last elections, tried to appeal to the more Chauvinistic, xenophobic instincts of the Turkish people. But they met with little response. Turkey today is ripe for co-operation with the foreigner. As a mere traveller I found nothing but friendliness—of a rather gruff, blunt kind. It took a long time to get permits to visit the military areas, but once they came through no further obstacles were put in my way.

Turkey, of course, is still strongly nationalistic, and reluctant to allow foreign immigrants into the country. The ordinary Turk still tends to be suspicious of the Greeks, and there is still a curtain, commercial and otherwise, between the Turkish coast and the Greek islands of the *Ægean* and the Mediterranean, which lie just off it. But all this may gradually break down, as it has already broken down at the political level. The Turks have a strong international sense. After all, they were not an Empire for five hundred years for nothing. They worked hard to become members of N.A.T.O. and are among its strongest bulwarks; and they have since drawn Yugoslavia into their system of alliances. In this sense—in the external sense—they are certainly an outpost of Europe: and now they are turning their attention towards Asia, towards Pakistan, and Persia and Iraq, hoping to serve as a bridge between the two continents.

In the internal sense it is hard to assess just how far the process of Europeanization has gone. One is struck by the European manner and European aspect of the Turks, and by a sort of Scotch common sense in their character. One is struck by their honesty, by the relative lack of corruption in their administration, by the efficiency of their police. A small incident may illustrate this. On one occasion I was unfortunate enough to leave my wallet on a ship in the Dardanelles—through being left behind at Gallipoli when the ship sailed before its scheduled time. I hardly expected to see it again. But on arrival at Chanak I reported the loss to the Chief of Police. He immediately telephoned to Smyrna, where the boat was then arriving. Within a quarter of an hour a police officer came to me with a message that my wallet was in the hands of the Smyrna police, who wanted to know what they were to do with it. I reflected that there are not many European countries where I should have been so fortunate.

Another good sign is that there are plenty of young men in official



positions in Turkey, especially as *kaimakams*, or district governors. Youth is not excluded from public affairs, as it has been until recently in most Arab countries. Turkey is a young man's country.

One could go on speculating for ages as to how far modern Turkey belongs to Europe and how far to Asia. I think one may summarize it in this way: that Turkey is an Asiatic country governed by people with a European outlook. It is, in short, an increasingly successful blend of East and West—and it is an enchanting and absorbing country to visit.

Colonel ORLEBAR: Are there any signs of Kurdish nationalism in Turkey?

Lord KINROSS: It is difficult to judge. I imagine in parts of Kurdistan beyond Lake Van there is a fairly strong spirit of independence; otherwise I would say that gradually the Kurds are being absorbed into the Turkish nation. In the frontier areas, where they are in contact with the Iraqi and Persian Kurds on the other side of the frontier, there is a stronger form of nationalism.

The CHAIRMAN: You have, Lord Kinross, said a good deal in regard to Army maintenance. When I was in the Mediterranean just after the last war the question of the Turkish Air Force came up and with it the problem of maintenance, on which an air force so greatly depends. I wonder whether there has been much progress in that regard so far as the Turkish Air Force is concerned?

Lord KINROSS: The Turkish Air Force is not large, but it is efficient as far as it goes. Their civil aviation has been run extremely efficiently with a very low accident rate. True, the planes are now getting a little out of date and there is a certain amount of alarm, but they are being replaced. Turkey certainly has a very good record in civil aviation and I believe that applies to the military side also, which shows that the Turks are mastering the problem of maintenance in that field.

Mr. LANGE: I should also like to put a Service question. It is evident from the interesting remarks we have heard from the lecturer that Turkey looks forward to support from the United States of America in regard to the Army and, I believe, also the Air Force? I wonder whether that also holds good with respect to the Turkish Navy?

Great Britain had an important Naval Mission, just before World War I, at Constantinople, the Mission being headed by Admiral Limpus. A second Naval Mission was sent to Turkey between the two wars—I believe in the 1930's—and of course it is well remembered that we had a distinguished naval officer at Ankara during the last World War in the person of the late Chairman of the Royal Central Asian Society, Admiral Sir Howard Kelly. Might I, therefore, in view of the continued interest by Great Britain in the Turkish Navy, ask whether this is still maintained and whether Turkey looks to Britain for advice on service along British naval principles and naval traditions?

Lord KINROSS: I would say that the contact is maintained. We have a Naval Mission in Turkey with out Naval Attachés and so on, who preserve a very close contact with the Turkish Navy. There certainly is close co-operation in that respect. Whether from the strategic point of view it

is accepted that the Turkish Navy can do a very great deal with regard to the defence of the country, I would not be able to say. That is a complicated strategic question. Turkey, being a member of N.A.T.O., is undoubtedly entitled to military and naval assistance from the other Atlantic powers, and the Turkish Navy would be regarded within that framework as part of the general N.A.T.O. naval organization. Quite a lot has been done in the way of improvement to the ports. A new purely naval harbour is being created in Iskenderon, and all such work is being done as a result of the closest possible co-operation between the Turks, the British and the Americans.

Group-Captain H. St. C. SMALLWOOD: I do not know whether I am taking Lord Kinross rather outside his terms of reference, but I would be grateful if he could add a word or two as to the relations obtaining today between Turkey and Iraq. Iraq is most important to us in England. Are there pleasant relations between the two countries?

Lord KINROSS: When talking about Turkish foreign policy generally, one has in mind that the Turks have followed two stages. Their primary concern was to come to an agreement with the West and to become incorporated into the Western system. Until that was done they were not particularly interested in building up relations with Arab countries. Now the Turks are turning very much more towards Arab countries, and I believe they see in Iraq the most likely and the most profitable ally for Turkey, because undoubtedly during the last few months there has been greatly increased co-operation between the Turks and the Iraqis. The Iraqi Prime Minister has recently visited Turkey, and there is great hope on the part of the Turks that they will persuade the Iraqis to come into the Turko-Pakistan pact and so strengthen their international defence position—their frontiers on the Eastern side as well as on the Western side. It seems that they hope that if this happens, then ultimately it may be possible to bring the other Arab countries into some such agreement. But it is Iraq the Turks are now concentrating on, as far as their Eastern defence is concerned.

Judge AMEER ALI: There is one rider I would like to add, with all respect to Lord Kinross. He referred to Turkey as being an Asiatic power in Europe. We must not underestimate the effect that Europe has had upon the Turks, because the old Ottoman Empire inherited from the Byzantine Empire a great many European institutions. The backbone of the Turkish higher ranks in administration, or a great part of it, was recruited from European Moslems in the past and until quite recently in the shape of Balkan, Albanian and even Greek Moslems. Only recently a former Yugoslav diplomat, a Croatian, spoke to me of "our Grand Vizier," and when I asked who he was he replied, "Muhammad Sokolli." That was in the time of Suleiman the Magnificent. So that there was a strong European influence brought to bear upon the Osmaili Turks from very early days. One has to bear that in mind.

Lord KINROSS: I possibly understressed that aspect. There is no doubt that there has been a strong international European tradition always among the Turks. Really the Ottoman Empire was a remarkable functioning international organization which derived a great deal from Europe, and

incorporated quite strong European elements which had a great deal of influence on the development of the country. We are simply seeing a continuation, in some sense, of a process which was already operating.

Colonel ROUTH : To what extent have the Turkish business men made up for the deficiency in commerce caused by the expulsion of the Greeks in 1922?

Lord KINROSS : I would say they have not yet altogether made it up; they are, however, making great efforts to do so and I think they may eventually succeed. There is no doubt that the Turks have learned a great deal about commerce and so on. For instance, in Smyrna there are big firms run by Turks which formerly were run by Greeks.

A QUESTIONER : The lecturer spoke of the education of the boys and the training of male teachers. What about the women? Surely it is more important for the mothers in the homes to be educated?

Lord KINROSS : The education of women is exactly on the same terms as the education of men. The whole of education in Turkey is for both sexes and there is a good deal of emphasis on the education of women. I do not wish to create the impression that the education is purely education of the male. The female element is regarded as exceedingly important and their education is taken very seriously.

A QUESTIONER : Are there now any survivors of the Armenians in Turkey?

Lord KINROSS : There are practically none in the countryside in Turkey, but a certain number in Istanbul; there may also be some in Smyrna. In these big cities there are a number of Armenians and some in quite powerful positions. Istanbul has a rich but small community of Armenians. At Konia I was shown round by an Armenian who said he was the last there and that he would not be remaining there very much longer.

Mr. ALI ASQHAR : Would the lecturer like to add a word or two in regard to freedom of the Press in Turkey?

Lord KINROSS : On the whole, there is freedom of the Press in Turkey to a very considerable degree; in fact, I would say that there is complete freedom of the Press in Turkey. Recently the issue has been slightly confused by the whole question of the law of libel and so on. There have been certain prosecutions, about which I do not know much because they have happened since I left Turkey. I believe the prosecutions of editors and so on who have received fairly substantial sentences have been prosecutions under what in Great Britain would be the normal civil law of libel. They are less political than civil prosecutions. It is a question as to what one may or may not say about an individual. It seems that certain sections of the Press in Turkey have overstepped the limits in that direction, probably owing to the law not being properly defined. It is only within recent months that there has arisen this question of the freedom of the Turkish Press being, to some extent, called into question. That is probably part of the answer—ill-defined law. As I have said, the Turkish Press is essentially a free Press.

A QUESTIONER : What about the Halkevis? Are they flourishing or were they set back owing to the Democrats?

Lord KINROSS: There was a rumpus going on in that regard; there is a feeling that the Democrats want to make them into state concerns as opposed to party concerns. I do not know what has happened. Of course, being party concerns there were not nearly so flourishing under the Democrats as previously under the People's Party.

Major NEISH: The lecturer spoke of fruit being carried to the Central Plateau from the Black Sea coast. Could he say if anything has been done in regard to fish, because those waters contain some of the finest fish in the world? The methods of catching them were, however, elementary in the extreme. I wonder if there are now improved methods of fishing and whether it is possible to get fish into the interior?

Lord KINROSS: Probably not. It is extraordinary how little fish one gets in Turkey; even in places such as Trebizond, on the Black Sea, one does not get much fish. I believe the fishing used to be in the hands of the Greeks. That is one respect in which there has been a failure: the Turks have not been able to fill the gap there. In the Bosphorus and round Istanbul the situation is different. There is a flourishing fishing industry. Certainly so far as the fishing industry is concerned there is room for development and improvement, but I do not think it would be possible at the moment to get fresh fish up on to the plateau from the Black Sea.

The meeting ended with a vote of thanks.

# RUSSIA'S NEW LOOK

By F. J. ERROLL, M.P.

Lecture delivered to the Royal Central Asian Society on December 1, 1954, Admiral Sir Cecil Harcourt, G.B.E., K.C.B., in the chair.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Erroll, who has kindly come to speak to us this afternoon, is an engineer by profession and of considerable experience. He is now also Member of Parliament for Altrincham. It was in that capacity that he went to Russia with the Parliamentary Delegation which has recently returned from that country. I now ask Mr. Erroll to describe "Russia's New Look."

**I**N a few brief introductory words I would like to tell you where we went and what we did. Then I propose to show a number of photographs which I personally took, the slides for which have been specially made for this talk, and from which you will be able to understand something of the Russia the Delegation saw. Following the photographs I shall turn to one or two of the main points which we learned from our visit and which are of particular interest today.

I must admit that the Delegation had a very limited view of Asiatic Russia. We were, however, able to visit some of the principal centres, and as Moscow dominates the whole of Russia perhaps what they do in Moscow and in the cities nearby may serve as a pointer to the type of policy which may be pursued in Siberia and Asiatic Russia itself.

We left England and flew to Stockholm, picked up a Russian aeroplane at Helsinki, and from there we flew down to Moscow, where we spent two or three days. From Moscow we went by train to Leningrad and back again to Moscow in time for the Arsenal-Dynamo football match on October 5. We left, hurriedly, the next morning by aeroplane for Stalingrad on the bend of the Volga. After a couple of days in Stalingrad the Delegation split into two groups: one going south to the Caucasus, the Crimea and back to Moscow; the other and smaller group, of which I was a member, going north and east and flying over part of Kazakhstan and up to Sverdlovsk, where we spent two days and then flew back to Gorki (formerly Nijni Novgorod). After two more days in Moscow we returned by air to England.

In showing some of the photographs I took on the tour I would like to call attention first to a most impressive building, the new Moscow University, an immense structure of which the slide only shows part. It has been built since the war over a period of about three years. The Russians are, naturally, very proud of the building and claim that it symbolizes the new development going on in their country. The building is just as handsome inside as outside, as you can gather from the photograph of the main assembly hall, which is one of the finest I have been in. The Delegation were all most impressed by what they saw here. And it was in Moscow that we had an opportunity of seeing the rest of the educational system at work. Here, for example, is a classroom in school No. 500; the Russians

told us it was not one of their best schools nor one of their worst, but a good average school in an industrial part of Moscow. Practically all the photographs were taken by myself, but I include this one taken by the Russians to show exactly how free we were to take photographs wherever we went. You will note the various members of the Delegation talking to the teachers, and a Press photographer, who was actually giving advice to one of the members of the Delegation as to what exposure he should use for his own photographs. So you will see that we had cordial co-operation.

From Moscow we went to Leningrad, where we saw another type of post-war construction—a vast stadium entirely built in Leningrad since the war. It is really a mound of earth in the shape of an oval with seats for over 100,000 people. This stadium is typical of the grandiose schemes of public works of which the Russians are so fond today. But not only did we see public works; we were also taken round a number of factories, and this view taken by Russian photographers is typical. It shows us going round the Electrosilia Kirov Works, which correspond roughly to any of our larger electrical engineering firms. Indeed, there was a close affinity before the war, these works having an arrangement with one of the best-known of British electrical firms for exchange of technical information.

From Leningrad we went to Stalingrad and saw the large tractor works there. You might like to see their production notice-board, which is such a common feature of the factories we visited. The factories are supplied with norms or targets, and a bonus is paid to workers and management in accordance with the percentage by which they exceed their targets. The notice-board has on it the target figures set for the different departments, and chalked in are the percentages by which the targets are being exceeded. On the left is a propaganda poster and on the right some notices which I have not yet had an opportunity to translate.

We saw a good deal of Stalingrad and were particularly impressed by a block of workers' flats, owned by the tractor works and used to house the workers employed in the factory. The block looks shoddy by Western standards and is rather crowded inside. The standard is one family to one room. But everybody seemed clean and comfortable. We gate-crashed unannounced into one flat in order to see what the conditions were like and so that we could be sure nothing was specially prepared. The children were especially pleased to see us, and in one place they asked if we had any coins from England or any English stamps we could let them have. When we had done our best to oblige, the children insisted on giving us something in return. One took an English penny from me and insisted on handing me her Communist badge.

Here you see the photograph of a typical industrial worker in Stalingrad off duty. He is not the Russian one is accustomed to think of: he is an assembly-line man earning a good wage in Stalingrad today. You see him leaning against the bonnet of one of the many luxurious cars which took us wherever we went. His dress is not bad and he has reasonably good shoes; a man with a sure outlook on the limited life he is allowed to lead. Of course not all Russians are looking like that, as this photograph of building workers in Stalingrad shows. This is typical of the construction workers we were to see in all the cities we visited.

While we were in Stalingrad we were taken on a trip along the Volga river in order to see the Volga-Don canal, another example of Russian fondness for grandiose schemes of public works. The canal links the Volga and Don rivers. Although it should have been in the height of the traffic season, the canal being frozen over for six months of the year, we did not see any barge traffic on the canal in either direction. Here is the entrance to the canal taken from as near as I was allowed to use my camera. The whole scene is dominated by the fine statue of Stalin looking benignly out over the Volga.

In several cities we visited we were shown the plans for "the reconstruction of the city," so it was no surprise when in Sverdlovsk that, on entering the mayor's parlour, we had the plans for the reconstruction of that city explained to us. The photo shows a large model in the foreground, and in the background the architect is explaining the form and nature of the various public buildings the Russians are proposing to erect. These plans, however inspiring they may seem on the first occasion, pall when one sees them over and over again, and make one feel that it is very much easier to have the plans than to put them into practice. The plans appear to be a substitute for a really energetic municipal building policy.

On this occasion, feeling slightly mischievous, having seen so many large secular buildings projected, I asked if they were going to build a large new church in the centre of the city. There was a rather awkward pause, but the architect rallied and said that on the corner of the plan—pointing to somewhere just off the photograph—there would be a plot of land on which believers could build places of worship if they wanted to. As the following day was Sunday we said we would like to go to church if possible. Oh yes, they said, there were still two churches left in Sverdlovsk, a city of 600,000 people. There was a little obstructionism, but we insisted on going to church, and here I show the church to which we were taken. You can see people flocking into a quite small church crowded to the doors. The service was already in progress when we arrived, but that did not prevent the priest from coming out to see us. He was a fine figure though pathetic and tragic withal.

I will deal later with the religious problem in Russia, but I would like to include here a passing reference to two other aspects of life there. This photo shows a Russian cemetery and the old woman and the children sit rather disconsolately beside one of the hedges, while another woman is laying a wreath on an adjacent tomb. While there are these evidences of interest in religion in Russia, the fact remains that the authorities do all they can to keep young people away from the churches and away from religious influence. This was typified when we went the same afternoon to see what was called a Pioneer Club, which is simply an organization of young Communists too young to be full party members. Their whole Sunday is filled with secular pastimes and pursuits, so as to make it impossible for them to attend any church service or receive any religious education. A concert was given in our honour, and four little lads played accordions very well indeed and kept us entertained for nearly an hour. You will notice the badge and the insignia of the movement with the motto "Be prepared."

Practically all the Delegation's time was spent in the cities, but we did have one opportunity of going into the countryside from Sverdlovsk. We went to the workers' settlement of Amaryl. It was a grey day and therefore not easy to take photographs, but the one I show gives some impression of the uniform greyness and drabness of the Russian scene when the sun is not shining. We also saw in this picture some soldiers off duty, obviously enjoying themselves in a traditional Russian way.

After we had been round a collective farm—a somewhat arduous affair during which I gave my head a nasty crack on the roof of a collective pigsty—the head farmer, or shief of the *kolkhoz*, insisted on the party taking lunch with him in his little farmhouse, where we enjoyed traditional Russian hospitality. The farmer was not able to raise it all out of his own resources, so the equivalent of Fortnum and Mason in Sverdlovsk had sent a truck and a couple of waitresses out in order to do honour to the occasion.

This picture of the farmhouse shows the typical Russian furnishings we found in many houses: a large cabinet in the corner filled with ornaments and glasses and so on; also a standard radio set which the Russians drape with embroidery, and a type of standardized celluloid doll for the entertainment of their children, which we saw in many places. The lunch followed the usual form of caviare and smoked ham and smoked salmon, washed down with vodka and brandy. Then we came to the serious business of large steaks with eggs on top, bottles of wine and all the rest.

From Sverdlovsk we went to Gorki and were taken round the famous Molotov Vehicle Works. You can see the Delegation walking down the assembly line. The car in production is a copy of the Standard Vanguard, much sought after in Russia and some Scandinavian countries. These superbly laid-out works produce a large number of motor vehicles.

There is a free market at Gorki where peasants can sell their products at uncontrolled prices. Here is one old woman only doing a small trade in mushrooms, but some of the others were full of life and gaiety. I think it appropriate to conclude showing the photographs on that note, because that is a picture which is typical of a great deal of Russia today. I started with a photograph of the new Moscow University, but I wanted to end with one of a typical smiling cheery peasant woman because that still represents a very large part of the Russia of today.

. . . . .

You will realize that we had an opportunity of seeing a great deal; in fact, our great difficulty throughout was to sort out our impressions and at the same time get a general overall picture. That was, perhaps, our greatest difficulty, because, while we could talk to the individual factory manager about his own factory, he, on the other hand, would not or could not tell us about the industry as a whole of which his factory was just a part. Only in Moscow could one hope to get the whole picture, but if we had stayed all our time in Moscow we would not have had an opportunity of seeing what the other big cities were like.

I have often been asked whether we were shown what we wanted to see or only shown what was good for us to see. I feel that the Russians played extremely fair in that respect. Naturally, they had to arrange some



sort of tentative programme for us, otherwise we might have criticized them for not having organized anything at all. Having offered a tentative programme, they asked for our suggestions, so in Moscow I seized the opportunity of putting in a list of plants and installations I wanted to see. I included one or two "hot potatoes," such as a gold mine, a prison labour camp, the port installations at Leningrad and an aircraft factory. By the end of the visit I had seen every single one on my list, including a gold mine, a prison labour camp and an aircraft factory. In fact, the Russians went one better. I had only asked to see a civil aircraft works because I did not think it fair to ask to see a military works, which we would not be prepared to show the Russians if they came to our country. But they were not to be outdone, and insisted on taking me round a large modern works where they were making jet-engined bombers. That was a most impressive sight, and I counted myself fortunate in being invited to climb into one of the bombers, look at the controls and generally to have a look round.

I compiled the lists of plants and installations to give me as far as possible a good general picture of Soviet heavy industry. I therefore tried to specialize so far as possible in that subject during the tour and to leave it to other members of the Delegation to concentrate on agriculture, social services, hospitals and education. I believe the factories I saw were a fair and representative cross-section of modern Soviet industrialization. The important point to bear in mind in regard to Soviet industry is that it has a high priority in the Soviet economy. Those who have read histories of post-Revolution Russia will know already that it was one of the great aims, both of Lenin and of Stalin his successor, that Russia must develop her heavy industries if she was to catch up with, equal, and perhaps exceed the lead of the Western Powers. They have therefore devoted a great deal of the national effort to developing factories, power stations, mines, railways and civil works of all sorts.

Let me now give a few details of one or two of the factories I went to, so as to convey to you some sort of picture of Soviet industrialization. We were fortunate in going to two machine tool factories, one in Moscow and one in Gorki. The works in Moscow were making lathes, and it was most impressive to see the way in which the Russians had standardized on one particular type of lathe and were producing it on mass-production lines. It was a good simple robust lathe, the sort of lathe one would be given as an apprentice in England, because one could not do much harm to it, so sturdy and robust was the tool. That was right and practical from the Russian point of view, as they are training more and more ex-peasants to take a hand in heavy industry. The lathes we saw were right for the job and they were also accurate. I was invited to take measurements on one of the lathe beds, and the lathe was certainly up to its specification. At the other machine tool works in Gorki there was much the same procedure for milling machines. The management had standardized on one type of milling machine and arranged the shop floor on mass-production lines. This works was of particular interest because it also made large heavy machine tools of a type which are withheld under the terms of the strategic ban from being exported from Great Britain to Russia. It is a

moot point as to whether we have been wise to maintain the ban or not. On the one hand, we have slowed down Russian industrial development to a certain extent; on the other hand, by withholding these important machine tools from them we have compelled the Russians to manufacture for themselves. They now realize that they can produce machine tools of a size and accuracy that they had not previously believed themselves to be capable of making; we have taught the Russians by necessity to make for themselves what they previously had to import.

At the large Ural-Mash Works in Sverdlovsk we saw heavy engineering at its best; we saw steel rolling mills under construction, also large excavators of the heaviest types and a variety of other equipment for mines, such as crushing units, winding gear and the like. I had an opportunity of going round their drawing office and meeting the chief designer. The drawing office employs no less than 350 people out of a total working force of about 8,000. The drawing office compared well with what one would expect to find in an English works in the Midlands.

Nevertheless, standards vary in Russia. At the Diesel Engine Works at Gorki the standard was lower because the priority for diesel engines has been lowered now that they can be imported into Russia once again. On the other hand, at the aircraft works I visited, the aircraft were obviously priority No. 1. Not only were the workers working faster and better than in other factories, but also they were liberally supplied with power-driven hand tools and the best type of jigs and other equipment to enable them to achieve the maximum rate of output.

The gold mine to which I went provided quite a different example of what the Russians can achieve. It was a modern gold mine, the main shaft having been sunk in 1951. From that mine the Russians are bringing up ore at the rate of 1,000 tons a day. The mine was well laid out and the underground haulage was by electricity. The working space was adequately ventilated and lit, and the equipment compared favourably with what one would expect to find in a metalliferous mine anywhere else in the world. It was interesting to observe that the planners in Moscow had decided that gold mining was of a sufficiently high priority to warrant a diversion of modern equipment for increasing the output of gold in the Soviet Union. It is a pointer to their foreign exchange policy and to their need to export in order to pay for their current imports that they are prepared to increase their output of gold at the present time.

My general verdict would be that the Russians are extremely capable in this field and very practical, but unless they have the benefit of foreign designers—and we know they have taken away a large number of German designers from East Germany—they remain copyists rather than inventors. It was the same story at the Gorki Vehicle Works, where the lorries were a copy of American lorries; the lorry engine was designed in 1941 and has been in production ever since. We have not a lorry engine of that age in current production in this country. When I put the point to the works director, he asked: "Why should we worry to change? We have a very good design. Why alter it?" The answer could only be: "You do not know how lucky you are; you have no competition to have to stand up to." In this regard they are following the view of Lenin, their great master, and it is perhaps

worth quoting from one of his revolutionary books an apt illustration of his plan for industrial development. Lenin wrote: "We do not invent, we take ready-made from capitalism: the best factories, experimental stations, academies, etc.; we need only adopt the best models furnished by the experience of the most advanced countries." Lenin wrote that in 1918, but I can assure you it is as true today as when he wrote it.

I want next to say a few words about the Church in Russia. You have seen a photograph of the church in Sverdlovsk and the old priest. May I remind you of the Russian Constitution in which it is said that there shall be freedom for believers to worship but there must also be, equally, freedom for anti-religious propaganda. That is typical of so much that is said in Russia. It looks fair on the surface, but it is manifestly unfair in practice, because if it were really fair there should be equal freedom for pro-religious propaganda as well as for anti-religious propaganda. In actual fact the anti-religious propagandists make all the running; the pro-religious propagandists, the priests and believers, are only allowed to say what they believe in inside churches to those who care to go there. One member of the Delegation asked a priest what his attitude was towards anti-religious propoganda which was pouring out in spate at the time of our visit. "Oh," said the priest, "that is really nothing to do with me. That propoganda is all politics." He knew perfectly well that the only way he could go on being a priest was by saying nothing about the anti-religious propoganda which was assailing his congregation throughout their daily lives.

We were taken to see an anti-religious museum in Leningrad, or, rather, having heard of its existence, we insisted on being taken to it. Here we saw the crudest misrepresentations of the Roman Catholic faith in the form of tableaux, sketches and diagrams all designed to throw ridicule on the Christian faith. Here it is that the anti-religious propagandists have been so clever, because they have not attacked their own Russian Orthodox Church. That would arouse too much opposition. Instead they attack the Roman Catholic Church, which in many forms has outward similarity and which in Russia is practically non-existent. They can attack the Roman Catholic Church with impunity, and at the same time get their points across extremely well and forcibly.

There was at the time of the Delegation's visit a strong anti-religious campaign going on in the Press. The theatre shows often included, by some means or other, a slighting reference to religious belief, such as the spectacle of a Russian peasant crossing himself in front of an ikon or a priest performing a bogus marriage ceremony as a result of being bribed ostentatiously by one member of the company. Those instances usually provoked laughter and titters. The fact remains that the Russian campaign has been not only continuous but is continuing with ever-increasing vigour. A belief in religion is regarded as incompatible with certain callings. One may not really be a member of the Communist Party and a believer; belief in religion is incompatible with being a teacher; and I should imagine that any show of belief makes life rather difficult for factory managers, works directors and State department officials.

You may have noticed that recently Kruschkev has announced that there is to be an easing up of anti-religious propoganda, and there are

certain Russophiles who have taken that up and said that it shows what progress is being made in Russia today. I do not think it means any such thing. It is simply timed to coincide with the presence of British Churchmen in Russia. They are today being received by the Moscow Church, so that I believe it is nothing more than a device to lull them into feeling that perhaps things are on the mend in Russia today. I see no reason why they should be letting up unless the campaign has been too crude in the past and so is arousing a certain amount of opposition.

The great skill in this anti-religious campaign is that there should be no martyrs; the opposition must never have an opportunity of turning itself into a group of martyrs. I should mention, because it will be of interest to you, that I did not see or hear anything of any campaign against the Islamic faith. I much regret that it did not occur to me to ask more specifically about that. The campaign against belief as explained to us was essentially against belief in the Christian Church; I heard no reference to Islamic believers. That does not mean the campaign is not being pursued against Islamic believers in Moslem areas.

I could, of course, talk for a long time on the different aspects of the Russian scenes we saw, but I feel I must confine myself to one final aspect, and that is the political situation, particularly as regards Russia and the Western world. As you will see, in some respects there is a new look in Russia today. The standard of living is increasing and improving. The large schemes of public works, many extravagant and wasteful, will provide, nevertheless, appreciable improvement in transport and other facilities. But while we have the new look we also have the old ideals, and the old ideals are entrenched in the Kremlin as firmly as ever.

As a Delegation we were extremely fortunate in having an audience with Mr. Voroshilov, President of the U.S.S.R., and also with Mr. Malenkov, who received us in his own office unaccompanied by anyone else save Mr. Molotov and one official interpreter. As a courtesy he invited the British Ambassador to be present, and we had a most stimulating and worthwhile talk with Mr. Malenkov and Mr. Molotov for one and a quarter hours before we left. I obviously cannot give you the conversation verbatim, but what follows is in some respects a kind of summary of the questions and answers. I should mention that Mr. Malenkov obviously enjoyed the debate. He liked being asked awkward questions and gave spirited answers. The only paper on his desk was that containing a list of the names of the members of the Delegation and which party they represented. As we had a shot at him he, in turn, slanted the answer according to the party affiliation. That is pretty good. After all, England is a small island a long way away from Moscow. We felt it was a compliment that he had taken so much trouble to know our political views.

We asked him about peaceful coexistence, and he said he thought peaceful coexistence could continue until the World Revolution. Pressed further, he admitted that they still believed in a World Communist Revolution and in the ultimate establishment of a World Communist State, but he hastened to add that there need be no war of weapons to bring it about; it need only be a war of ideas, and he added: "A war of ideas in which we are bound to win because the Communist way of life is so very much

better than yours." We thought that as he had never been outside Russia, except to visit Communist China, it might be a good thing if he were to visit the Western World.

We then pressed him about peace, and he explained that he was very concerned about the warlike intentions of the United States of America and the Western democracies. He asked us point-blank if we had seen any evidence of preparation for war anywhere in the Soviet Union. I was tempted to say I had seen very good evidence in the aircraft factory I had visited on the previous day, but I felt that would divert the conversation on to matters of detail. He also asked if we had seen evidence of air raid shelters anywhere. I would have liked to say that the only place in which I had seen them was in the aircraft works because the workers there were those the Russians wanted to protect more than any others. There is, of course, plenty of evidence of Soviet military preparation, of which the aircraft factory is only one example; other examples were the large numbers of troops to be seen in every town and the high proportion of lorries coming away from the Molotov Vehicle Works and being handed over to Army units.

We said: "Be that as it may, the Western world are very doubtful about your good intentions; will you as a gesture abandon the Cominform?" Oh no, he could not possibly abandon the Cominform because that was an information exchange centre and was similar to the Socialist Internationale, to which he understood the British Labour Party already subscribed. So we told Malenkov that we were very worried over Poland and Czechoslovakia; how could he possibly justify keeping such large numbers of troops in those countries, and did he not realize that by keeping Russian troops there he invited the British and the Americans to keep troops on the Continent of Europe? "Well," he said, "we could not possibly withdraw our troops from Poland or Czechoslovakia because that would be a breach of faith on our part." He pointed out that the Polish and Czechoslovakian Governments had both been freely elected and, as a result, had unanimously invited the Russian troops to go to the protection of those countries and save them from aggressive American imperialism. As one of the members of the Delegation remarked afterwards, if you can believe that you can believe anything. But it does serve to underline the great difficulty which confronts anyone who tries to deal or treat with the Russian Government. They want to have it all their own way; they believe they can only have their security provided everybody else is insecure.

You may say: Surely this drive for friendship is evidence of a new approach, a new attitude, in Moscow. It is certainly evidence of a new tactic, but it does not indicate as yet any change in the fundamental strategy of ultimately securing a World Communist Revolution. My reading of it is that the Russians realize that the method of Korea was wrong, that armed intervention only causes strong reaction in the Western world, and that they must go softly in future instead of being so aggressive. One must also remember that the West is now strong. We have N.A.T.O. We have armed forces encircling the Soviet Union and a degree of unity amongst the free countries which we did not have a year or two ago. Why

should Russia be friendly now? Surely only because the West is strong. Let us not be taken in by the friendship drive. I feel that Mr. Malenkov gave it away when he said: "If Britain and Russia are friends no one in the world will dare to attack us." He means, quite clearly: If only Britain could be wooed away from the alliance with the United States of America, then Russia will be far and away the strongest Power in Europe and be able to pursue that plan of Communist expansion.

The Russians are now pursuing, if they can, a battle of ideas rather than a battle of weapons, and the battle of ideas is one which should be taken very seriously. In every hotel we encountered delegations from the countries of Free Asia—an Indian delegation, one from Indonesia, another from Thailand, and delegations from other countries. In the remotest parts we came across these Asiatic delegations all being shown the Communist way of life under most luxurious personal conditions. I only regret we are not doing anything on that scale in the free countries of the world in order to show these new peoples that we have a way of life which is a very much better way indeed.

In the battle of ideas one may be quite certain that the Russians will cheat whenever they can, and we must be ready and prepared for it. I know this sounds frivolous, but I would not be at all surprised if Spartak had not been told to lose to Wolverhampton Wanderers in order to prove to the British that the Russians are good sportsmen! That is the extent to which they are prepared to go in the development of their battle of ideas.

You may say that this all sounds very pessimistic; is there no hope for the future? I am sure there is plenty of hope for the future, but I do not think we should be taken in by the present friendship drive. Maybe there will be a change of heart, and it will be quite easy to see when that change of heart has taken place. There are one or two fundamental requirements, and when those are met I am sure a change of heart will have occurred.

To begin with, there must be unrestricted travel from Great Britain into Russia, and Russians must be able to come and visit us whenever they want to and without special formalities. Then there must be the right of free assembly in Russia itself. That simply is non-existent today for all proper purposes. We were told of one example. When Sir John Hunt went to Moscow to lecture about his wonderful ascent of Mount Everest, the British Ambassador tried twice to get a public hall in Moscow so that Sir John could deliver his lecture in public. The Ambassador's two applications were never even answered or acknowledged by the Russian authorities, so when Sir John arrived he could only speak to the staffs of the other Embassies gathered together in the British Embassy.

Russia is a long way from being a free and independent country. Not only must there be travel from the Soviet Union and to the Soviet Union; there must be unrestricted domestic travel also. At present one can only buy a railway ticket if one has permission from the police beforehand to do so, so that people are not allowed to move about freely even within the confines of Russia. There must be unfettered radio and TV programmes, so that the U.S.S.R. can learn the ways of the West. If they would only permit free broadcasts we would be well on our way to winning the battle

of ideas. Finally, and most important of all, there must be real freedom for the Christian Church. To put it in a nutshell, the day that Mr. Malenkov becomes a Christian is the day I can believe there has been a change of heart in the Soviet Union.

There is no evidence of any of these fundamental changes having taken place so far. The so-called "friendship" is being used cynically as the new weapon in the fundamental war of ideas—a war which is of their making, and which could be avoided quickly if the minds of Russia's rulers could be opened to the free world.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Erroll said he would be pleased to answer questions, so I take the opportunity to ask the first question. We saw that a worker received extra pay for exceeding his output target. What happens if a worker does not reach the target?

Mr. ERROLL: If a worker fails to reach the target set for his job he may be summoned before the Workers' Committee, who tell him he has to do better. Also the trade union official, so far from being the worker's friend, will admonish him and try to see what the trouble is. If the worker still fails to maintain his target he is disciplined by the Workers' Committee and the manager must act upon the recommendation of that committee. The worker may be fined or made to work for a longer period for lower pay or compulsorily transferred to another works on lower priority production. If the worker still continues to be a slacker he may go to a forced labour camp somewhere east of the Urals.

Group-Captain H. ST. CLAIR SMALLWOOD: The lecturer mentioned Sverdlovsk. I would like to ask if there is any memorial to the Tsar's family there? Is the murder condoned or is it looked upon as a good thing?

Secondly, I would like to know whether there has been any attempt to develop the Lena goldfields, which were believed some years ago to be immensely rich in ore?

Mr. ERROLL: As regards the Tsar we asked the Russians about the place where the Tsar was said to have been assassinated. In Sverdlovsk, by luck, on the first day the driver of my car when going along the road turned to the interpreter and said, "That's the house where the Tsar was assassinated," and the interpreter, being new to Sverdlovsk, did not know that he should not have passed that remark on. Later I asked to see the house and the mayor told me that the house no longer existed, and when I said, "That's funny; I saw it this morning," he replied, "Dear Mr. Erroll, you must have been misinformed." The following day, as luck would have it, the Pioneer Club was practically opposite the house that had been pointed out by the car driver, so I said I would walk back to the hotel after the visit to the club so as to have a look at it. The response was: "Dear Mr. Erroll, you will catch a cold because it is raining." I replied that I was hardier than the Russians and would not catch a cold. "Well, dear Mr. Erroll, you will be late for dinner." I said: "It is two hours to dinner; I only have to walk four hundred yards to the hotel." So dear Mr. Erroll got out of the car and proceeded to walk, as I thought, alone to the house, but in two or three minutes I was followed and caught

up with by an English-speaking Russian from the Sverdlovsk Soviet who wanted to know what I was nosing around for. I told him I was trying to find my way into the house where the Tsar was assassinated. He replied: "You are misinformed; the house was in another part of the town. It has been pulled down." When I returned to England I obtained a copy of an old French book in which there was a photograph of the house in which the Tsar was assassinated, the book having been published in 1922 or 1923. I was astonished to find that the photograph of the house in that book exactly tallied with the one I had seen in Sverdlovsk.

As regards gold-mining, I do not know anything about the Lena gold-fields. Industrial managers usually know only about their own enterprises. I learned there was one deep shaft in Eastern Siberia which was the deepest in Russia, but the manager who mentioned it would not give me the exact location.

Major E. AINGER: May I touch on the subject of ideological weapons? Did the lecturer get any idea of the views of the students when talking to them? Were they beginning to ask questions? Are the sons of officials of the type of Molotov taking life seriously? I had a chat with another member of your Delegation and he could throw very little light on that aspect. My mind goes back some twenty years, when there was a good deal of ill-feeling between the officer class and the technological people, the idea being that the former grew fat on caviare while the latter lived on tea and biscuits.

Mr. ERROLL: As regards young people, we had some opportunity of cross-examining the students, men and women in their early twenties. We used to ask: "What do you think of England? We are from England. What would you like to ask us?" We asked that in order to try to find out what they were thinking about. In general, they possessed the ideas put into their heads by newspapers and radio. One question we were asked was: "Are the workers in England only allowed to work five days a week and have to starve the other two days?" Another student wanted to know why all the schools in London had been closed down. Another wanted to know how up to date Charles Dickens was, and particularly *Oliver Twist*, because he thought it gave an idea of life in present-day England. I do not think it is possible to say what it is the young people in Russia think. They think, as far as we could tell, what is said in the Press and on the radio.

As regards the officials' children growing fat and becoming playboys in Moscow, I am not quite sure what the questioner had in mind.

Major AINGER: Are they interested in amusements only and not interested seriously in life?

Mr. ERROLL: We were staying at the best hotel when in Moscow, and there was a dinner dance on three or four nights of the week. We watched it from the gallery, which was as near as we could get. It looked a very dreary affair.

Major Ainger's third point was in regard to the officer class *versus* the technologists. We never met any officers at all except one elderly Field-Marshal at one particular function, so that I cannot speak from personal knowledge. We were, however, told that at present the Russian Army is



well content and is very well looked after; it has a high standard of living by Russian standards.

Mr. LANGE: We saw two photographs showing stylish automobiles of a rather luxury type. Were they a Russian production or is there a great deal of importation of foreign luxury cars into Russia?

Mr. ERROLL: No, the cars you saw were made in Russia and we actually saw them being made. The Zim car, that which you saw the worker leaning up against, is a Russian copy of the American Chevrolet. They are good cars and run extremely well; officials get them on a system of allocation. We were told that anyone who had the money could buy one of those cars; I had the impression that there was a long waiting list. When I asked if I could see a motor showroom in Moscow the subject was changed quickly.

Judge AMEER ALI: I think it is pretty well established that propaganda against the Moslem religion in the Soviet Union is just as strong as against any other faith. There were complaints recently in Russian Central Asia that the religious habits of some of the population had slowed down production because they would fast for a month and pray on occasions. There was a statement in the Press recently to the effect that a more moderate method of anti-religious propaganda in Russia was called for owing to previous tactlessness. It was urged that more subtle forms must be used. It was further stated that moderation now being urged in this connection was evoked by the drive for further Soviet influence in the independent Moslem countries, in Persia and Afghanistan, etc. Anti-religious propaganda in those countries would not further Russian political projects.

Mr. ERROLL: I fully endorse what the questioner has just said. The Russians are going slow with their anti-religious campaign because they feel they were rather too hot on it previously, although they have no intention of letting up on it altogether. They intend to be more subtle. That is in keeping with the friendship drive. They must be more subtle in their political propaganda than in the past.

Sir NIGEL DAVIDSON: The lecturer mentioned that he visited a forced labour camp. Could he tell us what the conditions were like there?

Mr. ERROLL: I could give a whole talk on that subject. It was not actually a forced labour camp but a prison labour camp, where the convicts were put to work. The camp was thirty miles out of Moscow. They were all men there, all first offenders. I was invited to pick out any I wished to talk to. They were serving sentences varying from three to five or ten years for offences such as knocking a friend over the head with a vodka bottle or, in some cases, appropriating funds of a State department, which has a somewhat familiar ring about it. They were put to work in a factory where they produced kettles, pots and pans, aluminium spoons and such-like things. They received wages up to £3 10s. a week, which they could send to relatives or save up until they were released, or spend in the canteen where they could buy butter, eggs, biscuits, fish and even caviare. So you see all is well; even prisoners have caviare in Russia. They could also buy clothes to send out to the peasants if they wished. The object is to put into the mind of the prisoner the idea of steady regular work which will fit him to take his rightful place in the Soviet Union.

Mr. S. S. HAMMERSLEY: Did Mr. Erroll during the whole course of his tour meet any persons in a position of authority other than the proletariat or who had risen from the proletariat; in other words, would we be right in thinking that the whole of the former official ruling class has been eliminated?

Mr. ERROLL: That is a very thoughtful question and of course we only got very scattered impressions in regard to such a big matter. As regards works directors in the various factories, we found that they had invariably risen from the shop floor and in most cases from the floor of the shop of which they were in charge. As regards the municipal officials, the equivalent of the mayors of towns or cities, they were, again, almost invariably men who had risen from the bottom in their own town. The principal officials in Moscow, where we did meet them, were men who had come up and come on with the growth of the present Soviet régime. Here and there we did notice a person of a different stamp and, on making tactful inquiries, we learned he probably had some blood in him from the former régime and was "the son of a gentleman," as we would say in England. It was difficult, travelling so much in so short a period, to get used to the different facial types, but even on a quick and concentrated visit we were able to pick out one or two isolated cases of some survival from the old official ruling class. In one particular works I remember noticing that the assistant works manager was plainly of a different calibre from all the rest. Apart from the few odd exceptions I think it fair to say that the ruling classes of the past have been entirely wiped out. As another example there was a butler in one of the hotels who was very old but obviously had previously waited upon some well-to-do family in the district. He behaved quite differently from the present run of servants and had a style and a charm about him which singled him out from the others. Apart from those odd isolated examples, the whole of the top end of Russia consists of the new men and the new women who believe utterly and completely in their Soviet Communist Party.

The CHAIRMAN: It remains for me to thank, on your behalf, Mr. Erroll for his astonishingly interesting and thoughtful lecture, most delightfully given. I am sure most of us envy his Delegation their trip to Moscow. His talk has confirmed the determination of all here that we must continue to stand on our guard. Thank you very much indeed, Mr. Erroll.

# THE AVICENNA MILLENARY CELEBRATIONS IN PERSIA

By LAURENCE LOCKHART

IT is not possible within the compass of this article to give a detailed biography of Avicenna or a full description of his works, but it will not be out of place to include in it a brief account of his birth, parentage and principal achievements.

Avicenna, or Ibn Sina as he is known in the East,\* was born at Afshana, a small village near Bukhara, the capital of Transoxiana, in 370 A.H. (A.D. 980-81); there has been some dispute as to this date, but it is the one which is now usually regarded as correct. The fact that Transoxiana was a land which had repeatedly been overrun by Arabs, Turks and Persians, and had therefore a very mixed population, explains why these three peoples have each claimed him as one of their countrymen.

'Abdullah, Avicenna's father, was a native of Balkh, and it has not been definitely established that he was a Persian; on the other hand, no convincing evidence has ever been produced to show that he was of Arab or Turkish stock. Avicenna's mother, whose name was Sitara, was almost certainly of Persian race. Moreover, the fact that the family was Shi'i and not Sunni in its religious views tends to support the Persian claim, though this in itself cannot be regarded as conclusive evidence. But apart altogether from this question of the nationality of his parents, the fact that Avicenna spent so many years of his life in Persia, and composed his greatest works in that country, is in itself a strong reason why the Persians of today should take a special pride in his wonderful achievements and why they decided to pay a fitting tribute to his memory on the occasion of the thousandth anniversary (according to the lunar reckoning) of his birth.

The young Avicenna was educated in Bukhara, where the Samanid Nuh II, the ruler of Transoxiana, had his court. By the age of ten he had learnt the Qu'ran by heart. He then applied himself to the study of arithmetic, geometry, Muslim jurisprudence, logic and metaphysics; in all these studies he showed an extraordinary precocity and aptitude for learning. Here we may quote a few lines from his autobiography :

"I now occupied myself with mastering the various texts and commentaries on natural science and metaphysics, until all the gates of knowledge were open to me. Next I desired to study medicine, and proceeded to read all the books that have been written on this subject. Medicine is not a difficult science, and naturally I excelled in it in a very short time, so that qualified physicians began to read medicine with me. I also undertook to treat the sick, and methods

\* His full name was Abu 'Ali al-Husain ibn 'Abdullah ibn 'Ali, called Ibn Sina. Avicenna, the Latin version of his name, was derived from a mutilation of the Hebrew form Bin Sina.

of treatment derived from practical experience revealed themselves to me such as baffle description. At the same time I continued between whiles to study and dispute on law, being now 16 years of age."

Not long afterwards, Avicenna was called in to treat Nuh ibn Mansur, the ruler of Transoxiana, for an illness which the other physicians had failed to cure. He succeeded, and was rewarded by the grateful ruler with a post at the court and was also given leave to use the royal library; there he found a large collection of books and was thereby enabled to extend his knowledge still further.

It was fortunate for him that he had these educational advantages at an early age, because in 999 the Samanid dynasty came to an abrupt end when Mahmud of Ghazna invaded and overran Transoxiana. Avicenna could doubtless have obtained employment at Mahmud's court, but he preferred to seek his fortune in lands that were under Persian rule. After residing for a time in Khwarazm, he went to Gurgan, in north-eastern Persia, where he began the *Qanun fi'l-Tibb*, the "Canon of Medicine," the first of his two major works. He also wrote many other books there.

From Gurgan he went to Rayy, and thence, after an interval, to Hamadan, where he entered the service of the Buwayhid ruler Shams al-Daula, and rose to be his Vizier. At Hamadan he had to devote his days to his official duties, but at night-time he wrote his books, discussed metaphysical and other problems with his friends and often caroused with them. It was at this time that he began his other great work, the *Kitab al-Shifa*, the "Book of the Remedy," a treatise on Aristotelian philosophy and science.

After the death of Shams al-Daula in 1022, Avicenna found it expedient to leave Hamadan and enter the service of the Kakuyid ruler Ala al-Daula at Isfahan. In that city he completed the *Qanun fi'l-Tibb* and the *Kitab al-Shifa*, as well as a number of works on various other scientific subjects. All these books were in Arabic, but when Avicenna wrote poetry, as he sometimes did, he used the Persian language.

Avicenna had been endowed with an excellent constitution, but in his later years he overtaxed his strength and fell into ill-health. In 1037, although very ill, he accompanied Ala al-Daula to Hamadan, but died there almost immediately after his arrival.\*

Such in brief was Avicenna's remarkable career. There can be no doubt that he was one of the greatest thinkers in the Islamic world. His fame, indeed, soon spread far beyond its limits. Although he was, in reality, even more eminent as a philosopher than as a physician, it was his great medical work the *Qanun* which, in a Latin translation, was by far the most widely read of his works in the West. It was, in fact, used there for several centuries as the chief textbook on medicine.

Several years before the millenary of Avicenna's birth was due,

\* Here it must be pointed out that Ibn al-Athir, in his book *al-Kamil fi'l-Tarikh*, Cairo, 1301 (1883-84), vol. ix, p. 190, stated categorically that Avicenna died in Isfahan. For this reason the Isfahanis felt strongly that the celebrations that were held at Hamadan should have taken place in their city.

elaborate plans were drawn up in Persia for its celebration. In the drawing up of these plans and in the vast amount of work to which they subsequently gave rise, a number of ministries and other organizations were involved, such as the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Seven-Year Plan Organization, the Society for National Monuments, the Society for the Preservation of National Monuments and the Red Lion and Sun Society. Finance was to be arranged by grants from the Government and various bodies and by a special Avicenna lottery.

The plans referred to above included the following projects: (i) the replacement of the then existing tomb of Avicenna at Hamadan by an impressive mausoleum, (ii) the inauguration of a special library in the mausoleum building, (iii) the erection of a statue of Avicenna in Hamadan close to the mausoleum, (iv) the preparation and publication of a set of Avicenna's works in Persian, (v) the striking of an Avicenna medal, and (vi) the issue of a special set of postage stamps. It was, furthermore, decided to convene an Avicenna Congress in Persia in 1370 (1950-51), the year of the millenary, to which Orientalists from all parts of the world would be invited to attend and to contribute papers on Avicenna. To this Congress H.I.M. the Shah graciously agreed to extend his patronage.

Work was started on the new mausoleum on the site of Avicenna's tomb at Hamadan in 1949, and the construction was also begun of a lecture hall for the Congress in the grounds of Tehran University.

Unfortunately, when the date for the celebrations drew near, circumstances arose in Persia which necessitated their postponement until April, 1954 (some celebrations, however, did take place in October, 1952, at Tehran and Hamadan, but they were on a very small scale and there were no foreign participants).

Early in 1954 invitations to the foreign Orientalists to attend the Congress were sent out, and the date fixed for its opening was April 21. H.E. 'Ali Asghar Hekmat, the Iranian Ambassador at Delhi, who had played an active part in the planning of the celebrations, was given special leave of absence from his post in order that he might assist in the final preparations and preside at the meetings of the Congress.

Soon after the middle of April, over eighty Orientalists, from twenty-seven different countries, arrived in Tehran; in addition there were between thirty and forty Persian delegates. All the foreign delegates came as the guests of the Persian Government, and the arrangements made for their accommodation, comfort and transport were excellent. Nothing could have been friendlier than the reception accorded to the foreign delegates when they arrived.

On the morning of April 21 the delegates went to the royal palace to pay their respects to H.I.M. the Shah by signing the book; they afterwards went to Rayy to see the mausoleum of the late Reza Shah (it adjoins the shrine of Shah 'Abdu'l-'Azim, a ninth-century saint).

At 3 p.m. on the same day the Prime Minister formally opened the Congress in the new Avicenna lecture hall by giving the inaugural address. Speeches were then made by the President of the Society for National Monuments, the Minister of Education, the Chancellor of Tehran University and certain of the foreign delegates.

The reading of papers on Avicenna by the delegates began on April 22 and continued until April 27. The sessions were from 8.30 a.m. to 1.30 p.m., with a break of half an hour; on some days there was an evening session from 6 to 8 p.m. Each delegate was allowed to speak for fifteen minutes, and there was no limitation as to what languages could be used; consequently, there were papers in Persian, Arabic, Turkish, English, French, German and Russian.

The activities of the delegates were by no means confined to the reading of and listening to these papers.

On Friday, April 23 (when there were no congressional meetings), a visit was paid to the Gulistan Palace. In the afternoon the delegates had the honour of being received by H.I.M. the Shah and H.M. the Queen at the Marble Palace. They were introduced by H.E. 'Ali Asghar Hekmat, who, it was noticed, did so without a single note.

On other days visits were paid to the National Library to see the Avicenna collection of books there, the Sepah-Salar College of Islamic Studies, the Majlis Library, the Farhangistan (the Iranian Academy), the Archæological Museum and the Institutes of National Arts. On April 23 the delegates were entertained to dinner by the Chancellor of Tehran University, and on April 26 there was a state banquet followed by a concert at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The scene of activities was changed from Tehran to Hamadan on April 28. On arrival at the latter town the delegates were most comfortably accommodated in the luxurious Abu Ali Hotel, which had been specially built for the occasion.

At 5 p.m. the statue of Avicenna, which is in the Abu Ali Avenue close to its upper end, was unveiled in the presence of a large crowd. This statue, which is of Qum marble, is the work of M. Abu'l-Hasan Sadiqi.

On the following morning all the delegates assembled outside the new Avicenna mausoleum to await the arrival of the Shah, who was to perform the opening ceremony. As His Majesty drove through the streets on his way to the mausoleum he received a great ovation from the crowds lining the streets.

After the Shah had delivered the inaugural address, speeches were made by H.E. Ali Asghar Hekmat and others, and an ode to commemorate the event was recited by Sadiq Sarmad, the Malik al-Shu'ara (Poet Laureate).

The new mausoleum, which stands on the site of the former one, is situated on the west side of the Abu 'Ali Avenue, midway between the Avicenna statue and the Pahlavi square in the centre of the town. M. Seyhoun, who had recently completed his studies in Paris, was responsible for the design of the building, in which he endeavoured to combine both ancient and modern styles of architecture. The mausoleum, which is substantially built of stone, has a row of twelve granite columns in front. In the passage leading to the tomb-chamber at the back of the building are doors giving access, on the right, to the library and, on the left, to a conference room. The tomb-chamber is square in shape, the tomb itself being in the centre. On the roof of the building, immediately over the tomb-chamber, is a tower 76 feet in height. It has a conical top,

like the famous tomb-tower of Qabus ibn Washmhir, a contemporary of Avicenna, but there the resemblance ends, for the top rests upon an open-work structure consisting of twelve ferro-concrete supports.

After the conclusion of the opening ceremony the delegates were free to visit the ancient monuments of Hamadan, such as the Parthian lion, the Gunbad-i-'Alavian, with its beautiful twelfth-century stucco work, the building containing the so-called tombs of Esther and Mordecai (in reality, the last resting-place of Queen Shushan-Dukht, the Jewish consort of the Sasanian king Yezdigird I), the tomb of the mystical poet Baba Tahir, etc. In the afternoon an excursion was made to a ravine high up on Mount Alvand to see the Ganj-Nameh ("Treasure Book"), the name given to two Achaemenian rock inscriptions, one dating from the reign of Darius and the other from that of his successor Xerxes.

On Friday, April 30, the delegates returned to Tehran, where, in the afternoon, they attended the final session of the Congress. In the evening the Minister of Education gave a farewell dinner at the Officers' Club, thus bringing the celebrations to a close.

Before the delegates left Tehran on their homeward journeys they were each given a number of books on Avicenna, a complete set of the commemorative stamps and a bronze medal. On the obverse of this medal was the portrait of Avicenna by M. Abu'l-Hasan Sadiqi, the sculptor of the statue at Hamadan; on the reverse was a representation of the Avicenna mausoleum.

Looking back on the Avicenna Congress, one can say without hesitation that it was a great success. Its proceedings, under the admirable chairmanship of H.E. 'Ali Asghar Hekmat, were conducted in a most friendly atmosphere, and it was most stimulating to meet, and to listen to, specialists from so many different lands. When, in due course, the contributions of all these savants are published it will be found that the subject of Avicenna and his works, in all its various aspects, has been most adequately covered.

# BRITISH INTERESTS IN PALESTINE IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

By A. L. TIBAWI, B.A., PH.D.

THIS paper deals with certain aspects of a wider subject which the present writer has recently been investigating under the auspices of the University of London. The wider subject is the British cultural influence in the Near East in the nineteenth century. Palestine is dealt with here because British activities were mostly concentrated there. It is impossible to do justice even to this narrower subject in a short article. Without therefore attempting a general survey of the history of Palestine from Napoleon to Allenby, it is proposed to isolate certain British interests for closer study based on original documents. Nor is it necessary to go into the details of central and provincial Ottoman administration. It is essential, however, to understand both the internal autonomy granted to religious communities and the "capitulatory" rights of European powers in the Ottoman Empire.

The non-Muslim subjects of the Empire were organized, for administrative purposes, into religious communities, with subdivisions within each community (*millet*) according to the denominational divisions. The head of the community, patriarch or rabbi, was answerable to the Turkish governor, but had wide powers over the members of his community, not only in religious matters but also in secular affairs. This system, contrary to popular belief, did not originate with the Turks, nor was it developed, as might be supposed, during the period of their decline. The system was first adopted by the Arabs during the first century of Islam, following their conquest of territories previously dominated by Byzantium. It gradually assumed a definite form and became a recognized pattern of Muslim rule over peoples with a revealed book.

Following the same practice, but also in this case to foster trade, the Sultans of Turkey granted, at the height of their power and glory in the early sixteenth century, certain privileges first to Venice and then to France. These privileges included, within limited areas, exemption from customs-duties and local taxes, and judicial extraterritoriality which placed the subjects of these states under the jurisdiction of their consular courts. These privileges were enshrined in the famous Capitulations, a term which originally meant simply the chapters (*i.e.*, *capitula*) of the agreement containing these privileges, but later on assumed the meaning of extraterritorial rights of foreigners in Turkey.

As the power of the Sultans declined, the privileges they granted almost as acts of condescension became embarrassing and humiliating rights, which in the course of time had to be conceded, not always willingly, to other powers. By the beginning of the nineteenth century the Ottoman Empire was in decay, and the capitulatory powers were competing to



increase their influence over its internal and external policy. The original agreements were occasionally revised, almost always to the advantage of the European powers. As the Holy Land, Palestine has always been an object of interest to Christendom, but for a variety of reasons this interest has from the beginning of the nineteenth century been intensified. France, Russia and Great Britain were the three major powers directly interested in Palestine. France had acquired the right to protect the Latin communities, and likewise Russia to protect the Greek Orthodox communities. At first there was no indigenous Protestant community, but gradually, and largely through the efforts of the English missions, a small Protestant community was formed and recognized as such by the Ottoman authorities. Although Britain did not assume the formal rôle of protector of this community, she did in fact better by trying to balance the Russian and French influence.

British interests in Palestine during the century were more numerous than is commonly known. On assuming the mandate for Palestine after the First World War, Great Britain certainly did not come to a country in which British people and interests were not known already. That event was indeed only the culmination of a century of intensive activity, political, religious, educational and philanthropic. Of all this it is intended to deal only with the first three because their emergence and development were so closely interdependent.\*

Such was the prestige of Great Britain in the Ottoman Empire at the turn of the century following the defeat of Napoleon before the walls of Acre, which was defended from the sea by Sir Sidney Smith, that both the Orthodox and the Latin communities were seeking her protection: the Latin because of the rupture of relations between Turkey and France, and the Orthodox apparently because of Sir Sidney's presence on the spot. "The public has been much occupied," wrote Lord Elgin, the British Ambassador in Constantinople, on January 11, 1800, "by an expedition which Sir Sidney Smith has made from the Grand Vizier's camp to Jerusalem." Sir Sidney set out from Jaffa escorted by his own marines and a hundred Turks. On arrival at Jerusalem he went to the convent of St. John, and later marched in procession to the Holy Sepulchre. After three days he returned to the camp. "The Patriarch of Jerusalem [*i.e.*, Orthodox Patriarch, whose seat was still in Constantinople] has this day applied to me," continued Lord Elgin, "for a letter of recommendation to Sir Sidney Smith to request that officer to extend his protection to the Greeks as well as to the Roman Catholics at Jerusalem. . . ."<sup>†</sup>

Meanwhile in England the shock of the French Revolution, the Evangelical Revival and other factors were contributing to a remarkable missionary movement. In 1799 the Church Missionary Society was formed, and just after Waterloo it sent a representative to open a Mediterranean mission in Malta. In 1809 the London Society for Promoting Christianity

\* The following account is based mainly on the (British) Foreign Office diplomatic and consular papers preserved in the Public Record Office and on the records, both printed and manuscript, of the missionary societies concerned preserved at their headquarters in London.

† Foreign Office (Turkey), 78/28 in the Public Record Office, London.

amongst the Jews (known for short as the London Jews Society) was formed and soon started exploring possibilities in the Near East and Palestine. One of the main aims of the first Society was the conversion, through education and welfare, of the Muslims and the Eastern Christians to Protestantism, while the second Society aimed exclusively at the conversion of the Jews.

Missionary work did not, however, suit the Ottoman Government, who protested that, in the first place, it would undermine the state religion, and, in the second place, it would cause internal dissension and strife among their Christian and Jewish subjects. In reality the Ottoman Government feared that missionary activity was a mere cover for political and territorial penetration in the Empire. Under these conditions little more could be achieved than visits of exploration, contacts with local ecclesiastical heads and distribution of Bibles in the vernaculars, issuing chiefly from a press established for this purpose in Malta. But even this was rendered a risky endeavour by the simultaneous issue of a firman (imperial decree) by the Sultan and a Papal Bull in 1825 forbidding the distribution of these Bibles. "The Eastern Antichrist co-operates with the Western!"\* declared Josiah Pratt, Secretary of the Church Missionary Society. This is clearly picturesque language, but it must be stated for the sake of historical truth that the efforts of Sultan and Pope were by no means concerted. The Roman Catholic objection was that these new versions "were corrupted and vitiated," circulated by missionaries described by the *Propaganda de Fide* in Rome as "banditori dell' errore e della corruzione."† On the other hand, the Sultan's order was a measure of administrative expediency, designed to maintain the *status quo* and to prevent sectarian argument, which often led to violence. His objections had nothing to do with religion.

This situation was radically changed in the thirties when the Viceroy of Egypt, Muhammad Ali, defied his suzerain and conquered Syria-Palestine. As in his own dominions, the Viceroy made it easier for Europeans to travel, live and work in Palestine. The missionaries were quick to seize the opportunity. Thus the representative of the London Jews Society, a Dane in Anglican orders, was the first to establish himself in Jerusalem in 1833.‡ Before and after this date missionaries and travellers, but more particularly the former, were agitating for the instalment of a British consular agent in Jerusalem, and for the recognition of the Protestants as a community under their own spiritual head. In 1826 the committee of the L.J.S. was urged by its delegate, after a visit to Palestine, to endeavour before sending missionaries there "to effect something with the view of obtaining a resident consul or protector, in behalf of the visitors and European settlers at Jerusalem. . . ." He goes on to say: "My last visit to the Holy City has convinced me more than ever of the duty of attempting to engage our friends to see this desirable object put into execution."§ Let us note that the recommendation is dated 1826.

\* E. Stock, *History of the Church Missionary Society*, i, p. 231. London, 1899.

† London Jews Society, *Proceedings*, 1825, pp. 107-8, 100, 102.

‡ F.O. 78/874 (dispatch dated November 7, 1851, from Consul Finn to Canning).

§ L.J.S., *Proceedings*, 1826, p. 25.

Before that date consuls were employed solely by the Levant Company; after it they were appointed by the Government. The difficulty for the British Government was that consuls had hitherto resided only at seaports like Alexandria, or at important centres of land communication like Aleppo. Jerusalem was neither. Besides, it was a Muslim holy city, and hoisting foreign flags was likely to arouse trouble or at least protest.

But repeated representations, supported by influential people like the Earl of Shaftesbury, produced the desired effect. Palmerston took action. In 1833 he drafted a dispatch to the British consul in Alexandria instructing him to recommend to Muhammad Ali's favour British subjects "settled for commercial purposes in various parts of Syria." The consul replied that "His highness assured me with great earnestness that his anxious wish and desire was to give to British subjects every support, in order to cultivate his relations with us, and to show his respect to His Majesty's Government, and that every necessary order had been given by him in Syria to that effect."\*

The way to further British interests was now smooth. Accordingly Muhammad Ali was approached to approve the opening of a British Consulate in Jerusalem. He agreed in principle, but refused to sanction the appointment of a consul without the prior issue of a firman by the Sultan, the legal sovereign. This was sought in the usual way. Palmerston's dispatch to Ponsonby, the Ambassador at Constantinople, dated November 11, 1837, states: "H.M.G. having deemed it expedient to appoint a British consul to reside at Jerusalem . . ." and goes on to instruct the Ambassador to say that "frequent complaints have been made to H.M.G. by English travellers who have been at Jerusalem that in a place which they felt so much interest in visiting there was no British consular agent to afford to them the ordinary assistance which British travellers expect to meet with in places of considerable note."† Jerusalem is no doubt always a place of considerable note, but it was then not less so in the eyes of the Ottoman Government. The request for a British Consulate was being pressed simultaneously with another for the erection of a Protestant church in that city, requests which the Pasha of Egypt was prepared to comply with only with the prior sanction of the Sultan. After repeated representations the Sultan yielded, and recognized William Young as British vice-consul in Jerusalem. The new diplomat took up his residence in that city in 1838.

Considerable pressure was brought to bear on the Porte with regard to the erection of a Protestant church. But meanwhile Muhammad Ali's revolt against his master became, for a variety of reasons, a subject of concern to the European powers, which ended in their intervention and the restoration of Syria-Palestine to the Sultan. The occasion was an ideal one for speculation as to the future of the Holy Land, and it was proposed to constitute Palestine and the Holy Places as a Christian enclave under international control, but this form of control was as difficult to achieve then as it has proved to be since.

The restoration of Palestine to his control, in which Great Britain

\* F.O. 78/227 (Consul Campbell's dispatch dated July 20, 1833).

† F.O. 78/300.

played a major part, made the Sultan more amenable to British proposals. Within ten years three major concessions were wrung from him: approval of the erection of a Protestant church, acceptance of a Protestant bishop in Jerusalem and recognition of the Protestants as a new religious community. Writing to Ponsonby on February 8, 1841, Palmerston refers to the expediency of taking advantage of "the present state of affairs in the Levant to obtain from the Porte a formal assent" (*i.e.*, to the erection of the church), and concludes that this "is a matter in which H.M.G. take a deep interest, one in which they are extremely anxious to succeed." And succeed they did.

The major problem, however, was the Bishopric. The Church Missionary Society, which was still hovering round, but not yet operating in, Palestine, was thinking of Malta as a seat of a bishop of the Church of England for the Mediterranean. The Society had "earnestly promoted this important measure."\* But King Frederick William IV of Prussia, who was deeply interested in the missions and church unity, proposed through a special envoy, both to the British Government and to the Archbishop of Canterbury, the establishment in Jerusalem of an Anglican Bishopric to which all Protestant missionaries and residents, British or Prussian, would be attached. The proposal aroused much discussion and controversy, both in church and state circles, but in the end it was adopted, and legislation was introduced in the House of Lords by the Archbishop of Canterbury to cover it. In a confidential dispatch dated September 27, 1841, Palmerston wrote to Ponsonby that "it had been decided that a Bishop of the Church of England should be sent out to Jerusalem, specially consecrated for the purpose of exercising his ecclesiastical functions in Palestine. . . ."†

Of all the demands made on them this was the most perplexing for the Ottoman Government. Legally, the Bishop of Jerusalem was the Greek Orthodox Patriarch. Numerically, resident Protestants were still a mere handful. Administratively, the Government had to cope with the violent opposition to Protestant missionaries offered not only by the Eastern Churches but also by the Jews. In the same confidential dispatch from Palmerston already quoted occurs a passage, obviously framed to allay Turkish fears, as regards missionary work among the Muslims. "This Bishop," it runs, "will, like any other British or Prussian subject, have a right to reside in any part of the Turkish dominions, and the spiritual functions which he will exercise will in no way whatever interfere with the Mahometan subjects of the Sultan. . . ." The difficulty of conflict of jurisdiction was also ironed out, in form at least. The new dignitary was to be called "Bishop *in* Jerusalem" and not "Bishop *of* Jerusalem." After considerable delay, and rather sharp diplomatic exchanges, the Ottoman Government agreed, and the new Bishop entered Jerusalem on January 21, 1842. Recognition of the Protestants as a community was the next logical step; this recognition was formally granted in 1850. According to its terms, members of other Christian communities who became Protestant automatically came under the jurisdiction of the head of their new community. Previous to this year such persons were in a very

\* C.M.S., *Annual Report*, 1840-41, p. 47.

† F.O. 78/429.

awkward position, not belonging legally to the community they left nor to the community they joined.

Thus were the foundations laid. By 1850 British interests included the Consulate, the Bishopric, and the new Protestant community. From now on British activities, centred on these, became increasingly intensified and diversified. Thus, for example, the Church Missionary Society entered the field with an ambitious scheme of missionary work, through teaching, preaching and welfare, among both the Muslims and the Eastern Christians, while the London Jews Society continued its efforts on similar lines among the Jews. Other missionary organizations followed, and still more organizations of various description and interests appeared on the scene. The second half of the century is indeed so crowded with significant and interesting British activities that it is impossible to cover more than a fraction of them. They may, however, be conveniently indicated by taking some characteristic problems and episodes.

One of the first problems that had to be faced was the question of the nationality of the converts to Protestantism, especially if they were ordained in the Church of England. Thus a priest, a converted Jew, applied to the British Consul-General in Beirut for a British passport and stated he was a British subject, but when pressed to name the place of his birth in Great Britain he said he was "a British subject by spirit." The first Anglican Bishop in Jerusalem, himself also a converted Jew, took up the case with the consul, and wrote: "A clergyman ordained in the Church of England may not be a *native* of Great Britain, but he must be a *subject* of the Crown, having in his ordination vow sworn allegiance to Her Majesty. . . . I have no doubt you acted on instructions, but there must be an alteration made in the law. I have written to the Archbishop on the subject. . . ."

But the Bishop was here against a versatile consul who later acquired fame in the Crimea and the Indian Mutiny and rose to be a field-marshal. Colonel Hugh Rose, as he then was, wrote in a dispatch to Aberdeen dated December 26, 1843,\* that the proposed alteration in the law would mean in effect to empower a British ecclesiastical authority to "annul all the rights of sovereignty and nationality" of foreign powers whose subjects might be converted. Rose added very shrewdly that this would also "diminish the respect which is due to disinterested conversion."

British protection was of course a great attraction in a country where the unprotected practically had no rights. Despite propaganda by their priests that "England is Protestant and not Christian,"† some Eastern Christians were anxious to become Protestant out of conviction, but there were others who sought thereby advantages, like the Nazareth notable who wanted to pay off his debts and offered to become Protestant if he was paid a certain amount, or like the Jerusalem villager who claimed exemption from military service on the ground that he was brought up as a Protestant, or like the Muslim Āghā who fell from favour with the Turkish authorities and asked the missionaries to declare him a Protestant.

The Consulate, with its agencies, was a real force in the land, deriving

\* F.O. 78/537.

† F.O. 78/444 (dispatch from Consul Young to Palmerston dated January 25, 1841)

its prestige from the immense influence which successive British ambassadors exercised in Constantinople. But it must not be supposed that the influence of the Consulate was restricted to politics. There is ample evidence to indicate that it took interest in practically every aspect of the life of the country. Thus one consul was interested in the promotion of a cotton plantation, and was also instrumental in establishing a society "for investigation and elucidation of all subjects of interest, ancient and modern, scientific and literary, belonging to the Holy Land," which may be considered as the precursor of the Palestine Exploration Fund, a learned body which is still flourishing and doing distinguished work.

The same consul opened a new tourist way to Petra via Jerusalem. Hitherto English travellers proceeding from Cairo to Jerusalem used to visit Petra on their way, and disputes with local chiefs and guides were frequent. Because of this state of affairs the consul himself undertook the journey "to prove to the people that British subjects are not forgotten even in Petra." His plan was to make Jerusalem, instead of Cairo, the starting-point of the trip to Petra, and for this purpose he concluded an agreement with an influential local chief who contracted to guarantee the safety of British travellers against payment of a fixed sum per head.

As evidence of the political influence of the Consulate suffice it here to refer to a few typical cases. Mention has already been made of the case of the Āghā who fell frōm the favour of the Ottoman Government; the same Āghā offered his obedience to the Government through the British consul as a guarantee of personal safety. On a notable occasion the consul exerted his influence to replace the Mufti of Nablus. The occasion was this: a Greek Orthodox mob attacked the new Protestant school in their town, instigated or connived at, according to the consul's dispatch dated November 18, 1853, addressed to Clarendon, by the Muslim majority. The consul concludes his dispatch giving details of this incident with this passage: "The fanatical Mufti of Nablus is not a learned man, and is considered a plebeian parvenu among the old Arab families of that town; at the same time a really learned man is living there whose ancestors for several generations have been muftis of Nablus, and he is a good friend of the Protestants. I intend to recommend him to that office instead of the present man."\*

This same consul was a keen observer of what other consuls were doing. He took special interest, for example, in appearances which made for pomp in an oriental environment. He deplored, in many dispatches, that his residence was smaller, his servants and clerks less in number, and his entertainment allowances lower, than those of consuls of other major powers. Once he addressed a dispatch to Malmsbury dated June 21, 1852, in which he said that the Russians had added a new room to their consulate to serve as a prison, but he quickly added in comment, "a very desirable appendage to any consulate here."

The British consul in Jerusalem, whoever he may have been, must have felt himself in the position of an Ottoman minister, if not higher. "During my recent journey to Safad and Acre," runs one dispatch, "I was frequently visited at my various halting-places on the road

\* F.O. (Turkey) 195/369.

by Moslem inhabitants of the neighbouring villages, who recounted to me their many grievances" (*i.e.*, against the Turkish administration).<sup>\*</sup> Nor was this an isolated incident. Dispatches as late as the seventies and eighties of the last century occasionally contained such passages as "effendis recently called upon me to complain of the proceedings of Raouf Pasha," or "a memorial [was] addressed to me by the notables of Kerak." Even in 1901 the consul, this time acting on instructions from the Foreign Office, interfered to prevent the transfer on official business of a local lawyer because "his absence would cause delay prejudicial" to the case of a British subject for whom he was acting as counsel.

It remains to illustrate in the same way British educational activities. From the late thirties onwards, the London Jews Society was experimenting with the Christian education of Jewish converts, and the first Bishop established a short-lived Hebrew college. Serious work, however, began with the second Bishop in the late forties and in the early fifties of the century. Writing in 1849, the Bishop states: "The Diocesan Boarding School under an English lady was opened on 10th November, 1847, with 10 or 12 children of both sexes."<sup>†</sup> The school was reorganized in 1851-52, and was divided into two sections, one for boys and one for girls, in two separate houses. There were then some ninety pupils on the register: fifty Christians, forty Jews and two Muslims.

This school is the precursor of the institution which became famous as Bishop Gobat School in Jerusalem. But other schools in Nablus, Salt, Nazareth, etc., followed. From 1851 onwards the Church Missionary Society supplemented these Diocesan schools by opening new schools of its own. The character of all these schools, whether they were open for Arabic-speaking or Hebrew-speaking children, or for children speaking other tongues, is unmistakable. The sole purpose of education was religious, and on the evidence of the ecclesiastical or the missionary authorities of these schools the Bible was the main text-book and the Word of God formed the central core of the curriculum. Everything else was incidental, or intended simply to further this principal religious aim.

In his old age Gobat was fond of commenting, in his Annual Letters or public speeches, on his early pioneering in education. Thus in 1863 he said: "When I opened my first school in Jerusalem, seventeen years ago, there was not a single school in Palestine deserving the name, except among the Mohammedans; now we have eleven Protestant schools."<sup>‡</sup> While both the Greek Orthodox and the Latin communities may dispute—as indeed they did dispute—the validity of this statement, it cannot be denied that the opening of Protestant schools was one cause for the Orthodox and Latin religious authorities to open more schools for their own communities. The process assumed the form of keen competition which, though beneficial on the whole, tended to make the local Christian inhabitants too

<sup>\*</sup> F.O. 78/2494 (dispatch from Consul Moore to Ambassador Sir Henry Elliot dated February 17, 1876.)

<sup>†</sup> L.J.S., *Proceedings*, 1849, containing Bishop Gobat's Annual Letter dated October 28, 1848, p. 5.

<sup>‡</sup> L.J.S., *Proceedings*, 1864, containing Gobat's Annual Letter dated November 14, 1863, p. 16.

dependent upon foreign assistance in their educational, medical or welfare activities.

But on the whole Christian educational activity was one of the factors which prompted the Ottoman Government to introduce an education law and to organize a new school system, modelled on the French secular one and parallel to the old Muslim religious system. As the Greek Orthodox and Latin children were gradually withdrawn, or lured away, from the Protestant schools to their own, so were the Muslim children called away, though not entirely, from all the foreign schools, Protestant or otherwise, to enrol in the new state foundations. A British diplomat interpreted the new Ottoman educational policy as an evidence of the movement of Muslim revival.\* But the situation was further complicated by the interest which two major powers, France and Russia, took in the matter. Each of the two powers sponsored and financed a virtual educational system in Palestine, the one for the Latin and the other for the Orthodox community. The British establishments, however, remained private institutions supported entirely by voluntary contributions.

During the last quarter of the nineteenth century, therefore, there was in the educational field a keen competition to capture the mind and, if possible, the soul of the youth of the country of all races and faiths. The sharp contrast in the mentality and loyalty of many young men and women that was coming to the surface during the first decade of this century was due in no small measure to this educational chaos, which made no provision for a common orientation, except in the case of the majority of Arab Muslims who patronized the old religious schools or the new state schools or both.

But English schools continued, in spite of all difficulties, to be patronized by Arab children, both Christians and a small number of Muslims, and by Jewish children. The attitude of the Ottoman Government hardened, however, from the eighties onwards. The authorities, for example, insisted that foreign schools, the English included, must obey the new education law and its regulations or suffer closure. Following the closure of some schools in Syria-Palestine in consequence of putting this policy into action, representations were made on the subject to Salisbury, and labelled rather crudely as "religious intolerance in Turkey." But the British Ambassador at Constantinople had justly observed about the closure of the schools: "I believe this to be very much due to their [*i.e.*, Protestant school authorities] neglect to observe the rules and regulations laid down by the Ottoman Government . . . and their general failure to meet the wishes of the authorities as far as may be in their power."†

In 1886 the number of English schools within the consular district of Jerusalem was 57, with 96 teachers and 2,232 pupils (including 993 girls). The surprising fact that emerges from the dispute over the validity of the new Ottoman law is contained in a minute accompanying the Ambassador's dispatch of March 19, 1887, which reads, in part, as follows:

\* F.O. 78/4172 (dispatch from Consul-General Dickson to Ambassador Sir William White dated Damascus, March 21, 1887).

† F.O. 78/4172 (dispatch dated June 5, 1886).



" . . . it seems that the action of the authorities in closing the schools would be perfectly legal, more especially that none of the teachers hold diplomas or certificates, with the exception of one lady who holds an English certificate." The Foreign Office minute on this dispatch and minute, seen and initialled by Salisbury with his usual "S," states: "This is a most perplexing state of things. . . . We can only let them go on their own risk. I daresay these 'unfortunate females' will succeed in braving the Turk in spite of Article 129" (*i.e.*, of the Ottoman Education Law).

No attempt at the evaluation or interpretation of the British interests has been made above, but the fact of their presence may be conveyed in the picture of Sir Sidney Smith's expedition to Jerusalem in 1800, followed by the missionary, consular and educational activity. There were to be several memorable and glorious entries by distinguished British personalities into Palestine and the Holy City, notably that of the Prince of Wales (later Edward VII) and of Prince George (later George V), and last of all that of General Allenby in the First World War.

But when it came to the departure of the last British High Commissioner on the termination of the mandate, the exit was more memorable than glorious. Here is the picture as drawn by his Chief Justice: ". . . Of all the nations that had crossed the Palestinian scene the one that had come with the highest hopes was to last the shortest time. . . . In the early hours of the morning the mournful processions of what was left of the British Administration set out on its last journey. . . . There seemed nothing left to do but weep, but weep I could not, because I was too conscious of the rebuke of Boabdil, who with withering scorn told her husband, weeping over his lost Alhambra, to cease to regret like a woman what he could not defend like a man."\*

\* Sir William Fitzgerald, "The Holy Places of Palestine in History and in Politics," *International Affairs*, No. 1, January, 1950, pp. 9-10. Sir William's facts about Alhambra are correct, though he confuses the personalities. Boabdil is, of course, a corruption of the Arabic Abu 'Abdillah, the name of the last prince of Granada. The rebuke was administered to him by his mother, 'Aisha.

## REVIEWS

**A History of the Crusades.** Vol. III. By Steven Runciman. Cambridge University Press. 1954. Pp. 530; 15 plates, 5 maps and genealogical table. 35s.

The sub-title is "The Kingdom of Acre and the Later Crusades." There is no need to repeat what has been said in reviews of earlier volumes in praise of this history. This third and concluding instalment is perhaps less readable because much of it deals with petty states and pettier princes. Given a big subject the story goes with a swing. A reviewer may confine himself to the general conclusions about the causes why the crusades failed; the discussion of these leads the author to consider the economic conditions of the Christian states in Syria. The causes of failure were many and the order in which they are set down is not that of their importance. Lack of man-power; for after the first crusade, when the peasants hardly distinguished the earthly from the heavenly Jerusalem, practically no peasants came. In the knightly class most of the newcomers went home again. The revenue was small and the kingdom was dependent on gifts from Europe and, further, was not self-supporting but had to rely on corn from Transjordan. One is reminded of conditions today and is not surprised that the Arabs fear the expansion of Israel over still more of their lands. New arrivals always clashed with the descendants of the earlier crusaders; the residents had to live on terms with their Muslim neighbours (unless they were actually fighting them), while the newcomers had only one idea, to fight the infidels, though they had no planned strategy. The newcomers refused to profit by the experience of older residents and were often destroyed by their pride and ignorance; one crusade after another made the same mistakes. Speaking generally, the crusaders had no fleet but depended on the Italian mercantile republics for ships. The Italians drove hard bargains but thought more of their permanent trade with the East than of casual deals with crusaders who also were often divided between the lust for gold and the desire to serve the Church. Religious intolerance destroyed any chance of success, for only a union of all Christians would have had a chance of standing against a united Islam. As it was, the crusaders regarded the eastern Christians as schismatics or heretics and at times hated them worse than the Muslims; the eastern Christians suffered from the violence of the crusaders and from the Muslims, who punished them for the sins of their co-religionists. The destruction of the Byzantine empire was a colossal blunder and helped the final victory of Islam. The abuse of the crusading idea by the popes, who used it to further a selfish policy, helped to kill it. Palestine was not a fertile country and had few manufactures; it could export sugar, cloth of various kinds and perhaps glass and pottery, but some of these goods were more plentiful and cheaper in Egypt, which always wanted timber from Syria for buildings and ships, and this trade seldom ceased for long in spite of the fulminations of the papacy against furnishing war materials to the infidels. The Christian states lay across the trade routes, but their share depended on conditions outside their control. When the Mongol empire was strong, trade tended to go through Asia Minor, and when Syria was divided against itself, trade to the coast diminished. The king was allowed traffic dues, but he had given much of this away to vassals and the religious orders, so he was always short of money. Though Genoa and Venice found the Christian ports useful, their trade with Egypt was more important, so trade interests were usually opposed to religious duty. Yet it is curious that the kingdom of Jerusalem soon began minting gold, though there was no gold coinage in western Europe at the time. The contribution of the crusades to trade was small; in the field of art almost the only remaining examples are castles and churches. The castles are an advance on anything then existing in the West, for the builders learnt from what they saw on the journey eastwards. The castle was at once home and fortress. The double enceinte was borrowed from Byzantium, but the towers in the curtain were rounded instead of square; the crooked entrance was taken from the Orient, and latterly the keep, rounded the better to resist bombardment, was set at the weakest spot in the defence

instead of being, as formerly, in the most inaccessible place. Presumably local masons were employed, so the resulting form was due to a combination of local material and skill and the experience of the architects, who seem to have come from Europe. The earlier churches show East and West working together, but the later resemble closely European buildings. Hardly any small objects survive, but it may be assumed that local and Byzantine influences made themselves felt; in the Psalter of Melisende the text and chapter headings are Western and the pictures Byzantine.

There is some confusion in the use of proper names owing to following sources in different languages. One Armenian name appears as Hethoum and Hayton in the text, though the index shows that the two are one; Ahmet (which is not an Arab name) occurs in the text and is corrected to Ahmed in the index; on p. 42 October is a slip for April.

If this third volume is not a great story, it is greatly told.

A. S. T.

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**The Persian Gulf.** By Sir Arnold T. Wilson, with a foreword by the Rt. Hon. L. S. Amery. George Allen and Unwin. London. 1954. Pp. x+313. 25s.

This new edition of the late Sir Arnold Wilson's well-known work *The Persian Gulf* arouses mixed feelings. It is identical with the first edition, except for the slightly smaller format. On the one hand, one is very glad that a book that had become so scarce is now once more available, but, on the other hand, one cannot help regretting very much that the author's untimely death in action in the last war has prevented him from bringing the book up to date and also from correcting some errors.

Much indeed has happened since the book first appeared in 1928. Not only has there been a second World War, but the discovery of oil in very large quantities on the Arabian side of the Persian Gulf has revolutionized the mode of life of the inhabitants in the areas affected. A chapter on these highly important discoveries and their effects, local and otherwise, would have greatly enhanced the value and interest of this book.

Apart from happenings after that date, information has since become available regarding certain earlier occurrences. For example, it would have been most valuable to have had Sir Arnold Wilson's views on the stone with a Greek inscription which was found on Failaka Island at the entrance to the bay of Kuwait in 1937. This inscription commemorated the escape from shipwreck of an Athenian named Soteles and some soldiers. Would Sir Arnold have upheld the reviewer's own theory that the vessel in which Soteles and his companions were travelling was one of those which Alexander the Great had detailed to explore the western coast of the Persian Gulf? Another matter on which we now possess fuller information is the Persian occupation of Basra from 1697 to 1701. This little-known episode is of some interest, because it occurred at a time when the most unwarlike of monarchs sat on the throne of Persia and when the Persian army was in a sad state of decadence and inefficiency. Ahmad Kasravi's *Ta'rikh-i-Panj Sad Sala-yi-Khuzistan*, published in 1933, and the anonymous *Chronicle* of the Carmelites in Persia, published in 1939, both throw some light on this matter.

The reviewer takes this opportunity to point out that there are certain errors and omissions (inevitable in a work of this nature) which the author, had he been living, could with advantage have rectified. For instance, one must take exception to the statement on p. 149 that it is difficult to discover what material gain accrued to the English East India Company from its participation in the successful attack on the Portuguese stronghold of Hormuz in 1622. It is unquestionable that the Company *did* obtain some privileges from the Persian Government in return for its naval assistance on this occasion, such as being duty-free at the port of Gombroon (Bandar Abbas). More important still, as Professor Boxer has pointed out in his introduction to the *Commentaries* of Ruy Freyre de Andrada, the loss of Hormuz "snapped the chain of Portuguese fortresses along the East African and Asiatic seaboard in its strongest link." Had the Portuguese been allowed to remain in

possession of Hormuz, the English would never have been able to break their power in the Persian Gulf, and their factory and that of the Dutch at Gombroon would always have been exposed to attack from Hormuz and have been unable to compete with the flourishing emporium on that island.

Something more might have been said about the position of the Bahrain Islands in the eighteenth century. Sir Arnold was correct in stating (on p. 174) that the Arabs of Muscat occupied the islands "about 1718" and that their occupation was of short duration. The islands did not, however, remain long in Persian hands, for they soon came under the control of the redoubtable Shaikh Jabbara of Tahiri, who had made himself virtually independent. He held the islands until Nadir Shah's forces succeeded in re-establishing Persian authority there in 1736 (not 1753, as stated on p. 173).

One further point calls for comment. It is curious that Sir Arnold's critical mind accepted as genuine the so-called Will of Peter the Great (see p. 171 and 172). A close analysis of this document reveals the fact that it was a palpable forgery; there is strong reason to believe that it was perpetrated at Napoleon's behest in 1812 by an official named Lesur in the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs with the object of depicting Russia in an unfavourable light.

The reviewer would like to emphasize, in conclusion, that the errors and misstatements to which he has drawn attention above cannot be regarded as serious blemishes, and that he has the highest opinion of the work as a whole.

L. L.

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**The Men who Ruled India (the Guardians).** By Philip Woodruff. London: Jonathan Cape. Pp. 385, including bibliographical and source notes, appendices, index, 5 maps and 8 illustrations. 8½" × 5½". 25s.

Mr. Woodruff's second and final volume as brilliantly completes his task as the first began it. These eighty-nine years—covering the Crown's assumption of full authority in India in 1858 to the transfer of power in August, 1947—are hardly within the possible recollection of anyone now living, but, as the narrative proceeds, it gathers more and more readers who, in greater or less degree, can derive from it enhanced pleasure by reason of personal impressions, whether of hearsay or of actual experience. During the period the Indian Empire remained territorially the same as when it was taken over from the East India Company except that the annexation of Burma was completed in 1886 by the acquisition of Upper Burma, control of Malaya was passed from the Indian Office to the Colonial Office in 1867 and Aden (Colony and Protectorate) made the same change of its Whitehall "head office" by ceasing to be part of British India in 1937.

Burma became an appanage of the Indian Empire by the accident of three wars operating piecemeal in 1826, 1853 and 1886. Mr. Woodruff, in twenty-three pages, gives an excellently succinct account of the comparatively short-lived Indo-Burma partnership in which his "Guardians" duly played their rôles. He maintains that, even if the union had lasted longer, British influence would still have been slight. In a way he concurs—he does not specifically say so—with what is believed to have been the opinion of Garnet Wolseley after seeing the grief of the Rangoon crowds as Thebaw was escorted to the ship for exile in India. King Thebaw's rule had made him thoroughly detested, yet, Wolseley felt, Burmese pride in the national monarchy was deep-rooted and, although Thebaw's wholesale massacre of members of the royal family had made it difficult to find a suitable successor, the effort might have been well worth making. It is true that the tried efficiency of the system already benefiting India did bring to Burma ordered rule and justice, but—here Mr. Woodruff is quoted—"although the outlying provinces were at first glad to be freed, in metropolitan Burma the people remembered past glory and forgot past misrule. In India nationalism was a product of British rule; in Burma it was there ready-made. While Burmans on the whole liked individual Englishmen, they seem from the beginning to have felt humiliated in a way which hardly occurred to Indians until late in the century." In this light the decision of Burma to take independence without the Commonwealth is all the more readily understood. So

too is Mr. Woodruff's insistence that his task is to write mainly about the English in India with just this brief mention of Burma as an Indian province wherein a young officer of the I.C.S. might by chance find himself posted and, he could have added, distinguished I.C.S. seniors might find themselves in gubernatorial rank for rounding off service well rendered to India.

A wealth of hitherto unpublished material has been put at the author's disposal, supplemented frequently by personal conversations with the "Guardians" themselves enable the genius of a scholarly and vivacious pen to work its magic as in the first volume. Tucked away in the "Hansards" of the Indian Central Legislature will be found occasionally debates in which the District Officer was discussed with eloquent freedom and considerable variety of outlook. In those days the coming of the transfer of power was foreseen—and then perhaps only dimly—by close observers of the accentuated pace of "indianization" in the services and, as time passed, in the ministerial offices of the Centre and Provinces. Yet both critics and champions of the District Officer seemed to agree in recognizing the importance of his responsibilities to the welfare of the people and therefore to the whole administration.

In his gallery of portraits Mr. Woodruff shows some of these types: "choleric, eccentric, warm-hearted men who did not always pay attention to Government orders." Indeed, the perfect District Officer—without unduly straining the requirements of discipline—kept his references to his superiors to the minimum. They, in their turn, trusted him to act sensibly and to apply the astringent virtue of common-sense in the interpretation of orders which might appear to be beautifully tidy in the Secretariat in Madras, Bombay or even New Delhi but left many a convenient lacuna to puzzle the punctilious or stimulate the ingenuity of the man of action. Not otherwise could the District Officer successfully meet the demands made on him in emergencies which tended to occur with a frequency belying their label. "You will have a trying day tomorrow," said a Chief Commissioner to his District Magistrate, according to Mr. Woodruff. "You will be on the alert all day and will probably have a riot. But I have discussed all your arrangements and I approve of them. One embarrassment at least you shall be spared. I am going fishing." That was the right spirit. Rather different was that of another senior who to a newly joined Civilian junior administered a rebuke for dilatoriness in response to a call for his presence. Such a rebuke was "quite foreign to the traditions of the service." It produced a retort in kind. Next time that young Civilian was summoned "he appeared naked, borne shoulder-high in a tin bath-tub by four orderlies."

Nor did the good District Officer forget that the independence he asked for himself should be passed down to his subordinates so long as he knew they could be relied upon. Thus the apparently lowly tahsildar was looked upon as the embodiment of the Raj, and one Lieutenant-Governor who had done a village some service was more than a little startled and, it is to be hoped, pleased to have been told in an address of gratitude when he happened to visit the scene: "We hope that Your Honour may rise to be a tahsildar."

The period after the Mutiny, as Mr. Woodruff sees it, was one in which the name of Elphinstone was honoured as the guiding beacon for the best of the Civilians. The purely paternal era which stretched out to the very edge of the twentieth century tended by its apparent smoothness of working to dim memories of the real aim of trusteeship as defined by Munro, Elphinstone, Henry Lawrence and Herbert Edwardes. The seed had, however, been sown, and with the products of the Indian Universities by way of the London examination entering the Service in, at first slowly and later ever more rapidly, increased numbers, the doctrines of liberalism and national aspiration gained steady acceptance. It may be argued that the pace was forced by currents in Westminster, if not Whitehall, but before those currents flowed strongly the "Guardians" themselves were inculcating notions of freedom which in the long run were to mean the death-warrant of their great Service—a death which could not have been happier but for the tragic manner of the final demission of power. The "Guardians" had well stood up to the changes in the transitional period of semi-parliamentary government when paternalism had to be modified by recognition of the advance of "indianization" in bureaucracy and ministerial offices.

The strain and stresses of the second World War sharpened antagonisms between those who were marshalling and effectively directing India's mighty war effort and those who had, long before 1939, ranged themselves against Fascism and Nazism and yet proceeded, first by withdrawing from the Ministries and later by launching a dangerous rebellion, to assert their nationalism in terms of sabotage. The unreality of this curious phase of Congress policy was met by studied patience, but to rebellion there could be only one answer in 1942 when the Japanese were at the gates of India. Mr. Woodruff is ready to believe that in the early days of the war patience might have been more effective if less rigidity had prevailed in New Delhi, but he is careful to add that final judgment cannot be passed until, some years hence, state documents are fully available.

Though the decision to make the transfer of power after the statesmanship of Lord Wavell and of the Pethick-Lawrence Cabinet Mission of 1946 had gone far to lay bare the unreality of Congress's anti-war pretensions and in so doing to assuage bitterness on both sides, another ominous portent darkened the political horizon. Transfer was possible, indeed essential, but not in the form so long worked for and expected. Partition was the *sine qua non*. Lord Mountbatten came, saw and confirmed that disappointing discovery. Whether the rapidity regarded as equally necessary should have been hedged around by effective provisions to avert the evil consequences of partition must, Mr. Woodruff thinks, be finally judged when those fuller data are available. In the meantime the mass migrations and massacres which so swiftly followed the enthusiastic inauguration of the two Dominions have left scars in the memories of the "Guardians," whose Service tradition was based on the sanctity of human life in days of peace. Mr. Woodruff cannot help making this rueful comment:

"The slaughter was one reason why some men left with a feeling that their life's work had been wasted. It is not easy to look at things with cool detachment when you have spent your life trying to prevent bloodshed and leave the scene of your work with corpses piled indiscriminately shoulder-high at your garden gate."

The necessity for this sombre note to be sounded is in itself a testimony to the justifiable pride which the author feels in surveying the record of the men who made service to India their passion and privilege, who—within the limits of human imperfection—sought to bring what they had learnt of justice, neighbourliness and that comity which should, but so often does not, govern international relationships. Whatever happens in India and Pakistan, the statesmen of those new independent republics within the Commonwealth may be sure that the spirits of the British Civilians—indeed of the two million occupants of British graves in the soil of the subcontinent—will watch with hopefulness, sympathy and affection in token of an historic partnership dissolved with goodwill and magnanimity on both sides.

EDWIN HAWARD.

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**Within the Taurus.** A Journey in Asiatic Turkey. By Lord Kinross. London: John Murray. Pp. 182; 21 illustrations and sketch-map. 18s.

Since 1914 Anatolia has been little visited by foreign travellers. After the First World War the Turkish War of Independence precluded the possibility of such travel, and subsequently the Republican Government forbade the entry of foreigners to most districts in Anatolia for political reasons. The eastern vilayets, in particular, were placed under martial law owing to the Kurdish insurrections of the twenties and thirties. The present volume is one of the first accounts of a visit to the eastern vilayets by any foreigner for many years, and its main interest lies in the author's account of conditions in those provinces. This inevitably raises the delicate and thorny questions of the old minorities—Kurds, Armenians and other Christian elements of the population. The author quotes at length from the numerous books written during the nineteenth century by European travellers in Anatolia, and the comparisons of conditions then and now are revealing. The Armenians have virtually disappeared altogether, whilst the Kurds are being assimilated into the Turkish life as "mountain Turks." It is gratifying to hear that the policy of the Democratic

Party towards the Kurds is a modification of the former policy of the People's Party, which was to hold down the Kurds by force. Today the policy appears to be to educate them in the Turkish language and thus gradually to assimilate them into the Turkish community. The Kurds are a proud, virile and attractive race, and in the past individual Kurds have rendered great services to the Ottoman Empire. Surely the only humane and enlightened policy must be to open up these backward tribal areas by the development of communications, the construction of schools and hospitals and the provision of the best amenities of civilization. A famous Kurdish Agha in 'Iraqi Kurdistan was quoted many years ago as saying: "I would welcome Government control in my district provided the authorities erected a school and a hospital for every police post they put up." The proposal, mentioned by the author, to construct a University at Van must be a great step in the right direction, and no doubt the prospect of oil development in the mountains of Kurdistan will inaugurate a fresh era that will eventually bring the settlement of the tribes and the break-up of the tribal system. If the Turk is "the Englishman of the Middle East," as the author aptly describes the Turkish character, the Kurd is most certainly the Scotsman of the Middle East, and he has won the hearts of most foreigners who have lived amongst his tribes and his mountains. One may hope that the inevitable spread of civilization to this ancient race may be gradual and painless and that their local costumes, crafts and languages may be preserved to some degree.

The author writes with evident knowledge and appreciation of architecture and describes the buildings of the many historical epochs which this ancient land has witnessed in considerable detail and with expert skill. He has some particularly interesting passages on Armenian architecture and on the origins of the dome and the Gothic arch.

Lord Kinross will delight all travellers with his humorous accounts of incidents familiar to those of us who have lived and worked in the Near and Middle East. One cannot help feeling, however, that he missed much by having to rely on an interpreter, and certainly his admitted lack of Turkish has led him into some strange misconceptions, as, for instance, his assertion that no word exists in Turkish or any other Oriental language for "maintenance." Not only are there several alternative words available which have been in general use for many years to describe "maintenance" in the technical sense, but the commonest of these is the simple Turkish word *bakım*, from the verb *bakmak*—to look, to watch, and hence to tend or maintain. Lord Kinross still more surprisingly appears to share the popular belief that the Turkish Government, acting under Atatürk's directions, has changed the names of all cities and towns throughout Turkey. All that has happened, of course, is that since the inception of the Republican régime in 1923 the Turks have insisted on Turkish place-names being used instead of Greek or other foreign versions. And, anyhow, surely Ankara is nearer to the classical Ancyra than Angora?

But these are minor criticisms of a book which will be warmly welcomed not only by all Turcophiles but, one hopes, by the general public, who are all too ignorant of conditions in Turkey and of the most exacting and valiant part which Turkey is playing as the guardian of the peace of the Middle East. This is vividly portrayed by the author in his descriptions of lonely garrisons encountered in the eastern vilayets, and one suspects that security reasons alone have prevented him from giving a fuller account, with more of his entrancing photographs of this little-known region so close to the Iron Curtain.

H. M. BURTON.

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**In the Shadow of the Mahatma.** By G. D. Birla. Longmans, Green. Pp. 331. 10s. 6d.

"The Birla Letters" which are published under the title of *In the Shadows of the Mahatma* cover a period of twenty-five years from 1924 until 1949. The author, Ghanshyamdas Birla, may today be regarded as the most powerful of a group of modern Indian industrialists who find some difficulty in reconciling their true devotion to their country with the fashionable tendency of the State to take charge of any industrial enterprise which can be interpreted as falling within the category of "public utility." But the interest in Mr. Birla's memoir is entirely historical. For example, we read that on July 22, 1937, Mr. Birla lunched with Mr. Churchill, who

expressed himself thus: "If you can show by your actions that you can make democracy a success, you will have no difficulty in advancing further. Play fair and we will play fair." In view of the criticism which the Prime Minister has had to meet in regard to allegations of indifference to India's constitutional progress, the quotation is significant. It is but one of hundreds for the preservation of which we are grateful to the author. The book therefore proves to be an indispensable supplement to the study of British-Indian history from the era of the Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms until the crowded days of 1947.

The keynote of these letters is sincerity. There are few flourishes of style and Mr. Birla's own letters are all the more impressive for their simplicity. Occasionally such phrases as "the wish is father to the thought" remind us that the author is always master of his pen.

The greater part of the book is taken up by his correspondence with his great leader, Gandhiji, and the reader will be impressed by a relationship between two men whose philosophical approach to the daily problems of corporate society were so divergent and who were yet inseparable as idealists where the independence and interests of their country were concerned.

In between the mass of quoted correspondence, when Mr. Birla allows himself to comment on men and affairs, he is scrupulously fair, whether it be to his own colleagues in the Congress or to the great Englishmen of the day, Lords Halifax, Lothian and Linlithgow.

This book is not history. But as a check on such a work as Professor Coupland's *Report on the Constitutional Problem of India*, no historian can afford to be without it.

BIRDWOOD.

**World Without Mercy.** The Story of the Sahara. By René Lecler. London: Werner Laurie. 1954. Pp. 223; 13 illustrations, sketch-map, bibliography. 15s.

How many times, poring over a map of Africa in a grubby school atlas, have boys dreamed up visions of those inaccessible places of the Sahara! In Salah, Tamanrasset, Agadez, Ghat, Bilma, Zinder—those romantic, fabulous names have lingered in our memories down the years, coloured (with the help of P. C. Wren) by dreams of burly Swedish legionnaires (they were always "burly" and Swedes for some reason), endless horizons of sand dunes, the whitewashed fort (generally the "southernmost outpost"), the fluttering tricolour, the sanguine activities of the Touareg women, the depot at Sidi-bel-Abbes and the rest. Then there were our true-life heroes whose names we had taken from the map—Flatters, Lyautey, Lamy and Laperrine. How shattered were these fancies in 1940!

Here, in Lecler's admirable book, it has all come to life again. All the old glories of France, the seemingly timeless odysseys of men like Henri Barth, Caillié, Nachtigal and Rohlfs. And there were Englishmen too, but the laurels go to the intrepid Frenchmen who, in the nineteenth century, pioneered the trails over which the wheeled and winged wonders of André Citroën and Louis Breguet now make their way.

Many of us who have followed the old explorers' tracks to Timbucktoo, who have marched across the seas of sand from Fort Lamy to Kufra with their musty volumes in the saddlebags, will appreciate this up-to-date story of the unveiling of the Sahara. Lecler is to be congratulated on writing such a pleasant and accurate survey.

ERIC MACRO.

**The Middle East.** Royal Institute of International Affairs. London. 1954. 2nd Edition. Pp. 590 + xviii; 2 maps, bibliography. 35s.

It is a great pleasure to see an entirely new edition of Chatham House's political and economic survey of the Middle East. For many years to come editions of this excellent book will be used as a standard textbook on the area. After an introduction of some eighty pages dealing with the history and politics of the area as a whole, each country (Egypt to Persia and Turkey to the Sudan) is treated separately with an historical summary, an economic survey and a factual account of the geography and



politics. In addition there are several statistical appendices on such items as trade, oil and population, a good reading list and two good maps—one showing oil distribution and the other the physical characteristics of the area.

It is difficult to criticize a book written or edited by such eminent authorities as Elizabeth Munroe, Sir Reader Bullard, Dr. Bernard Lewis, Albert Hourani and Doreen Warriner, to mention a few. Perhaps the most interesting pages are those dealing with locations upon which there is always a dearth of up-to-date information. Aden, Yemen and the Persian Gulf Sheikdoms are particular examples of countries which appear infrequently in our newspapers. It may therefore disappoint some readers to find that the space allotted to these areas is very small.

It is to be hoped that Chatham House will continue to publish new editions of this book at frequent intervals and possibly in due course find more room in its pages (even at the expense of expanding into two volumes) for information on the less well-known areas.

ERIC MACRO.

**Middle East Dilemmas.** By J. C. Hurewitz. New York: Harper Brothers. 1953. Pp. 273 + viii; endpaper map.

**The Arab World.** By N. Izzedin. Chicago: H. Regnery Company. 1953. Pp. 412 + xii; 19 illustrations. \$6.50.

Hurewitz, whose name is already well known to students of the Middle East in England, was secretary to a group of members of the American Council on Foreign Relations which met in the winter of 1951-1952.

"From this modest enterprise," writes Mr. Percy Bidwell in the foreword, "the present book took its beginning." The result is a satisfactory, if brief, survey of the Middle Eastern political scene from the American viewpoint.

As the first ten pages of the copy of the book received by the Society were missing it is not possible to comment upon what the author says by way of introduction, generally the most interesting section of such surveys. However, Persia is the first country dealt with. Egypt, the Fertile Crescent, Arabia and Turkey follow. The penultimate chapter is an interesting study on the history of economic and technical assistance given to the area. The book ends with some notes on current problems of American policy in the Middle East.

It is well for students in this country to read American books on an area which has for so long been the exclusive sphere of influence of European nations and in particular the United Kingdom. The reader will find much to displease him and many points of view which are new. He should not, however, be deterred from absorbing this excellent summary, so clearly and concisely presented.

Hurewitz's book has a semi-official, non-committal air about it. Miss Izzedin's, as is to be expected, is even more anti-British. It is, however, an adequate survey of the struggles for freedom from foreign domination of the major countries of the Arab world. Providing that the reader already possesses a sound factual background knowledge of the countries about which Miss Izzedin writes, her book is worth study by students of Arab affairs. It may be used with confidence as a reference book. The reader should, however, bear in mind the author's Arab origin when attempting to assimilate her eulogies on the present Egyptian régime.

Englishmen with first-hand experience of the Arab countries will read much of her comments with reserve. Nevertheless, she concludes, as have many before her, with a warning note. Two major problems face the Arab world today—internal stability within each country and unity of the countries to protect common interests.

ERIC MACRO.

**Call to Greatness.** By Adlai E. Stevenson. London: Rupert Hart-Davis. 1954. Pp. 100. 9s. 6d.

In my youth the White Man's Burden was a common expression. The author of this book shows how the U.S.A. have inherited this responsibility. His understanding of this situation has been greatly amplified by his travels round the world in 1953, an understanding most clearly expressed in *Call to Greatness*.

Your reviewer is reminded of meeting an American official in India during the last war who, on his arrival, was able to point out the many errors the British Raj had committed during its rule. A year later the same official told me that he had had a fearful nightmare. "I woke up and thought that all the British had left India, and we were left to run it!"

Stevenson modestly owns to the complexity of problems which face the U.S.A., and in his talks to Harvard students leaves his hearers in no doubt as to the tremendous difficulties before them. It is well that this generation should appreciate these difficulties, and while there are American citizens such as Stevenson to guide them one feels that high policy is in safe hands. A book very valuable to the English-speaking peoples.

H. St. C. S.

**The Upanishads.** A second selection, translated by Swami Nikhilananda. London: Phœnix House. Pp. 381. 4to. 18s.

In this second volume Swami Nikhilananda produces new translations of three more Upanishads, the Svetāśvatara, Praśna and Mandukya, together with Gaṇḍapāda's Kārikā upon the last named. As in the first volume, he has also translated Śāṅkara's commentary and added his own explanatory notes. By way of an introduction he has written an article upon Hindu ethics, which after touching briefly upon those of the other systems of philosophy refers them for their noblest expression to the Vedānta. The book thus presents a fine if intricate exposition of the Monist interpretation of the Hindu scripture which will commend itself to the thoughtful and patient reader.

H. O. C.

**Moslems on the March.** By F. W. Fernau. Translated from the German by E. W. Dickes. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 1954. Pp. xi + 312 and index. \$5.00.

This is a singularly readable and informative survey of the Muslim World. It covers such a vast extent of time and space that it is almost inevitable that the reader with specialist knowledge will detect errors—or at least weaknesses—where the survey concerns his particular interests. But such faults of detail as were observed by this reviewer are far less frequent and serious than in most books of this type; and they are, in general, more than compensated for by the sweep and proportion of the landscape as a whole.

Part I is entitled "The Islamic Intercontinent" and is divided into five chapters. The first ("Deserts, Water, World Routes") is introductory, and discusses the geography, social conditions and strategic importance of the "Islamic girdle of countries from Morocco to Turkestan." The next ("Builders of the House of Islam") gives an outline history from the inception of Islam to the beginning of the modern age. A chapter on "The Moslem Community" follows, which starts with a general survey of the field, includes a little more historical matter, and then deals successively with the mystic orders, with certain outstanding reformers, and with trends of policy in the Muslim world. The final chapter of this part concerns "Alien Rule and Independence," and covers the partition of the Muslim world and the stages of its "emancipation."

Part II is entitled "Nations in Ferment." The first chapter concerns itself with the dream of the Arab Kingdom, the "freedom and unity" of the Nile Valley, the awakening of the Magrib, and the Arab League. Chapters on Persia, Pakistan (together with the "citadel of Asia"), Turkey, and "The Moslems' Oil" including that within Soviet territory follow; and the concluding chapter is devoted to "The Moslems and World Peace." All are written with vigour, and in parts with penetration.

It is quite evident, in a number of contexts, that the writer is a German, and that his race has coloured his views regarding both British and German policy in the Muslim world. As is almost inevitable in a book of this nature, moreover, it is already out of date in a number of particulars—e.g., the importance attached to the Grand Mufti in regard to Palestine, the references to the positions held by Shishakli, Neguib

and Ibn Sa'ud in Syria, Egypt and Arabia respectively, and the emphasis on the situation in Persia and Egypt before the recent agreements were concluded. Of especial interest, on the other hand, are the passages regarding Islam in Central Asia, particularly within the U.S.S.R.; while an outstanding merit is a series of admirable maps, which both illustrate and reinforce the author's theses.

The translation is, in the main, excellent and the format attractive.

J. N. D. ANDERSON.

**The Wonder that was India. A Survey of the Culture of the Indian Sub-Continent before the Coming of the Muslims.** By A. L. Basham, B.A., Ph.D., F.R.A.S. Sidgwick and Jackson. Pp. xxi + 586. Illustrated with pictures, line drawings and maps. 45s.

Mr. Basham, who is Reader in the History of India in the University of London, has written less for the scholar or the specialist than for the general reader with some interest in the subject. It is a subject which, as Mr. Basham points out, owes much to the research and linguistic ability of gifted European missionaries and servants of Company and Crown. The production in England of so attractive and competent a book devoted to pre-Muslim India is of particular value as, for a number of reasons, the wonder that was Hindu (and Buddhist) India is, like the Middle Ages, almost unknown to a multitude of educated Europeans. The Mogul Empire was roughly contemporary with the Tudor monarchy. There is a regrettable tendency among many to class almost as prehistory what went before. Yet no one can understand Europe or India who does not understand the religious and historical foundations of its culture. Mr. Basham has given us a clear and pleasing chart of the Indian foundations.

Mr. Basham writes at a time when archæological achievement enables at least rough justice to be done to the civilization of Harappa and Mohenjo-Daro. He shows that ancient India has had more effect than is often supposed upon the thought of the Western world. Mr. Basham believes that the Yavanas—"Yavana" usually means a Greek of South India—in the military service of the Tamil Kings included fugitives from the Roman Legions, and he illustrates from Greek and Sanskrit the linguistic aspect of the connection between West and Orient which was more intimate than the study of the Greek and Roman classics would intimate. Goethe, Fichte, Hegel and New Englanders like Emerson and Thoreau were deeply influenced by Anquetil-Duperron's translation of such works as the Upanishads. Modern India and Pakistan possess a synthesis of European and Eastern civilization. Mr. Basham believes that we must study the ancient heritage here examined, "for it is no longer the heritage of India alone, but of all mankind."

JOHN BIGGS-DAVISON.

**The East India Company and the Economy of Bengal from 1704 to 1740.**

By Sukumar Bhattacharya. Luzac and Co. Pp. 240. Maps and appendices. 21s. (cloth).

Sukumar Bhattacharya is Professor of History, Asutosh College, and this work is piously dedicated to the memory of Syamaprasad Mookerjee, who, as President of the governing body of that foundation, gave its author every encouragement. It was a thesis approved for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy at the University of London and is a specialized study rather than a work of literary merit or profound historical insight. It is unpretentious and clearly written and the thorough research and patient scholarship for which it called are now at the service of the student of the general affairs of John Company and of British India.

In his conclusions the author quotes Sir Thomas Roe, whose embassy from James I to the Great Mogul is included in the summary of the earlier period of English trade with the peninsula: "Europe bleedeth to enrich Asia." Despite the mercantilist economics of the time and the export of English manufactures, such as broadcloth, Bengal had a continuous excess of exports over imports from Europe. The Parliament at Westminster legislated against the importation of Bengal textiles

and calico, but this had small effect as English merchants made a good thing of re-exports to the Continent. Western industrialism did not overwhelm Bengal craftsmanship until a later period than is described here. Mr. Bhattacharya paints no propaganda picture of Indian contentment invaded by English aggression such as once delighted nationalist hearts. The English Company is no serpent in a Garden of Paradise. Indian poverty contrasted less glaringly then with European living standards, but the economic and social system was unbalanced and unhealthy. There was a caste structure but no middle class of enlightenment and enterprise. The European Indiamen sailed the Bay of Bengal. Neither Emperor nor Subahdar gave adequate "response" to the "challenge" from beyond the seas. No effort was made to harness foreign technique and science to native purposes. Complacency or apathy was general. There was no urge to improve and reform. It was thus no vital society upon which the East India Company intruded its influence but one of stagnation and decay.

Mr. Bhattacharya neither hides nor exaggerates the defects of the Company's servants, of private trade and private monkey business. He gives us facts and figures which are helpful to an understanding of how they lived and thrived and died. Impartiality such as his is one of the fruits of his country's independence. There is no longer any need to make out a prosecution case.

JOHN BIGGS-DAVISON.

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**Warren Hastings.** By Keith Feiling. Macmillan. 1954. Pp. xi + 420. 8¼" × 6¼". 30s.

This biography is a useful addition to the information available on this period and on the character of this great Englishman, who may be said to have invented the science, or art, of viceroyalty. Even today, 170 years later, Warren Hastings probably occupies a higher place in the Indian mind than any other European. Recognizing that British control was a passing phase, he took pains to acquaint himself on the languages, religions and traditions of this ancient civilization and to rule them in the way to which they were accustomed.

The Impeachment of Warren Hastings 1786 and the nine years' trial is probably the greatest travesty in the history of British Justice, as is clearly shown in these pages. The insane jealousies of Burke and Francis were, for unworthy and party reasons, allowed to sway unduly the judgment of those responsible. Complete exculpation and subsequent recognition of service did not compensate for the long years of persecution and anxiety suffered by one who deserved at least as much from his country as any other Englishman of the century.

The author sets out to concentrate on Hastings' personality and aspirations, private life, humanity and sympathies, rather than documentation of events and achievements. The impressive bibliography (pp. 400-404) includes some new material and must have involved a great deal of study, which is of lasting value.

It is probably a fair criticism that Mr. Feiling endeavoured to show the good points of his subject in order to substantiate his own views, selecting perhaps at times evidence to this end in preference. Few biographers succeed in objectivity. In the same author's biography of Neville Chamberlain, for instance, it is doubtful whether Sir Anthony would agree with the narrative of the Prime Minister's last few years. Perhaps the reader, however, should recognize the value of the portrait given rather than expect too much.

A more important matter for the many readers who will have had some Indian background is the failure of the author to convey the atmosphere of Company days in the eighteenth century. More at home in writing for a Tory public in England, he has produced the dry bones of India 1750-85, rather than its reality. The reader falters through 300 pages of a jungle of unpleasant persons until he reaches the surer touches of the London scene. Business and political morality had not then evolved in English life. And in India any method was justified in shaking the pagoda-tree. Hastings realized, as others later, that this system complicated government. A hundred years before his time he tried to purify the administration and restrict the doubtful practices of his subordinates, who resentfully had their revenge

at the Impeachment. His own personal accounting was so meagre and incidental that his comparatively blameless ventures were often hard to defend later.

Another ground for criticism is the omission of an appendix of Indian words, phrases and their meaning, also a list of the *dramatis personæ* and a good map of India. Even old hands find it difficult to follow, for instance, the Mahratta and Rohilla wars and Scindia's interest in the Carnatic. The notes on chapters help in following the general sequence of events, but are not in themselves sufficient.

This volume is often quite readable and does establish the case for Hastings, but the above points need attention before this record can take its place in authoritative historical records.

G. M. ROUTH.

**Big Tiger and Christian.** By Fritz Mühlenweg. Jonathan Cape. Pp. 558. Illustrated. 15s.

This is an adventure story of an unusual kind about a part of the world that is now closed to us. Big Tiger and Christian are a Chinese and a European boy and with them the reader travels from Peking to Urumchi. They are a charming pair and behave in a most natural manner, unlike the heroes of most boys' stories. They become involved in an incident in one of China's civil wars of the nineteen-twenties and start their journey in an army lorry. This is stolen from them by a fellow-passenger, Mr. Greencoat, who is the villain of the book, and they then make their way by various means, meeting tribesmen, Buddhist monks and other inhabitants of that region. By their intelligence and alertness they frustrate Mr. Greencoat's plans and ultimately reach their destination, from which they return to Peking through Siberia.

Fritz Mühlenweg visited Mongolia three times with expeditions to set up meteorological stations. This was a lengthy business and entailed long stays in remote places. He had many adventures of his own and got to know the region and its people very intimately. This book is based on stories he told his own children, describing people he had met and friends he had made. A number of the characters mentioned were real people, and with the Mongolian shepherd, Naidang, one of the heroes of the story, he spent the New Year of 1931-32. From him and his daughter, Sevenstars, he obtained much of the material which he has incorporated in this book.

To many of us Sinkiang and Mongolia have the charm of inaccessibility and it is as a very real account of life in that part of the world that this book should be valued. Not only is it very readable, but it is also an excellent picture of the people and their customs. By the end of it the reader feels he has lived amongst them as the writer did and acquired some true and charming friends. This world is not only closed, it is passing altogether, and it is delightful to have in this form such a record of the culture that had changed little since the time of Ghengis Khan.

The success of the book is proved by the sense of loss which the reader feels when he reaches the end. The narrative is absorbing and the story credible. It may be felt that the boys take their separation from their families in a very philosophical manner, but apart from this there is nothing at which the most stringent critic might quibble.

The author has been well served by his translators, Isabel and Florence MacHugh, who have not only produced a good English version, but have also been able to retain the atmosphere and to allow the characters a true individuality, so that in conversation there is no doubt of the race of the speaker without any question of pidgin English or irritating phraseology. In addition the book is illustrated with most charming black-and-white drawings by Rafaello Busoni, which greatly add to the reader's enjoyment. Whether these depict a Mongol yurt or a wolf hunt, they are equally realistic and at once bring the scene described in the text very clearly to mind.

Peter Fleming's introduction is a review in itself, and the book must have recalled to him many interesting and happy memories. This may be a book about boys, but it is one which readers of all ages will enjoy and which may well rank as one of the best accounts of life amongst the Mongols.

J. E. F. GUERITZ.

**Persia is my Heart.** By Najmeh Najafi. Gollancz. Pp. 245. Illustrated. 13s. 6d.

The title of this book, *Persia is my Heart*, would seem to most Persians to be a statement of the obvious. It is an expression of their nationalism and also of the emphasis on emotion rather than reason which is a great characteristic of that race.

Najmeh Najafi's story of her own life is a delightful study, beautifully told in her own voice and accent, as she must have related it to Miss Hinckley. Each stage succeeds the next as imperceptibly as the child grew in years, without one ever becoming conscious that the tale is told by an older person. No hint of unexpected knowledge is allowed to creep in, nor any undue precocity. We are early made aware of the depths of Miss Najafi's love for her country and the people, but she is never blinded to its faults. Instead she is stimulated to determined efforts to assist her country's progress towards enlightenment, and to the improvement of living conditions for the very poorest members of the population.

It is customary for many writers to refer to life in the Near or Middle East as "colourful." Those who read this book will see the drab brown wastes, the barren plateau and the grey poverty of the Persian peasants. It is to alleviate the lot to which they are resigned that Miss Najafi has dedicated herself; under her guidance we can see the potentialities of these very wastes and the eventual comfort, if not colour, which Miss Najafi's efforts may bring to the peasants.

Many students and young people feel they hold the secret of successful re-organization of the world. They have a solution to every problem of racial, sociological or other significance; many Persian students have just such ambitions, but few have the drive and initiative of Miss Najafi. She may well be the first woman to show sufficient determination on her own account, both knowing what she wants to do and how to do it. She is fortunate in having an understanding mother and family. It is possible that she might have met greater opposition had her father remained alive.

But Miss Najafi, by any standards, is a remarkable person. To start a dress shop while still in her teens and make a success of it, to conceive the vision of "winter factories" for local handicrafts in the villages, are great achievements for any woman. For one of a race and faith which as yet provide no place for women in public life, it is little short of miraculous.

One hopes that Miss Najafi will find the knowledge she is seeking in America, and that she will return to her country strengthened in purpose for the performance of her task.

The book contains many charming vignettes of Persian family and village life. The great loyalty and love between servant and master or family and retainer are well illustrated, also the strict religious observance. Miss Najafi's style is well suited to this form of narrative. She has found a good friend and adviser in Miss Hinckley. The decorative drawings are delightful. The transliteration is unorthodox, but Miss Najafi explains this in her own charming manner in the last chapter with its careful list of pronunciations.

M. E. G.

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**A Village in Anatolia.** By Mahmut Makal. Translated by Sir Wyndham Deedes. Valentine Mitchell and Co. 1954. Pp. 208. Illustrated. 18s.

An account of life in a Turkish village by a Turk who has lived there as a member of the community is something of interest to English readers, especially if they know something of conditions in the Middle East. There is a good deal that is obscure about life in the Turkish countryside. Visitors from Europe see mainly the towns or pass quickly through the villages in fast cars. Official statements from Ankara tend rather to give the impression that the progress, so obvious in the towns since the Revolution and especially the emancipation of women, extends also to the villages.

This book gives a very different picture. Here one sees life as one knows it was in the days of the Sultan. The author was the school-teacher in a village in Central Anatolia. He was naturally an adherent of the ideas that made the new régime possible in Turkey. Yet he describes the almost incredible ignorance of the people

of this village and the vicious obstruction of the village elders to the efforts of this teacher to carry out his duties. There can be no doubt that the ideas which inspired modern Turkey, as she was led by the Ataturk and by her present leaders, were completely absent in some villages at the time this book was written. Superstition is still widespread and religious leaders and agents of secret Dervish orders, who are supposed to be abolished, still exert an influence over the peasants which the Ankara régime has been unable altogether to suppress. This book gives chapter and verse from one who has suffered from the activities of these reactionary subterranean forces. Although he had the full support of the Ankara authorities he had great difficulty in overcoming the obstruction of petty officials in league with the reactionaries. At times he had to close his school because the children did not dare to come to it through threats from the village elders. At other times he had to sleep in the school when the snow blew in on a winter's night, and the local builder did not dare to repair the roof for fear of reprisals. The author's book created a sensation when it appeared in Turkey, because the people of the towns and even the authorities did not realize the state of backwardness of some of the peasant population. He was jailed for a time by the local police for his revelations, but public opinion, which is now a real force in Turkey, brought about his release.

And yet one cannot read the book without feeling that the author spoils part of his case by exaggeration. He pictures the desperate poverty of the village where his school was. Actually he is describing a very bad, almost famine year, in the days just after the last world war, when very little could be done by the Turkish Government to help the peasant improve his agriculture and when the rains that year had failed. Moreover, one realizes, when one looks at the map, that the village where Mahmut Makal was teacher was on the edge of the Tüz Göl desert and has probably some of the poorest marginal land in the whole of Anatolia. Thus one does not get a fair idea of life and conditions in Turkish villages by reading this book. But it does enable one to correct some of the things that are written about Turkey today, because it shows that the Ankara régime still has a lot of backwardness to contend with in the more out of the way parts of Turkey.

M. PHILIPS PRICE.

**No Ten Commandments.** Life in the Indian Police. By S. T. Hollins, C.I.E. Hutchinson. 1954. Pp. 304. 8½" × 5¾". 16s.

Really excellent production, from any angle. Those who have known Hollins since, as he notes it, the days of Queen Victoria will be glad he has made this record and said many things which needed saying. We all agreed he was a first-class policeman—service with a smile, though his frown was less popular with malefactors. But we did not know he could write like this. As Sir John Nott-Bower of the Metropolitan Police, who worked under him, says rightly: "a vivid portrayal of the life of the people; packed from cover to cover with incident and adventure, with tragedy and comedy. What a book! I wish I could have written it myself!" The dust-cover says truly: "Many retired police officers have told stories of their fight against crime, but none has had a story like this to tell. The cases described are unique because they could not have occurred anywhere in the world except India."

The record is quite selfless. The author sets out to put across the achievements of the Indian members of the Service of which this book is an amazing exposition. Between the lines one appreciates the steel frame—that other race which by character and impartiality had built up, especially in the Police Service, an organization which is recognized as hitherto unachievable by any other race. Small wonder that thousands of weeping Indians mourned the departure of their lifelong inspiration over two centuries.

It had to be. Self-rule had been the goal during all that period. Western efficiency is no compensation for national responsibility. Maybe the last stages were rushed owing to world emergencies, but there was no other way. India, profiting by the exertions of a long line of devoted Britons, is working out its destiny, and books such as this go to show how much the Indians of all types have to offer

towards solving their own problems and becoming a stabilizing force in a troubled world.

It may be that Hollins has given us some of his best tales, but he must have other notes to present in readable form, even if this means some references to collaborators of earlier days. Such books have more than a personal or even historical value. Their popular presentation enables the interested reader to assess Indian problems of 1954 and to understand and give a fair wind to the efforts of such bodies as United Nations to size up their vital problems of Asia now so much in the melting pot.

G. M. ROUTH.

**Nanga Parbat.** By Dr. Karl Herrligkoffer. Elek Books Ltd. London. Pp. 254; 8 colour plates, 55 monochrome plates, 5 sketch maps and diagrams. 9" x 5½". 25s.

This is a mountaineering epic of unusual interest, of attempts, several ill-fated, to scale what was until 1954 the highest peak ever ascended by man.

In Book One, "Tragedies," the period covered is from 1895, the year of Mummery's rash venture, down to the "Winter Escapade" of 1950. It has been ably and impartially dealt with by Mrs. Eleanor Brockett and Anton Ehrenzweig—translators of the German version—and concludes with a "Summing Up" by Erwin Schneider, Nanga Parbat veteran of 1932.

Book Two, "Triumph," is Dr. Herrligkoffer's official record of the Willi Merkl Memorial Expedition of 1953. He writes dramatically of the alternating progress and frustrations and of the ultimate attainment of the objective striven for for so long and at such great cost of life. Aschenbrenner of Kufstein takes up the story and describes the build-up to Camp IV, close under the Rakhiot Peak at 22,000 feet. Another Austrian, Frauenberger, after shepherding the Hunza porters up the Rakhiot ice-wall, tried to establish Camp V at 23,000 feet, but was forced down to a site at 22,600. The oxygen had to be left at Camp IV.

On June 30 word came through from base camp to those on the mountain that the monsoon had arrived and that the high camps were to be evacuated forthwith. However, the weather had cleared above and it was decided to face the great risks involved and launch the assault. The fullest credit is given to Hermann Buhl of Innsbruck, who, unaccompanied, climbed over 4,000 feet in seventeen hours and with almost superhuman determination and powers of endurance reached the summit a few minutes before the sun went down. Without oxygen, without food or drink, inadequately clad, without sleeping-bag or shelter, he spent seven hours of darkness at over 26,000 feet. At early dawn, both feet frost-bitten, he resumed the arduous descent, limping down to the Diamir depression, up again to the Silver Saddle and, finally, twenty-eight hours after starting up, staggered into the arms of his comrades close to the Moor's Head. But for the unexpectedly long spell of fair weather, which mercifully lasted until base camp was reached, the Naked Goddess must have again taken toll in lives of men.

It will be noticed that no Sherpas took part in the ascent, although the Himalayan Club had, with some difficulty, enrolled, routed and despatched a team to railhead at Abbotabad. The arrangements made for the outward journey through Azad Kashmir to Gilgit broke down and after a long wait the stranded men were recalled to Darjeeling. The Hunzas, expert cragsmen, but with inadequate experience as yet on snow and ice, seem to have done well, and Herrligkoffer, while deploring the non-arrival of the Sherpas, expressed the opinion that "the conquest of Nanga Parbat with Hunza porters was just within the limits of possibility," which proved to be the case. He has also gratefully acknowledged the unfailing co-operation and support given throughout Pakistan by officials and others alike.

An appendix by Eleanor Brockett and Anton Ehrenzweig, "The Hunza Porters," in which the Hunzas and their neighbours across the valley are well and fairly described, is a valuable addition to this very interesting and well-produced book. It is well provided with illustrations, colour and monochrome, and has adequate sketch-maps and diagrams.

H. W. T.



**Growing up in an Egyptian Village.** By Hamed Ammar, M.A., Ph.D. Routledge and Kegan Paul, Ltd. 1954. Pp. 299. 28s.

This book is first and foremost an anthropological report, but it also contains matter of interest to the more general reader of Middle East conditions. Pressing on through such sentences as "the functional approach is basically 'holistic'" and "cultural configurations are mere expressions of autonomous psychological trends," you come upon enlightening information about modern everyday life in the village of Silwa, near Aswan.

The author's comments on the attitude of these villagers to the ownership of land makes especially interesting reading in view of the agrarian reform of the present Egyptian régime. It is striking to notice the difference in outlook and behaviour between the inhabitants of this comparatively remote village and the town-dwellers in the north of Egypt, where the waves of Western ways have long broken over them, for good or for ill. In some points the likeness is more remarkable than the divergence.

In the course of reading this book comparisons of his own, both ancient and modern, will occur to the reader who knows Egypt. The fear of being bitten by scorpions, for instance, which appears to loom particularly large in the lives of Silwa children, puts one in mind of the magical texts against scorpion bites in a well-known nineteenth-century dynasty papyrus. At the modern end of the scale it is interesting to note the game of "water carriers" which Dr. Ammar says is popular with small boys in the village, for it is not unlike a game the reviewer, who happened to spend her childhood in Egypt, often played and imagined she had invented herself.

The degree of discipline and exigency of social demands made upon the young of Silwa seem in some ways curiously Victorian. "Adab"—disciplined manners, according to a definite code—is instilled into the children from about three years old. Dr. Ammar traces the effect of this upbringing through the medium of set sociological and intelligence tests and the study of dreams and general reactions. The fact that the author himself was born in Silwa and was brought up there till the age of seven adds a human interest to the book in addition to the technical matters with which he deals.

The wealth of detail in the text and the footnotes added thereto, not to mention the thirteen appendices and eight tables, are somewhat confusing. There is even a certain amount of repetition within the complications. But although the word "readable" can hardly be here applied, yet this book remains well worth reading. Professor Margaret Read writes an appreciative preface.

M. ROWLATT.

**The Temple Tiger and more Maneaters of Kumaon.** By Jim Corbett. Oxford University Press. 1954. Pp. 197. 8" x 5½". 12s. 6d.

This is the fifth of Colonel Corbett's volumes on his Indian background, and the third of the "Maneaters of Kumaon" series. This reviewer is not the only reader who feels he has left his best wine until last.

His tale of the Talla Des maneater is probably as arresting a record of jungle life and danger as has ever been written. The author does well to explain that he would not have ventured to tell this almost incredible story of the lone chase of a wounded tigress for five days and two nights had his previous volume, *Jungle Lore*, not given some clue to his methods.

In *Jungle Lore* we read of his very early life in the Kumaon forests near Naini Tal. He was in fact brought up in the jungle and became almost a part of its wild life. He grew to know the calls of the many birds and mammals and the meaning of their calls—danger, bed-time, signals to progeny, and so on. Whether it was cricket to imitate the tigress's mating call and then shoot the frustrated male is hardly in doubt if this is to save human victims.

In fact Jim Corbett represents a new product in literature. Most of the great hunters of Asia and Africa started their experiences after maturity, and have seldom been, so to speak, an integral part of the terrain they describe. Our prehistoric ancestors, and others since, no doubt knew their "Nature" but had not the art to

portray it. Literary art would be rare among jungle-breds. But here we have a real expert giving us possibly for the first time this unique inner study of the ancient art of man's survival.

Corbett's style, always simple, readable and revealing, has now developed a new polish. It is fascinating to follow the duels between man and beast in jungle setting, especially to those who know the man and his habitat, his record and his mutual friends. We know too that he is a very brave man and a master of understatement, who tells of failure as well as success. Perhaps the submontane Himalayas form a better and more varied background of animal life than other wild spots in the world. And perhaps the sociological conditions in this area make possible circumstances which must be less likely in other parts. Whatever the facts, this latest and best of the author's experiences is probably the most enthralling of his tales of "Shikar." As *The Times* said of his *My India*, comparison can only be with Kipling.

G. M. ROUTH.

**Afghanistan (Ancient Aryana).** By A. Rahman Pazhwak, of the Afghan Bureau of Information. Key Press, 194, Portland Road, Hove. 1954. Pp. 81. With coloured portrait of H.M. Zahir Shah, 2 maps and 66 excellent illustrations. 9½" × 7". No price.

The A.B.I., having become "aware of the great demand by institutions, organizations and individuals for general information about Afghanistan," here provides "a short survey of the political and cultural history of Afghanistan, together with a brief outline of the geographic, social and economic conditions of the country and the way of life of the people."

Of the 81 pages only about 28 are letterpress.

While the phraseology and arrangement are English, the facts are presented in oriental form, as one might imagine a direct translation from a Persian document. This is a pity. Luckily it applies mainly to the first half of the book.

The general set-up is excellent and deserves more care in dealing with historical facts. These—the earlier cultural data should be corrected by some professional archæologist, such as Professor Childe, and the name spelling (p. 12) and structure of some of the sentences corrected to conform to the pattern of the intended readers by a professional English journalist. There is too much repetition in this historical portion, and national claims are too often made which throw doubt on the accuracy of the whole. Such treatment—in fact not very drastic revision—could transform any second edition into a much more convincing picture of the unique history of this mountain kingdom, now coming into its own. No need to draw on Indian or Persian stories when so much occurred within the national frontiers. In ancient times, before the Mongol invasions, Afghanistan was a far more populous country with important cultural and political status. A more professional review of this period could give a most effective picture of many important episodes which helped to develop the ancient world. A bibliography would help.

It is true that while western Islam was bridging Greek learning, the Afghans were doing the same with Pahlevi and Indian languages, and playing their part in the enlightenment of posterity. If the author prefers to use Mohammedan lunar dating for these periods, Christian readers would be assisted by the more universal B.C. and A.D. equivalents being added.

War has evidently been the national sport for many thousands of years in this area. Perhaps, if it were not so, the rocky terrain could never have supported the residue. That is one of the problems of the future.

The last half of the pamphlet is excellent and gives a very fair picture of recent history, culture and activities. A little revision of the first half should give real dividends.

G. M. ROUTH.



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PART II

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# NOTICES

THE Annual General Meeting of the Society will be held on THURSDAY, JUNE 9, AT 5 P.M. Further particulars to be announced later.

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## ANNUAL DINNER

As already announced, the Annual Dinner is to be held at Claridge's, London, W.1, on TUESDAY, JULY 12, 1955. Formal notice has been sent to all members. Applications for tickets should be made to the Secretary as soon as possible.

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The Council acknowledges with gratitude the following :

From Lieut.-Colonel E. H. Cobb, O.B.E., a handsome Chinese vase on plinth, to be seen in the Society's Library. The vase was presented to Lieut.-Colonel Cobb by the Indo-Sinkiang traders at Gilgit on the occasion of the reopening of the Central Asian trade route between India and Kashgar in 1943.

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Further acquisitions to the Library :

*Les Annales Archæologiques de Syrie*, Tome III, No. 1 and 2. 1953.

*Tadjikistan*. P. Luknitsky. Moscow, 1951. (In Russian.) Presented by B. Waurick.

*Kuwait, Past and Present*. Presented by the Kuwait Oil Co.

*Islamic Society in Persia*. An inaugural lecture delivered on March 9, 1954, by Ann K. S. Lambton. Presented by the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London.

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## IMPORTANT

AS IT IS PROPOSED TO PUBLISH A NEW LIST OF MEMBERS IN THE NEAR FUTURE, THE HONORARY SECRETARIES WILL BE GRATEFUL IF YOU WILL INFORM THE OFFICE IF THE ADDRESS TO WHICH THIS JOURNAL HAS BEEN SENT IS EITHER INCORRECT OR INADEQUATE IN ANY DETAIL. PLEASE GIVE CORRECT PARTICULARS IN BLOCK LETTERS.

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# NEW TRENDS IN IRAN

By SIR CLARMONT SKRINE, O.B.E.

Report of a lecture delivered to the Society on Wednesday, December 15, 1954, Admiral Sir Cecil Harcourt, G.B.E., K.C.B., in the chair.

The CHAIRMAN: Sir Clarmont Skrine has recently returned from a visit to Iran, and he has come today to describe to us some of the new trends in that country. He needs no introduction by me, for he is well known to most of you as a man with long and varied experience of various countries in Central Asia, including Iran; also as an extremely keen and skilled photographer. Happily, today we are going to have the benefit of both those aspects of Sir Clarmont's abilities. I will not delay further but ask him now to deliver his lecture entitled "New Trends in Iran."

LAST October, in an attempt to cure a nostalgia of six years' standing, I flew to Persia on a month's holiday. I had been encouraged to do so by letters from my very good friend, H.E. Amir Asadullah Alam, son of the late Amir Muhammad Ibrahim Alam, C.I.E., of Birjand, better known to his many British and Indian admirers as the Shaukat-ul-Mulk. Though heads were shaken both here and at Tehran at my revisiting Persia so soon after the turn of the Musaddiq tide, I knew that with such a sponsor all would be well; and so it proved.

A long day's flight *via* Amsterdam, Munich and Rome was followed by an entirely sleepless night in the air between Athens and Tehran, broken by one refuelling halt only, Istanbul. Dawn burnished the snowy mountain-tops of Diarbekir and Kurdistan below us as I sipped a tepid but welcome cup of tea, and an hour later the peerless cone of Demavend, towering 18,600 ft. above the eastern horizon, signalled our approach to the Persian capital. Next, 16 hours after leaving Amsterdam, the big K.L.M. Constellation was circling down to Tehran's Mehrabad airport.

During three of the four weeks of my stay in Iran I was lucky enough to be put up at the Hotel Darband, a luxury affair built by the late Shah on Crown land at the tree-shaded mouth of a steeply pitched gorge some eight miles north of the city and 1,500 ft. above it. It is very difficult to find tolerable hotel accommodation at or near the capital these days unless you have a friend with a "pull," but that is just what I had; for the kind friend I have just mentioned, Amir Alam, is Minister in charge of the Shah's Department of Relinquished Properties (*Amlāk-i-Wahguzāri*), which administers the estates of the late Reza Shah Pahlevi. These include, as well as the Hotel Darband, the big hotels at Ramsar and Babol-sar on the Caspian shore as well as smaller ones at Chalus on the Caspian, Gach-i-Sar, and Ab-i-Ali in high valleys of the Elburz. In Tehran itself there is only one first-class establishment, the Park, and that is always full. Plans are complete, I was told, for the construction of a really big government-run hotel on the northern outskirts of the city; when this is completed a great deterrent to tourism in Persia, the shortage of good accommodation at the capital, will be removed.

After six years' absence what impressed me most about Tehran was

the vastly increased traffic in its streets and the relatively efficient manner in which the police control it. As of old, long shiny American saloons predominate, but there are five or six times as many of them and ten times as many buses; no less than 500 motor coaches had been imported with the help of American "Point Four" funds not long before I arrived. The Tehranis are getting bus-minded; long queues wait patiently at the bus-stops, just as if they were at the Marble Arch. Another innovation is the fleet of German Volkswagen "baby buses" which ply between Tehran and Shemran by the Gulhek Avenue carrying twelve passengers. But I was pleased to note that British small cars still provide the bulk of Tehran taxis; Austins, Standards, Hillmans, Vauxhalls and Fords carry you anywhere you like within the limits of the New Town at a cost of tenpence a "course" or run, which may be two miles or more, but you must not stop to buy a paper or cigarettes—if you do, it is another tenpence. They take three passengers, and quite a lot of luggage on the roof, and they are astonishingly numerous. London would do well to introduce them in place of some of the lumbering, antiquated, unnecessarily roomy vehicles we have known so long. In my day at Tehran the vain efforts of the police to persuade drivers to keep to their side of the road and refrain from "driving on their horns" were a standing joke. Some of the tales no doubt were apocryphal, but not these two, which are vouched for on the authority of a distinguished colleague. When "islands" were first constructed along the middle of Shah Reza Avenue there was much critical comment in the tea-houses of the capital. This came to a head when a police car at speed crashed into one of them at night and killed a policeman who was travelling in it. The popular reaction was not, as one would have expected, "How scandalous that the police, whose duty it is to teach the public to keep to their side of the road and not drive too fast, should themselves crash into one of the islands!" Not at all. The tone of the newspapers' comment next day was: "Serves them right. Everyone in Persia drives in the middle of the road; what do they want to put up obstructions like these islands for?" The other illustrates the prevalence of jay-walking and horn-blowing in those days. My friend was walking along the famous shopping street Lalehzar, which is quite narrow and has recently been made a one-way street. He noticed a youth strolling across the road, exchanging badinage with a friend over his shoulder and not looking where he was going. Arrived at the other side, the boy bumped into the radiator of a car which was parked by the kerb with no one in it. Turning round angrily to the empty car he shouted indignantly: "*Chira buq na-zadid?*" (Why didn't you blow your horn?).

Conditions are very different in present-day Tehran. Traffic regulations, including one against unnecessary horn-blowing, are enforced and effective; traffic lights, hand-operated by properly trained police, keep hundreds of cars on the move at the main cross-roads even at peak hours; and the standard of driving on the formerly very dangerous Gulhek and Pahlevi roads to Shemran has improved out of all recognition.

Though the lay-out of modern Tehran would do credit to any of the smaller European capitals, though its main streets are brilliantly lit and

it boasts a radio station and bus queues and traffic lights, it still has no piped water supply. Water for public and domestic purposes alike comes from wells or along open drains which conduct spring-water to the town from the slopes to the north; drinking water is distributed by horse-drawn water-cart. This, however, will soon be a thing of the past; work has already, with American aid, commenced on a pipe-line from Kerej twenty miles to the west. On my way over to Chalus on the Caspian I saw barrages, tunnels and pumping stations at an advanced stage of construction on a perennial torrent which drains the high valleys of the 15,000-ft. Takht-i-Sulaiman, central massif of the Elburz.

The second thing that struck me about Tehran in 1954 was its enormous expansion. Soon after the war its population was estimated at 800,000; now it must be well over a million. Whole new suburbs can be seen crowning ridges on both sides of the beautiful Pahlevi Avenue, which leads to Shemran and Saadabad, where the Shah's summer palaces are, and ribbon development is becoming a problem on the Gulhek, Kazvin and Mazanderan highways out of the city. It seems that one of the effects of the Musaddiq régime was to discourage every form of investment except real estate; those who had money and could not get it out of the country bought wasteland at prices up to £1 a square metre and built houses on it. The boom in real estate has been maintained since the fall of Musaddiq by the demand for villas with swimming-pools for the many Americans who have arrived in Tehran in connection with "Point Four" and other organizations.

One feature of Tehran of which we all, Persians included, used to complain is still unremedied, and that is the difficulty of finding addresses, owing to the frequent changing of the names of streets and lanes and to irregularity in the numbering of houses. A new friend telling you where he lives does not simply say: "43 Pomegranate Lane, Tulip Avenue"; he says: "Go along Tulip Avenue until you come to the Baths of Hafiz, then it's the third lane on the right; the name written up (in Persian, of course) is Weeping Willow Lane, but everyone calls it by its old name of Pomegranate Lane. Look for a green-painted gate, the fourth on the left after you pass the bakery." One morning I had to find an address in a lane off Saadi Avenue. Up and down the busy mile-long thoroughfare I drove in vain; there was no lane of the name given. I stopped and asked a policeman. "Lane So-and-so, Saadi Avenue? Yes, this is Saadi Avenue. Which cross-roads is it near? You don't know? Well, I'll tell you how to find it. You walk slowly, looking at the names of each lane as you pass, first up one side of this avenue and then down the other. You'll find Lane So-and-so." After that I went away and telephoned for a guide. It turned out that the name of the lane had been changed twice in the last six years!

An appreciable proportion of the longer and shinier cars in the streets is accounted for by the presence of hundreds—literally hundreds—of Americans. Most of them are members either of the large staff of the U.S. Embassy or of one or other of the Advisory Missions to the Iranian Army and Gendarmerie, but the "Point Four" aid organization has a large personnel, and there are also the American members of the Oil



Consortium, the staff of the Export-Import Bank and many representatives of transatlantic industrial and commercial concerns. Of Russians, on the other hand, one sees very little compared with the post-war years. Advertisements and shop-signs in the Russian language are now rare in Tehran's "West End," where the shops sell Coca-Cola, American cigarettes, delicatessen and chewing gum as a matter of course. Most of the Americans in Tehran are comparatively young and stay only a year or two, not long enough to learn the language; they have their own social clubs, two of them, and meet each other and the same circle of English-speaking Persian friends at frequent cocktail parties and dinner-dances. Persians whom I met deplored this, saying that only those of their countrymen who had business with Americans had any chance of getting to know them. This is certainly a pity, for there is no doubt that many Persians are saying about the Americans the same sort of things now that they used to say about us British in the days when we and the Russians were the only pebbles on the beach, namely that Americans as individuals are not interested in their country and look upon it merely as a source of dollars, and a place from which to get back to America and their idea of civilization as soon as possible. As a highly-placed Persian friend said to me: "When you are doing as much for people as the Americans are doing for us, you have to be *extra* careful of their feelings."

Even their critics acknowledge that the Americans are doing a tremendous job in Persia and lavishing dollars and technical skill in the effort to improve the lot of its people. Much leeway has to be made up. Persia's economy was in none too good shape even before World War II, thanks to the impoverishment of the people by direct and indirect heavy taxations, particularly the sugar and tea monopolies, and the squandering of the resources thus collected on uneconomic projects like the Trans-Iranian Railway. Then came the war, the economic effect of which was disastrous in spite, or perhaps because, of the huge expenditure of the Allied armies in the country. For Persia, peace did not begin till the Red Army at last moved out in May 1946, two months after the British and American occupation troops, and even then the revolt in Azerbaijan prolonged the crisis. But with that problem satisfactorily settled and the relatively enormous oil royalties increasing yearly there was every hope that prosperity was on its way. Alas! Dr. Musaddiq and the men who put him in power changed all that. They killed the goose, and the source of the golden eggs on which Persia had relied so long dried up, fortunately only for some three years. Since the *coup d'état* which ended the Musaddiq régime Persia's economy has revived, thanks to the realistic policy of the strong Zahedi Government and to massive help from across the Atlantic.

The trouble is to know where to begin. What are the priorities? Apart from all-important oil, which will finance itself, I would start with surface and air communications; next, agriculture, including irrigation, forestry, fisheries and animal husbandry; next, building, cement manufacture, mines and light industries. As an inveterate sightseer and photographer I would like to add tourism, but this valuable "invisible export" is potential rather than actual.

## OIL

The Iranian Oil Agreement of October 1954 covers a period of twenty-five years with provision for three five-year extensions. It is between the Iranian Government and the National Iranian Oil Company on one side and a Consortium of eight oil companies from four States—Britain, the U.S., the Netherlands and France. The former Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (now the British Petroleum Company) has a 40 per cent. share, Royal Dutch-Shell 14 per cent., five American companies 40 per cent. and the Cie. Française des Pétroles 6 per cent. Under the terms of the Agreement two "Operating Companies," registered in Iran but incorporated in Holland, have been formed to operate the oilfields and the Abadan refinery respectively on behalf of Iran and the National Iranian Oil Company to the extent provided in the Agreement. The General Managing Director of both companies is a Dutchman, Mr. L. E. J. Brouwer; there will also be American, British, French and of course Iranian nationals among the senior executives.

The Member Companies of the Consortium (except the French, who are establishing a branch of their own at Tehran) have set up subsidiary "Trading Companies" to act for them in Iran. The Trading Company of the British Petroleum Company was registered, first of them all, towards the end of October last. These companies will buy oil, according to their shares, from the National Iranian Oil Company and sell it, either as crude oil or in the shape of products refined for them at Abadan, to other concerns who will transport and market it outside Iran. These latter concerns will normally, though not necessarily, be affiliates of the Consortium members. The object of this complicated arrangement is to ensure, through the payment of Iranian income tax on the resulting profits, that the profits arising in Iran from the oil operations are shared "fifty-fifty" between Iran and the Consortium members. The shares of the two "Operating Companies" are held by a company, incorporated and having its headquarters in London, called Iranian Oil Participants Ltd. The Consortium have also formed a company in London called Iranian Oil Services Ltd. to undertake procurement and servicing for the Operating Companies.

It is generally agreed in oil circles that in getting the wheels of the oil industry moving again the difficulties expected were not so much technical as administrative, especially in the sphere of labour relations. The National Iranian Oil Company maintained the installations in good order during the Musaddiq close-down, but the output of petroleum products was negligible. Yet it continued, under orders from Tehran, to pay wages to the entire labour force, some 28,000 strong at Abadan alone, although the vast majority of the men had nothing whatever to do. "You can imagine the administrative tangle that has resulted," said a prominent oil executive to me. "For three years all our former local employees have been paid their wages, from six tomans [5s.] a day upwards, for doing nothing. Now they want a big rise of pay because they have to *work*! To make matters worse, various private 'empires' have been carved out of this racket by bosses who control and pay the idle labour; the intrigu-

ing and jockeying for position and squabbling that is going on can be imagined. But the *will* to get started again is there; the foreigner is welcomed back because he alone can cope."

### ROADS

Throughout history the great extent of Persia has been a handicap to its progress. The inhabited areas are situated round the periphery of the Kavir and Lüt Deserts and distances are therefore relatively enormous between the chief centres; important towns like Kerman, Birjand, Zahedan and Bandar Abbas are a thousand miles and more from the capital. The transition of Persia from a mediæval to a modern economy within the last thirty years has been bound up with the modernization of its communications. To give you an idea of the contrast between now and a generation ago I may mention that when I first arrived in Persia, landing at Bandar Abbas in October 1916, I travelled by caravan—horses for me and my escort, camels and donkeys for our equipment and supplies—to Kerman, 285 miles, in three weeks; in 1918, when as a war measure the Indian railway system was extended to what is now Zahedan, the journey for civilians from there to Meshed *via* Sistan (620 miles) took six weeks. In 1927 I did the latter journey by car in four days, in 1944 by air liner in 2½ hours. From the camel to the air liner in twenty-eight years! Is it surprising that Persians sometimes try to run before they can walk? The marvels of modern science have been forced upon them, poured into their country during two world wars without effort on their part. Cars? Aeroplanes? Iran has taken them in her stride. To a Persian nothing is difficult, a fact which was impressed on me in my early career. One day towards the end of World War I, I was on a motor reconnaissance in a remote part of South-eastern Kerman province. Our two-cylinder Hubmobile tourers, recently arrived overland from India for the South Persia Rifles, were the first cars that had ever been seen in that part of Persia. We had halted to cool the engines at a tiny settlement on the edge of the desert and the villagers stood round watching in silence. Among them I noticed a burly fellow who seemed particularly interested in my car, peering under the bonnet with intense concentration.

"Do you know what this is?" I asked him.

"Oh yes, I know," he replied. "This is an *otomobil*. I'm a blacksmith, you see, and I'm going to make one like this when I have time."

During the reign of Reza Shah the camel-caravan came to be regarded as the stigma of a backward country and the American light lorry took its place. For its benefit the tireless Shah embarked on ambitious road-making schemes all over Persia. The surface of the new roads was made and maintained by shovelling broken rock on to it, to the detriment of the vehicles and their tyres. But Persians, if they cannot manufacture cars or lorries, know how to keep them on the road; their garages performed daily miracles of repair and maintenance and somehow they kept the traffic going. The camel-man and the muleteer turned into lorry-drivers; the Golden Road to Samarcand became a bus-route overnight.

During World War II the Allies spent millions on the reconstruction of Persia's road system. Their heavy transport, especially on the two supply routes to Russia, certainly inflicted heavy wear on it, but there is no doubt that after the war Persia had, on the whole, better roads than before. During the régime of Dr. Musaddiq lack of funds for maintenance caused much deterioration, as I noticed on my trip round Mazanderan last October; but this is rapidly being made good by the present administration with American aid. The new Seven Year Plan includes the asphaltting of no less than 6,000 km. of main road; the well-known British firm of Mowlems will almost certainly be entrusted with the carrying out of this great work. The roads concerned are mostly along well-known existing alignments—Isfahan-Shiraz, Isfahan-Yezd-Kerman and so on—but I heard of one new alignment which interested me very much. The whole 580-mile Tehran-Meshed road is to be metalled, but east of Shahrud the main route will be not *via* Sabzawar and Nishapur as at present but across the mountains to Gurgan (formerly Asterabad) and Gumbad-i-Kabus; thence it will break entirely new ground *via* the Atrak valley to Bujnurd and Kuchan, where it will link up with the existing road between Meshed and Bajgiran on the frontier of Soviet Turkmenistan. This new alignment of the Tehran-Meshed highway will afford easy access for the first time to a region of exceptional interest both to the naturalist and to the sportsman, the Guli Daghi or "Flowery Mountains" of Western Bujnurd. The whole district is known as the Sahrayi-Turkoman or Turkoman Steppe, being inhabited by the Goklan section of that tribe whose chief grazing-grounds have long been on the Persian side of the frontier. The best description I know of the Bujnurd forests is in that fascinating "shikar" book, Lt.-Col. R. Kennion's *By Mountain, Lake and Plain*.

#### AVIATION

During the Occupation of 1941-46 three or four internal air lines were run with Allied military aid by Iranian Airways, and these were maintained and extended after the evacuation at any rate up to the Musaddiq *débâcle*. Dakotas, mostly war machines adapted to civilian use, were flown by American and European pilots with reasonable regularity between Tehran and the more important provincial towns. During the Musaddiq régime, I understand, Iranian Airways, like other public services, languished from lack of funds, but under the stimulus of American dollars and technical aid the organization has since been re-equipped and brought up to date and its schedules improved and extended. Some sixteen services a week now connect Tehran not only with the provincial centres but with Bagdad, Kuwait, Beirut, Karachi, Bombay and Delhi. To the improved service to Meshed I owed this time a very pleasant weekend at my war-time headquarters; I had only two nights to spare, and with four services a week each way to choose from I was able to leave Tehran after breakfast on Saturday, have "elevenses" with my kind hosts within a mile of the famous Shrine of the Eighth Imam, and return on Monday in time for lunch at my Tehran hotel.

## MESHED

At Meshed I was the guest of that delightful and public-spirited couple, Dr. and Mrs. Mahmoud Zia'i of the Shah Reza Hospital. Thanks to their thoughtful hospitality I was privileged to meet the *Ustandar* (Governor-General) of Khorasan, M. Ram, the lay Administrator of the Shrine, M. Motamedi (for years Iran's representative at Delhi), another old friend, General Afkhami, G.O.C. Khorasan District, and other notabilities. I found many changes in Meshed and its environs, mostly for the better. The place is noticeably less dusty than of old, for all its more important avenues are now asphalted. The six-rayed roundabout known as the Maidan-i-Fawzia is at last complete and a spirited equestrian statue of Reza Shah adorns it. On what used to be the parade ground of the Arg or Citadel, scene of public hangings in Qajar times, stands a massive National Bank building, austere rectangular in shape but lavishly faced with many-coloured Nishapur marble. No trace remains of the Russian occupation of the war years, but my friends in the higher-income groups had much to say of the Communist-fostered ill-feeling shown towards them by the working class during the Musaddiq régime. I was surprised at the number of women I saw in the streets enveloped in the black *chadur*, which in my time was worn only in the precincts or immediate neighbourhood of the Shrine; this retrogression in the direction of the hated veil is generally regarded as a symptom of the partial recovery by the priesthood of the influence they lost in the time of Reza Shah.

In Khorasan as in the western provinces the "Point Four" organization (see next section) is doing splendid work. No less than sixty-five Americans are based on Meshed, and they have started, among other things, thirty-two village schools in which English is taught. Teachers are trained in soil conservation and other modern agricultural methods, hygiene, domestic economy and social science. These schools are frequently visited and encouraged in their work. Tenants of Shrine lands who have recently been granted proprietary rights (see below) are being helped by the organization with co-operative credit and agricultural machinery.

One feature of old-time Meshed is amusingly unchanged. The same fleet of ramshackle droshkies, pulled seemingly by the same ancient horses, still clip-clop Pahlevi Avenue morning and evening; the Droshky-drivers' Union, it seems, has successfully opposed up to date the granting of licences to taxis, with one solitary exception! I could not help rather admiring this piece of sturdy conservatism. It was sad, however, to see the gateway of my old Consulate-General, which for more than sixty years presented an imposing façade to Meshed's Central Asian throng, shorn of its Consular shield and even of the words "British" and "General," defaced, no doubt, by Tudeh-minded hooligans during the Musaddiq period. Within the high walls the garden, famous for its lawns and herbaceous borders, for the shade of its towering planes and for the flavour of its hothouse-size peaches and nectarines, is overgrown and unkempt; verandas and greenhouses, pergolas and toolsheds are dilapidated; walls and roofs are not unmarked by the rains and snows of three

Musaddiq winters. But the main Consular residence with its two-storeyed colonnade of wooden pillars, picturesque relic of Nasir-ud-Din's reign, is intact and the life-giving water still flows in its due periods along the leaf-fringed channels. For a small staff of faithful servants, including two hoary veterans of the famous 105th Hazara Pioneers, still act as caretakers, hoping against hope that one day a "Burra Consul Sahib" will return. The flutter caused by my sudden reappearance from nowhere can be imagined; the old Hazaras literally wept for joy on my shoulder, their bushy beards tickling my cheeks, and it was pathetic to see their faces fall when they learned that I had come in no official capacity and had no news of any decision to reopen the Consulate-General.

#### "POINT FOUR"

In the spheres of agriculture and industry the U.S. Government "Point Four" organization is playing a major rôle. As I have already said, American aid is on a massive scale. In the fiscal year July 1, 1953, to June 30, 1954, the U.S. Government allotted a total of 60·5 million dollars as "special economic assistance" to promote internal economic stability in Persia and combat the rising cost of living, and another 23 million for "technical co-operation." This aid is being continued for a further three-year period during which 127 million will be allotted, 85 million of it in the form of loans and the remainder in outright grants. Of this total sum—

- (a) 52·8 million is for imports of consumer goods;
- (b) 53 million will be used for "short-term developmental assistance";
- (c) 21·5 million is for "technical co-operation."

The object of (a) is to provide the Persian Government, pending the receipt of funds from the reorganized oil industry, with a source of currency with which to meet its operating expenses; (b) will finance projects in housing, road improvements, water supply and health approved by the World Bank. The most interesting, perhaps, of the three categories of "Point Four" assistance is (c), the "Technical Co-operation Program." In this the U.S. and the Iranian Government are co-operating in the improvement of livestock, plant production, forestry, land and water use, rural schools, teacher training, domestic economy, material control and sanitation. New breeds of poultry and cattle have been brought from the U.S. and elsewhere in the hope of improving Persian breeds; thirty-four chicken-farms in the Tehran neighbourhood alone are being supplied with birds. The experts of the British Middle East Office question the wisdom of importing too many new strains; they think it would be better to concentrate on improving the Gulpaigan and other local breeds of cattle. They are particularly doubtful as to whether the Persian sheep which bear carpet wool and karakul fleece can be improved upon from elsewhere.

An admirably-run veterinary laboratory at Haidarabad produces all the necessary vaccines and serums. New strains of cereals and cottons

are being imported; in this the Agriculture Institute formed by the late Shah at Kerej, twenty-five miles west of Tehran, is co-operating effectively with the Americans.

On the Persian side, a well-staffed Planning and Development Bureau called the *Sazeman-i-Barnameh* has been set up under that dynamic personality M. Abolhasan Ebtehaj, lately President of the National Bank of Iran. Roughly, the Bureau is responsible for planning, co-ordinating and exploiting the national resources; not only agriculture and mines but all the mills and factories founded by the late Shah come within its purview. It is in effect a realization of that long-cherished dream, the "Seven Year Plan." In an interview M. Ebtehaj, an old friend, told me that although for a couple of years or so the *Sazeman* would depend on "Point Four" and other foreign funds (including, he hoped, a loan from Britain), the entire revenue from Persia's oil under the new Agreement would, when it materialized, be available for development purposes. He was optimistic about the scope for British enterprise in the Persian field. The country, he said, needed British capital and advice in partnership with Persian capital and with local knowledge and skills. Discussing this point with me later, Mr. Hillier of the British Embassy's Commercial Secretariat said: "British firms would be well advised in carrying out contracts to concentrate on advice, tactful supervision and the supplying of equipment, undertaking only the difficult bits themselves. Otherwise they may run up against snags in labour relations, company law, factory regulations and so on. Another way is to go into partnership with a Persian firm and let it do most of the work and local purchasing."

#### TEXTILES

It is to be hoped that under the control of the *Sazeman-i-Barnameh* the various Government factories and mills established before the last war by Reza Shah will be reorganized, re-equipped and modernized. Most if not all of them are run at a loss owing to heavy overheads and to overstaffing. There are too many directors and executives drawing anything up to £120 a month and too much underemployed labour. Employees combine their duties at the factory with work in the fields; the superintendent of a cotton textile mill in Mazanderan told me that many of his employees cultivated plots of land, often at the expense of their work in the factory. He did not blame them; their wages were too low to live on, and anyway it kept them out of mischief; no trouble from Tudeh Communist shop-stewards in *his* mill! A beginning has been made with the re-equipment of the factories; at the Chalus silk factory in the same province I was shown a new German 500-h.p. power-plant which is being held in reserve in case of a breakdown in either of the two existing (French) engines. At this factory 218 looms of pre-war design are operated by 700 local women who are paid at the rate of 30 to 40 rials a day (2s. 6d. to 3s. 4d.). Cocoons from the Resht district, 150 miles to the west along the Caspian shore, are used and all kinds of silk tissues produced up to brocade at 400 rials (£1 5s.) a metre; but the same set of designs has been in use for years and the factory could do with some new ones.

## OTHER INDUSTRIES

Apart from textiles, new equipment is required for sugar refineries, rice-husking mills, tea-, match- and tobacco-factories. Much more cement-making plant is needed than exists at present to cope with Persia's vast building programme, civil and military. Another promising sphere is water and oil distribution; Sir Alexander Gibb and Partners, whose Kuhrang waterworks at Isfahan has realized a dream of centuries, are, I believe, helping in the new piped supply for Tehran. A well-known British firm is tendering for the construction of an oil pipeline from Khurramshahr over the mountains to Tehran, a scheme of impressive magnitude and difficulty. British tractors are already helping Persian agriculture in considerable numbers; in this line we can undercut American and even Canadian machines. Sir George Binney's United Steel group has landed a big contract for rails for the Trans-Iranian Railway in competition with the French, who have brought off a much smaller deal. I have already mentioned Messrs. Mowlems' all-Persia road contract, which is estimated to involve £30 million worth of work *plus* another £10 million for equipment. These successes are a pointer to the prizes which await British industrial enterprise in the new Persia.

## FORESTS

In the forests of Mazanderan and Gilan which fringe the Caspian shore Persia has one of the last surviving natural stands of broad-leaved timber in the Old World. It is greatly to be regretted that this national asset is being wasted. The best forests are theoretically Crown lands but leased to the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, which makes what it can out of them. There is no attempt at conservation and none worth speaking of at replanting; with the limited powers and resources of the Ministry neither would be possible on an adequate scale in present conditions. The worst enemy is not Big Business after hardwood, brier root for pipes or oak staves for beer-barrels (some business is done with British firms in these lines), but native charcoal-burners. With all its wealth of oil, Persia still uses vast quantities of charcoal, and the price of this fuel at Tehran is so high that it pays to bring it in big lorries over the Elburz by the hair-raising Chalus-Kerej road. There are something like 1,500 kilns in Mazanderan alone, and the burners just fell a tree, lop off the branches for charcoal and leave the trunk to rot. Between Ramsar and Chalus whole hillsides formerly under dense forest have been denuded within the last two or three years. I have it on good authority that the Government and the Shah himself are perturbed by this state of affairs, and that the assistance not only of "Point Four" but of the British Middle East Office has been requested. The B.M.E.O. is prepared to lend a number of forestry experts for advice and to train Persian students at the Government Forestry School at Troodos in Cyprus. But in this, as in all other departments of Persia's economy, the crying need is for good administration rather than for technical advice.



## LAND

I have already mentioned that during most of my stay at Tehran I was the guest of H.E. Amir Asadullah Alam, head of the Department of Relinquished (Crown) Properties. In this I was doubly fortunate, for in talks with my host I became acquainted at first hand with the facts of a very significant new development. Some of you may remember a report in *The Times* one day last summer that His Imperial Majesty the Shah had paid a special visit to Fariman in the Khorasan province, 600 miles east of the capital, for the purpose of presenting in person the title-deeds of Crown lands there to the tenants. The estates in question, like others in Khorasan, Mazanderan and elsewhere in North Persia, had been acquired by His Majesty's great father, Reza Shah Pahlevi, and on the latter's abdication in August 1941 his son entrusted their administration to the above-mentioned Department, which was set up for the purpose. The function at Fariman marked the inauguration by His Majesty of a policy designed to remedy, so far as it lay in his power to do so, the worst evils of Persia's feudal land-tenure system—share-cropping, absentee landlordism, usury by village capitalists and a condition sometimes bordering on serfdom among the tenants. The importance of such a policy, in relation to the Communist menace, in a country which marches for miles with Soviet Transcaspia need not be emphasized. Since Fariman at least two other estates, if not more, have been handed over to the tenants in the same way: Gurgan (Asterabad), near the eastern border of the Caspian province of Mazanderan, and Veramin, thirty miles south-east of Tehran. Shots from a film recording of one of these functions were on the television screen some nights ago on the occasion of His Majesty the Shah's departure for the United States. Amir Alam, who has throughout been closely connected with the scheme, gave me one day some interesting details of it.

"In the northern zone of Persia, where most of the late Shah's lands are situated," he said, "the produce of the land is divided as follows:

For the <i>land</i> and the <i>water</i> the proprietor takes	...	2 shares
For providing the <i>plough-oxen</i> and the <i>seed</i> the		
<i>gāvband</i> (bailiff) takes	... ..	2 „
For his <i>labour</i> the peasant takes	... ..	1 share
		—
		5 shares
		—

"In the typical case of a six-hectare (fifteen acres) plot the cultivating tenant under the present system receives his share partly in cash, five rials (5d.), and partly in kind,  $1\frac{1}{2}$  kilos ( $3\frac{1}{2}$  lb.) of wheat. One or two rooms in the village are allotted to him according to the size of his family. The *gāvband* sees to it that the peasant is always in his debt and therefore unable to take his labour elsewhere.

"Under the new scheme any tenant of six hectares of the land under distribution who can put up the money, gets his holding *and the water*

which goes with it in freehold for 2,200 rials (£9). If he has eight hectares he pays 2,800 rials.

"On his six-hectare plot the peasant will sow two hectares with 450 kilos of wheat and one hectare with cotton. The seed will be advanced to him by one of the new co-operative societies which we have started, financed by a special Agricultural Bank with 14 million rials capital, put up half by the public and half by the Relinquished Properties Department. An average outturn on the wheat will be eightfold (some farmers get fifteenfold), that is to say, 3,600 kilos, for which the co-operative society will pay him 3,600 rials per ton at present rates, or 12,960 rials. The hectare under cotton will ordinarily give him a ton, worth 14,000 rials. The gross income from his holding is therefore about 27,000 rials, or £114. Under the old system he would have received throughout the year 1,800 rials in cash and 600 kilos of wheat worth 2,160 rials, total 3,960 rials (£16)."

"I've got a photo of the Shah, with you in attendance, handing the title-deeds of their lands to some Turkoman peasants," I said. "No wonder they're grinning all over their faces! But how do they get the produce to market? I suppose the co-operative societies will buy it off them. But do they trust the societies?"

"They didn't at first. Last year the new peasant-proprietors of certain Crown lands sold only 50 tons of cotton to their society; this year they have sold 500 tons."

"What about the *gāvbands*? Are they given the option of buying any land?"

"If there is any surplus after the peasants have taken up as much as they want it is distributed among the *gāvbands*. Being of a superior class and having capital they make more out of their holdings than the peasants do, as a rule."

"Is anything being done about housing?"


"Yes, the Department is helping the peasants to build homes for themselves, mud-brick and wood cottages of a good design, separate from the cow-byres. No money is being wasted on showy buildings as has so often been done in the past."

"Will many private landowners follow the Shah's example, do you think?"


"Not many, I'm afraid," said my friend. "Most of them cannot afford practically to give away their land. But they may be encouraged to sell some, at any rate, of their land at economic rates to their tenants, which will be a very good thing as far as it goes."

I could see other uncertainties: unless special legislation is enacted, as in India, to control the alienation of smallholdings there is the danger that the *gāvbands* will gradually buy out the less efficient peasants, who will then be in danger of becoming once more virtually serfs tied to the land—slogan-fodder for the Communists.


But there is no question that the Shah's initiative in distributing lands acquired by his late father among the peasants is a sign of the times as well as a generous gesture. We have seen that thanks to American generosity and the settlement of the oil dispute there is a better prospect



THE PRECINCTS OF THE TOMB OF THE EIGHT IMAM  
MESHED



THE RESIDENCE OF THE GOVERNOR OF BUJNURD,  
KHORASAN PROVINCE



THE SPA AT RAMSAR IN MAZANDERAN, CASPIAN COAST



LAND DISTRIBUTION BY H.M. THE SHAH. PERSIAN TURCOMAN PEASANTS  
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ON THE CHALUS ROAD OVER THE ELBURZ TO THE CASPIAN  
COAST



PAHLEVI AVENUE, TEHERAN, WITH ELBURZ RANGE IN  
BACKGROUND



BEER-SHEVA



BEER-SHEVA NEW GOVERNMENT HOUSING PROJECT

*See "Developments in the Negev", p. 176.*

today than at any time since 1939 that the technical problems presented by Persia's agriculture—improved communications, water and soil conservation, scientific animal husbandry, the use of agricultural machinery on a large scale—will at last be tackled. But the main problem is not material or technical but human. In her recent book *Landlord and Peasant in Persia* Dr. Anne Lambton calls for a reform of the whole land-tenure system so as to give more security to the cultivator; fixed rents must be substituted for crop-sharing, labour-service (*bigar*) must be abolished, the size of estates limited. "Nothing short of a fundamental change in the conception of society and the relation of the individual to society," she says, "is likely to bring about a reform of conditions." My first thought on reading these lines a year ago was that such a change was unlikely to be brought about by anything short of a revolution on Communist lines, with or without a third World War to facilitate it. Now I am not so sure. During the Musaddiq régime, when Tudeh-instigated agitators had their own way in many country districts, the ill-feeling shown by the labouring class towards the landlords, even the best of them, was very marked. Can it be that the aristocrats of Iran have heard the rumbling of the tumbrils? Or is a new spirit abroad, comparable with that sent forth in France by the Abbé Pierre and his Ragpickers? However this may be, a way of salvation, albeit a hard one, has been shown by the young Shah to his landowning subjects, and much depends upon how far they are prepared to go along it.

Admiral of the Fleet Lord CORK AND ORRERY: What are the prospects of future political stability in Iran? Is there a new spirit being shown today?

Sir CLARMONT SKRINE: That is a question which everybody is asking, including the Persians themselves: Seeing that there is this great opportunity, with new money—"Point Four" aid, a British loan and oil royalties soon to flow again—is there going to be any change from previous experience? There have been so many promises of industrial development on a great scale. Everybody now sees, and all in Persia agree, that unless the present Persian Government, and the governing class generally, use the money properly and invest it for the benefit of the people there will be disgust and disappointment and a possibility of revolution, or at any rate of progress by the Communists. Personally, I am optimistic. I believe there is a new spirit abroad in Iran. The giving of Crown lands to the people is a sign of that new spirit. I am sure also that the big road programme will materialize, because communications are so important; it is something tangible; all over Persia people will see roads being made and will realize that the money is being spent for the good of Iran as a whole. That is the best hope of stability.

Sir NEVILLE BUTLER: Is there likelihood of improvement in the water supply of Tehran?

Sir CLARMONT SKRINE: Yes. I am glad to say that this is another scheme on which money is really being spent. On the very road you saw on the screen just now there is a pumping station and waterworks; up in the Kerej

Valley I saw a tunnel under construction and, between the mouth of the valley and Tehran, trenches are being prepared for the water-supply pipeline to Tehran. This should be ready within the next year or two.

Colonel GASTRELL: Has anything come of the scheme to make use of water beneath the surface—say, 100 metres down? I gather that there are in Iran great masses of water underground which have not yet been tapped. There was some talk of tube wells when the Persians could get the necessary steel.

Sir CLARMONT SKRINE: I believe the American "Point Four" people are doing something in that regard; they are keen on irrigation and on tapping subsoil water. That is an interesting point. The *qanāts*, or underground water channels, some of which have existed for hundred of years, are a way of bringing subsoil water to the surface by means of subterranean channels and gravity. If the Americans can find some way of tapping that subsoil water and bringing it cheaply to the surface, in other words, if by modern scientific methods they can make new and better *qanāts*, it will be a great advantage. Newcomers are apt to say: "Why make miles of underground channel? Why not use power-driven pumps to bring the water to the surface?" But such a system would not necessarily take the place of a *qanāt*. A long *qanāt* may have anything up to a thousand wells, and there is not much point in having a thousand pumps, one on each well, to bring the same amount of water to the surface that the *qanāt* will deliver lower down. The wise thing to do is not to despise the traditional way of getting water from under Persia's soil, but to improve upon it with the aid of modern science.

Colonel ROUTH: Thirty years ago A. J. Wilson told me that when Reza Shah was making his railway he said: "Poor fools, they are committing suicide." What is the lecturer's opinion now as to that?

Sir CLARMONT SKRINE: Nobody can claim that the railway is commercially a paying proposition. It was built not with foreign funds but with money raised by means of the sugar and tea monopolies, which bore heavily on the masses. A tremendous impoverishment of the country resulted from the vast expenditure on the railway. I would not call it "suicidal," but it certainly dealt a heavy blow to Persian economy. The impoverishment of the people as a whole which marked the following years was partly, at any rate, due to the vast expenditure on the railway.

Colonel ROUTH: I had in mind the danger from Russia.

Sir CLARMONT SKRINE: The railway is very little good to the Russians strategically, because the late Shah purposely made the Caspian terminus at Bandar-i-Shah (Ashurada) instead of at Persia's only Caspian port, Pahlevi (formerly Enzeli), 250 miles to the west.

Mr. M. PHILIPS PRICE: Is there any prospect of the private landowners following the example of the Shah or being pressed by the Government so to do?

Sir CLARMONT SKRINE: I said just now that one of the question-marks about this new scheme is that the Shah and his advisers may be letting the land go too cheaply. Thirty-six tomans, or £1 10s., a hectare is little more than a nominal price. I fear private landowners will have the excuse that they cannot compete; by letting their land go at that price,



they may say, they will be left with nothing. Hence there will be an excuse for not doing anything at all. Some system might have been tried whereby groups of peasants would club together and pay a more economic rate. Public opinion will of course bring pressure to bear, but I doubt very much whether many private landowners will follow the example of the Shah.

The CHAIRMAN : It now only remains for me, on your behalf, to thank Sir Clarmont Skrine for a most interesting and instructive lecture. It was, I feel sure you will agree, also encouraging despite the obvious difficulties facing the Persians at the present time. We also thank you, Sir Clarmont, for the lovely and interesting films. (*Applause.*)

# THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC BACKGROUND IN THAILAND

By H.R.H. PRINCE CHULA CHAKRABONGSE OF  
THAILAND, G.C.V.O.

Lecture delivered to the Royal Central Asian Society on January 19, 1955, Admiral Sir Cecil Harcourt, G.B.E., K.C.B., in the chair.

The CHAIRMAN: His Royal Highness Prince Chula Chakrabongse is very kindly going to address the members of the Society today; in fact, he has come all the way from Cornwall in order to do so and we are very appreciative of that.

As many of you know, Prince Chula Chakrabongse was educated at Harrow, Trinity College, Cambridge, and the Royal Military College, Bangkok. He is also well known here as a writer. The subject of his lecture is "The Political and Economic Background of Thailand" and I now ask him to address us.

**M**R. CHAIRMAN, Ladies and Gentlemen,—As the subject of the talk I was requested to give is "The Political and Economic Background in Thailand" I should at the outset make clear, in case there is any doubt, that I am a private individual who has no connection whatever with the present Government of Thailand. Many members of that Government are personal friends of mine, as also are many of those who are in opposition. One can hardly speak of a political background without some reference to politics, and it should be understood that any opinion I express concerning politics is my own opinion—I hope a fair and true opinion—based upon my own observations.

We from Thailand are naturally excited and pleased to find that our country has become of so much more interest to people in Britain. Years ago we were known because of a beautiful breed of cats with blue eyes, blue eyes which we, human beings of Thailand, actually do not have. Also we were known because of the famous twins who, I am reliably informed, were Chinese though born in our country. Now we are to become more and more known because in February the Foreign Ministers of the nations which signed the Manila Treaty, which gave rise to the South-East Asia Treaty Organization, will be meeting at Bangkok and your Foreign Minister, Sir Anthony Eden, will shortly be leaving England to attend that meeting.

The name "Thailand" is constantly mentioned in the ordinary Press and in magazines; in fact, the *Reader's Digest*, a magazine which I am informed is read by 22,000,000 people, contained in its January 1955 number an article in which Thailand is described as "Jewel of Asia," which is somewhat exciting.

There is yet another point which I must clear up. I have been informed by the Secretary of the Society that the members know a good deal about Asia but that I must not expect them all to know everything about any particular part of Asia, and so I feel I must mention the question of the two names given to my country. One often hears it asked: "Why does the country have two names?" or "Why has your country changed its name?" It has always amazed me that in a country which has two names

—England and Great Britain—there should be surprise that any other country has two names. Actually the names “Siam” and “Thailand” are both quite ancient. I consulted an authority on the subject in Thailand early last year and I learned that, roughly speaking, “Siam,” “Sayam” and “Thai” are equally ancient. “Thai” is more ethnographic, and “Siam” is applied to the actual land where we live; therefore in our own language there is no equivalent to the word “Siamese,” describing a person. We speak of a human being as “Khon.” So a Thai or Siamese in our language is “Khon Thai,” never “Khon Sayam.” It is similar to you in your language speaking about English food, English manners, and then the British Constitution or the British Government. Our Government in 1938 or 1939 decided that it was confusing for us to have two names, and so they decided on one only, Muang Thai, or Thailand, of which the simple translation is “Land of Free Men.” There is no question of the name having been changed. In the same way France also has two names and one speaks of the French and France; or of the Gallic temperament, deriving from Gaul. Even the now famous Anna Leonowens, who was the English governess to the children of the King, said in her book, written in 1873: “Siam is called by its people Muang Thai (The Kingdom of the Free).”

#### DIFFERENCE FROM REST OF SOUTH-EAST ASIA

A point one has to examine in connection with Thailand is the difference between that country and the rest of South-East Asia. Probably very few people have considered why the people of Thailand differ from those in the rest of South-East Asia. I believe the difference to be due to the fact that Thailand has had an almost continuous independence. Since the kingdom was established under the Sukho Thai monarchy in, approximately, 1250 there has been practically continual independence, right down to the present day. There were two Burmese occupations in the seventeenth century and we had a Japanese alliance or occupation, whichever you prefer to call it, recently. Otherwise we have been an independent kingdom all those years.

The first monarchy, that of Sukho Thai, lasted from 1250 to 1350; that was followed by the Ayudha monarchy, 1350 to 1767. Then we were defeated completely and absolutely by the Burmese, but we recovered and regained our independence and rebuilt the capital at Dhonburi and later at Bangkok in 1782 under the Chakri family, to which I have the honour to belong. The Absolute Monarchy of the Chakri family lasted from 1782 to 1932, when it became a Constitutional Monarchy as it is today, but still under the same ruling family. That continuous monarchy had a big influence on the country as a whole, whereas most other countries in South-East Asia have, as you know, passed through long periods of colonization by the British, the French or the Dutch under whom there were no active monarchical institutions, they having been either swept away during the colonization or kept in the background.

Again, because of continuous independence the Thai language has never ceased to hold its own. For it cannot be denied that in countries which were colonized the national language took very much the second place in

all official documents, business correspondence and so on, and even the important newspapers were printed either in English in the British colonies or in French or Dutch in the respective colonies. Moreover, the national language was often termed the vernacular language. That, I think, influenced a decline in the development of their own languages and literature in the countries colonized as their languages took a back place. That did not happen in Thailand.

In the same way, our principal religion is Buddhism, which, of course, as a religion has complete toleration for all other religions. There has never been in Thailand any religious persecution of any sort or kind. In fact, one of the kings of the Chakri monarchy who reigned from 1851 to 1868 not only tolerated other religions but even spent money building a Roman Catholic Church for the Roman Catholic community in Thailand. He actually encouraged Islam but, nevertheless, conserved our own religion and kept our own priests always in the forefront of all the religious movements in the country continuously and without interruption. That has had a big influence on the country as a whole.

Lastly, having had independence throughout this lengthy period, we did not come under any feeling of inferiority complex in having any European people in our country, for they all came as visitors or business men. They might have thought themselves superior, but we were certainly quite convinced that they were not, with the result that we had no awkward feeling towards them or any wish to show them we were equal, because we were quite convinced that we were equal. I regret to add that the same situation did not seem to obtain in countries which were colonized. Now independence has been restored to very nearly all the countries in South-East Asia—I am not yet clear as to the position of the three so-called Associate States of the French Union; I am not clear how far they are now independent; but Burma is independent, Indonesia is independent, and India also. I do not think it can be denied that during the first transitional period from the empire or colony to independence a great deal of misunderstanding and suspicion was found on both sides owing to the fact that the Asian population felt for a long time that there was a gap between them and the Europeans who lived in those countries.

I do not know whether any of my audience have read the excellent *Memoirs of the Aga Khan*, recently published, in which he brought out that point so well. In stating that Thailand has had continuous independence for 800 years or so, I am in no way trying to boast that we are in any way more able or more clever than our brothers in South-East Asia. It cannot be denied that we were favourably placed, geographically, between the British and the French influences; but as for that, I do not think it can be denied either that in addition to our fortunate geographical position we were also helped to maintain our independence by the wisdom of two of our monarchs—namely, King Mongkut and his son, King Chulalongkorn. There is no doubt that they both exercised great wisdom in maintaining a policy of restraint; also they were past-masters in the art of compromise. Had they been less so I doubt whether in that period of intensive colonization by the Western Powers we could have escaped. Other countries were not so favourably placed as we were.

To return to my first point about the influence of the monarchy, although I was not yet born at the time, I know that when there was trouble with the French in 1892 there were a number of people in Thailand who were anxious to have a show-down with the French and to have a fight. It took a good deal of courage on the part of King Chulalongkorn to persuade his people to take things quietly and to compromise and so maintain our independence and not lose too much territory. If the monarch had not been able to unite the people in such a way, he would not have been able to carry on his policy, which at first sight was unpopular.

For all these reasons I conclude that Thailand differs from the rest of South-East Asia owing to the continuous independence of the country which has completely prevented our having any inferiority complex; we have kept our religion absolutely intact, our language intact, and our monarchy intact, all of which has resulted in unifying the country.

### GEOGRAPHY

For the benefit of those who may not be fully familiar with Thailand, of whom I gather there are some, I point out that the area of the country is, approximately, 200,000 square miles; in other words, four times the size of England and Wales or a little larger than France and almost exactly the same size as Spain. That is the kingdom of Thailand today. The country is very flat in the middle and in the north-east, hilly and wooded in the north and south. The hills start at the backbone of the southern strip. Very few people realize that we have over 1,000 miles of sea coast, starting at Cambodia, coming down to the Gulf of Siam and on down the Malay Peninsula; in the south there is the South China Sea and in the west the coast-line follows the Bay of Bengal. The main river is usually called by the English the Menam, Menam being a Thai word meaning "river." That river runs down the whole country and our ancestors gave to the river the title Chow Phya, or the "Duke," because without that river we would not have been able to exist; we owe everything to that big river which runs right down the middle of our country.

The climate of Thailand is tropical, the three seasons being the wet, the cool—you can hardly call it cold—and the hot. For the first time in four years I have chosen not to return to Thailand in January, but I have been told that it is much cooler this year than in any of the former three years; that the temperature is 62° or 67° at the present time.

### POLITICAL BACKGROUND

Thailand today has a Constitutional Government. The King is 26 years of age, very tall and good-looking; his wife, the Queen, is 22, and is very beautiful. They have two children, a boy and a girl. The present Prime Minister is Field Marshal Pibulsonggram, and he has held office almost continuously since January 1939. The Legislative Assembly, or Parliament, has only one House, and there are 122 elected members. They are elected from all the provinces. At present about 30 of the 122 members are in opposition to the Government. From the time of the Constitution of 1932 there has been what is considered to be a period of emergency or trial; therefore, in addition to the 122 elected members or deputies, there

are 122 nominated deputies. These are nominated by the King in accordance with the Constitution, which in a constitutional country means by the Government. The King can do no wrong, so he cannot be responsible for actually nominating anyone. The theory is that the nominated members should be experts in various affairs and sit in the Assembly to help the elected members and to see that they do not go completely wrong during the first ten years of this experiment. So that the Assembly, to your eyes, looks rather like the House of Lords and the House of Commons sitting together and debating in the same Chamber, members having equal voting powers.

I have visited the Thai Legislative Assembly several times and was there last in March 1954. In actual fact, while the elected members speak quite frequently, the nominated members do not speak very often; they only rise when there is under discussion some special subject on which the particular nominated member can speak as an expert. If he is a retired Government servant who has held an important post in the Ministry of Agriculture and the question of irrigation is under discussion, he may be the one who would rise to speak. All the members have votes, and obviously the Government would not nominate anyone not likely to support the Government. It is said that the Government cannot be defeated. If that appeared to be likely, they only need call in the nominated members to vote for them. But, after all, there is nothing to prevent the nominated members revolting against the Government one day and voting them out. So, while it is easy to say that under the present Constitution the Government cannot be turned out because the nominated members will vote for them, there is no guarantee whatever that somebody might not persuade the whole lot of nominated members not to vote for the Government one of these days. Therefore it is not correct to say that the Government cannot be turned out. In any case, at the moment, from the point of view of voting strength, the Government do not rely on the nominated members, because out of an Assembly of 122 only 30 are in opposition. Hence until the next Election, which I believe takes places in 1956 or 1957, the Government are likely to remain.

Speech in the Assembly is quite free. Opposition members, from what I saw in my own experience, frequently rise and speak very fiercely and very strongly indeed against the Government, but they are not arrested for that; they go home quite safely and return again to speak another day. Last year the Government somewhat hurriedly brought in a Bill and the Opposition felt that there had not been sufficient time to study the Bill, so they walked out *en bloc*; they refused even to listen to the debate. Though the Opposition cannot turn the Government out they are free to speak absolutely as they like, as I have heard them do. The probable reason why the Opposition are not more effective is that they are not very well organized. There is at the moment only one party, the United Party, who support the Government and meet informally in a large house to discuss the measures they are going to bring before the Assembly in due course. Recently a member of the Opposition asked the Government to bring in a Bill to make it legal for political parties to be formed, but the Government refused, saying that there was nothing in the Constitution to

prevent anyone forming any such party; they pointed to the British example: that there is no law in this country which protects in any way a political party; it is something outside the Constitution.

The franchise is universal, male and female. One condition is that in order to stand for Parliament a candidate must have reached a standard of education which approximately equals the Junior School Certificate, and there are also certain disabilities, such as having been convicted on some criminal charge. Women can become candidates for election, and there are already quite a number of them in the Assembly; two or three in Opposition. Until recently there were a husband and wife who were members at the same time.

The Judiciary is surprisingly independent of the Government, and that has always amazed me when observing Thai judges, because they are probably the worst paid in the world; they receive perfectly ordinary Civil Service salaries and they are classified in the category of Civil Servants; they do not even get more holidays than do Civil Servants. At the same time, the judges are extremely independent of the Executive. There have been during the last few years many cases of attempted rebellion and various affairs of that nature, and the judges have acquitted an enormous number of offenders brought forward by the Government. That is to me a matter of amazement. It is my private opinion that because the bulk of the judges are drawn from students who have been trained in England, and nearly all have qualified as barristers in England, they have been influenced by the great tradition of the English Bar, and to that their independence can probably be attributed. I do not know. The fact remains that corruption of our judges and, much more surprising, fear of the Executive are practically unknown.

#### ADMINISTRATION

Thailand is divided into provinces, of which there are between 40 and 45. The Governors of the provinces are Civil Servants appointed by the Home Office at Bangkok. As I have said, the Members of Parliament are elected from the provinces. A province with a very large population may have two or three representatives in the Assembly. A province with a small population has one.

The provinces are sub-divided into districts and the District Commissioners are also Bangkok appointed, but there the central appointments end, because a sub-district headman is elected by the village headmen, and the village headmen are elected by the population. There is no centralized appointment lower than that of a District Commissioner. As many provinces as can have municipal councils do have them, and all the ordinary work of lighting, cleanliness, and in connection with the various amenities of the provinces and the districts is carried out by the municipalities.

#### POLICE

We have Metropolitan Police and Gendarmerie; that is, the continental system of Gendarmerie, centrally controlled from Bangkok. Also there is a special anti-bandit squad equipped with armoured vehicles, light aero-

planes, helicopters and parachutists. This squad is used to deal with bandits, whether of a political or non-political nature—we have plenty of both—and also they are called on in the case of any armed rebellion. The present Police Chief is General Phao, who is keen to have the Police as like the British Police as possible, not only because of his personal taste and admiration for the British Police but also because our Police have been founded largely on the traditions of the British Police Force. Actually when the Police first came into being in Thailand 100 or more years ago the officers were all British. Since then we have sent a number of young men to England for training, and I believe there are at present twenty or thirty Thai Police officers being trained at Scotland Yard. Thus the tradition of our Police Force continues to be very much on the British lines.

### ARMED FORCES

There is in Thailand National Service for the Army, the Navy and the Air Force; while commissioned officers and a few of the N.C.O.s are professional or regular soldiers, the rest are National Service men. There are in Thailand a number of American technical advisers and technicians attached to the Armed Forces, but they in no way command the troops; these are entirely commanded by Thai officers. Neither do the American advisers or technical experts train the troops; they train their own small cadres of instructors, who then train other troops.

The fighting quality of Thai troops is, perhaps, a matter of some concern to you here as we are now joined together in the South-East Asia Treaty Organization and Thailand is a country which is very much exposed on all sides. Very little news has come to this country, but anybody who has bothered to study recent military operations will realize that the fighting quality of Thai troops has been shown by the battalion which we have had in Korea since the commencement of the war there. Our troops have fought against North Korean troops and also against crack Chinese troops. In this connection I would like to quote a citation which our troops received from General Maxwell D. Taylor, Allied Forces Far East and U.S. Eighth Army Commander :

“The Royal Thailand battalion is cited for outstanding performance of duty and extraordinary heroism against armed enemy from 10 to 13 November, 1952, in Korea.

“When the battalion’s outpost position was attacked by two enemy companies with supporting fire from heavy weapons, a furious hand-to-hand struggle took place in bunkers, trenches and communicating positions. Although the enemy assault caused extensive damage, the battalion held and the enemy withdrew but immediately began to regroup for a second attack.

“The enemy forces soon launched another, more savage, attack using heavy supporting fire. Refusing to be defeated, the battalion fought courageously and, failing to breach the battalion’s position, the attackers were forced to withdraw with heavy losses in dead and wounded, abandoning a large amount of supplies and equipment.



“The extraordinary heroism and resolution exhibited by the members of the Royal Thailand battalion reflect great credit on themselves and the military service of the Kingdom of Thailand.”

That was a fight against crack front-line Chinese troops. Therefore I have no doubt in saying that our Thai troops, if the cause for which they have to fight is a just one and they have the right weapons—men cannot hurl themselves against tanks—they would do quite well, as they have already done in Korea. We have been changing the troops in Korea all the time, so that the number of men who have had fighting experience is quite big. When the Korean war started Thailand was one of the first countries to offer troops to the United Nations.

#### THE ECONOMIC BACKGROUND

As is well known, Thailand's principal export is rice. In fact, I am told that 75 per cent. of our exports consists of rice. We also export teak, tin and rubber. We have started a few light industries for home needs, but they are at present insufficient. 85 per cent. of the population of our country are farmers. It is, of course, dangerous to rely on one crop. Now more and more people eat rice, but more and more also grow rice. Hence this question of one main crop is one which is of some anxiety to us.

There has been a good deal written in the Press about the so-called north-east area, which is supposed to be so badly treated and where the population are said to be very poor and without help, and so on. I was in that area in March 1954, but not there long enough to be able to say whether what was being said was true or not, but it did not seem to me that the area was particularly different from the rest of Thailand. I was interested when reading in *The Times* recently an article by a Professor of Social Science at Birmingham University, who had spent a year in Thailand. He said that the farmers in that particular area were poor but far from dissatisfied; in fact, he found the north-east a tranquil and reasonably well-run area. The Government say—whether they will actually do what they say or not, they alone know—that they are going to try to improve the situation in the area, which is due to lack of water. I believe a big irrigation scheme is being started.

Most of the farmers in the country own their own land; in fact, it has been recently reckoned that only 17 per cent. of the population do not own their land, although it cannot be denied that much of the land owned by the farmers is under mortgage because the farmers, although hard-working, are rather gay fellows, and inclined to be overfond of gambling.

There is only one big city in Thailand, and that is Bangkok, with a population of over 1,000,000, the city having been built originally by the Chakri family from 1782 onwards. There are about 10,000 Europeans, the largest group being the British, living there. It is of some surprise to me that the British are still the biggest single unit among the Europeans. Also in Bangkok there are 500,000 Chinese, mostly traders who, on the whole, are not very interested in politics. Probably they have become sick and tired of politics in their own country and they would like to be left to carry on with their trade. I do not know whether it is true or not, but I am told

by the experts that only 10,000 of the Chinese are active Communists. Communism in Thailand is, of course, outlawed, but that does not mean it does not go on underground.

The other towns in Thailand are very small, mostly market towns and administrative centres.

#### COMMUNICATIONS

The railways in Thailand are State owned and they are still recovering from war damage. There were two private railways running from Bangkok to the mouth of the river Chow Phya. All the railways suffered heavily during the recent war, being bombed by British and American Air Forces because they were carrying Japanese troops and war material. However, the railways are slowly beginning to recover from that damage. There are many roads but they are mostly rather bad as yet because it is so difficult to maintain roads in a country which is almost yearly under flood conditions. The flooding is good from the point of view of the rice crop, but certainly not good from the point of view of road maintenance. Thailand has efficient internal airways and many of the people travel about the country by air.

#### EDUCATION AND HEALTH

There has been in Thailand compulsory primary education since the days of Absolute Monarchy, that system of education having been put into force as far back as 1918 under King Vajiravudh or Rama VI, and of course wherever it is possible to have schools they are provided. Education in Government schools is free. I am informed that 75 per cent. of the population are now literate. There are five universities, all in Bangkok; also there are over thirty technical schools, some in Bangkok and the rest in the country. There are French and American missionary schools. There are very few British missionaries in Thailand; they are mostly international Roman Catholic and United States missionaries. I have visited the missionary schools, and found them excellent. I inquired as to the rate of conversion to the Christian religion and, sadly, they told me that in the last 100 years approximately 2 per cent. of the children attending the respective missionary schools became Christians.

There are many hospitals in Bangkok; only a few in the provinces. The Thai surgeons and doctors who have been trained in Great Britain, in France, in the United States and elsewhere have returned to Thailand to practise, so that practically the whole medical service is now in the hands of Thai personnel. There is no National Health Service in Thailand.

There is a Central Agricultural College in which the King takes a personal interest. The College is situated between Bangkok and the Don Muang airport. In addition to the young students who live and study at the College, there are courses attended by farmers from all over the kingdom. I have been to the College and seen the courses being run for the farmers and was happy to see that they were all very interested and keen.

The Press in Thailand is free, but no one is allowed to publish anything which threatens the security of the country, nor can one, without running

the risk of censorship, criticize any foreign government. Any matter concerning troops or the number of tanks and so on must not be published; otherwise, as I have said, the Press is free. I have with me the covers of two political magazines which I will pass round and which will probably convince you that the Press is definitely free, apart from the restrictions I have mentioned. The first cover depicts a huge tub which is supposed to contain the national income. The Minister of Finance is pouring in the national income like water, while the other Ministers have made holes in the tub so as to drink from it for their own benefit. I do not think you will find that sort of anti-government illustration being circulated under Franco or Malenkov.

Recently there has been much talk to the effect that two of the Prime Minister's great friends, one the head of the Army and the other the head of the Police, are great rivals for the position of future Premier. On the cover of the second magazine the Prime Minister is shown, in comic manner, trying to ride two tigers. That sort of thing is typical of our Press, and I have not heard that anyone has got into any trouble. Hence it seems safe to say that the Press is free.

#### CULTURAL BACKGROUND

Next to our own culture, of which we are very proud, which comes partly direct from the ancient Thai race and partly derives from Brahmanic influence, I think English culture must also be reckoned with as an influence, in that practically everybody learns English, it being compulsory in all the schools. Moreover, thousands of young people have come to England as students; at present there are in Britain 800 such students. At the same time, there is no doubt that there is a slow movement towards United States influence, such as wearing bright Hawaiian shirts instead of plain English shirts, though probably that does not apply only to Thailand; every country is, it seems to me, heading towards the U.S.A. and "cow-boy comics" and so on. That tendency is universal, at least on this side of the Iron Curtain.

#### BUDDHIST RELIGION

The Buddhist religion is, of course, the fundamental influence throughout our lives in Thailand; we take our religion very seriously indeed. The Buddhist religion has influenced all our thoughts and feelings; hence the gentleness and mildness of Thai people even during a revolution or the various civil wars which we had the misfortune to experience between the end of the second World War and 1951.

The temple is the centre of village life, and even the village school is situated in the temple, although the school is run by the Ministry of Education. The village school teachers are Civil Servants, but in order that it may absorb the spirit of the temple the village school is nearly always built in the temple.

Our women have always been practically equal with men; they are now completely so. There has never been a purdah system in Thailand. There was polygamy, but that was abolished by law in 1935, but polygamy in no way meant degradation of women because they only became second or

third or fourth wives freely in accordance with their own wishes. It was not a question of being forced to do so. Now polygamy has, as I have said, been legally abolished. Whether it exists in some other form is not for me to say. And that applies to other countries also!

#### FOREIGN POLICY

I think I am safe in stating, although I have no right or authority to do so, that the foreign policy of the present Thai Government is based largely on membership of the United Nations, on S.E.A.T.O., and the Colombo Plan, together with friendship with the United States of America, which is undoubtedly very strong. I can say without fear of contradiction, because I am able to prove my statement, that friendship for the United States of America has not been born since the war because of the aid Thailand has been receiving; that friendship has been in being for over 100 years. It dates back to the time of Abraham Lincoln, so that it is traditional. It arose largely because the United States had no colonies in South-East Asia; therefore we felt comfortable with a Power in that position. Our friendship with the United States was particularly enhanced during 1917 when Thailand joined the Allies in the war against the Germans at the invitation of the United States. During that war our Thai troops saw a good deal of the United States troops; our men and theirs became very friendly when in Europe together.

I think it is now time to conclude my talk, during which I hope I have been able to give you some knowledge of my country, about which I am far from being an expert. I thank you very much for listening to me so kindly.

Group-Captain H. ST. CLAIR SMALLWOOD: I should like to ask His Royal Highness if there is a Department of Forestry in Thailand at the present time. In the old days we used to lend from India a member of the Indian Forestry Service to act as conservator of the Siamese forests. It appears to me that now Thailand depends so largely on her rice crop it would be wise to develop also her trade in teak. Teak in the past used to come to us largely from Burma and Siam, but export of it from Burma has now largely ceased because most of the forests there are under bandit control. Thus it would appear that there is an opportunity for Thailand to develop her trade in that very valuable timber.

H.R.H. PRINCE CHULA CHAKRABONGSE: The Department of Forestry certainly still exists in Thailand. Not only is there teak in Thailand but much other timber also. I have a country house about 150 miles from Bangkok and nearby a new forest is being planted. Forestry is being continued vigorously.

Miss CARSON: I believe young Thais used to go for a period of service in the monasteries. Is that still so, if it ever was?

H.R.H. PRINCE CHULA CHAKRABONGSE: It is still so, and the period of activity in the monastery lasts for three months, which corresponds, approximately, with the wet season. Young men over the age of 21 can go into a monastery for three months. They leave at the end of that period

and become ordinary laymen like everybody else. That is going on in the countryside to a great extent at present. Many people in Bangkok cannot get away from their work, but actually most employers and the Government are very lenient and allow their young men to enter the monasteries for a short period. The young men cannot enter the monasteries in order to escape military service, not only because of the law but because of Buddhism. When the Buddha laid down the rule for anyone to be initiated into a monastery, there were many things they had to be without—for instance, skin disease; and one of the other things was that they must not be wanted by the Government. Men trying to escape military service are certainly wanted by the Government. Not only do young men go into the monasteries, but many who cannot actually do so study the doctrine at home and sit for the examination at the end of the three months, as if they had been in a monastery.

Mr. ABRAHAM: The lecturer mentioned certain restrictions on the Press. What is the date of that policy and how long has it been adopted?

H.R.H. PRINCE CHULA CHAKRABONGSE: I must answer very carefully because I must not speak for the Government, for whom I am not responsible. I think it started because of the neutralism which we have now abandoned. Having joined SEATO we have definitely abandoned neutralism. Obviously whoever framed the law thought that not all our journalists were necessarily responsible men; there were many among them who were not very well educated. It was a very badly paid profession. I can assure you, because I am a journalist myself, that the fees are very, very low. Therefore there was a fear that some young fellow might write all kinds of stuff, and then the Foreign Office would be telephoned by the various Embassies, and thus there would be some difficulty. But I think such rules have been relaxed, for I have in the articles which I send to Thailand every fortnight discussed foreign Governments, and even criticized them, but I have never been prevented. I think the restriction is only there as a safeguard. It is probably dying a natural death now.

The CHAIRMAN: As there are no further questions it only remains for me, on your behalf, to thank His Royal Highness very much indeed for coming and giving us such an interesting and, I would say, heartening description of his country in the past and now. He has paid a great tribute, and a well-deserved tribute, to the wisdom of the monarchs who have governed Thailand. I would add that the description, to me, appears also to pay a great tribute to their integrity as well as to the general standing and integrity of the country itself, which seems to be borne out by what His Royal Highness has told us about the independence and integrity of the judges and the fine performance of Thai troops in the field. Integrity, as I see it, is the basis of all government. I agree with the speaker who explained that when we did go in to various countries it was because they did not have sufficient integrity to enable them to get along in the modern world. With that, I again thank you, Your Royal Highness, very much indeed, for your exceedingly interesting and delightful lecture.

# SOVIET CENTRAL ASIA

By ERIC DOWNTON

Report of a lecture delivered to the Royal Central Asian Society on Wednesday, January 26, 1955, Admiral Sir Cecil Harcourt, G.B.E., K.C.B., Chairman of Council, in the chair.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Downton, who is going to talk to us this afternoon, is a Canadian by birth. He spent some three years on the Atlantic as a Canadian Naval Officer during the last war. At the end of the war he returned to his journalistic work and has been a Staff Correspondent of the *Daily Telegraph* since 1947. He has served in most parts of the world, including the Middle, Near and Far East. He has reported most of the post-war military campaigns, including fifteen months covering the Korean war.

In 1953 he was a *Daily Telegraph* correspondent in Moscow, which he was revisiting after an absence of six years. He was for some months the only representative there of a British daily paper, apart from the Communist party's *Daily Worker*. It was during that period that he undertook the journey to Soviet Central Asia, it being the first time for twenty years that a British non-Communist newspaper correspondent from Moscow had been able to visit that area.

Mr. Downton has come over from Germany this morning, thanks to the weather being fine enough, and we are especially grateful to him for making that effort in order to come to speak to us. We now look forward to his lecture.

THE journey of which the talk today is the subject was, as the Chairman has indicated, made a little over a year ago. Unfortunately, the type of vagabondage which is the lot of a Foreign Correspondent has prevented me, until today, having the privilege of appearing before you. But from what I have heard since from my non-Russian friends in Moscow I believe my general impressions of a year ago are still valid.

I should explain that I was in Moscow as a correspondent. Since June, 1953, as part of the tactical manoeuvres which are included in the so-called "softening up" following the death of Stalin, travel restrictions have been considerably eased. It was as a result of this relaxation of restrictions that Mr. Harrison E. Salisbury and myself were able to make our journey through Soviet Central Asia.

We travelled by air from Moscow across Kazakhstan to Alma-Ata, the capital of that province, with a stop at Karaganda; then on by overland route from Alma-Ata we went to Frunze, the capital of Kirghizstan; from thence we flew to Stalinabad, the Tadzhik capital, and from there, also by air, to Tashkent, Samarkand, Bokhara and Ferghana, returning by air to Moscow. As the Chairman has said, we were the first non-Communist British journalists to make such a journey for many years, perhaps since before the Revolution. The journey was not officially supervised; it was not one of the famous Russian Cook's Tours. We were on our own to some extent, though frequently under supervision. Nevertheless, within the limits of the trip we had freedom of action.

Incidentally, since I was last in Moscow in 1946, there had been a remarkable improvement, amongst other things, in the airline communications. It is now possible to travel very widely throughout the Soviet Union

by very reasonable airlines, of which there are two categories, the "soft," which is slightly comparable to a European air service, and the "hard," which is rather like flying under Service conditions. The air links, on the whole, are reasonably good.

### GENERAL FEATURES OF SOVIET ASIA

As you are all aware, Soviet Central Asia comprises four Republics—Uzbekistan, Tadzhikistan, Turkmenistan and Kirghizstan—and extends from the Caspian Sea in the west across to the Chinese frontiers in the east. In the north the area borders Kazakhstan and in the south Afghanistan and Iran. The population of Soviet Central Asia, as far as it is possible to calculate, is perhaps  $11\frac{1}{2}$  million, and the area is about 500,000 square miles. The area certainly contains some of the most unusual natural features of the U.S.S.R. In the north there are extensive deserts, oases and mountain foothills. In the south and south-east there are some of the highest, largest and most glaciated mountain ranges in the world, including the Tien Shan, Trans-Alay, Pamir-Alay and Pamirs.

It is interesting to note that this entire area—to which, it seems to me, there is nothing comparable in the world in this respect—drains into inland sea basins, not a drop flowing into the open oceans. Most of the waterways drain into the two major rivers of Central Asia, the Syr Darya and the Amu Darya, both of which flow into the Aral Sea.

### THE ECONOMY OF THE AREAS

Despite the considerable industrial developments, agriculture is still the main factor in the economy of Soviet Central Asia. The main types of agriculture discernible, even on a quick trip, were: firstly, irrigated farming, with extensive crops adapted to that sort of land irrigation, mostly cotton, the greatest contribution of this area to the Soviet economy. Secondly, dry farming, which is chiefly comprised of grain crops on mountain slopes having sufficient moisture to support the crops. Thirdly, lowland livestock raising, including sheep and camels, which is adapted to the dry steppe and desert. Lastly, highland livestock raising of cattle, goats and sheep, which can be carried on in the higher mountain valley pastures. Of all these, irrigated farming is by far the most important; it employs the greater portion of the population and covers more than two-thirds of the sown area, the main crop being cotton. Driving through the area, we noted that the mulberry tree frequently bordered the irrigated fields and that there is an extensive cultivation of the silkworm.

Having passed only three weeks in the area I do not propose to enter into geographical, historical or ethnological details, but in the time available to me now I would prefer to talk, boardly, of general impressions. I should like, if I may, to slightly reverse the customary manner of formal lecturing and give you at this point instead of later my general conclusions as a result of the trip.

### CONSIDERABLE DEVELOPMENT

Let us not by wilful delusion or wishful thinking blind ourselves to

the fact that very considerable developments are taking place in Soviet Central Asia and in the neighbouring Sinkiang. Those familiar with Professor Owen Lattimore's works know of Sinkiang's immense potentialities. However, Sinkiang is outside the scope of my talk, though it certainly comes within a regional survey. We can deplore the methods used and the historical events leading up to the present conditions. We can argue as to the degree of achievements, dispute their ultimate significance or durability. But let us admit that a great deal is being done in this area which is likely to grow again in political significance and impact, although it seems to me entirely unlikely that it will regain its old glories, glories of the time when Samarkand and Bokhara were cities of great power. In parenthesis, my own personal feeling is that the next great swing of the centre of gravity of world power will be away, and perhaps more quickly than we would like to think, from its new resting place, North America, to Eurasia, to parts of what are now the Soviet Union and China. What is happening today in Tashkent and Sinkiang and across the immense steppes of Kazakhstan—this will all be a contributory factor to the forthcoming resurgence of Asiatic power.

#### SOVIET CENTRAL ASIAN IMPACT

Let us not, out of complacency or smugness or any feeling of "cultural" or "technical" superiority, underestimate the impact that these developments in Soviet Central Asia are having on Asia at large. Since making this trip through Soviet Central Asia I have visited the Middle East, Africa, India, Pakistan, Nepal and Afghanistan. Already the impact of the new Soviet Central Asia, whatever we think about it or judge from our point of view, is making itself very much felt in those vital peripheral areas. In some places—in Afghanistan, for example—the process of expansionism and infiltration by Soviet power has begun. In others, notably New Delhi, it is quite remarkable how many people one meets who have been taken—and I say this without disrespect—on the Red Cook's tour of Tashkent cotton-mills and the opera house and to see the irrigation system in Tadzhikistan and so on. It is significant how impressed these people have been. Tashkent, too, has a more literal "voice"—one of the most powerful radio stations in Asia, from which a very strong and constant wave of propaganda goes out to Asian ears. And Asian ears, eyes and minds and hearts are certainly far more attuned to the message from Tashkent than perhaps we are ready to admit. All who have recently visited countries east of Suez must have been struck by the growing spirit of what I suppose we might call emotional pan-Asianism and, since Korea and Dien Bien Phu, by the notable decline in Asian respect for European morals and strength.

#### A SELF-CONTAINED AREA

Economically, industrially and militarily, a self-contained—but far from autonomous—area is being created in Soviet Central Asia, which is very much part of the pattern we see in other peripheral regions of the Soviet Union: in the Far East, and so on. This has obvious advantages in a country whose internal communications are still relatively under-developed.



It removes a good deal of strain from railroads, air-lines and domestic communications.

A very strong impression is the fact that Moscow's grip—when I say "Moscow's grip" I mean the Western grip—and imprint on these regions is both obvious and depressing. The party organizations; the format and contents of newspapers; the programmes in the opera houses ("Yevgeny Onyegin" in the ornate Tashkent opera house and "Madam Butterfly" in Stalinabad!); the theatre play-bills; the same old slogans in the "Parks of Culture and Rest"; the restaurants with their frightfully slow service, where even the food has little of local variety except mediocre shashlik and pilaff; the stores, a fly-blown replica of the poorer stores in Moscow; the same kind of bookshops and the same books; the large numbers of Western Russian officials (every official of Central Asian nationality seems to have a Western Russian opposite number); in particular, some industries strongly staffed by Western Russians; the presence of Western Russian troops and frontier guards—in every way there is undeniable evidence of the control of these areas by Western Russia.

There is certainly no colour-bar. On the other hand, the encouragement of local minority cultures, about which we hear so much in Soviet propaganda, is an extremely limited matter, mostly confined to rather precious art displays, folk-dancing, production of the odd newspaper in the local language, and so on.

#### RELIGION

Another general impression is that throughout Soviet Central Asia there is a good deal of evidence that the Islamic religion is still offering very stubborn resistance to the indirect Communist efforts to stifle religion. One sees in the theatres, in the opera houses, in the museums, in the newspapers, many slogans referring, for example, to "remnants of feudal bey mentality." The Citadel in Bokhara has been converted into an effective museum, the object of which is to show the horrors of life before the Soviet régime. There is so much protest against the traditional aspects of Islam that one might be led to think that there is much concern over religion's continuing hold on the people. Undoubtedly this indirect anti-religious propaganda is having an effect. I remember, for example, sitting in one of the few mosques I could find in Samarkand. The congregation was composed mostly of middle-aged or elderly people. Afterwards I was shown round the mosque by a charming old mullah. We had some general conversation and then I attempted, perhaps rather rashly, to bring the subject round to the dissension between Islam and Communism, whereupon the mullah shrugged rather resignedly, stroked his fine white beard, and said: "Well, you know, many of our young men and boys do not so often follow the ways of their fathers." The subject was obviously rather embarrassing to him. He saluted and walked away. In rather a different aspect, in Bokhara, there is a remarkable old sect of Bokharan Jews. I visited their synagogue, a primitive type of synagogue, its ornaments mainly beautiful old Bokhara rugs. Here again the congregation appeared to be mostly middle-aged and elderly, and the Rabbi made a similar regretful reference to young men being interested in other

beliefs. It is obvious that there is a great draining away from the old faiths. There were a few other minor cases of people hinting about suppression of important rights—but as elsewhere in the Soviet Union, no one really dares speak his mind to a foreigner.

If I may recapitulate, these are some of the major general impressions: considerable material development, although there are plenty of wide, primitive patches in this development; the impact this development is having on neighbouring countries which are of great concern to us—Persia, Afghanistan, Nepal, etc.; then the terribly harsh orthodoxy, the bleak mould, being forced on these regions by Moscow's heavy hand; the complete political control from Moscow; the continuing conflict between atheistic Marxism and the religious creeds, especially Islam.

#### SCENES ON THE JOURNEY: KAZAKHSTAN

May I now turn to some discussion of the journey itself? The flight from Moscow to Alma-Ata brought some tantalizing but incomplete glimpses of the tremendous industrial development which is going on in Kazakhstan, something we seldom hear about in the outside world. Kazakhstan is undoubtedly one of the world's great new areas of primary development. It is the second largest Republic in the Soviet Union, a vast, flat land about 1,070,000 square miles, one-third the size of the United States of America. It has enormous fuel bases. We came down in the Karaganda, in the heart of the great coal basin, the last stop before we arrived at Alma-Ata. In 1926 Karaganda was a hamlet, according to the Russian text-books, with 150 people; today it has, perhaps, 500,000 inhabitants and is the centre of a very large industrial complex. There is a vast coalfield and also extensive copper deposits at Dzhezkazgan and Kounradsky. Among other enterprises are the manganese mines in the Ulu-Tau range, developed during the last war to replace mines in areas occupied by the Germans. Kazakhstan, oddly enough, has a very large fishery industry because it includes part of the northern reaches of the Caspian Sea, part of the Aral Sea and part of Lake Balkhash.

The point I want to make is that Kazakhstan is an area in which there is tremendous development taking place and, bearing in mind the qualifications already mentioned, it would be most unwise to underestimate these developments. Alma-Ata is the capital, and in the Kazakh language the name signifies "The Father of Apples," because Alma-Ata is situated in very pleasant orchard country.

#### KIRGHIZSTAN

We travelled from Alma-Ata to Frunze in a truck, built over with a wooden body and with no springs, so that the journey, much of it across open, roadless steppe, was by no means comfortable. Rather ironically there was on the truck, officially designated an omnibus, a notice: "First four seats for invalids and pregnant women"! On leaving Alma-Ata we crossed the Chu range and ran into one of the fantastically primitive patches which still exist in this area. It was rather like turning a corner and meeting the hosts of Jenghis Khan; we were suddenly in a community living on horses—men, women and children riding little shaggy

ponies and wearing their felt hats and high boots, all reminiscent of what one had seen on old scrolls and manuscripts in Peking. We were, in 1953, back among the people familiar to Jenghis Khan. There were occasional rather primitive collective farms. Sometimes we saw riders in full cry after some invisible quarry, paced by a pack of what appeared to be shaggy greyhounds. The road across the area, where it does exist, is a crude track. We came jolting down into the Chu valley and Frunze, the capital of Kirghizstan, at the foot of the Kirghiz range.

In Frunze one sees some rather odd contrasts—engineers from the nearby uranium mines coming into town and lining up in the stores side by side with our friends from Flecker's "Golden Road."

Kirghizstan is rich in uranium, mercury, lead and tungsten. The major uranium workings are at Maylysay, about 150 miles south-west of Frunze, and at Tyuya-Muyun, 100 miles further south. By all accounts, quite considerable uranium mines.

### TADZHIK

From Frunze we flew to Stalinabad, capital of the Tadzhik Soviet Socialist Republic. On the way one gets a distant prospect of Stalin Peak, 24,585 feet, the highest point in the U.S.S.R., in the Pamirs, called here "The Roof of the World," and near which is the Fedchenko glacier, according to Soviet text-books the longest continental ice-stream in the world.

Stalinabad, although drab and having some very bad slums, gives an impression of bustle and "Get-up-and-Go." There is a strong party organization, with personnel brought out from Western Russia. Incidentally, here we found a first-hand example of the way in which European minorities have been strewn around in this area. We accidentally encountered a young German taxi-driver, who somewhat reluctantly and carefully told us his story. His family was among groups of Volga Germans who had been moved during World War II and dropped out here under somewhat fierce conditions. They had since created a small community of their own and he took us to see a group of houses or huts which the Volga Germans had built—very primitive but very clean. They were not allowed to have German lessons in the schools or to receive German literature, although they said they could occasionally listen-in to German broadcasts. The taxi-driver told us that there were considerable groups of Bulgarians, Latvians, Esthonians and other victims of enforced removal who had been brought into the area. Although apparently they had a good deal of local liberty, they could not move outside the general area; they could go to school and get jobs there. The conditions under which they live are very harsh.

Flying into these areas one sees something of the very extensive irrigation systems which are being built through Tadzhikistan, mainly in the valleys of the Ferghana, Gissar and Vakhsh rivers, where it is said there is fairly extensive cultivation of long-staple Egyptian cotton. Irrigation is a notable feature of this area.

Tadzhik Soviet Socialist Republic has a population of 1,600,000, and it is situated in the extreme south-east of Soviet Central Asia. In the east

it borders on China, in the south on Afghanistan. Only a narrow tongue of Afghan territory separates it from Pakistan. It is the smallest of the Central Soviet Asian Republics.

#### UZBEKISTAN

We went—this time by “hard” air travel—from Stalinabad to Tashkent, which is the real hub of Soviet Central Asia. It is the capital of the Uzbek S.S.R. Uzbekistan, with 6,500,000 inhabitants, is the most important and most populous of the Republics. In area it is 157,400 square miles, about one-third of Soviet Central Asia. It has over half the population; one-half the sown area; four-fifths of the cotton area; four-fifths of the industry; two-thirds of the railroads; and most of the larger cities.

Tashkent is a disappointing city. Although it dates from the seventh century, there are very few signs of antiquity. There is a good deal of shoddy building taking place, but it is the centre of a very remarkable new industrial complex. The teen-aged towns are changing the face of Soviet Central Asia. Adding to the industrial potential of the Tashkent zone is Farkhad, a hydro-electric station on the Syr Darya near Begovat, completed after the war.\* Chirchik, another of the teen-aged towns, 15 miles north-east of Tashkent, also has a large hydro-electric station and a thriving chemical industry, specializing in nitrogen fertilizers. Angren, 45 miles south-east of Tashkent, another new town, is a large coal-mining centre. At Almalyk, near Angren, a copper refinery has been built. In Tashkent there is also the largest textile concern in the Soviet Union. Much of the machinery used there was sent from England before the war, and some of the original technicians studied in England in the middle 1930s. There are many other industries in the area; in fact an effective industrial complex is being created—all new, but very drab.

The most impressive building in Tashkent is the opera house, completed since the end of the war. Though somewhat ornate, it is impressive. But it is disappointing when visiting Tashkent to find the familiar Leningrad and Moscow operas being played. To Tashkent comes a constant stream of foreign delegations on conducted tours, mostly from the Middle Eastern and Asiatic countries.

Landing at Samarkand's airfield one's thoughts inevitably turned to James Elroy Flecker's “Hassan” and the Golden Road: but there is little of romance left. On the airfield there was a considerable force of Red Air Force fighter-bombers. On the whole, it was a little disappointing flying into Samarkand in something akin to a rather old Dakota plane, even with a caviare sandwich. There is little left of the antiquity of Samarkand. The bazaars are clean, being closely inspected and controlled, but they are colourless. Occasional small caravans of Bactrian camels arrive; but the caravanserai are carefully regulated, their walls plastered with instructions on hygiene and political slogans.

Most of the monuments remaining in Samarkand are those which are associated with Tamerlane, including his tomb; the three maddrasah around the Registan—Tillikari, Shirdar and Ullug-Beg; the ruins of his

\* Begovat, seventy miles south of Tashkent, has in the past ten years developed into Soviet Central Asia's major metallurgical concern.

summer palace (the Shah Zindeh); and another maddrasseh, built by one of his wives, Bibi Khanum, after his death. The buildings are reminiscent of similar edifices in Teheran and Shiraz. Everything is in a bad state of preservation. Some half-hearted repair work is going on, but apparently very limited and slow; also there are not very many visitors. The Tomb of Tamerlane is in fairly good condition. It has a very attractive dark blue dome, and an octagonal burial chapel, the walls of which appear to be of alabaster. Some inscriptions in gold on a faded blue-tiled panelling are in fairly good repair. The only other tomb in this chapel, besides that of Tamerlane, is the tomb of his spiritual teacher and guide, Mir Said Berki. Tamerlane's tomb is covered with a single slab of dark green nephrite, inscribed only with his name, devoid of all titles and other flourishes. I looked for but found no sign of the horse's tail, whip and gazelle skin mentioned by such early European travellers as that great Hungarian, Armin Vambery. There was nothing. An old man, possibly a mullah, who showed me round, said the tomb was empty. Tradition has it that the tomb was rifled by vandals long before the Russians took Samarkand. How authentic that is, I do not know. It seems a pity. You may remember Sir Clement Markham's description—that after his death at Otrar in 1405 Tamerlane was "embalmed with musk and rose-water, wrapped in linen, laid in an ebony coffin and sent to Samarkand." There is nothing to recall that.

My Russian text-book, printed in Moscow in 1948, claimed Samarkand as "the oldest city in Asia, dating from the third or fourth millennium B.C." However, the stamp of real antiquity is not to be found. Nowadays the city has not a great deal of character. The population of the area—another cotton-growing area—is said to be about 1,000,000. There is some light industry in the city, some food processing plants, and in the near neighbourhood considerable wheat growing and extensive orchards.

Of all the cities in Soviet Central Asia Bokhara has retained most of its colour and traditional character, despite the grey Communist process of standardization. Here the *tyubitkas*, the embroidered skull-caps, are gayer and more frequent; the women's plaited pigtaileds are longer, their embroidered dresses brighter. There is an occasional strolling minstrel and story-teller. Now and then even a veil is seen. In the *chaiḳas*—tea-shops—one sees customers sitting cross-legged on the tables, sipping tea, pulling on home-made hookahs and gossiping with all the East's supreme contempt for the passage of time.

Some of the old walls and arches remain, although they are festooned with loud-speakers and with banners bearing the same old slogans seen everywhere in the Soviet Union. The Park of Culture and Rest is the same as that seen in any Volga town. There is an old maddrasseh which has been converted into a Marxist library, but in spite of that it maintains a good deal of its old character. The old citadel has been preserved as a museum, while the summer palace of the last Emir—Olim Khan, who fled to Afghanistan in 1920—is maintained as a show-place, with all its tawdry garishness, for propaganda reasons. The so-called Tower of Death, from the top of which the criminals used to be hurled to death, still stands. There are a few disused mosques, in a bad state of repair.

According to Soviet text-books the Bokhara district today has a population of about 500,000. A few miles from the old city is the New Bokhara—or Kagan—an incredibly dreary place, built in recent years as a railway centre on the Trans-Caspian railroad.

There is a trade in karakul skins, the processing still being a Bokharan speciality. The handweaving of the famous rugs has almost died out. Apparently a small number are still being made for artistic display and occasional gifts. It is sad to think that so much of the individual character of the city has gone. Walking out past the slogans, the rolls of honour, and pictures of local Stakhanovite workers, to board the plane at the airfield, I wondered how the ghost of Avicenna—that universal genius, probably the greatest of Muslim philosophers and the physician in whom Arab medicine reached its culmination—would react could he revisit his birthplace today.

Airborne once more, we headed for Ferghana, the main town in the Ferghana valley, in east Uzbekistan, the largest oasis in the Republic. My text-book on Soviet Central Asia, bought in Moscow, said it was a cotton and silk textile centre, and went on to give a description of the Ferghana valley which reminded me of Kashmir, and I thought I was coming to something reminiscent of the beauty of that place. Naturally, I expected a degree of exaggeration, but not as much as I realized there had been when I arrived in Ferghana itself. I found it quite the most dismal part of the tour. Apart from a new ugly hotel and some drab government buildings, there seemed little change since the town saw some desperate days during the Civil War. There were more beggars than I have seen anywhere else in the Soviet Union. In half an hour, during which we were served with some extremely bad pilaff in a fly-plagued open-air eating place beside a dirty river, ten or twelve beggars came to the table, including children, horribly crippled ex-Service men and some old men and women. That was the last point of our tour before we flew back to Moscow.

You will notice that our itinerary left out the remaining Republic of Soviet Central Asia, the Turkmen Soviet Socialist Republic. Turkmenistan has a population of 1,300,000 and an area of 187,200 square miles. In the south it borders Iran and Afghanistan. I had applied for permission to visit the capital, Ashkabad, but this was refused on the ground that Ashkabad came within the frontier zone still forbidden to foreigners. From Turkmenistan some infiltration of Afghanistan is going on.

So, for the reason I have explained, it was with Ferghana, and not Ashkabad, that I ended the tour and flew back to Moscow—the undeniable centre of government and power over this little-known region.

SIR CLARMONT SKRINE: Did the lecturer hear anything of the "Davidrov Scheme" to make a gigantic barrage at the junction of the Ob and Irtysh rivers which flow into the Arctic Ocean and divert their waters, together with that of the Yenisei, into the Aral Sea? Or of the Aral-Caspian canal project which is to raise the level of the Caspian from the same source and also divert the water of the Oxus into the Caspian?

MR. DOWNTON: How far that has gone, I do not know. There was a

report about eighteen months ago that work had been suspended. In connection with the Ama Darya canal there was a considerable amount of work started, but about eighteen months ago it was admitted that the work had ceased. Whether it has been restarted or not, I cannot say.

Mr. M. PHILIPS PRICE: Could Mr. Downton say what form the infiltration into Afghanistan is taking? When I was there in 1948 I crossed the Hindu Kush and went down south of the Oxus river, but I did not see any sign of Russia or Russian influence the whole time I was there. I was under the impression that the Afghan Government had matters very well in hand. Has anything happened recently?

Mr. DOWNTON: Mr. Philips Price, I was in Afghanistan about six weeks ago. Colonel Shah, the Pakistani ambassador, and his colleagues are extremely concerned about infiltration, though that is, perhaps, the wrong word to use. There is a great deal of economic activity going on. The Russians have secured contracts for a certain amount of road-making and to build a railway. But the thing which is worrying Pakistan most is the attempt the Russians are making to corner oil supplies. I understand that Pakistan is very anxious that America and England should put oil tanks and so on into Afghanistan very cheaply, but our oil companies are reluctant to do so. The Afghan Government, by all accounts, is sitting on the fence very hard in view of what has happened in Tibet and what is happening in Indo-China. They are sitting on the fence very hard and accepting what is relatively a considerable amount of Russian economic help.

Lady PRATT: I have heard it said that Soviet Central Asia is one of the largest oil-bearing districts in the world. Did the lecturer see any signs of that?

Mr. DOWNTON: No. There is around Tashkent some sign of limited oil exploitation, but I am not aware that there are any strikes in the major sense of the word elsewhere. In Soviet Central Asia there have been strikes, but not major strikes in the way we know them in Canada and so on. Of course the Russians are doing a great deal of prospecting and there may be big results later. I know of no oilfield in Soviet Central Asia which would, in the modern sense, be regarded as a large oilfield.

The CHAIRMAN: If there are no further questions, it remains for me to thank Mr. Downton very much indeed for coming and talking to us and giving us such a very vivid picture of the strange medley of building-up which is going on in Soviet Central Asia, a picture we are glad to have and one which we cannot ignore. Thank you very much indeed, Mr. Downton.

# IMPRESSIONS OF EGYPT AND THE SUDAN

By M. PHILIPS PRICE, J.P., M.P.

Report of a lecture, with slides, delivered at a meeting of the Royal Central Asian Society on Wednesday, February 9, 1955, Admiral Sir Cecil Harcourt, G.B.E., K.C.B., in the chair.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Philips Price needs no introduction to most of those present. He has been a member of this Society for many years and has lectured previously at our meetings. As most of you know, he is a Member of Parliament, and has been so for a long time, being probably one of the most travelled Members, travelling chiefly as a free lance and not on official delegations. In addition, he is a journalist and has written many books. I now call on him to address us.

IT is with some diffidence that I approach the task of giving you an account of the impressions I gained last autumn of Egypt and the Sudan, because I realize that there are in the Society many who know far more about those two countries than I do, in that they have probably lived and served in them for many years. I have only twice been in Egypt, the last time in October 1954, and I had never been in the Sudan until I went there last autumn. But, knowing the tolerance of members of this Society, I am emboldened to give some account of what I saw and heard, in the hope that it may contribute towards clarification of the ideas about those two countries.

Of course this Society deals almost entirely, as its name implies, with Central Asia and its peoples. Geographically, the Sudan and Egypt form part not of Asia but of N.E. Africa. On the other hand, the southern shore of the Mediterranean has since the Mahomedan era come very much under the cultural influence of Asia, particularly, of course, of what is known as the Middle East, and the Arabs have left, since the early days of the Mahomedan era, an indelible mark upon the northern shores of Africa.

## THE ASIAN INFLUENCE

The population of Egypt is not entirely Arab but contains a mixture of many races, going back to very ancient times. It is, in fact, one of the most ancient civilizations we know of. In the Sudan there is a large area in which there is no Arab population, but a very strong, and indeed quite pure in places, negro element. The Nile, of course, is the great giver of life to all this part of N.E. Africa. Rising in the plateaux round Lake Victoria Nyanza, it passes through forests and swamps where the population is negroid, living in primitive tribal conditions and pagan in religion. This is the type of country in part of Uganda and Kenya, and it is that type of population which spills over into the Southern Sudan. Northwards, the country opens up into prairies, and farther north still there are deserts studded with oases round the banks of the great river. The negroid population in this area gradually thins out, while the Arab population increases, so that finally there is a mainly Arab population, descendants of those who came in from Asia in the early Mahomedan era. There are, of course, many gradations between negroid and Arab.



The great cultural line runs, quite irrespective of political frontiers, about half-way down the Sudan, along a line across the Middle Nile up to the Abyssinian frontier and right across to the frontiers of the Belgian Congo. All the Upper Sudan is non-Arab, negro, pagan and primitive. Further north one sees more and more the cultural influence of Asia until, primarily in Egypt, there is the pure Arab cultural influence, noticeable also in Northern Sudan. In other words, the farther north one goes, the stronger is the Arab and the Semitic influence, and Arabic, of course, is part of the Semitic group of languages. Consequently Egypt, although racially mixed, is culturally and politically a unit, and it has been easier to build a nation there because one type of culture has been dominant. In the Sudan, on the other hand, it is going to be more difficult to build a cultural and political unit because while Northern Sudan is very much like Egypt, based on Islam, the South is primitive and pagan, so that the conditions under which the population live are pretty well what they were a thousand years ago.

There is something rather mysterious about the history of N.E. Africa. The people of Egypt and the Lower Sudan have learnt the art of agriculture by irrigation and the use of horses and camels for traction. Their standard of living is relatively advanced; in fact, as advanced as that of any of the countries of the Middle East. One can say that, economically, Egypt is the most advanced of the Arab-speaking countries, with possibly the exception of Syria. But south of a line drawn across the Middle Nile one encounters primitive life where agriculture is archaic and the livestock industry very poor. Still farther south, in Uganda and British East Africa, Tanganyika and Kenya, agriculture is of an even more primitive type, and it seems that the influence of the higher civilization of the Arabs and of the people from Central Asia has not penetrated into that area, with the exception of course that the Arabs did penetrate down to the coast of East Africa, though their influence was not of the best because they went there to trade slaves; they made raids into the interior for that purpose. Nevertheless, they did establish along the coast, and only along the coast, Mahomedan culture and civilization, which prevail to this day. There was and is nothing of their influence inside the country.

Consequently negro Africa remained, until the British arrived there, very much as it was thousands of years ago—primitive religion, pagan spirit worship and black magic, witch doctors and most primitive agriculture, over large areas not even cattle and sheep, and the beasts of burden, as today over much of the area, women who carry things on their heads. It may be true to say that the tsetse-fly had something to do with this, because cattle and sheep cannot thrive where the tsetse-fly is predominant. But that is not the whole story. It is, I think, because there was failure of penetration of Asian culture into Central Africa, so that the Arabs did not establish their influence there. And yet there must have been some passage of people into this part of Africa because one finds all over Kenya, Uganda, and I believe also in Tanganyika, some of the African tribes showing the strong features of the Nilo-Hamitic people: the aquiline nose, the narrow head and the very open eyes, so different to the ordinary negroid type with thick lips and fuzzy hair, indicating that there has

been immigration down into that area at one time. Though Asian people penetrated into this part of Africa they did not establish Arab civilization; they became absorbed into the native culture of the Bantu tribes of Central Africa.

I have dealt with the foregoing points in order to show where the Asian influence penetrated into Africa, where it stayed and where it faded out.

### EGYPT

As I have said, Egypt is the most advanced of the Arab-speaking countries in that part of the world. It is geographically in Africa but culturally in Asia, whereas the Sudan is geographically in Africa but culturally it has one foot in Asia and one foot in Africa. And there is this interesting fact to be borne in mind, that historically speaking the Egyptians have been dominated by foreigners for centuries, not since the days of the Pharaohs have they been really independent. First the Greeks, then the Romans and then, for a time, the Persians even, as one realizes when going to Luxor and seeing the great statue of Rameses II lying smashed on the ground as it was left by the followers of King Cambyses of Persia when he invaded Egypt hundreds of years ago. Then came the Arabs; they ruled Egypt for a time; then, again, they fell under foreign influence. The Mamelukes who governed them in the Middle Ages were Turkish mercenaries acting for the Arabs, and they continued to govern Egypt until the time of Sultan Selim the Grim, who conquered Egypt and made it part of the Ottoman Empire, which it remained until very recent years.

Though Arab culture and Islam remained the basis of the life of Egypt, the people never until recently showed any real signs of throwing up their own leaders, but I am convinced that they are showing signs of doing that today. Like other people of Asia, the Egyptians have developed during the last fifty years a strong national feeling. The greater prosperity caused by our control over Egypt, under Lord Cromer's régime in the last century and the beginning of the present, created a rising national consciousness. Before we left we encouraged the Egyptians to set up parliamentary democracy as we know it. I am afraid it cannot be said that parliamentary democracy has, in the early stages of its application in Egypt, been a great success. One cannot wonder at that. With 90 per cent. of the population illiterate, the radio and the bazaar demagogue have been the chief moulders of public opinion in Egypt. Consequently, the controller of the radio and of the bazaar demagogue (namely, the big landlord, the pasha and the rich merchant) has run elections and has dominated Parliament.

The corrupt régime of the Wafd was brought about in this way. It has largely caused the average Britisher to be somewhat disgusted with what has happened in Egypt since we have left, and there is, of course, good cause for that disgust. The anti-foreign agitation which was carried on by the Wafd has been a smoke-screen behind which misrule and corruption have flourished. But I must add that I was very impressed by something I saw last time I went to Egypt. Quite a change seemed to have taken place since my first visit in 1946.

When I went to Egypt in 1946, just after the Second World War, I had an introduction to one of the Secretaries to the late King. I went to the Abdin Palace to meet him; he was very nice to me, a charming gentleman who had been educated at Oxford. He knew which horse was likely to win the Derby, but, somehow, I felt he did not represent Egypt. When I went to the Abdin Palace again in the last few days of October 1954, I saw a most extraordinary change. This was the ex-King's Palace. The whole place was given over to offices of the Government. There was bustle and everybody was busy doing various things. There were young emancipated Egyptian girls, dressed like Europeans, working hard at typing. There were young men with reports and memoranda bustling about the place. I went to one of the places close by where I had seen the delightful pasha seven or eight years ago, and I saw written over the door: "Office of Land Reform." I naturally came to the conclusion that something had happened since my earlier visit.

The truth is that the Egyptian Army stepped in and decided to clear up an Augean stable of a corrupt parliamentary democracy under the former régime. We in democratic countries do not like to see soldiers mixing or taking part in politics, but then we have centuries of experience and parliamentary education behind us. Very few, if any, Middle East countries have had experience of parliamentary democracy. Therefore, in a young country, not young in culture or in race but young in political experience, we need not be surprised to see the Army taking a direct interest in something which affects its very existence as a corporate body and, indeed, affects the nation as a whole. And the fact is that the Army in Egypt today is officered and manned very largely by the common man of Egypt: the little people of the middle class with small businesses, the sons of Civil Servants and of the professional classes of modest means, and indeed the sons of that hitherto forgotten and downtrodden class the Egyptian peasants, they are there, corporals, sergeants, sons of peasants, some of them junior officers—all that shows that when the Army takes an interest in political affairs it is not going to be the kind of régime which has hitherto dominated.

It seems to me that the Army in Egypt today is trying to do what Ataturk did for Turkey, but of course the task in Egypt is more difficult than in Turkey because the Turks have had for centuries the experience of self-discipline and self-government as the centre of a great Empire. Egypt, as I have explained, has for centuries been dominated by foreigners, and it is much more difficult to get things running smoothly. One cannot do more than wish them well and hope that they succeed. I believe the Army to be the only hope.

The present régime has its many difficulties and its enemies at home. There is the Wafd, the former régime, underground. Then there is, more important still, the Moslem Brotherhood, with whom the Army worked together for a time in the early days of the Revolution. The Moslem Brotherhood has no use for rich pashas and corrupt politicians. It consists of many of the old leaders of Islam and of quite a number of young people who are deeply religious and who long to return to the simple ways of Islam as in the days of the Prophet. They are the puritans

of Egypt. Unfortunately, there is a romantic and unpractical streak in the Moslem Brotherhood. They are inclined to think that all the ills of Islam are due to the foreign unbeliever. They would not hear of any compromise over the Suez Canal, which the Army leaders were prepared to consider. The Moslem Brotherhood wanted to drive out of Egypt all foreign commercial and industrial enterprise, with complete indifference to the social and economic effects of their policy on the wealth and prosperity of Egypt.

Of course the leaders of the Army, being practical men, could not get on with romanticists of this type for very long, and so the break was bound to come. When I arrived in Egypt at the end of October 1954, that was the situation, and I felt it was coming to a head. It did so while I was there. I had made arrangements to see, first, some of the entourage of Colonel Nasser, and then Colonel Nasser himself. Everything was arranged, and then I heard Colonel Nasser had been shot at in Alexandria. Naturally, conditions during the next few days were somewhat chaotic and it was not possible to see any of the leaders of the Government. Nevertheless, the Government had the situation well in hand. In the crowds which paraded the streets of Cairo there was no anti-foreign demonstration, so far as I could see; the crowds were extremely friendly to foreigners. The only bit of hooliganism was the burning down of the headquarters of the Moslem Brotherhood. While all that was going on, I felt I ought not to try to see the important people, but go out into the provinces, into the Delta, to see something of the land reform of which I had had an inkling when I went to Abdin Palace and people at the Office of Land Reform.

I went, first, to see a big estate owned by the late King in the Delta which had been divided among the peasants. In other words, the agrarian revolution had started, and I wanted to see something of it. 1,400 acres had been divided among the peasants, each having three acres. On the land of the Delta it is possible to grow two crops a year because the soil is so extraordinarily fertile; it is only a question of getting sufficient water. Alfalfa, cotton, wheat, maize, clover are grown. In the first year there are two cuts of alfalfa, then cotton is grown; in the second year, wheat, then maize; in the third year, clover, then wheat or maize. The alternative crops are grown one in spring, the other in the late summer. The crops were consolidated into areas of about 100-acre plots. Each peasant had one acre of each of three of the crops, three acres in all. Crop consolidation makes it possible for there to be mechanical cultivation. I saw tractors working on the land. The Co-operative Society had been loaned tractors and large cultivating machines by the Department of Land Reform, so that the Co-operative Society was able to do the initial cultivation of the land, leaving the later stages for the peasants to do by hand cultivation.

The financing of the scheme is quite reasonable. The peasant takes all the crops on his three holdings of one acre each; he pays the Co-operative Society for the mechanical cultivation, but the Co-operative pays a portion to the Government for the loan of the implements. The peasant pays also interest and sinking fund to the Government for the

purchase of the land from the original owner. In the case of the King and the Royal Family the estates have been confiscated. Private owners are being paid for their land. The basis of payment is limited to seventy times the basic land tax. There is no question of the system of land purchase being different as between one estate and another; the system is the same throughout the country. In a recent lecture to the Royal Central Asian Society,\* Sir Clarmont Skrine told us what was going on in Persia and thought—and I believe there is a great deal in what he said—that the land reform there is not of this uniform nature. The Shah is making considerable concessions to the peasants which the private owners feel they cannot afford to make. It is different in Egypt. There really is a uniform system; every peasant pays on the basis of so many years' purchase of the basic land tax.

There is, however, one difficult problem in Egypt and there has been an endeavour to solve it. There is the problem of land inheritance and the Moslem law. The sacred law of Islam lays down that the owner of property must pass on his land to all his children, which tends to hinder the cultivation of land and renders it difficult to make improvement. Under the Egyptian land law that has been got over by insisting upon the maintenance of the holding. One of the children takes it over, but the proceeds of the land can be, unless they wish to contract out, divided amongst the other members of the family. That seems to be a practical way of dealing with the problem and at the same time it gives some recognition to the sacred law of Islam.

The land reform deals not only with large estates, because they are, after all, only one-tenth of the whole land; it applies to all property above 200 acres, and the law is that no one can own a bigger acreage than 200 acres, which is similar to the agrarian land reform which Turkey has put through during the last twenty years. I have heard rumours of its not being carried out entirely like that, that there are exceptions and so on, but in the main that is the aim and object, and it is largely being carried out.

There is, of course, a political aspect to all this. The Army wants to break the economic and hence the political power of the Wafd. As regards the economic side I made an attempt to work out one peasant's budget. That is not easy, but one can get a rough idea. The most valuable crop grown in the Delta is cotton, and the gross return on cotton is, roughly, £90 an acre. Formerly there was no reason why the whole of that should not have been taken by the landlord, and the greater part of it generally was; it depended very much on whether the landlord was a good or a bad landlord. The essence of the land reform seems to me to be that everything is now uniform. The peasant knows where he is; he is not dependent on the whim of one man. The landlord in the past often took £65 an acre from the peasant, leaving him no more than £25 for the one acre of cotton. Today out of the £90 an acre for the cotton land, the peasant has to pay £21 in interest and sinking fund for the purchase of the land and, on an average, £15 towards the cost of Co-operative cultivation, the cultivation by tractors and so on, leaving a final return on the cotton land of £60 an acre. Of course, the other two acres of the

\* This issue.

peasant's holding produce less and consist of wheat, maize, alfalfa and fodder for the animals. On the whole, one may say that on the three acres the peasant may now net £100 a year, whereas formerly he was lucky if he received between £30 and £40 a year; £100 is not a princely sum but, in view of the poor conditions under which a fellaheen has lived so long, a considerable advance. In the villages I saw a few indications of the rise in the standard of living. Some peasants had radio sets and some had bicycles. I enquired how long they had had those and found they had been bought recently. That seemed to indicate that there is a general improvement. Some of the money paid out to the peasants for their crops is paid in Co-operative tickets which go to the women, so that they can cash those tickets in the local bazaar, and that is a good step forward.

Of course the Army régime in Egypt knows quite well that this land reform will not solve the land hunger, because the population of Egypt is rising at the rate of 400,000 a year. Hence more irrigation is needed, which means more water from the life-giving Nile. Plans have been drawn up for raising the level of the Nile above the Assuan dam by a new dam which it is hoped will irrigate 2,000,000 more acres. That will cost £200,000,000 (sterling). But the sands are running out. The population is rising continually. One hopes as education spreads the birth rate will tend to fall. That is the only hope for the future of the country. The finance of this scheme is a serious matter. We still owe Egypt sterling balances of something under £100,000,000. Some of that, no doubt, we are releasing at the rate of about £15,000,000 a year. We could increase that. That would be the basis, possibly, of a further loan for them to get on with this scheme. It seems that the International Bank and possibly the Americans will have to come along.

All this tends to show that the Egyptian Army régime is being realistic and wants to receive help from the West for the economic development which it knows is a matter of life and death for Egypt. This was the psychological reason for the recent Anglo-Egyptian agreement on the Canal. The Army is reasonable because it knows it has terrific economic problems to solve, and that it must have economic assistance from the West. Therefore, in spite of the strong anti-foreign feelings which have been whipped up in the past by the Wafd and the Moslem Brotherhood, the Army régime has been able to put through a realistic policy of co-operation with the West.

#### THE CANAL ZONE

I now come to the Canal Zone. What has happened there? I went there and had the pleasure of the hospitality extended to me by the daughter and son-in-law of Sir John Shea, until recently our President, who was then Chief of Staff of the British Army in the Canal Zone and was preparing to leave for Cyprus. Before I went into the Canal Zone proper I spent a little while in Ismailia, and saw a straw showing which way the wind is blowing. I saw two British Military Police walking with an Egyptian Police officer, chatting in a friendly way together, patrolling the streets. Ismailia was the place at which some of the most ugly incidents

took place during the time of the trouble. But now the British are packing up and leaving. We are putting the stores in order for the civilian experts who are to look after them, and the units of the Egyptian Army which are to guard the stores.

I visited the camps at Fayid and a place nearby; I did not get to Tel-el-Kebir. From the information that came to me I think that a sum of not less than £100,000,000 sterling of British tax-payers' money is still out there—very important, of course, as a base of supply to other forward bases in the Middle East in the event of trouble further north. The problem I did hear—and it is not an easy one—is that of stopping pilfering of the stores. I think we managed to stop it fairly well. One hopes that the units of the Egyptian Army will succeed in doing so also.

I gained a good impression of the appearance of the Egyptian soldier, both officers and men, compared with what I had seen five or six years before. He seemed smart and intelligent and went about his business efficiently. I was informed by those who know that his training in modern warfare has only just begun. I doubt very much if the Egyptians want a show-down with Israel; at least at the present time. I hope not ever. At the same time, I could not help noticing that feelings towards Israel showed no sign of letting up; in fact, they are more bitter than ever. I can see no chance of the Arabs generally, certainly not Egypt, raising the blockade.

#### THE SUDAN

The important point in regard to the Sudan is the political situation there. Religion has played an important part in the politics of the most culturally advanced part of Sudan—*i.e.*, the Arab part in the north. There are two parties, both with religious background. One is the *Umma* party, based on the Ansar sect, founded by the Mahdi whose Dervishes killed Gordon. The Dervish sect believes that God made other revelations after the Prophet Mahomet and that the father of the present Mahdi was the last to hear God's word. The other party is the National Unionist party, which arose out of the *Ashigga*, based on the Khatmia sect and more orthodox. They claim that God revealed His last word to the Prophet Mahomet. You are all aware that the Mahdi Dervishes revolted in 1885 against the Egyptians and conquered a large part of the Sudan, and that Egypt and the British under Lord Kitchener threw out the Mahdi after the Battle of Omdurman and established the Condominium. Fear of the return of the Mahdi sect and party dominates the Khatmia sect and the National Unionist party. Rather than have the Mahdi sect and party back in power they would prefer to seek the aid of Egypt, but they also want the independence of the Sudan. I talked to their leaders and gained the impression that they want independence. They want to be linked with Egypt, but when pressed as to what the link is to be they were non-committal. I saw the posthumous son of the famous Mahdi whose Dervishes killed Gordon. He received me in the cool of the evening in a lovely garden in which beautiful Kavirondo cranes walked about begging for food as we were taking tea. We discovered that we were the same age within a week or two. The impres-

sion I had was that the Mahdi is not a fire-eater as his father was, but a courtly Arab gentleman. Yet the fear of the Mahdi sect and party dominates the politics of the Sudan and gives the Egyptians a chance to interfere in Sudan politics. It seems to me that there is something else behind this, probably the age-old struggle which runs right through Central Asia, the struggle between the nomad, the pastoral and the settled and agricultural sections of the population. The followers of the Mahdi are, on the whole, rather more to be found among the pastoral tribes of Kordofan in the west and south-west, and the National Unionist party and sect that follows Sayid Ali el Mirghani is more to be found among the settled population round the rivers. In other words, it is the old struggle which we know in Central Asia and have seen in Persia and Iraq and at times in Turkey—the struggle between the Desert and the Sown.

If Egypt does not interfere in the elections, I believe the Sudan will declare for independence, but at the same time will wish for friendly relations with Egypt and probably with the British. Unfortunately, there is a rather mischievous gentleman who is in the Egyptian Government at the present time, Major Salem, who has been into the Sudan and using influence—I think undue influence—there. Nevertheless, we all must agree that good relations between the Sudan and Egypt are essential, if only because of the Nile water question, the waters of the Nile being the means of life and the absence of them the cause of death to both countries. Egypt, being the more thickly populated country, requires to be more plentifully supplied, so that in the case of Egypt it is more a matter of life and death. In the case of the Sudan it is a question of developing the potential wealth of a potentially rich country. Therefore, while there is agreement about the existing use of the water supplies from the Nile, agreement and understanding as to future use have become vital.

I should like here to interpolate a few words in regard to British officials in the Sudan, a question which affects us all. As the Sudan becomes independent our officials have to leave. We have been there long. We have given the area good Government and established various services. What will happen? There are British officials who have spent their lives in the service of the Sudan Government and done magnificent work. I was glad to see that the Nigerian Government is offering posts to those who are going to have to retire from the Sudan. That is excellent. I am told that a number of our Crown Colonies in Africa will be only too glad to have a number of those officials. And yet there is a certain tragedy about their retirement from the scene of their activities. It seems to me that our compatriots in the Sudan are not considering money—they are being offered generous terms of retirement—but I felt on talking to them that they regard themselves as men with a mission; they have had a job of work to do, a mission to their fellow-men which they want to carry through; they are sorry their mission has to be given up; they would like to carry on. In other words, they were doing what inspired Gordon in the past when he went out to Egypt, a most laudable and Christian character, to serve their fellows. There is nothing for



it, however. The Sudan must now run on its own show, as we have half taught the people there to do. The truth is that people prefer to be badly governed by themselves than well governed by somebody else.

The political services, when our officials leave, will, I imagine, be carried on without much difficulty by the Sudanese. It is, however, a far more serious question when we come to the economic services because they involve technicians, engineers and other experts whose presence alone can keep things running smoothly. As an example of what I have in mind I cite the Sudan plantation. I spent a whole day there from early in the morning until late in the evening when I left by 'plane. I had a good look round. I found there were four British irrigation engineers and experts virtually running that plantation. From what I could gather, there was only one Sudanese sufficiently trained to be able to take over if all four British experts go. There is no one else, apparently, able to deal with the complicated business of controlling the waters, keeping the canals clean and dredged and all the hundred and one complicated jobs connected with the maintenance of that wonderful system of irrigation. If all four of the British engineers and experts go, I have grave doubts as to how the Sudanese will be able to carry on. These four experts want to go because unless they are given an assurance as to how long they can continue in the service there, they feel that they can get other posts fairly easily now but that in ten years' time they may not be able to do so. That is the problem. It is up to the Sudanese.

#### SUDAN AND EGYPT IRRIGATION PROBLEMS

Immense economic problems lie before Egypt and the Sudan in connection with water and irrigation. As I have said, for Egypt that is a matter of life and death, if it is to grapple with its teeming millions. For the Sudan it is a problem of developing the potential wealth of the country. 84,000 million tons of water of the Nile pass down into the Sudan and Egypt every year; 12,000 million tons are lost by evaporation; 50,000 million tons are used by Egypt; 22,000 millions tons are used by the Sudan. There is also a certain amount of the water which goes out to the Mediterranean, which could be saved and used by means of the dam to which I referred earlier. But there is a much bigger problem still. It is believed that if the waters of Lake Victoria Nyanza, which is the source of the Nile, were raised by four feet it would be possible to provide 80,000 million tons more water, nearly as much as all the water which flows down the Nile at present. That would double the irrigation possibilities of the Sudan and Egypt, and it links up with the great hydro-electric power scheme connected with the Owen Falls and the other great falls in Uganda, a scheme on which a beginning has already been made. This is a problem affecting not only the Sudan and Egypt but our colonies and protectorates in East Africa, and it has big international implications.

But there is one other big problem. If 80,000 million tons more water went down the Nile, as things are today half of it would be lost by evaporation in the Sudd, a vast swamp in the Southern Sudan. I have

spoken of the primitive non-Arab population and the negroid element there. Many of those people live in this vast swamp, and it is here that the evaporation of the Nile waters takes place at a tremendous rate. The problem of dealing with that swamp will have to be tackled in the first place. That will mean dealing at the same time with the human problem of these primitive tribes who have hitherto lived largely by fishing and small cultivation. If that swamp is drained and canalized, it will mean a big revolution in the way of life of those primitive folk. So that immense problems arise in connection with the irrigation of Egypt and the Sudan by the use of the Nile water. I only add one last point: it is to the advantage of all concerned in the international water problem that good relations shall exist between the Sudan and Egypt.

Asked if he could throw any light on the hostile attitude being taken by Egypt in regard to the proposed alliance between Iraq and Turkey, Mr. PHILIPS PRICE replied: Egypt feels she is the strongest of the Arab States and she wants to lead the Arab League. That feeling is so strong that Egypt pretends, at any rate, to think that the danger in the north is not so great as it really is. Iraq clearly sees and feels that danger and is prepared to make alliances. It seems that Egypt is afraid she might lose her influence, but I am not without hope that she will come round to a rather more reasonable attitude in regard to this matter. For the moment the position is a little difficult. The people have got themselves into that way of thinking, and one must bear in mind that the régime in Egypt, for so long the Wafd and the Moslem League, whipped up the public feeling so that the danger has come in people's minds to be the imperialism of the West, and Russia does not matter. That kind of mentality is prevalent in Egypt and is bound to be, because the feeling has been for so long worked up. The Army realize the position, but they have their own difficulties to deal with.

Colonel W. C. GARSIA: Are the Egyptians an Arab people? Are they not descendants of the ancient Egyptians, most of whom have adopted the Moslem religion?

Mr. PHILIPS PRICE: That is probably so. I referred to the Egyptians as a mixed race. What I meant was—and I hope I conveyed it—that even though they may be a mixed race culturally they are Arab and Islam. That is what really matters.

Sir RONALD STORRS: In congratulating our lecturer on his admirable discourse, I would like one point verified. Does he consider Arabia to be in or out of Asia? We sitting in Egypt and in Palestine have always regarded Arabia, very properly, as outside Asia. We consider Asia begins on the east side of the Persian Gulf. I gather the lecturer places Arabia inside Asia. The Islamic culture which is inside Asia at present is from Arabia. The debt of gratitude is due mainly to the Arab-speaking countries from the Islamic peoples of Asia. Therefore I am asking, does the lecturer think that Arabia is in Asia or out of it?

Mr. PHILIPS PRICE: You have put me a poser. Geographically Arabia might be regarded as in either Asia or Africa, because there are two dividing lines of water, the Red Sea on the one hand and the Per-

sian Gulf on the other. Culturally, of course, this was the centre of Islam where the Prophet Mahomet preached, but from there there went out great influence towards Central Asia, where Islam has been established for many centuries, and into India and also all across North Africa. Culturally, it is the centre of Islam and it has spread into North Africa and right through to Central Asia and into Southern Asia. Geographically, it might be said to be both Asian and African.

WARIS AMEER ALI: I believe we who originated from Arabia do consider ourselves, or did consider ourselves in the old days, as part and parcel of Asia before some of us became part and parcel of Great Britain.

Admiral Sir CECIL HARCOURT: Time is up, and it remains for me to thank Mr. Philips Price for a most interesting and clear picture of what he saw during his recent visit. This is the Central Asian Society and some may wonder why we have had a lecture which deals with Africa. Of course, what goes on in Egypt does so vitally affect the Arab States—which I confess I always thought were in Asia—that we are most grateful to Mr. Philips Price for coming and speaking to us today. We thank you very much indeed, Mr. Philips Price.

# MIDDLE-EASTERN OIL: BLESSING OR CURSE?

By BRIGADIER S. H. LONGRIGG, O.B.E., D.LITT.

Lecture delivered to the Royal Central Asian Society on February 23, 1955, Admiral Sir Cecil Harcourt, G.B.E., K.C.B., in the chair.

The CHAIRMAN: Brigadier Longrigg has kindly come to talk to us this afternoon and the rather provoking title of his lecture is "Middle Eastern Oil: Blessing or Curse?" He is well known to most of you here as an orientalist of great experience, particularly of Iraq, and also as a writer. I suppose his principal work is a History of Iraq from 1900 to 1950, which was printed in 1953, and also a History of Oil Development in the Middle East. He has recently been made a Doctor of Letters by the University of Oxford on the strength of his historical work. You see how well fitted he is to speak to us and I shall now ask him to give his address. (Applause).

CIVILIZED society today depends, in every material sense, on abundant supplies of the petroleum products; and as to these it is well known that the eastern hemisphere must now (and, to all appearances, henceforward) depend on its own supplies, because the Americas need all or almost all that they produce, and indeed are already taking considerable quantities from the east. Therefore, if our civilization is of value (as *faute de mieux* we certainly assume!), it is clear enough that these ample supplies of oil which support it must be hailed as immensely precious to us, wherever they are found; and, in fact, they are found precisely in the Middle East. It is not easy to imagine what western and southern Europe, western and southern Asia, all Africa and Australasia would do without these resources, since no other natural oil is in sight to take their place; synthetic or shale-produced oil is economically not for a moment comparable, coal is certainly not available, and the general peaceful use of atomic energy on an important scale does not belong to the present or to the immediate future. At present these middle-eastern petroleum deposits not only satisfy the needs of the eastern hemisphere but, by the extraordinary volume of their proved reserves, they give us every confidence that they will continue to satisfy them for many years—and, of course, the tale of middle-eastern petroleum discovery is as yet very far from complete. There is therefore little doubt that a student of industry or indeed of society in the Free World as a whole would make short work of the question which forms the title of this lecture. His answer, of course, is that these middle-eastern supplies are an outstanding blessing to us all. I agree; but the question I am posing today is not quite that. I accept, for the moment, the proposition that what is indispensable for industry and society (as we know society) in the Free World is on the whole a Good Thing, even though a philosopher could raise more and deeper questions as to the nature of The Good; and it can be that what is "good" in one place or context can look quite otherwise, locally and specifically, in another.

One's own judgment on all this range of questions must depend on one's views on ultimate values, the nature of true happiness, the destiny of man, and so on. But for the purpose of this talk, and without being ignorant of the interdependence of local and general considerations, I am thinking for the moment in far more limited terms; my question means specifically "Would the plain man be justified in calling it a *blessing* for the Arab and Persian populations of the middle-eastern countries to have had these very big oil deposits discovered in their countries?—will *they* as a result lead happier and fuller lives?—or will this oil, and all that it involves and will involve, be in the longer run more of a *curse* to them?"

Having thus approached our central question, let us now, looking closer still, make a few necessary observations and distinctions. One of these is that by oil deposits I mean, of course, all that follows from them—not merely the liquid oil and its gas, but the presence of a great industry and many allied activities in the country in consequence: the payment of very large sums of money to the local Government treasury by whoever is, by agreement, extracting and transporting the oil; and the fairly wide direct diffusion of wealth to the local public by the operating company or companies through the wages it pays, the local purchases it makes, the works' contracts it gives, and the local services it provides. All this is what "the presence of oil" means to the country concerned.

Observe next, in passing, with how capricious a hand Nature (in so far as her secrets have been revealed so far) has bestowed her hydrocarbon gifts. The presence of giant deposits of oil in the Middle East not only—and naturally enough—bears no relation whatsoever to the needs of the communities among whom it is found, but is granted to some and withheld from others even among the closely contiguous groups of countries we are discussing. In Cyprus, the Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Israel, the Sudan, the Yemen, the Aden Protectorate and all southern and south-western Arabia, no oil at all has been located. In Turkey, revealed supplies are so far very small indeed and can make no considerable difference to its society or its industry. In Egypt, an oil-producing and oil-refining country since 1910, deposits are relatively small, and have never exceeded an output of 2½ million tons a year; therefore, although the Egyptian refining industry is considerable, petroleum is only one—and far from the greatest—of the country's resources, and does not help us to solve the problem we are now considering. The same is true of the countries—Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Aden—where the transit or the refining of oil, or both, bring appreciable revenues to the State, and work for its citizens, but not upon the greatest scale.

Our problem is better illustrated by the six other territories I mention next, of which three are full-scale countries with pretensions to a place among the nations, and three are very small territories without, at present, any such claims because of their extreme smallness and paucity of population. The three nations are, of course, 'Iraq with its more than 30 million tons a year production, its local refining sufficient for all its own needs, and its great pipelines and extensive export; then Persia with its potential production of (say) 35 million tons a year or more, and the largest refinery in the world, both now being brought back into at least considerable opera-

tion after a long, sad, self-inflicted immobilization; then Sa'udi Arabia, with its oil province of Hasa on the Persian Gulf producing more than 45 million tons a year of oil, refining some locally or in Bahrain, shipping some in crude form by tanker, and sending some by pipeline to the Mediterranean.

The other three producers are the tiny States of Kuwait, Qatar, and Bahrain. Kuwait consists of a single town and seaport surrounded by desert occupied by a scanty handful of nomads; Qatar is a totally barren peninsula with perhaps 15,000 human souls and a single village, its capital; Bahrain is a narrow island off the Gulf coast, 30 miles long and more than half desert. All three are ruled by Arab dynasties on patriarchal lines, with the protection of (and a measure of supervision by) Her Majesty's Government, without which they would no doubt have long ago ceased to exist as independent political units. Kuwait is currently producing over 45 million tons a year of petroleum, nearly all exported crude by tanker; Qatar about 5 million tons, similarly exported; Bahrain about 1½ million tons which, with a much larger quantity of Sa'udi Arabian oil brought from the mainland by submarine pipeline, is treated locally in a large refinery and is exported in refined form. Of that strange phenomenon, the Kuwait-Sa'udi Neutral Zone, with unassessed but certainly not inconsiderable oil potential recently discovered, I need say nothing, since there is no settled population whatsoever to be happy or unhappy and the oil revenues simply accrue to the joint, but absentee, owner-States.

In every one of these territories the oil industry is already great and still growing; there is production, transport, storage, refining, and export, with all the connected activities usual in the industry. In every case the operating company or companies are among the greatest British or American concerns of their kind in the world, and are well equipped for their tasks by wealth, experience, and intelligent goodwill. Their record of achievement is remarkable, and, I am convinced, highly creditable; the misdoings or negligencies with which Big Business is or has been sometimes charged elsewhere seem to be very little in evidence in the middle-eastern oil industry. The companies are admirably performing their part—as no other agency so far devised could perform it—in turning the buried treasure of these countries into actual wealth, according to agreements made with the local governments, usually after long bargaining and not infrequent revision. Fuller particulars regarding these companies, and their relations with the respective governments, do not belong to my present subject; and as regards the precise sums paid and payable by them to the local Treasuries in royalties, taxes and otherwise, I will abstain from offering more than the roughest figures. The sums range from £75 to £90 million sterling a year, or more, in Kuwait and Sa'udi Arabia to something between £5 and £10 million a year in Qatar and Bahrain, with 'Iraq today and Persia presumably tomorrow, receiving sums very much nearer to the first than the second of these ranges. It is enough for our present purpose to observe that, apart from other (non-governmental) streams flowing directly into the pockets of the local public, official revenues of this order are on an entirely different scale from any which these nations have ever before received.

It is a common element in all these six territories that they have been, up to now, extremely poor : indeed, sheer poverty, for hundreds of years, has been their great and oppressive handicap. It has resulted in a very low level of education and housing (except in the smallish upper and upper-middle classes), non-development of resources, imperfect communications, backward agriculture, starved public services, and a sadly low standard of life—normally a bare subsistence level—among the great majority. These phenomena of local life, in the age before oil development, have been deplored and resented in those countries where there was some awareness of other and higher standards, and have been taken for granted and, almost until now, unquestioned in the more primitive communities. And when I speak, as I shall, of the impact of the new wealth on these territories, I must, by generalizing, be much less than exact for any one of them. Their scale and population, as I have said, vary enormously; their immediate needs, standards and aspirations are far from identical; their resources and potentialities other than oil are immensely different. But I must, for brevity, speak of an imaginary or typical such State in terms which you will easily realize will not be factually applicable to them all.

The more one knows of the needs of these territories, and the progressive eagerness of their governments and publics for better things, the more one realizes the immense and beneficent work which it ought to be possible for the authorities now to carry out in them, with the aid of the *ad hoc* bodies set up by law for the execution of these improvements, and the five-year or seven-year plans, covering every service and interest and department, which such bodies have established and other bodies and interests—statel, parastatal, state-controlled, or otherwise—will establish. When you ask, "What can they do, or what do they plan to do?" the materials for a reply come flooding so abundantly into one's mind that it is hard not to conclude immediately that our answer is going to be "blessing!"—since how can a planned series of progressive, enlightened, humanitarian measures, now for the very first time possible of realization, be a curse?

Very well: in agriculture—by far the greatest indigenous industry in 'Iraq and Persia, and not negligible in two of the others—there is a world of invaluable work ready to be done which must closely and favourably affect the lives of a great part of the population. The skill and labour *which money can buy* can certainly avail to put an end to the devastating floods which hitherto have caused most grievous losses of life and property in 'Iraq every three or four years; if the Great Rivers could be controlled, their dyke-defences strengthened, their seasonal surplus waters drained off for later use in the dry season, then not only would a nightmare of loss and damage be removed from a whole countryside and its cities, but a great gain would result for agriculture. No wonder the 'Iraqis are giving such works the highest priority! And much more than this can be done in the field of irrigation, and not in 'Iraq alone. The precious water whose sole presence, with proper control and safeguards, is needed to turn desert into rich farmlands, can be led far into arid country, can increase both winter and summer crops, can create homes in viable surroundings for settled nomads and for large future increase of population, and, finally,

can give a heightened standard of life to millions of a hungry and backward peasantry.

Still in the wide agricultural field, there is much more that an enriched Government can do. It can undertake major capital works of drainage and desalination, can create new lands (needed tomorrow if not today) by the drainage of marshes, can accomplish works of afforestation to fix the soil in the uplands and prevent denudation, and produce sorely needed timber. The war on pests of every kind can be redoubled, including the annual campaigns against the curse of locusts; facilities for agricultural research can be much extended; types of seed and crop can be evolved resistant to the endemic risks of drought and blight and capable of increasing yields and producing varieties worth better prices in the world's markets. Here there is work not only for the research scientist, but for a host of travelling demonstrators, teachers, instructors able to spread to every village the new seed-types and pest-destroyers, and with them the profitable knowledge of better methods of planting, cultivating, reaping, and disposal. Government and para-governmental bodies can play a great part (once they have capital) in the spread of mechanization in agriculture, the use of tractors, reapers, combines, and the rest, with the provision of a maintenance and spare-parts service, tuition in upkeep and repair, and perhaps help in buying on credit. Overlapping with this can go the establishment of rural co-operatives and, behind it, redoubled Government effort to improve the still faulty and discouraging features of land-tenure and thus to secure to the peasant himself—though this is a notoriously difficult field of political and social pressures—the benefits of security and a fair share of the rewards of effort. Especially it should be possible to ensure the just and economic division of all new lands brought under cultivation. And the work of survey, delimitation, and establishment of rights, on which all sound land-settlement must be based, can go on at redoubled speed.

Even this is not the whole picture; you can visualize the very important services that Government will now be able to offer to its farmers in superior communications by rail and road, to bring their produce to markets; the improved storage, silo and warehouse accommodation at railway stations and ports; and the much-needed help, by precept and example, in packing, grading, cleaning, and marketing—all to bring better prices to grower and merchant by a better status in the world's markets. The same is true of animal produce—wool, skins, sheep, horses, buffaloes, camels—which, by improvement of stockbreeding and many connected measures, a better-financed administration should be able to transform. In a word, though middle-eastern agriculture can never escape the dangers and frustrations common to farmers the world over—and not least the fluctuations of world prices, which can hit producers very hard—I have said enough to suggest how much a well-provided Government could do for the agricultural masses. And similar steps could go far to create, by water-finding, an agricultural way of life, even though on a restricted scale, where at present it is almost wholly lacking, in the deserts of Arabia.

Local industry, to which I turn next, offers a different picture. This is because raw materials for manufacture (except petroleum itself) are notably



scarce in these territories and the local market is at present too limited to offer the highest attractions to capital. Locally available funds for investment are restricted, and are more habitually invested in land and buildings. Add to this that the skilled artisan class is at present small, and the possibility of competing with the factories of Europe (and those of India and Japan) is doubtful. Nevertheless, a great deal more than nothing can be done, and a measure of industrialization not only is already in hand but forms part of the programmes of nearly all middle-eastern governments. The diffusion of oil-produced wealth will and does increase local purchasing power, and makes the establishment of local factories more attractive; foreign capital will be more easily, or less reluctantly, attracted; electric power will be easily produced and universally distributed; the artisan class will grow with the demand (especially with the output of good technical colleges, and of the Science faculty in the local University), and Government itself will have (as 'Iraq and Sa'udi Arabia and Persia have already shown) funds for investment in State industrial enterprises. All this, I feel, suggests the possibility of a limited, but certainly valuable, diversifying of the national productive effort; the lessening of dependence on imports in a range of needed articles; and perhaps the production of locally desirable materials (such as fertilizers) from petroleum itself. The presence of abundant oil for all industrial and energy-producing purposes, probably at rates well below world prices, cannot but be an important national asset. And I would call particular attention to the benefit of providing, in industry and business, openings for more of the educated middle class, who up to now have sought their careers, *faute de mieux*, mainly in politics and the law, both heavily overstaffed with the unemployed intelligentsia.

So much for agriculture and industry. Now, what of the administration itself, and all it can now, but never could before, do for its public? The picture—which, I emphasize again, I am bound to generalize and simplify—is a highly attractive one. It is not limited to better educated, better paid officials working with greater honesty and capacity in better conditions; it must mean also more reliable public security by reason of more expert and better trained forces specialized for the purpose, and, one might add, more efficient and better armed national forces for self-defence, should need arise. It can include all the blessings of good roads and bridges; rapid and confidence-inspiring post and telegraph systems; railways, wherever justified; well-run public airports and airlines; harbours and shipping facilities if and when demanded. And note that some of these at least can turn into permanent revenue-producing assets; and they are all advantages—or *blessings*!—which money, well spent, can definitely bring. And it will buy, with time and goodwill, towns with clean and well-lit streets, planned housing estates, modern drainage, controlled traffic, pure water supplies, and all such of the beauties and amenities of town life as fit the local scene and need. All this, so quickly expressed, can mean scarcely less than a transformation of the conditions of urban life. And to enjoy it one can envisage a population trained in a diversity of schools and colleges, staffed by well-trained teachers—these perhaps in part borrowed from abroad in the early days—and designed to produce,

within a generation, a level both of general and specialized education far above anything seen in these territories before. With this effort, now practicable and already being made, can go all that a full Treasury can make possible in Health services at every level, from preventive work in stamping out malaria and bilharzia to the finest specialist institutions, big general hospitals, school and factory clinics, travelling dispensaries. And note in particular that all these blessings of improved living conditions, education, and medical facilities can in time be extended to the remoter villagers and tribesmen as well as the towns, and can transform rural as well as urban life. And to all this can be added, with a generous hand, whatever social security plans, covering old age, injury, sickness, unemployment, and so on, will best commend themselves.

One word, in passing, upon an aspect obviously less essential but still far from indifferent to the citizens of these States; I mean the much better appearances that their nation will be able—or is already able—to keep up in the world at large; the fuller part they can play in international bodies and funds, the outward trappings of Government at home and abroad. These things all take their place in building up a national pride and self-respect with which, kept within reason and proportion, no one need quarrel.

Nearly all that I have described so far belongs, as you have seen, to the sphere of Government initiative. As to the greater wealth of a fair part of the community, due to the operating companies' own direct local expenditure, I need not go into detail; it is and will be very pleasant for at least some thousands of people! But I ought separately to mention, because they are so striking a phenomenon in their often primitive surroundings, some of the operations of the companies themselves which touch the local public—the medical services which they maintain (by no means solely for the employees), the technical education they give with all its range and refinements, the roads and airports they construct, the civilizing and stabilizing effect of their desert roads and pump-stations, the practical help they offer in local schemes of water or gas supply and the like, the housing estates they erect, and the example (which cannot for ever remain unheeded) of secure employment of their labour in conditions far superior in nine cases out of ten (or more) to anything else seen in the territory. All this, in the countries we are discussing, amounts to something very considerable indeed, and it is already in largely developed existence.

In the field covered by governmental effort I have mentioned only a part of what might be said as to the blessings which this wealth from its soil could produce for one of these fortunate countries; but it is clear that such blessings could well amount to a diffusion of greater wealth, higher living standards, more safety and comfort, more enlightenment, better health—in fact, a *better life* by all ordinary standards, for a great part, or even for nearly all, of the population. But it is time for me now to approach the question which you, ladies and gentlemen, have been expecting: is this happy state of things in fact in existence, or visibly coming into existence, or is it likely to? These examples that I have given of new-found wealth *might* be spent, by a wise, honest, benevolent, efficient,

harmonious middle-eastern Government, for a grateful and responsive people—are they facts or probabilities, or are they dreams?

There is, by way of a provisional answer, a great deal already to be seen in each of the six States I have mentioned—except perhaps in Persia, which (through its own fault) has not yet really begun its new era. There is enough to show very serious efforts in flood-prevention, for instance, in 'Iraq, and schools and town-planning and water supply in Kuwait, and a railway and harbours and wireless stations in Sa'udi Arabia; and the Administrations of any of the territories concerned would probably subscribe, in spirit, to the sort of programmes I have outlined. The blessings I have indicated are in fact partly, occasionally, locally coming into visible existence and, as far as can be foreseen, they will increase.

So far, so good; but we have now to turn to considerations which may make us a good deal less happy. They consist of adverse factors which are equally implicit in the situation and are partially, occasionally, locally explicit also.

Now, money does not spend itself; and the administration of very large expenditure on a whole range of projects and services involves much more than mere ordinary accountancy. It involves all stages of planning, long-term and short-term, practical and practicable formulation and timetabling, and foreign purchasing, and the recruitment and retention of specialized staffs, and the integration of many interests—technical, political and social. It is true that these governments can and do obtain great assistance from outside—Point IV experts, International Bank missions, British Middle East Office consultants, resident or visiting advisers, eminent executives engaged *ad hoc*, consulting engineers, and the rest. These can do much, but not all: a great burden is inevitably cast on the normal—even on a specially strengthened—local administration; and this, in each of these territories, is at present very doubtfully adequate to these demands, but at the same time would not—for political reasons *could* not—dream of parting with its functions. The trouble is the sheer insufficiency of officials trained for work on the higher levels, and standards not nearly high enough all the way down the official ladder. This is bound to lead to a measure of inefficiency, delay, confusion and possibly leakage, seriously destructive of the best results.

But I should fear more than this. You are aware of the bitterness of faction in political life in the middle-eastern countries, the short-lived and mainly personal political parties, the instability that must lead—certainly in 'Iraq and Persia, less in Sa'udi Arabia and the Arab sheikhdoms—to a rapid succession of changing cabinets, with not infrequent interventions by the armed forces or by the mob. Even with the partial removal of development projects from the orbit of current administration, there remains all too much danger of inconstancy in policy, changes of project, wasteful reconsiderations and abandonments. With this—and largely responsible for it—go two other elements: one is the Arab character in which—mixed in with its eminent social and intellectual gifts of quick responsiveness, cleverness and humour—one recognizes its extreme individualism, its impatience, and its reluctance to compromise, qualities damaging to what ought to be a steady united national effort. Another

element is the presence in those States of regional pressures—for example, as between northern and southern 'Iraq, or between western and central Sa'udi Arabia. The operation of these on the choice of projects to be carried out, on the allotment of finance, and possibly on appointments, is notably unfavourable, and regional resentment at not getting all they ask for can lead to attacks on, and a weakening of, the whole development organization. More generally, the ill-rooted nature of the so-called democracy, the heterogeneity of society, the struggle for power among a smallish political class in 'Iraq and Persia, and, on the other hand, the pressure of large ruling families with a high sense of privilege and sometimes a much lower sense of public service, in the Arabian States, are likely to contribute to an aggravation of existing factions and disunities by reason of the new and much greater stakes to be played for henceforward in local politics; it is all too probable that these will be bitterer even than before, and the greed of royal princes and hangers-on (with no doubt many honourable exceptions) certainly not less pronounced. I should fear that the new wealth, in fact, will not cure the constitutional or political evils of the State, nor produce the great and sorely needed blessings of unity and stability. Only the ignorant and the wishful thinkers can say: "Ah, the 'Iraqis or the Sa'udis will all be quite happy from now on—they have all that money!" It will not be quite like that.

Nor is it certain that programmes as enlightened as those I sketched a few minutes ago will be in practice everywhere adopted; in Sa'udi Arabia there has been, in fact, serious waste and much foolish misspending on unessentials in the earliest years of prosperity (though this, I believe, has now been partly corrected); in Persia military expenditure may not improbably take an undue share of the revenues which the new Consortium will produce; and elsewhere the cost of new palaces and urban construction, or extravagant representation abroad, may eat unduly into the sums available for improved services or productive works. The cruder forms of personal self-enrichment are, I hope, unlikely to be seen; they scarcely belong to the present age; but any expenditure whose result was to emphasize the already striking difference in living standard between rich and poor—or to weaken the respect felt by the population for its rulers—would be definitely harmful. Nothing could be worse than great irrigation schemes if their result were only to bring bigger rents to already rich landlords and nothing to the peasantry; or town-planning accompanied by the "rackets" of the powerful; or contracts corruptly awarded. The avoidance of these dangers is no matter of course, and it calls for a sense of public service and national solidarity which, I am afraid, cannot be taken for granted.

I have spoken so far of the potential evils of misspending, serious forms or degrees of which would, I am convinced, deprive oil wealth of much of its blessings or turn it into a curse; but after all they need not happen, and they are not generally speaking, yet in evidence to any alarming extent. With rather the same degree of foreboding, neither fully supported nor quite unsupported by observed results so far, I will turn to other probable phenomena. One of these is the ill balance, or discontinuity, in the body politic which may result, in all or any of the countries, from the sudden

creation of a purely industrial element among a population still overwhelmingly agricultural or pastoral. The two classes will share few of the same interests, and will, to all appearance, be almost wholly divorced. Can this be a healthy development? Again, is it not likely that fully developed modern industry—in effect the oil industry, with its inevitably foreign control at least for some years to come—will make explicit the grades of an industrial bureaucracy in which ill-will (certainly fostered, as it always is, by ultra-nationalist politicians) will point to the presence of foreigners in many or most of the leading positions? And will they fail to point their fingers at the foreign staff's greater rewards and privileges, which the companies will no doubt wish to minimize but cannot in practice entirely abolish, simply because the best personnel are unobtainable without them? Plenty of bitter and dangerous comments on such lines have, in fact, been heard before now.

Again, in these cases where great wealth pours into the local Treasury, and is freely spent on the public welfare, is there not some danger of sheer pauperization? Will there be any need for a Kuwaiti or a Qatari to work at all while passively receiving the best of everything? Will not the hardihood, the toughness of character, of the Arab be lost through too easy a life of unearned welfare? To ask this is but to draw attention, in a narrow field, to the corrupting effect of wealth—as notorious as that of power itself. In one's own world one hears a friend say, "It's delightful that the impoverished Jones family have been left a fortune—or won a football pool: now at last they can live properly"; but we all know that it's not necessarily as easy as that. It is a dull truism that money cannot buy happiness; but it is a very real and common experience that a sudden accession of wealth, especially to a young and not particularly well-balanced person, can be ruinous to him or her. Many a football-pool winner, I am sure, was better and happier before winning than a year later, and many of one's own friends were much pleasanter people before they "came into money"! These are homely examples of the point I now want to make—and it's fundamental to the discussion—that the wealth itself is a quite neutral gift, containing potentialities of curse as well as blessing, and that what matters, morally and materially, is how you spend it, what it turns you into.

Oil is, at all times and places, a wasting asset. In spite of the best of economic working and methods of recovery, the reservoirs will one day run dry, or run to water; and on that day oil revenues will cease. Even with the greatest wisdom and foresight in investing funds while they still accrue, and devoting a large share of them to permanent revenue-producing projects, it is inconceivable that anything like their present affluence can bless any of these States after its oil is exhausted. Is there not risk, then, of a grave, even a catastrophic, reversal of fortune? And may not the last state be worse than the first? History, even contemporary history, is not without examples of the plight of a one-industry country losing its sole source of wealth; and if we are asking the question "Blessing or curse?" we must, after all, take the whole span of foreseeable history into account. A sounder warning was never given than *respice finem!*

And what, after all, is the new alternative type of life which the oil industry offers to its thousands of local employees in exchange for the penury but freedom, the backwardness but pride and continuity, of the old life of peasant, herdsman, fisher or labourer? Can it, in the East as in the West, be other than one of regimentation, monotony and drabness in big unnatural aggregations of workers? It is not easy to avoid feeling that, just as industrial buildings, however well designed and constructed, must ruin a fair rural prospect and banish picturesqueness from the scene, so the scenes and conditions of their new daily life for thousands will be very doubtfully preferable (to say the least) to all the ignorance, squalors and hardships of their old.

These thoughts are, in my view, such as to make us pause thoughtfully before passing our final judgment. There are, or may be, it appears, certain sobering elements in the case, very different from the joys and powers of even the wisest spending. These elements are misuse of opportunity, ill effects on society, increase of discontent, fears of pauperization, dread of ultimate reversion to poverty; and I have deliberately portrayed them in colours bolder, perhaps, than any present facts justify. But one cannot stop there, and I pass next to two other aspects of modern industry as a whole—or, indeed, of the modern way of life as a whole—as we see it established in countries which have a long social and cultural tradition of quite opposite character. This tradition in middle-eastern countries is rooted in the Islamic faith, in pride of race and family, in a certain tempo and fashion of life, in certain priorities and values. It has been solid in its acceptance of time-honoured respects and loyalties and beliefs, and has for centuries felt no need to look beyond them. This culture belongs to the people and their country; it is their own. Now has arrived—and is admirably typified by a great modern industry—the outside, the European, the modern world, with a very different tempo, different values, different manners, no religious and certainly no feudal background, and loyalties totally remote from those of eastern and Islamic society. There are many phases of middle-eastern society and politics which show to any observer some of the results of this familiar impact, an impact which has, of course, been widely studied and analysed during the last century and a half. The clash of cultures, or modes of life and thought, has failed so far to produce the valuable synthesis for which some have hoped; it has produced rather, in the Middle East, as we know, a marked weakening of the hold of the ancient ways and loyalties, a division of the community into a conservative element who react against modernity, and a progressive element highly receptive of it, though by no means always of its essentially best content. Modern industry, especially in mammoth form and European-directed, by its demands, its routines, and its assumptions, will help materially and all too rapidly—at a pace far exceeding the normal, natural speed of a cultural change of direction—to create a moral rootlessness or vacuum in the nation. A significant part at least of the enriched and modernized community may find itself gaining a whole world of material wealth—and losing its own soul.

I have left myself time only for a few words on the altered position of the oil-enriched nations *vis-à-vis* the outer world; but it is, like so much

else, a picture not without disquieting forms. That any of the rich States will share its great, even its excessive, revenues with poorer neighbours seems unlikely, though an outstanding chance for generous fraternal gestures is there. In a better world it would be easy enough for Kuwait, shall we say, to aid Syria or Jordan, who are permanently "hard up," to finance their development projects, to put capital into their schemes or institutions, or to help with the hapless Palestinian refugees. But none of this seems to be happening, nor even to be foreshadowed; more probably the egoism characteristic of all (not only of middle-eastern) nationalism is once again to be sadly demonstrated, and will do nothing to increase international goodwill. The dependence of certain of the producing countries—Iraq and Sa'udi Arabia—on their western neighbours for pipeline way-leaves can open the door to dangerous quarrels. The relations between the local States and the governments of the countries of origin of the operating companies can all too probably be adversely affected by disputes between the former and the companies: as happened tragically, for instance, between Persia and Great Britain in 1951 to '53, and as might happen not inconceivably between the United States and Sa'udi Arabia. Or disputes with an obvious oil implication, such as the present Buraimi frontier controversy, can occur to separate and embitter the best of friends; oil in such matters is far from being a lubricant! And finally the middle-eastern nations' new richness in a vital strategic material and source of wealth can scarcely fail to attract envious eyes: the eyes of Iraq cast, not for the first time, upon Kuwait, those of Persia on Bahrain, those of the Sa'udis on the Trucial Coast, or—far more formidable—those of Russia on northern Iraq and southern Persia alike. No security is so great as that of the unenvied; possess, an oilfield and that security is yours no longer.

I must conclude. By over-simplifying, by painting my picture admittedly first too bright and then too dark, I hope I have at least shown that the question from which I started is not capable of a single categorical answer. "Blessing or curse?" It all depends! I am certain that the great changes which oil wealth wisely spent and husbanded, may bring about, can be rich in blessings for these territories; and nobody will grudge them their fortune or fail to wish them every happy consequence. But it is well to recognize that the spending and husbanding are unlikely always to be wise, and may very well be accompanied by added faction within and new dangers and embarrassments without, and by a loss of national individuality, solidarity and continuity. There is a strongish case, I should say, for concluding that probably these countries would be happier, freer, safer and more themselves *without* this unearned and unexpected richness—and some people (I wonder how many) will accept this verdict. Personally, when all is weighed, I cannot bring myself to accept it: because the blessings can be so real, the dangers are in part avoidable, and if they come are not necessarily irresistible. In these as in most of their problems it is mainly (though not exclusively) in the hands of the nations themselves to choose the better and to avoid the worse: and this choice, and steadfast adherence to it, will tax their wisdom and character to the utmost. Good luck to them!

Mr. J. BIGGS-DAVIDSON : Is it known when the oil reservoirs are likely to run dry, or is that something that cannot be predicted?

Brig. LONGRIGG : They will run dry one day, but one cannot say when, because one does not know how extensive they are. Discovery has not yet stopped and it is not known how fast the oil will be drawn off. If the final total of oil and the future demand could be ascertained, the question could be answered, but while both those elements are unknown I am afraid the answer must be unknown too.

Mr. GORDON WATERFIELD : I do wonder whether it is fair to accuse Kuwait of being egotistic because she does not help other Arabs. Is it not true that the cost of creating a welfare state from nothing has proved to be very much more than anybody expected? In other words, is it not true that Kuwait, extraordinary as it may be, seems short of money? Also, is it not fair to say that all these countries are nationalistic, and that Kuwait and Iraq and the others are presumably looking forward to a day when they will be more powerful in relation to the others and there will be a different balance between the Arab countries with oil and those without oil? It would seem to me that to consider one's own people is fair.

Brig. LONGRIGG : You say it is not to be expected that the people of Kuwait will give money away because they are nationalistic. In fact, that is not so much an excuse as the cause; it is because they are nationally egotistic that they do not feel like giving money away! In Kuwait, I should not insure the life of a Shaikh of Kuwait who gave much of it away, because the royal family are very much averse from that course. The Shaikh himself has said so. As regards Kuwait being unable to spare money because the creation of a welfare state is so expensive, I cannot take that very seriously. Supposing they are getting £70 million a year to build a welfare state, on behalf of a population which is now at most 200,000, the proportion is so grotesque that if they slipped a mere £5 million into another Treasury it would not hurt them. They would merely have to make their plans more moderate. The question can be argued, of course.

Mr. PHILLIPS-PRICE, M.P. : Does Brigadier Longrigg not think that one of the most vital things to deal with in the problems which he has so eloquently put before us is the development of education, particularly technical education? He referred to the danger of so many going in for the law, journalism and so on. Is not the answer to try to increase technical education, and, if so, is it not vital to induce these countries to give technical education? That would mean the institution of training establishments, and would that not be very difficult without help from the West?

Brig. LONGRIGG : I am sure that what you suggest is true. Foreign help in the form of instructors is asked for, and is received in a quite considerable way. I think technical education is far from being a neglected aspect, and certainly the oil companies are doing a very great deal, partly by the royalties they pay and partly by direct action. The oil companies are bringing men home for technical education and giving it on a very extended scale indeed. I agree entirely with your estimate of the importance of it.

Col. ROUTH : About oil running dry, geologists in the Persian oilfields



told me twenty years ago that they had to nurse oil supplies very carefully and they had to see that they did not take too much from any one site at any one time. Shortly after that they doubled the output, by better geology and calculations and by finding fresh fields nearby. The same thing happened in America. It was said that in twenty years' time there would be no oil available, but oil was then used in a different way. Might it not be that these oil supplies will go on for twenty or thirty years or more, until these countries become more or less viable?

Brig. LONGRIGG : I should expect the supplies to go on for very much longer than that. If one thought they would dry up within the next century it would be an extremely serious thing! I have no doubt that your prediction is a pessimistic one.

A MEMBER : With regard to the internal price of oil, do the governments have the full benefit of low costs of production?

Brig. LONGRIGG : Governments are not as a rule able to dictate the price of oil. Either it is sold to them at a world price or they get a preferential price, but that depends on bargaining. I do not think the companies would mind the financial loss by selling it sometimes at an exceptionally low price, but once you start giving oil away at special prices you find you cannot go on producing it. I have a good deal of sympathy with companies which do not want to sell oil quite as cheaply as the governments would like.

A MEMBER : Would the speaker agree that a summary of the whole problem, which makes it one of the most difficult, is the moral and spiritual development of the people concerned?

Brig. LONGRIGG : Yes, I quite agree.

A MEMBER : Would you comment on the advantages and disadvantages of the Continental Shelf oil reservoir?

Brig. LONGRIGG : The main advantage is that one may get more oil.

The MEMBER : I was thinking of the international problem.

Brig. LONGRIGG : There is not an international agreement yet. A definition of international rights is, however, coming nearer, but it depends on what people think *is* the Continental Shelf. Some think it is 200 miles; we think it is a good deal less.

A MEMBER : Did you say that the Western Hemisphere depends largely on the middle east oilfields?

Brig. LONGRIGG : At present some oil is going from the Persian Gulf to North America. This is intensely unpopular with tens of thousands of small producers in North America because they want to sell their own oil, but nevertheless North America *is* importing middle-eastern oil.

Mr. KEIGHLEY BELL : Is any strategic pipeline likely to be run direct from the oilfields to Turkey? It might help the Turks if, instead of all the oil having to be taken round via Tripoli to Alexandretta, there could be such a pipeline. Also, do you know whether there now exists any feeling likely to embitter the relations between Turkey and the Arab States owing to the oilfields lost when the "Brussels Line" became the frontier?

Brig. LONGRIGG : Turkey lost the oilfields, but she had never had them! They were discovered two years after the Brussels Line was put in

place. Turkey would like the oil of northern 'Iraq, but she will not get it. As regards a pipeline running north from northern 'Iraq to Turkey, it is not physically impossible, but I think it would be impossible to find anybody to finance it. Commercially, it would take a great deal of money, for very little return.

The CHAIRMAN: I am afraid our time has come to an end. We have listened to a most interesting and most instructive and a very thoughtful lecture from Brigadier Longrigg, for which we are most grateful. It does seem to me that the point he has made has also been brought out in the questions, that the really important thing is education and, in particular, a proper sense of values—and, I would say, the spiritual sense of values given in the education. I do feel that our countrymen working in the Middle East can make a very great contribution by their example and in particular by integrity in all their dealings. On your behalf, I should like to thank Brigadier Longrigg very much indeed for this talk.

The vote of thanks was accorded by applause.

# AFRO-ASIAN CONFERENCE PROSPECTS

By PHILIP MASON, C.I.E., O.B.E.

Report of a lecture delivered to the Royal Central Asian Society on Wednesday, March 9th, 1955, General Sir John Shea, G.C.B., K.C.M.G., D.S.O., in the chair.

The CHAIRMAN: We are very fortunate today, ladies and gentlemen, because we have to talk to us on the prospects of the Afro-Asian Conference Mr. Philip Mason. Author, Director of Studies at Chatham House and traveller, he began a diplomatic career in the Indian Civil Service as magistrate, district commissioner, under-secretary, typical of that type of Indian civilian who was bound, with reasonable fortune, to reach the highest offices, only in his case there was no doubt that he would fill such a high place. Then when he had left India Mr. Philip Mason started writing and he has written many books, particularly a very charming novel entitled *Call the Next Witness* which showed such intimate knowledge of the life of the people in his district of Garhwal which he loved so well and where, indeed, he is so well remembered to this day. Then, just to finish off, he was on the staff of the Supreme Commander both in the preparation and the conduct of the Burma campaign. Next came his masterpiece—I am sure there will be many others—*The Men who Ruled India*. And now I ask Mr. Philip Mason to give us his views on the Afro-Asian Conference.

IT is, in a way, refreshing for once to speak, not on a subject on which one feels that probably many in the audience know much more than oneself, but on a subject about which no one can possibly know anything. I feel on this score at least that I am safe against being heckled, because the amount of solid fact I can lay before you is minute. That is, in a sense, rather appalling, but I must explain that it was not I but you who asked for this subject, so that I can face you now in the spirit in which Macbeth said to Banquo's Ghost: "Thou canst not say I did it: never shake thy gory locks at me."

Now for the facts. The five Colombo Powers—India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Burma, and Indonesia—just under a year ago, in April last, were meeting in connection with the trouble in Indo-China at the same time as the Conference at Geneva. It was then that Indonesia put forward the suggestion that there should be a conference between the Asiatic and African States. Reading between the lines, one feels that that suggestion, coming from Indonesia, was picked up with some enthusiasm, certainly with a show of enthusiasm, by India; with a distinct absence of enthusiasm by Ceylon and Burma; and with notable reluctance by Pakistan. In the utterances which followed that original beginning one sees a distinct difference in approach between the various Powers. Indonesia had from the start put the emphasis on anti-racialism and anti-colonialism. I do not know whether the experience of others is the same as mine, but my own experience has been that, among those from Asia with whom I have spoken, the most bitter have been Indonesians. I believe certain others can confirm that impression. Whether it was due to something in the nature of Dutch colonial rule, or something inherent in the nature of Indonesians, I do not know. At any rate, that has been their emphasis.

Mr. Nehru's emphasis, on the other hand, has been very different.

Mr. Nehru's utterances on this subject have been in what I might call his cosiest vein, rather the atmosphere of tea on the vicarage lawn: we will get together; we will explore the avenues; we will discuss, and we will appreciate each other's point of view; we are not anti-anything; we do not want to hurt anyone; we do not want to form any blocs or alliances. Also he has emphasized that this is the first time this has happened; that in such a case one must not expect too much, and that nothing very formal will come out of the Conference.

The *Hindu* of Madras, a Right-wing Congress paper, has suggested that in addition, no doubt, to some platitudes on the subject of racialism and colonialism there will at the Conference be a good deal of attention focused on economic questions and on raising the standard of living in Asian and African countries.

But all this is really speculation. All one has to go upon is the Press communiqué issued by the five Colombo Powers after their meeting just before Christmas at Bandoeng. They then announced four objects of the Conference (a) to promote goodwill and co-operation between the countries participating; (b) to consider the social, economic and cultural problems of those represented; (c) to consider problems of special interest to Asian and African peoples—for example, those affecting national sovereignty, racialism and colonialism; (d) to view the position of Asia and Africa in the world today and consider the contribution they can make to world peace and to world co-operation. After those four objects there followed in the communiqué a somewhat curious sentence: "Each country to decide for itself what it would like to discuss." I do not know what sort of picture that calls up in your minds, but to my mind it calls up a picture of considerable confusion. However, that will probably be sorted out. The Secretariat have been appointed, and there is little doubt that in practice the Secretariat will decide what is to be discussed, taking into consideration the suggestions which people make, and that in practice the Secretariat will follow the instructions from the five sponsoring Powers. Therefore one may assume that matters will not get on to that agenda which the five sponsoring Powers do not wish to see there.

Next we come to the composition of the Conference; that is, those who have been invited—namely, twenty-five countries, in addition to the five sponsoring countries. I will not read the list of the twenty-five countries, because it demands the ability of a chess player to go through twenty-five names and remember who is there and who is not. It will be more helpful to discuss the list in the light in which people used to discuss invitations to balls at Government House: take notice of those who have not been asked and those who, rather surprisingly, have been asked.

The notable absentees are the Union of South Africa; Israel; Korea, North and South; Nationalist China; and—you might just add—Nigeria, Australia and New Zealand. The Union of South Africa fulfils the condition of being an independent State in Africa or Asia, but an invitation was not sent to the Union "on account of its aggressive racial policy." I quote Mr. Nehru. It seems to me that if he did not wish to cause embarrassment to the Union of South Africa it might have been better to send an invitation. Israel was not invited, and on that Mr. Nehru re-

marked that he thought the exclusion of Israel was not very logical. One understands that at the Bandoeng Conference India wished to include Israel, but Pakistan was much opposed, pointing out that if Israel came the Arab countries would not come because (a) Israel was not a State and (b) if it was a State the Arabs were at war with it. I suggest that that is no more illogical than some of the other exclusions. It really fits in very well with the exclusion of Nationalist China, as to which, again, Communist China might well say it is not a State and if it is they are at war with it.

Why have North and South Korea not been asked? Well, the only explanation I have seen officially is, again, that of Mr. Nehru, who said that Korea, North and South, was excluded because while that country and Vietnam, North and South, were both in a highly fluid state the Colombo Powers felt special responsibility to North and South Vietnam because they had taken some part in the events which led up to the Cease Fire. So they felt Vietnam must be included, although logically one would have thought both countries should be excluded. I do not know whether you find that very convincing. Another explanation suggested to me unofficially is that Communist China would not have been prepared to sit down with Syngman Rhee and that if North Korea were invited it would be necessary to invite also South Korea; therefore, both were left out. Another possibility is, of course, that the Conference wished to discuss events regarding Korea, and they might have found the presence of that country's representatives embarrassing, but I do not find that one very convincing.

I have already suggested the reason why Nationalist China was not included. Probably many countries would take the view that Chiang Kai-shek does not really represent a State; that he is an exile hoping to go back one day, but not a State. Nigeria I mentioned because it is a little difficult to say exactly where independence starts and ends. The Gold Coast has been asked; Nigeria has not been asked. It is clearly possible, if a line is to be drawn, to draw it between those two and to say that the Gold Coast is a little more independent than Nigeria. It is not surprising to me that Australia and New Zealand were left out. They are not, geographically, in Asia and the Mandate for New Guinea would hardly qualify them without qualifying also Great Britain and France.

Of the notable invitees, those who were asked and might have been expected not to be asked, the Central African Federation heads my list. I am very glad indeed that the Colombo Powers do feel that there is a real difference between the accepted statement of policy—that is, partnership—which is there in the Central African Federation and the policy of the Union of South Africa. The Central African Federation had not on March 7, and I think has not yet, accepted the invitation, and it has not indicated how it will answer. The Federation was asked late; the invitation only reached it while Sir Godfrey Huggins—or should I already say Lord Huggins?—was in London. The Federation must have waited until he returned to Africa and must be still discussing the question.

It may be said that the Gold Coast is very nearly independent, and of course if a strict line on independence were taken very few African

\* Now the Viscount Malvern.—Ed.

countries would have remained to be asked; there would have been left: Africa south of the Sahara, Ethiopia and Liberia, which would have made a very poor show, so that the degree of independence was interpreted as "fairly independent" or "nearly independent." North and South Vietnam I have spoken of and given Mr. Nehru's official reason for inviting them. It may also be that here, too, there is a personal reason and that it is felt that Ho Chi-minh should be at the Conference.

There was some speculation in regard to Japan, it being suggested that Japan would not be a welcome member of the Conference on two grounds: first, that Japan is tied to the United States of America and is barely independent; secondly, that Japan was what the Asian Powers would call a bad Power, an aggressive colonial Power, or that it had been that in the past. However, these objections could hardly be sustained. If they were going to ask the Gold Coast and the other African territories for the reasons I have suggested, Japan could hardly be left out because it is at least as independent as the Gold Coast. On the second point there is another principle implicit in many statements made in connection with the Conference, which is that aggression is one thing when committed by a European Power and something different when committed by an Asian Power. Japan has presumably been asked in accordance with this principle.

An interesting point about the acceptances was that discussions in the papers, which looked as though they were half inspired, indicated that both the Philippines and Siam would refuse to come to the Conference. They have, however, both since accepted, which looks rather as though they had been in conversation with Washington on the subject and that Washington had changed its mind and felt it was good to have present at the Conference some whom Washington would regard as good Powers.

What is the background of the whole movement? What is the point? What started it? Why are these Powers having a Conference at all? It seems to me it arises primarily out of the deep sense of humiliation which is felt among the educated peoples in Asia when they look back at the nineteenth century. It needs imagination on our part to realize how deep that humiliation must have been when we think of the complete domination by the white race, and particularly by north-western Europeans, at the end of the nineteenth century. The whole of the Americas was governed by European people. Europe, of course, governed practically all Africa and a great part of Asia. In those parts of Asia not actually governed by Europeans there were special privileges attached to being Europeans which probably any European State would have found intolerably humiliating, such as the capitulations in Turkey and the Treaty ports in China and arrangements similar to the capitulation in China by which a European could not be tried by a Chinese court but only by his own Consul.

It seems to me it is in the light of that feeling of humiliation which has arisen from that subjection that the Conference must be viewed. Some here have no doubt read Panikkar's *Asia and Western Dominance*, in which he has expressed with great ability and at length the great feeling of indignation which Asians have felt and their feeling that they were subject to unfair and unjust aggression.

Coming a little more to modern times, what is the result of that feeling of humiliation today? I think we can speak of a general Asian point of view. It is not adhered to by all Asian Powers, but it is widely held. India is the chief spokesman of it, and many others would follow India's lead in varying degree. It was very well summed up in an article in the *New York Times*, so well summed up that my summary follows that which appeared in that paper. First of all, there is a desire, because of the humiliation of which I spoke, to take an independent line whenever possible, an independent line in world affairs, and not to be tied to anybody else's coat-tails. That is very understandable. Secondly, there is a feeling that it is possible to arrive at some kind of workable relationship with the Communist Powers. Communism in China is felt in India, and I think in many other Asian countries, to be an upsurge—that is an American word and comes from the *New York Times*—an upsurge against poverty, domination by other people and against internal corruption. Those three things are felt to have been the reason why China became Communist, and China is not thought of as an aggressively imperialist Power. When reading the article in the *New York Times* I was reminded of a discussion we had in Lahore at the informal Commonwealth Conference some ten months ago. The unofficial representatives of all the Commonwealth countries were present and we had been speaking of defence problems, and clearly our representatives fell into two categories. The United Kingdom, Canada, Australia and New Zealand were all urging India, Pakistan and Ceylon to spend more money on their defence and to look with a greater feeling of fright and urgency at Communist China. They were reluctant to do so, their feeling being that what money they had they preferred to spend on raising their own standard of living and on internal improvement. Mr. Hugh Gaitskell, who was the leader of the delegation, interpolated one of those brilliant, useful interpolations which save a discussion from foundering completely on absolutely opposite points of view. He said: "Surely this difference, which is clearly there between us, arises from our recent history. We in Europe have seen in the course of a lifetime many States overrun by external aggression; we are terrified of seeing a State attacked and overrun by an external aggressor. But you, India, Pakistan and Ceylon, on the contrary, have been protected from external warfare for more than a hundred years and you are thinking of something quite different. You have recently suffered from internal upset, with heavy slaughter at the time of the partition, and you are frightened of risings within the country rather than aggression from outside." That seems perfectly true: that the feeling in those countries is that it is not Communist China that is the danger, but the Communist within India who is the danger, and that the only way of combating him is to spend money not so much on guns and tanks as on raising the standard of living and developing industry.

To return to the analysis of the Asian feeling, I think it may be said that the kind of feeling of which India is the chief representative is strongly against blocs and what is described as "polarization of Powers"; that is to say, slipping into groups and being tied up with other blocs, partly because in the present state of affairs in the world that necessarily

means hanging on to somebody else's coat-tails. It means hanging on to the coat-tails of either Russia or the United States of America. And partly because it is felt that this ganging-up contributed to what the Asians call the two European civil wars and we, in our arrogant way, call the two World Wars. Therefore they want to avoid getting tied up with either the United States or Russian blocs, and they say that they also want to avoid a third bloc. I do not know how they are going to do that. They say that theirs is not going to be a bloc but an area of neutrality and peace. I must confess that I feel a bloc by any other name smells just as strong. Also it occurs to me that a bloc without a good deal of power behind it is not very different from what used to be termed a "Power vacuum," and was regarded as something very dangerous into which other Powers were bound to run.

The Asian Powers recognize that they need help; they need it in capital, in technicians and in other ways, but they would like it to come without strings. They do not want it to come from the United States because they feel that strings would be attached to it, implicit though not explicit. They would like help to come from the United Nations and they do, in general, feel strongly that the United Nations should be strengthened and that respect should be paid to the decisions come to by the United Nations—except, of course, when they refer to Kashmir. They feel also that the unrealism of the United States contributes to the world's dangers—they mean unrealism in relation to China. Probably there are many in this country who would agree with the view that it is unrealistic for the United States to refuse to admit that Chou-en-Lai and the Communists are the Government of China. The Asian Powers want to see an end of all vestiges of colonialism in Asia. Very understandable. They go on to say—and here probably very few of us would agree—that the scene in Africa is very similar to the old scene in Asia, and they would like to see colonialism banished from Africa also. That would seem to most of us almost as unrealistic a view as that of the Americans about China.

I would like to refer to another American argument in an article in the *Christian Science Monitor* by Mr. Joseph Harsch, in which he said the Afro-Asian Conference seemed to him to have "all the massive delayed action potential of the Monroe Doctrine." He pointed out, not wholly accurately, that all the States concerned in this Conference were inhabited by people whom the white people thought of as coloured and that they were all ex-dependent States. That is, as I have said, not altogether accurate, because the Central African Federation has been invited to the Conference, as also has Siam, which cannot be called ex-dependent. He went on to state that it is assumed that the ties of being Asians and Africans and ex-dependents override all other ties, and that it is assumed that Communist China, which is tied to Russia, has more in common with Japan, which is tied to the United States, than with Russia or America respectively. That seems to be somewhat overstating the position at the moment, because surely the world in which we live is one in which there are a series of linked groupings of this kind which do not necessarily contradict each other. We in this country belong to the Commonwealth, to N.A.T.O. and to S.E.A.T.O., and one can think of dozens of other ties of that kind. The Australians



belong to the Commonwealth and to the Anzus Pact at the same time. It is surely possible to have two allegiances. Surely it is in fact the case that the Asians do have something in common, even though they take such widely different views of blocs as Pakistan does compared with India.

The mention of the Monroe Doctrine in this context is particularly interesting to me because at the Lahore Conference to which I have referred we discussed the same question. We spoke then of a Monroe Doctrine for the Indian Ocean. A suggestion was made by India and Pakistan that it should be stated that other Powers were not welcome in that area. We then pointed out, without a moment's hesitation, that when the Monroe Doctrine was formulated there was in existence a force which policed the world, which was in fact the nearest thing to an International Force that has been seen in the world since the collapse of the Roman Empire, and that was the Royal Navy. We pointed out that the Monroe Doctrine was founded on the strength of the Royal Navy, and that if we had not accepted the Monroe Doctrine and welcomed the proclamation of it by America it could not have worked. We also pointed out that to have a Monroe Doctrine without power behind it would amount to a Power vacuum.

Another comment made on the Afro-Asian Conference is that if it were to become a permanent feature, something which occurs every two or three years, as Mr. Nehru has certainly suggested, there was some danger that it would become a little United Nations. Mr. Nehru's comment on that was that he was not clear what a little United Nations meant and, in any case, there was no danger that it would happen. I agree with him. I share his doubt as to what it means, and I do not think it is a very serious danger. I suppose that it would provide an alternative forum of opinion to which people could appeal if they thought they got the sticky end of the deal in the United Nations, but it would have no legal binding force. I do not think it would be of any serious consequence, and it does not seem a bad thing that there should exist some medium for the registration of opinion felt by a group of countries outside the United Nations. It seems that it would be good if there were some kind of European means of registering our common views and feelings.

What is likely to be said at the Afro-Asian Conference? What will it do? One can make certain guesses, fairly definitely; others on which it would be rash to put money. In the economic field it is not likely that very much that is substantial will emerge. Nearly all the Powers concerned are wanting money from outside; they need capital in order to develop themselves, and when Powers are all in the same boat it does not seem they will get very much further by conferring. It may be that there will be a certain amount of bedroom deals between individuals. The Yemen or Saudi Arabia may decide in a bedroom to swop a little gum arabic for copra from the Philippines, but I do not see that taking any very extensive or massive form. Basically, they are all countries with more to take than they have to give.

A suggestion was made in the Egyptian Press—with a touch of malice, I thought—that it might be well if the Conference discussed some internal tensions and disputes, such as that between India and Pakistan and that

between India and Ceylon. But I think one may take it as fairly definite that matters of that kind will not find their way on to the Conference agenda if the five sponsoring Powers do not want them there, and those cases they certainly will not want there.

The Conference will pass resolutions, and one can be pretty certain of some of them. They will pass some general resolutions condemning racialism and colonialism; they will pass more specific resolutions sympathizing with Indonesia's claim to New Guinea, a claim which has been commented on by some papers as being neither more nor less than pure colonialism; but it is colonialism by an Asiatic Power, which is different. The Conference will probably pass resolutions about Tunis and Morocco and resolutions condemning the racial policy of the Union of South Africa. I guess there will also be a resolution about the hydrogen bomb and its use and—rather long odds—there will quite likely be one about Kenya, condemning the brutal action of the British and what is going on there. There will probably also be something fairly general on the subject of entangling alliances put up at some stage of the Conference, though I do not think that will get very far. My idea is that Indonesia or China or India will put forward a suggestion condemning any kind of entangling alliances on the part of Asian Powers. I think then that Pakistan, Turkey, Iraq and Siam would object, together with Japan and the Philippines, and after a good deal of discussion and argy-bargy in bedrooms that will be dropped. That is as far as I can go in regard to the resolutions. I cannot think of any more subjects which seem likely to call forth resolutions.

When it is all over will it be hailed as a diplomatic triumph for anybody? If so, for whom? It clearly cannot be a diplomatic triumph in the sense in which the Conference of Berlin was, because there is nothing to bring home. It cannot bring home anything very concrete or definite, but it may well be that the Afro-Asian Conference will be a triumph for personalities. If so, there are obviously two candidates for the position of *prima donna*, one being Mr. Nehru; the other Chou-en-Lai. It is a guess as to which of those two will succeed in catching the limelight and which will succeed in getting his own ends. If I were asked which would utter the greatest number of words, I think I should be clear what I thought as to that. If I were asked which was more likely to gain his own ends, I think again I should be pretty clear in my mind which of the two would do that.

What are China's objects? Why is China coming to the Conference and coming out of seclusion from behind the bamboo curtain? Propaganda, of course, must be her main aim. If you take the Washington view of China you will say the main object is to lull others into a sense of security. Whether you take the Washington view or the Delhi view of China, in either case you would suppose it would be to China's interest to enlarge the neutral area and to try to add others to India's position as a neutral Power. That object of adding to the neutral area is very unlikely in my view to be achieved in the sense that I would not expect to see any of the Powers already linked with the West by alliances actually detached on this occasion, but I think some of those Powers, Pakistan or Siam, might emerge from the Conference finding it rather more difficult for

their Governments to justify to their people their entanglements or alliances with other Powers.

Can any good come of the Afro-Asian Conference? And is there anything really dangerous in the immediate future likely to come out of it? One suggestion which has been made is that it is likely to worsen race relations in Africa because it will add to the feeling, which is very widespread in South Africa, Central Africa and in Kenya, that India is an imperialist Power with eyes on eastern Africa. It is not a view which I share, and I do not believe the Conference will add much strength to it. It seems to me the view is strongly held for reasons which are not wholly rational.

Whether you think any good will come out of the Conference or not depends entirely on the view you take of China. If you take the Washington view of China, then no good could come of the Conference, and some evil may come out of contacts between China and the rest of the world. If you think there is any possibility that the Delhi view may be right and that China is mainly concerned to improve her standard of living and assert her independence and that she has no immediate aggressive aims with regard to her neighbours, well then I suppose there is a possibility of good, and one should welcome her contacts with the outside world which might help to create more understanding of her objects outside her own area; so that it is just possible that some good might come out of it.

If you see the rôle of Great Britain in the way in which I see it in the next ten years, it seems to me that because of the linking alliances and groups, of which I spoke earlier, there is a possibility of Great Britain playing an enormous part in the diplomatic history of the world in the next few years. China and Russia are linked together, and if there is also a kind of link between China and India, and there is a link between India and ourselves, which I firmly believe is still a real link, and there is also a link between ourselves and Canada and a special link between Canada and the United States, I think that we do occupy a really key position, and may be able to influence both parties to some extent. If so, one must feel that the emergence of China from her diplomatic isolation may produce results which will be beneficial.

I am bound to say that it seems to me in this possible rôle which the United Kingdom might play there is a weak spot in our armour. Our strength depends on moral strength, and I think our great moral strength in the world family is due to the fact that we came away from India, and in so doing gave them tremendous evidence of good faith. But the weak spot in our armour is the racial policy within the Commonwealth, in the Union of South Africa and other places, in Kenya and in the Central African Federation and, to some extent, in this country recently. But that is only a small cloud on the horizon. At the same time, that seems really the greatest weakness in our armour if we are to play this high part, which there is just a possibility of our being able to do.

To sum up my views on the Afro-Asian Conference, if I were a cartoonist and could draw, which I fear I cannot; but if I were asked to draw a cartoon of the Conference I should take a hackneyed old theme

and draw a picture of the fisherman in the *Arabian Nights*, and he would be Indonesia uncorking a bottle out of which an enormous jinn issues like a great black cloud with a question mark in its womb, and the jinn would be China. I should draw the picture in such a way as to suggest that the jinn might possibly be used for the service of man, but there would be a strong indication in the background that it is very seldom a wise act to summon up spirits from another world.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Philip Mason has kindly consented to answer any questions or to listen to any views you may have to express, but may I ask you to be brief in expressing views, as the time remaining to us is short.

Colonel WHEELER: Is it known to what extent the Soviet Central Asian States are represented at the Conference?

Mr. PHILIP MASON: They are not invited.

Colonel WHEELER: Does that imply that they are not independent?

Mr. PHILIP MASON: I think it does. Mr. Nehru was asked on one occasion whether he had invited Russia or thought about doing so, Russia being to some extent an Asiatic Power. He replied that Russia was mainly a European Power, and one could read into his reply the view that in so far as Russia was an Asiatic Power it was a colonial Asiatic Power.

WARIS AMEER ALI: The lecturer spoke of a feeling of humiliation on the part of Asians arising from European domination. My family have been in India for two hundred years, and I must say I feel no sense of humiliation whatsoever and I do not think more than one in a million or one in 100,000 feel any sense of humiliation. Such humiliation as is felt is generally expressed by those of rather recent origin—there is no crime in that—people who have come up as a result of the liberalism and education given by Great Britain in the last century and a half. I do not think you will find any sense of humiliation in any Indian Army officer or soldier who served in the old days.

Mr. PHILIP MASON: Hardly anyone would be more likely than I to agree that no sense of humiliation was felt in the Indian Army; on the contrary, there was a tremendous sense of pride and comradeship. I do not think every Asiatic has the feeling of humiliation, but it is present among governments and in the Press and among the educated classes at present.

A MEMBER: What were the lecturer's impressions of the attitude of the Secretariat at Lahore or the Administration as opposed to the non-official leaders in India? Was there the same feeling of humiliation amongst ex-members of the Indian Civil Service who are now members of the Indian Legislative Service?

Mr. PHILIP MASON: I believe every old member of the Indian Civil Service and the Army feels a great sense of pride in remembering their own service, but at the same time there is a feeling that the country needs to assert itself, to show itself completely independent, and that it can now stand on its own feet. That is the kind of feeling I sensed.

Mrs. MELDON: It was interesting to hear the lecturer's remarks as to China. A cousin of mine has spent thirty years in China, and his version

is that from the point of view of China it is really a question of which countries are worth trading with.

Mr. PHILIP MASON : There is a good deal in that.

Mrs. A. L. HOLT : I was told by an Indian that one of the things they resent is the colour bar and the attitude towards intermarriage between Europeans and Indians, whereas Europeans who married Arabs were not considered to have demeaned themselves. That is because the Arabs have a country which is not under the government of the white people, whereas Indians were, and it was laid down that Indians and whites should not intermarry.

Mr. PHILIP MASON : That is true.

A MEMBER : Has the lecturer any suggestion as to what Great Britain can do at the time of the Afro-Asian Conference?

Mr. PHILIP MASON : Keep very quiet.

The CHAIRMAN : I do not know when we have listened to a more interesting lecture, and one which has given us so much food for thought. The theme of it all has been most attractively and clearly worked out. We owe Mr. Mason our most sincere and heartfelt thanks.

I would like to tell you that, following the example of another distinguished civilian, Mr. Mason is shortly going to Central Africa under the ægis of the Rockefeller Foundation to write another of his attractive books. I feel sure we all hope that the remarkable success which has followed him throughout his career will continue to follow him in the great work he is now undertaking. (Applause.) We thank you very much indeed, Mr. Mason.

# DEVELOPMENTS IN THE NEGEV\*

By PROFESSOR NORMAN BENTWICH, O.B.E., M.C.

Lecture delivered to the Royal Central Asian Society on May 19, 1954, Admiral Sir Cecil Harcourt, G.B.E., K.C.B., in the chair, and since brought up to date.

The CHAIRMAN: Professor Bentwich has very kindly come here today and I think he is probably known to everybody here. His distinguished career has been too long for me to recite, but it has included important legal appointments in both Palestine and Egypt and lecturer on international law. He was editor of a review and the writer of countless books. Professor Bentwich knows more about the subject on which he is going to talk than probably anybody else here, and I shall not delay you further but ask him to address us.

## THE NEGEV OF ISRAEL

**M**ORE than half the territory of Israel, and nearly half the area of Palestine west of the Jordan, is the arid region called the Negev. That is a Hebrew word meaning both South and arid, or parched. Mr. Philby has written recently from Mecca to question that interpretation and suggests that the Negev is the name of a region. No doubt the name was applied in the Bible particularly to the dry region of Canaan (the Land of Israel) which extends from Beersheba southwards to the peninsula of Sinai.

In the division of the Mandated country of Palestine between Israel and the Arab State, which was made by the Assembly of the United Nations in 1947, the Negev was allotted to Israel, with the exception of a small strip of twenty miles along the Mediterranean coast from Gaza to the Egyptian frontier. That strip is today occupied by the Egyptians and 200,000 Arab refugees. The Negev is Israel's main land reserve for settlement of immigrants on the soil. It is the one part of her territory which gives a sense of spaciousness. Today a large part of it is empty. It is a pearl-shaped triangle of territory on the north-eastern side of the Sinai peninsula, stretching from the Mediterranean coast to the shore of the Gulf of Akaba which runs up from the Red Sea. At the Gulf four States meet within a semicircle of twenty miles. They are Israel and Egypt on the western side; the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and Saudi Arabia on the eastern. A town of Akaba, or Elath—its Biblical name—has been an important place of maritime and trans-desert trade from Bible times. The strong kings of Judah, Solomon, Jehosaphat and Uzziah, had at Elath the port whence their ships set out for Ophir, the land of the Queen of Sheba. Here, centuries later, the Maccabean kings had their outlet to the sea. Here, also in the early centuries of the Christian era, the Romans, renaming it Aila, had their port for triremes and galleys sailing the Red Sea and Indian Ocean. And here, one thousand years later, the Crusaders launched their galleys, to fight the Saracen corsairs. When the Christians were expelled, the place became an important station for the Moslem pilgrimage to Mecca.

The Romans called this part of their eastern provinces Arabia Petraea, or Stony Arabia. They stationed at Akaba (Aila) a legion to impose peace on the tribes of the desert. In their day the northern part of the Negev was

\* See illustration facing p. 113.

populous. They built there one of the main trading highways of the Empire, to link Syria and Arabia with Egypt and North Africa, and along the road were townships whose inhabitants brought the arid land into cultivation, by making reservoirs and cisterns to store the water. The problem of cultivation in the Negev has always been how to store water in the short rainy season of winter so as to cultivate the soil during the dry months of the year, and supply the needs of a settled population. When a strong power has ruled the area, that problem has been solved. The remains of the Roman and Byzantine cities—represented today by the impressive ruins of Esbeita, Abda, Asluj, and others—bear witness to their achievement. When there has been no strong power, the Nomad Arabs from the Desert, the Bedouin, have grazed their camels and herds on the sparse cultivation, and the invading sands have overwhelmed and filled up the cisterns and the reservoirs. The Bedu, it is said, is not only the child but also the father of the Desert.

In the years immediately before the first World War, two young British Archæologists, (Colonel) T. E. Lawrence and (Sir) Leonard Woolley, under the direction of the veteran Col. Newcome, explored the Negev. Both were destined to gain great fame, one as the hero of the Arab revolt in the Desert, the other as the excavator of Chaldea, Antioch and other famous sites of antiquity. The Negev was part of the wilderness of Zin, the land of the wanderings of the Children of Israel when they came out of Egypt. They described the Biblical sites, which still often keep their Bible names, and they described also the monasteries and convents, which had been scattered over the area in the early centuries of the Christian era. In one of the ruined cities alone they estimated that ten thousand people may have lived in an age when material wants were small, and men's thoughts were centred on religious exercises. A later expedition of archæologists, in the period between the wars, brought back a hoard of literary records of the third and fourth centuries of the Christian era. They were in the form of papyrus rolls, and they throw a vivid light on the legal and social conditions of the time.

In recent years the Negev has been more thoroughly explored by Professor Glueck, who was Director of the American School of Oriental Studies in Jerusalem, and surveyed the country east of Jordan and identified scores of Biblical sites. He has traced at least fifty inhabited places of the early centuries of the Christian era and shown that the inhabitants were skilled farmers and water engineers. He identified these settlers with the Nabateans from across Jordan. They built terraces and canalized the slender rainfall from the slopes to the terraces. In this way they made the desert blossom so that it provided sustenance for a large population. Well guarded highways linked the settlements, and on some of them Roman milestones have been found.

The Negev is one of the man-made deserts which negligence has multiplied in the Middle East. An area of an industrious population of cultivators in antiquity became a barren and empty waste. It was a glaring example of how a few inches of soil determine civilization. The epoch of the Crusaders brought a temporary revival. The Frank knights, like the Romans, were concerned to keep open the routes between Egypt and Syria

and between the Mediterranean and the Red Sea. They were strong rulers, built castles on the high places, and restored the cisterns and the cultivation. In the sixteenth century the Ottoman conquerors, having extended their way to the Red Sea, rebuilt the Crusader fortress of Akaba, and Sultan Salim left his stamp upon it.

The Negev itself was desolate and derelict, occupied only by a few nomad tribes. It remained so till the end of the nineteenth century. Then the Turks made Beersheba, which in Bible times was an important place because of its wells, again a centre of the nomad tribes. The wells, by which the patriarch Abraham pitched his tent, were apparently inexhaustible. Beersheba was the one town in Palestine which was planned in a modern way. At the beginning of the century German engineers laid it out with parallel streets. It had a mosque, a serai, a school, a courthouse and a municipal garden.

In the first World War when the Turks allied themselves with the Germans, Beersheba was a base of operations for their attack on the Suez canal and the British Army defending it. The Turks advanced their railway into the heart of the Negev, some fifty miles south of Beersheba, to a ruined Byzantine town now known as Auja Hafir. Amid the fallen pillars and the relics of ancient churches they built railway sheds, a market, a hospital and a school; and a monumental column records their exploit. Their army of invasion advanced to the Canal in 1915, and again in 1916; but was repelled. The embankment of the railway and bridges half destroyed by British bombers bear witness to the outburst of activity. In 1948 military activity was renewed around this post, when the Israel Army, which had driven the Egyptians out of the northern section of the Negev, threatened to advance across the Egyptian frontier line. At the bidding of the Security Council of the United Nations, however, they called a halt; the area was demilitarized, and Auja Hafir was left in Israel's possession.

During the thirty years of the British Mandate, Beersheba kept its place as the centre of administration of the Negev; and it was also the seat of tribal courts, composed of Sheikhs, who judged the cases of the nomad Arabs according to their customs. The number of the Bedouin in the Negev in those days was estimated at 60,000. But the effect of firm rule and the growing prosperity of the country was to induce many tribal Arabs to give up wandering and turn to regular cultivation.

Since the creation of the State of Israel, Beersheba has become a more important town than it ever was in the past. It is the administrative centre and the market place of the whole Negev. Its former Arab inhabitants have departed; but already it has a population of nearly twenty thousand Jews from many countries, and the number grows each month. A glass industry and factories for pottery and plastics and sanitary equipment, which use local raw materials, have been planted there. Some of the Bedouin Arabs, who previously were the main population, have permanent encampments in the neighbourhood, and come to the market with their camels. But the undulating plain that stretches away for miles is now sown with Jewish agricultural villages which are introducing modern scientific methods. They dam the flood waters that descend from the mountains in the few days of heavy winter rains, so as to conserve a part



and to be able to irrigate their fields in the dry season. Larger irrigation schemes are being undertaken. Pipes have been laid from the coastal plain, where artesian wells tap the subterranean waters.

A much more daring venture, which must await for its execution some agreement between Israel and the Kingdom of Jordan, is to lead the waters of the Jordan and its tributaries by canals to the arid southern plain. Mr. Johnston, the emissary of President Eisenhower, is trying to negotiate it. Meantime, a hopeful experiment is being carried out by the Israel Institute of Scientific Research—named after the late President, Dr. Weizmann—for de-salting the brackish water, which is found in plenty under the surface of the Negev. The man-made desert may be unmade by scientific skill. Another experiment is to condense the moisture in the air by mounds of pebbles which make tiny catchment areas, so that, in the Bible phrase, they “turn flints into fountains of water.” In the winter of 1951-52, an area of two hundred thousand acres in the Negev was sown with grain, and yielded a harvest of seventy-five thousand tons.

It was only in 1943 that the Jewish Agency began to plant Jewish villages in Negev. It started with three experimental points. Three years later, it carried out a bold operation, planting simultaneously in one day eleven settlements each with its water-tower and its stockade. Today more than fifty co-operative villages and collective farms are established, and a fertile belt is extended each year. The settlers come from all parts of the world, and Greater Beersheba is a cosmopolitan town. French is commonly heard in the streets because many of the settlers have come from French North Africa.

In the first years of the State the population of the town consisted mainly of the soldiers' garrison and the camp followers. After that, however, the big immigration to Israel, particularly from the oriental countries, brought rapid increase to the civilian inhabitants. There was for a time no permanent housing for the immigrants; the old streets of houses and shops were occupied by the first-comers, and a vast temporary village of tin huts and of tents, the “maabara” as it is called, spread around the town. So it was in 1950, 1951, and 1952. But the central Government and a dynamic Mayor set about building a greater Beersheba, having as their target a town of 50,000 inhabitants. In the last two years permanent housing has been built for almost all the civil population. The maabara, which at one time held 5,000, has today a remnant of a few hundred.

The expansion of new Beersheba has been well planned. Each housing quarter is laid out with regard to the contours of the ground; and in the formerly treeless plain woodland and gardens are planted. A small-holder settlement, where each householder has a quarter-acre of garden and adobe house, is rising in the suburbs. An industrial zone, aligned by the northern road that leads towards Hebron, and well away from the residential quarters, has a plant for chemical industry on a big scale employing 300 workers, a brewery, and a depot for the mining enterprises that are extracting the copper and prospecting for petrol in the Negev. If the mining and industrial hopes are realized, Beersheba may be a big manufacturing city during the next decade, the Sheffield of Israel.

Not less remarkable than the industrial and mining development is the

cultural. A sense of community is built up in the motley population. The town already boasts the best-designed House of Culture in the land, primarily used as a cinema, but designed also for concerts, lectures and conferences; and is said to have, too, the best bookshop in Israel. One of the first things done by the Military Government in 1949 was to fashion an open amphitheatre on a rise in the midst of the town for concerts and lectures. Now that is superseded by the House, which seats 1,200. The House was inaugurated in September, 1953 when the archæologists of Israel held their annual conference. Archæology is a passion and a pastime of the general populace as well as a profession of the scholars; and the conference brought together thousands of the agricultural settlers and town workers. One outcome was to found a museum of the antiquities and history of the Negev, in Beersheba. The region is rich in the record of the past, from the Age of the Patriarchs to the Era of the Crusaders. The 4,000-year story is skilfully displayed in the Museum placed in the former Mosque. Pottery, coins, glass vases, jewellery, Hebrew, Nabatean and Greek inscriptions, and craft objects of the Arab and Bedouin culture are exhibited. Another part of the Museum is given up to botanical, geological and other collections of the nature of the region.

Few, if any, of the former Arab inhabitants are permanent residents in the city. But 16,000 Bedouin live in the territory of Israel, almost all of them in the region. They come to the market with their camels; and their Arab keffiyeh and their flowing "burnous" bring a picturesque touch. Some come to see the Government doctor who before the World War was a practitioner in Cairo and has a thorough knowledge of Arabic. Four clinics for Arabs have been opened by the Government in different villages.

The materials for Beersheba's industries of glass, pottery and plastics are near at hand in the central Negev. In that amazing landscape, which looks like a range of mountains of the moon, there are vast deposits of phosphate rock, glass-sands and ceramic clays. They are mingled together at and around a place called Machtesh, the Great Crater, which fits the Bible description: "The foundations of the world were laid bare and the earth was rocked and cleaved asunder." It is a sudden gash in the hills, with the shape of a gigantic oval, produced by some primeval disturbance. The phosphate deposits and the clays are being worked on a considerable scale.

Another place of scenic grandeur in the Central Negev became notorious recently because Arabs ambushed there a bus travelling from Elath and killed the passengers. It is a high point on the road, commanding the descent from the plateau to the Araba plain below sea-level. It preserves its Biblical name Ma'alah Akrabim, meaning the ascent of the scorpions. From it you survey the whole mysterious waste between the Dead Sea and the Gulf of Akaba. On the top of the pass are the remains of a fortress which the Romans built to guard the road.

Mr. Ben Gurion, who was Prime Minister of Israel and Minister of Defence from the Declaration of Independence in May 1948 till December 1953, and then insisted on giving up political office because he was spiritually weary, retired to a small collective settlement in this arid part of the Central Negev. It is about 20 miles south of Beersheba, and is called S'deh

Boker, meaning Cowboy's Meadow. There he lives with his wife in a prefabricated hut, sharing the life of the Kibbutz, and spending part of the day in manual work. He has taken with him some of his library of philosophy, and the Greek and Latin classics. His purpose is to refresh body and mind, and then return with a fresh message to his people. From his retreat he sends rousing calls to the people in Israel and to the Jewish communities outside. And his example of a pioneer life in the Negev is in itself a clarion call to the youth.\*

Beersheba is connected by a finely engineered motor road with the Southern end of the Dead Sea, where the principal plant of the Potash enterprise, now half nationalized, has taken the place of the wrecked plant at the Northern end of the Sea in Arab territory. The lorry loads pass through Beersheba to a new railway terminal of Migdal Ascalon, on the site of the Philistine town by the Mediterranean. Soon the Lydda-Beersheba railway, which the Turks laid for strategic reasons, and the British providently removed, will be restored. Another trunk road, under construction with kaolin, which is also dug from the Crater, will link Beersheba with Israel's outlet on the Gulf of Akaba, Elath, and will open up communication with the copper mines of King Solomon.

Many are beguiled by the Bible phrase "from Dan to Beersheba" to regard the chief town of the Negev as the land's end of Israel. It is, in fact, almost the geographical centre, although much of the 150 miles which stretch from it to the Gulf of Akaba is today a wilderness. Each year, however, marks an increasing penetration of that arid waste, partly by mining exploitation, partly by agricultural settlement. A geological-botanical museum at Beersheba illustrates the scientific advance that is designed to reclaim the area.

The area of the Central and Southern Negev is rich in the heavier minerals. It is, in the words of the Bible, "a land whose stones are iron, and out of whose hills you dig copper." This was the region of King Solomon's Mines: and the smelting ovens of the copper and iron, which the King worked with slave-labour, are traced on several of the hill-tops. The smelting ovens were a regular refinery of ancient days. The site was chosen where the north wind, blowing down from the Dead Sea and the Araba, was strongest. And flues were constructed above the hearth on the principle of the blast furnace. Intense heat must have been generated for this smelting. Today, at Elath, windmills have been erected with a purpose of generating electricity by the power of the northern winds.

Before the first World War American engineers were prospecting in this region for petroleum. It has been proved to exist, but has not yet been worked commercially. The first drilling was made in the autumn of 1953. If oil is found in commercial quantity, one of Israel's major economic problems will be solved.

The principal port for the minerals extracted in the Negev will be a new Elath on the Western shore. At the head of the Red Sea Fjord, Elath is Israel's window to the Orient, as Haifa is her window to the Mediterranean and the West. Archæologists, excavating mounds by the Gulf and the township, have identified King Solomon's haven of Etzion Geber—

\* Mr. Ben Gurion has since returned to political office.

meaning the Spine of the Giant. The haven took its name from the rocky crags that come down to the sea.—We may compare the Giant's Causeway in Ireland.—It is within a few miles of the new harbour, at present a jetty, which Israel is planning to build, and which may one day be a second Aden.

Near Elath, in what was part of a howling wilderness, Jewish pioneers have begun to cultivate the soil. Two experimental farms have been planted, where wells give an adequate, and sometimes abundant, water-supply. One is a post of the Israel army. The other, named "Well of Light" (Bir Ora), is a training-centre for boys and girls of the secondary schools, who spend a few weeks of pre-military service working the soil. They have turned what was a waste place into a smiling oasis. Water has been found by boring in a Wadi 100 kilometres north of Elath: and that gives hope of a growing agricultural hinterland.

The present harbour-master is an Aryan German ex-sea-captain who was persecuted by the Nazis, escaped to Poland before the World War, and got to Palestine. The site is lovely and romantic: a belt of palms along the shore, bare black and red mountains around, and turquoise waters of the Gulf between them. Three years ago Elath was waste and sand. Now it has barracks, air-field, a fishery-school, a power station, a radio-telegraph installation, a botanical garden, in which the desert plants are gathered, a town hall, and a stadium for entertainment where the world's musicians come to play.

A few miles south of Israel's Elath, on the western side of the Gulf, opposite the Hedjaz, you come to the Egyptian frontier guard-post. An Israel sentry watches above him on the cliff. A modern road runs from the Egyptian post, across the Egyptian section of Sinai, to Ismailia and the Suez Canal, linking Asia and Africa. The last stretch of an older road, rebuilt 100 years ago by the Egyptian Ibrahim Pasha, who for a time occupied Palestine, is in Israel's territory. For centuries the Negev has been a desert to be crossed as rapidly as possible. Today it is being transformed into an area of settlement and industry as it was 1,700 years ago.

The CHAIRMAN: Professor Bentwich has very kindly said he will answer questions and I should like to start by asking if he could tell us what size ships could be got into the port of Elath.

Professor BENTWICH: On that I am ignorant and I should hate to say anything about it to an admiral. I was told that the water there is deep close to the shore on the west side. At the moment the ships coming in are only a few thousand tons.

Colonel ROUTH: I wonder how it is that with all our present knowledge we have not got anywhere near the population in that part of the world that they had in ancient days. I take it the ancients had not to remove the sand. They cut down the trees and got going, and I suppose the problem is now more difficult.

Professor BENTWICH: The transformation which has taken place in these last five years is most encouraging. The Negev is altogether a different place. There are perhaps fifty villages and agricultural settlements and this fairly big town at Beersheba.

Colonel ROUTH: When Hore Belisha spoke in the Lords about a canal in the place of the Suez Canal had he any idea of the Negev?

Professor BENTWICH: I cannot speak for him but I expect he had. There have been several schemes: one going back to the nineteenth century was for a canal from Gaza to the Gulf of Akaba. As I understand it, the engineers can make a canal through mountains or over a complete desert. It is just a question of giving them the means.

General MARSHALL CORNWALL: In Northern Negev a considerable amount of what used to be quite fertile country was covered by sand. That could be removed by bulldozers and the real sub-soil could become top-soil. Has anything been done in that way?

Professor BENTWICH: They did bring bulldozers and remove the sand. When they have carried away the sand from the rock and have brought water, they can proceed to cultivation.

Lord BIRDWOOD: Does future development envisage the food being grown in the Negev to maintain what looks like being an industrial population, or would the food have to come from outside?

Professor BENTWICH: I think the idea is that the settlers shall grow the main foods. In the year 1952-53, which was a very good rainfall, half the cereal product of Israel came from the Negev. Barley and maize grow well, and the hope is that they will be able to produce what is required for an industrial population.

Mr. WHITE: Are there Administrative headquarters in Beersheba, anything as in the days of the Mandate? Is there a District Officer?

Professor BENTWICH: The administration is run very similarly to the Mandate Régime, and there is a District Officer. There was for a time a military governor, but Beersheba is now a municipality with an elected council. There is also, as in the Mandate time, a tribunal for the Bedu Arabs.

Group Captain SMALLWOOD: Has there been any sort of oil exploration in the Negev?

Professor BENTWICH: There has been much prospecting in these last years. Before the first World War the Standard Oil Company were prospecting in the northern part of the Negev. One company started drilling last year. So far, apparently, they have not struck oil.

Mr. H. F. AYRES: May I ask if any experiment has been made to show that the land is really good agricultural land? The reason I am asking that is because some years ago in the Sudan we were told if we put water on some land we should get crops. This was carried out on rather a large scale and the first year the crops were very good. The second year they were indifferent, and the third year nothing happened at all. I was wondering if this land was of permanent agricultural value or if it might deteriorate rapidly.

Professor BENTWICH: I cannot answer from knowledge, but I should be surprised if they did not have scientific testing of the land.

# ON THE INDO-PAKISTANI BORDER

By IAN STEPHENS, C.I.E.

Report of a lecture, illustrated by lantern slides, delivered to the Royal Central Asian Society on April 28, 1954, Admiral Sir Cecil Harcourt, G.B.E., K.C.B., in the chair.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Ian Stephens, who has kindly come to speak to us this afternoon and show a number of slides of the Indo-Pakistani border, is well known to many present as formerly Editor of *The Statesman* of India. His wide experience includes a period as a war correspondent. He is now a Fellow of King's College, Cambridge.

THIS performance of mine to-day will not attempt to be a learned address; I am not qualified to be learned about Bahawalpur. I intend merely to show a series of photographic slides, with running commentary, and to try, from the photographs, to give you some reflection of the pleasure I experienced last December when taking them.

Before we start, however, just a few introductory remarks seem needed about the problems and nature of the country we shall be going to.

Bahawalpur is a place which many of us, probably, have passed through, but perhaps few have stopped at. It is on the main line between Karachi and Lahore, and when glancing out of the railway-carriage window on those through-journeys one saw desert, then wheatfields and the domes of mosques; and at the stations, perhaps all that one noticed to differentiate the area in any way from much of the country to north and south was the people's tendency to wear the fez or Turki topee rather than the turban. That is a point of some significance.

Bahawalpur is the biggest princely State of what is now Pakistan, and the ruler or Nawab comes from a family of Arab stock, descendants of invaders who arrived centuries ago on the coast somewhere in the Sind area, fought their way up, and established themselves about 500 miles inland; and there is still strongly maintained in Bahawalpur, despite its distance from the sea, this Arab tradition. The Nawab's bodyguard wear various kinds of highly picturesque, Arab-style gowns; the police are all be-fezzed; and the local people, anyway in the towns, still mostly wear fezzes too.

I went to Bahawalpur on holiday, during the Cambridge Christmas vacation. Actually the main objective of my journey was Ceylon. But one cannot pass through a country one is fond of, such as Pakistan, without spending a little while there, and as the time at my disposal was short I thought I would take a look at Bahawalpur, which I had never stopped at before. It would not be much more than a night's run from Karachi up the main railway line.

I supposed I should be interested in it mainly as a princely State in process of democratization. The Nawab is, nowadays, a constitutional ruler, like the Rajapramukhs in India, and functions in much the same way as a Governor of an ordinary Province—except that he is an hereditary

Governor. Executive power lies with the Ministry—an elected Muslim League Ministry, and largely composed of young men. That is, incidentally, one of the charms of Pakistan: the youth of the people in important positions.

I soon realized, however—perhaps I should have done earlier—that there is something even more interesting about Bahawalpur than democratization and Ministries: its position as a Pakistani border State lying up against the frontier with the new India, and intimately involved in one of the most grievous and unnecessary of the many unsettled Indo-Pakistani disputes—the dispute about supplies of Indus Basin water for irrigation. That international factor formed a sombre background to otherwise happy reflections during my journey.


The map before you shows the Suleimanki canal headworks at the top north-eastern corner of the State. The water which takes off from the combined Sutlej-Beas rivers—here—and further water which takes off rather lower down from the Islam headworks—at this point—irrigates all the irrigable area of the State about as far as Dera Nawabsahib—that is to say about half the area of Bahawalpur that is irrigable. (Probably two-thirds of the State, because of the contours, are permanent desert, the remaining one-third being the total that is capable of being irrigated.) The part of Bahawalpur that is irrigated from the Sutlej-Beas differs from the other part, the part that is irrigated from the Panjnad headworks, in that the water, immediately above the Suleimanki canal headworks, comes directly from India. It is not physically in any way under Pakistan's control. That is the formidable point. And the Indians, farther up the Sutlej-Beas, are now putting up huge new irrigational works of their own, canals which must almost inevitably divert much of the water south-eastwards into Indian Punjab. And we must in fairness remember that that is an area which in British days was always seriously under-irrigated by comparison with Western or what is now Pakistani Punjab, and with Bahawalpur. The people in Indian or Eastern Punjab, and in Bikaner—many of whom are refugees from Pakistan—genuinely need more irrigation water.

That is the problem. The great irrigation schemes of the new India, further up the combined Sutlej-Beas than Suleimanki, will, so far as can be foreseen, switch so much water from the rivers, before they ever get into Pakistan, that the water-level in the Bahawalpur canals will be very gravely diminished, particularly at the critical season when crops are being grown. Indeed, as no doubt you know, it is vigorously alleged by the Pakistanis that exactly this sort of diminution, at the critical crop season, has more than once been contrived already by the local Indian officials just beyond the frontier—perhaps without the Delhi authorities' knowledge; and a species of propaganda war has been going on between the two countries about this very point.

Now, if Indo-Pakistani relations continue not to go well, and if the World Bank fails to establish some comprehensive agreement between the two countries for utilization of the waters of the Indus Basin as a whole, then there is plainly a possibility, or indeed likelihood—a physical not merely a political likelihood—that the whole of the upper part of the State

of Bahawalpur will be reconverted into the desert that it was before the existing British-conceived irrigation projects in the State were put through in the late 1920's and 1930's.

Moreover, one can find here, in this narrow strip of territory a little to the south-east of Suleimanki that you see on the map, an ugly, small-scale demonstration of what might happen. For, owing to a local dispute between the Bahawalpur Durbar and India, separate from the main Indo-



A. J. THORNTON, reproduced from *The Geographical Magazine*

Pakistani dispute, 60,000 acres have in fact already been reconverted into desert from their former green fertility. No water whatever, I understand, has come through by the distributary from Ferozepur District in India since the winter of 1947-48, shortly after Partition. It is a horrible sight to see this thing as one travels through the upper part of Bahawalpur, and it keeps one continually in mind of the formidable impact of this water problem, and of how much worse it might become.

I was travelling mainly with irrigation engineers, able, objective-



minded men who considered the problem, not as politicians, but simply as technicians. And they assured me that, if it were dealt with intelligently and from the technical aspect alone, as an engineers' problem, it would prove soluble without any very great difficulty. Provided that new irrigation works in India and Pakistan were co-ordinated chronologically, and that dams were built at the right times as well as in the right places, then there would be enough water in the Indus Basin to distribute for everybody. But if there is lack of co-ordination, if the present Indo-Pakistani feuds continue, then almost anything may happen to this large and nowadays fertile north-eastern part of Bahawalpur State.

So you will well understand that there turned out to be a grim background of international cogitations to my travels.

But another thing that I realized when in Bahawalpur, which led straight to pure pleasure, was that the vast desert area to which very few people ever bother to go, but which forms about two-thirds of the principality, is almost ideal to wander about in for a holiday-maker in winter. What could be more delightful than to go to such little-known country—it is part of what geographers call the Thar, or great Indian Desert—and to be among the nomadic tribes, who wander sparsely through it with their flocks and herds, and to spend, as I did, my Christmas Day out there, away at the back of beyond? Most of my best slides, or anyway the ones I like most, are of this desert region—and I think it is now about time that we started seeing the first of the series. . . .

The lecturer (Mr. STEPHENS) then displayed before us eighty photographs illustrating his travels, all but a small number of them being in colour. The series opened with a succession of shots of people and buildings in Bahawalpur city itself—alternately termed Baghdad-i-Jedid. We were then taken to Dera Nawabsahib, the seat of the Ruler, where we were shown the Palace, and some very colourful studies of the princely bodyguard, clad in their different kinds of Arab-style uniforms. After this, the illustrations shifted us right up to the disputatious far north-eastern corner of the State, beside the Suleimanki canal headworks, where members of the Pakistani Border Police patrol the vexed new frontier with Indian Punjab, and the road and the railway, unused since Partition, lie unrepaired and desolate—the latter with its metals ripped away and the "stop" signal perennially up—and where 60,000 fertile acres have been reconverted into desert owing to the cessation of water supplies along the Ferozepur distributary.

From this afflicted area we travelled down the canal bank via Harunabad to Fort Abbas and Fort Marot. There the real desert journey began, illustrated by the lecturer's most attractive photograph. We were transported by well-described stages via Yasman, Channan Pir, Dingarh, and Dhori to Rukanpur, a very far-away place where the territories of the adjoining Indian princely States of Bikaner and Jaisalmer meet against the Bahawalpur border. We saw the dancing of nomad tribesmen, a desert fair, many camels, ruined forts—and, at Rukanpur, more Pakistani Border Police. The journey ended at Derawar, a large and spectacular fortress on the desert edge, where the residue of the famous Bahawalpur Camel

Corps is kept, and former Nawabs of the State and their families lie nobly buried within massive domed tombs of blue and white.

General Sir MOSELEY MAYNE: What language was talked in the places where Mr. Stephens went?

Mr. IAN STEPHENS: I am afraid I am no linguistic expert. Even my Urdu is not as good as it should be. I cannot speak Punjabi. But I can understand the sound of it. And what I heard in Bahawalpur was not quite Punjabi to my ears. It puzzled me, in the desert areas particularly. And when I asked what it was they said: "No, of course it isn't Punjabi, it's Multani!"—a language of whose existence, I confess, I had never heard before. But that applies to the indigenous people, and not of course to those who migrated from the Punjab proper in the 1930's in order to occupy the newly created canal colonies. They talk real Punjabi.

Sir GEORGE GILLAN: Mr. Stephens mentioned the importance of water supply. I seem to remember that about 1937 it was proposed to flood the entire part of one of the States so as to get a complete flow of water. I recently read in the *The Times of India* that the Government of India is proceeding with that project; they propose to copy what we did in Wales. Would not that make things easier so far as water supply is concerned?

Mr. IAN STEPHENS: No, I do not think so. I am not very clear what dam is being referred to, but if, as I infer, it is in India, then the danger is as I explained: that the water impounded by it—as you will see from the map—is likely to be diverted down the big new Indian canals which I have spoken about, and go to places in East Punjab or Bikaner and away from Bahawalpur.

The CHAIRMAN: As there appear to be no further questions it remains for me, on your behalf, to thank Mr. Stephens for his talk. When I introduced him I failed to tell you that he was an exceedingly skilled photographer, but you have now realized that from the perfectly lovely photographs you have been shown. It must have been a most interesting journey, and it is kind of Mr. Stephens to have let us share it. We all join in thanking him for that.

## IN MEMORIAM

THE announcement of the untimely death in London on January 25, at the age of 56, of Dr. G. M. Lees, will have come as a grievous shock to his many friends in this Society, and they will wish to offer their deep sympathy to his widow and to their son.

George Martin Lees was educated at St. Andrew's College, Dublin, the Royal School of Mines, and, after the outbreak of the War of 1914-18, at the Royal Military Academy, Woolwich. He saw service with the Royal Artillery in France (where he won the M.C.) and with the R.F.C. in Egypt and Mesopotamia (where he was awarded the D.F.C.) before transferring to the Civil Administration of Iraq. In 1921 he joined the Anglo-Persian (later Anglo-Iranian) Oil Company as assistant geologist, and in this capacity travelled extensively in Persia, the Persian-Gulf Shaikhdoms, and other countries of the Middle East. After a year's study at the University of Vienna he received the degree of Ph.D. for a thesis on the geology of 'Uman. In 1930, at the early age of 32, he was promoted to be chief geologist of the Company. From now on his activities became world-wide, and the technical journals will have paid tribute to his brilliant career as a geologist of international reputation, a career that was crowned by his election as a Fellow of the Royal Society in 1948 and President of the Geological Society from 1951 to 1953.

For many former colleagues and friends in this Society, of which he had been a member since 1920, his passing will have awakened nostalgic memories of earlier days, when he was serving in the Civil Administration of Iraq. Lees was one of a small group of officers who, in the spring of 1919, were sent to Southern Kurdistan under the leadership of E. B. Soane to reorganize the ramshackle autonomous government under Shaikh Mahmud, which the British Occupation Authority had set up at the end of the war in the hope, vain as it turned out, of avoiding military commitments in the hills. He was posted to Halabja, the little Kurdish township situated in that fascinating region on the Iraqi-Persian frontier where the huge spurs of the *chaîne magistrale* of Zagros, here called Avroman or Hewraman, fall 7,000 feet in five or six miles from the crest to the broad plain of Shahrizur, and the centre of administration for the great nomadic tribe of Jaf. A lively and amusing first-hand account of his adventures at this time is contained in the lecture entitled "Two Years in Kurdistan" which he gave to the Society in March 1928.\*

It was not long before Lees had impressed his personality to an unusual degree on the whole of his extensive district. A good working knowledge of the language quickly acquired, sound administrative ability, a rigid sense of justice tempered by a sympathetic comprehension of tribal mentality, buoyant high spirits and a light-hearted genius for raising a laugh in the most solemn conclaves, the fact that he returned to the R.A.F. to fly his own aircraft on the operations under General Fraser during the brief interruption of the work of reform by Shaikh Mahmud's revolt, and many feats of physical prowess, all combined to make him something of a

\* ROYAL CENTRAL ASIAN JOURNAL, Vol. XV, 1928, p. 253.

legend. The Hewramis, with a touch, perhaps, of that generous tendency of the Kurds to magnify the virtues of their chosen heroes, will to this day aver that over a long day he could always outlast their nimblest cragsmen. That is thirty-five years ago, but the name is still well remembered and the news that "Kapitan Lys has loaded up his tents for the last time," as the Kurds say, will be received with sorrow by the greybeards in many nomad camps and mountain villages of Southern Kurdistan.

C. J. E.

**M**AJOR-GENERAL SIR WILLIAM BEYNON, K.C.I.E., C.B., D.S.O., who has died at the age of 89, had a distinguished career in Indian Frontier fighting which has seldom been equalled. This was to be expected from a descent from the families of Sam Browne and the Lawrences. After Marlborough and Sandhurst he was commissioned in the Royal Sussex Regiment, but soon transferred to the Indian Staff Corps and spent his regimental service in Gurkha regiments—mostly in the 3rd Queen Alexandra's Own Gurkha Rifles, of which regiment, after his retirement, he was Colonel for nineteen years.

He first saw active service in the Black Mountain Expedition in 1888. A few years later he was Staff Officer to Colonel Kelly during his campaign for the relief of Chitral. For this Beynon was awarded the D.S.O. He published an account of this small war, entitled *With Kelly to Chitral*. He was in the thick of the fighting on the North-West Frontier two years later. He took part in the operations on the Samana and in the Kurrum Valley, the relief of Gulistan, and Tirah, the actions at Changru Kotal, Dargai, the capture of Sampagha and Arhanga Passes, the action at Dwater on November 24, 1897, and the operations in the Bara Valley in December of that year. For these services he earned a Brevet Majority. After a short tour of duty at Army Headquarters he was sent to Somaliland, where he took part in one of the small wars which by this time had become a habit with him. Here he earned a further Mention in Despatches. Two years later he was appointed to the Staff of General MacDonald, who commanded the troops on Sir Francis Younghusband's Mission to Lhasa. In the fighting in 1904 he took part in the action at Naini on June 26, the subsequent operations around Gyantse and the march to Lhasa. For this campaign he was awarded a Brevet Colonelcy.

To a junior regimental officer he appeared to be the ideal of a staff officer—always ready to help and fussing nobody. During the crossing of the Tsangpo he put up his rod and fished, keeping an eye on other things at the same time, and what a relief this was to the officers commanding the crossing! For his services during the First World War he was awarded the C.B. and K.C.I.E., and during the subsequent Afghan War he was promoted to Major-General for distinguished service in the field. He retired in 1920.

Sir William Beynon had been a member of the Royal Central Asian Society since 1926 and was for a while Honorary Secretary. He had served on the Council in some capacity or other for nearly ten years.

F. M. B.

## REVIEWS

**The Art and Architecture of the Ancient Orient.** By Henri Frankfort. The Pelican History of Art. Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, Essex. 1954. Pp. xxvi + 270; 192 plates and 117 figures in the text. Price 42s.

This imposing book is one of the first of the forty-eight volumes of the Pelican History of Art announced by Penguin Books: the latest and greatest adventure of Sir Allen Lane.

The distinguished author, Professor Frankfort, died before the book went to press, and Miss Rachel Levy was responsible for revision of the text.

The book is tough reading, and perhaps over-technical in content, if, as it appears, the series is intended for a public beyond the specialists. Yet, the reader is carried along by the graces of Professor Frankfort's style, by his brilliant syntheses (for instance, in his treatment of the difference in Sumerian and Egyptian sculpture) and by his remarkable gift for animating the subjects which he describes (the granite head believed to represent Hammurabi).

This volume on "the Ancient Orient" does not comprehend Egypt nor the Aegean, nor does Professor Frankfort touch on the fascinating theme of the connection between Sumer and the Indus valley civilization beyond reference to the appearance of the Indian humped bull (*Zebu*) in Sumerian decorative motives of the Early Dynastic Period (c. 3000-2340 B.C.). Part I of the book is limited to a study of the successive phases of Mesopotamian civilization. Sumerian Protoliterate (c. 3500-3000 B.C.); Sumerian Early Dynastic (c. 3000-2340 B.C.); Akkadian (2340-2180 B.C.); Neo-Sumerian (2125-2025 B.C.) merging into Isin, Larsa and Babylon (2025-1594 B.C.); the Kassite Dynasty (1600-1100 B.C.); the beginnings of Assyrian art (1350-1000 B.C.); the late Assyrian period (1000-612 B.C.) and the Neo-Babylonian (612-539 B.C.). During a span of history which is nearly double the length of the Christian era, the general impression is one of a gradual silting up of the human spirit, from the charming fantasy of the prehistoric "whirling style" (Fig 1), through the superb "feudal" insolence of the Akkadian ruler (Plates 42 and 43) and the aware sophistication of King Gudea (Plates 46-49), to the sombre strength of Hammurabi (Plate 63), and the formal discipline of late Assyrian art. Indeed, it is somewhat depressing to note in terms of "historical periodicity" the resemblance between the stark functionalism of Assyrian state buildings (Figs. 27 and 28) and the new architectural style of mid-twentieth century Europe. Again, the friezes of "war in the marshes" (p. 94 and Plates 99 and 100) may be compared in spirit and in detail to incidents of modern internal security operations.

Part II of Professor Frankfort's work covers the regions which he regards as peripheral to the sequence of Mesopotamian civilizations: Asia Minor and the Hittites; the Levant in the Second Millennium B.C.; Aramæans and Phœnicians in Syria; and ancient Persia. Professor Frankfort seems to share Mr. Berenson's contempt for all regional cultures beyond the great centres of civilization. While he understands the splendour of the military architecture of Boğazköy, he sees in Hittite art "a stunted growth" (p. 129) "feeble outside the capital and without tradition" (p. 153); and he finds that "the hallmark of Phœnician art is the lavish use of bungled Egyptian themes" (p. 188). In Iran, however, Professor Frankfort admits brilliance and originality in Elamite art (p. 204). Again, in a brief study of the Achæmenian period he praises these early Aryans as a "tribe of nomadic or semi-nomadic horsemen who took charge of the civilized world and did not destroy civilization, but enhanced it." (p. 213). Professor Frankfort gives a suggestive *mise-au-point* on the much-discussed Luristan bronzes. He believes that this "nomad's gear" (daggers with special sheaths, axes, bowcases, horse-gear, wagon-parts, etc.) was made for Aryan conquerors (Cimmerians, Scythians, or Medes) by craftsmen working under the older influences of Mesopotamian art (p. 208), and he finds that the "zoomorphic style" was evolved through the ingenuity of the Luristan smiths catering for nomad tastes (pp. 210-211).

Professor Frankfort seems to appreciate fully the complexities of the impact of

the nomad world on the older civilizations. He does not dismiss the nomads simply as barbarians, and, quoting Sir Ellis Minns, he recognizes that the nomad world evolved "a highly specialized mode of life" developing original techniques and no mean art. They were terrible indeed because of their skills, their flair for adaptation and their impulse to action.

In an excursion on the origins of the Hittite culture, Professor Frankfort believes that the people of Alaja-Hüyük (which he dates c. 2300-2000 B.C.) entered Anatolia from the north-east and that "they constituted the advance-guard of the Hittites" (p. 115). He suggests connections between the Alaja-Hüyük finds and the well-known grave at Maikop in the Kuban valley in the Northern Caucasus. Further, he emphasizes similarities in the treatment of animals on the famous Maikop vase and Mesopotamian animal motives.

Professor Frankfort does not discuss the important excavations undertaken by the late Professor Kuftin in Trialeti in S.E. Georgia in 1936-40, (an example perhaps of the scant facilities which western scholars have for following contemporary archaeology in the Soviet Union). Professor Kuftin himself points out the strong resemblance of finds in the Trialetian sites with the objects from Alaja Hüyük. Indeed Trialeti and other sites so far unexplored in Georgia and eastern Anatolia may well be found to link the cultures of Anatolia and the Northern Caucasus. To Professor Kuftin Mesopotamian influences on the successive cultures of Trialeti are clear, and it would seem that Trialeti, particularly rich in copper and *Lapis Lazuli*, may have been an early source of supply of metals and stones to the Mesopotamian cities.<sup>1</sup>

The plates are beautifully produced, and Mr. Bell Scott is to be congratulated on the many intricate drawings in the text. The end map is not so good; several places frequently mentioned in the text have been omitted (e.g. Koyunjik—not Kuyunjik, Zawiye (near Sakkiz) and Ivriz).

W. E. D. A.

**The History and Culture of the Indian People. The Classical Age.** By Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan. Bombay: Arthur Probsthain. 1954. Pp. lx + 745, with four maps and 43 plates (two, of Ajanta paintings, in colour).

This, the third volume of Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan's *History and Culture of the Indian People*, Volume III, is a composite work by R. C. Majumdar, its General Editor, D. C. Sircar, K. A. Nilakanta Sastri, R. Sathianathaier, G. V. Devasthali, M. A. Mehendale, H. D. Velankar, K. R. Srinivasa Iyengar, U. N. Ghoshal, Nalinaksha Dutt, J. N. Banerjea, A. D. Pusalker, A. M. Ghatage, T. M. P. Mahadevan, H. D. Bhattacharyya, U. C. Bhattacharjee, S. K. Saraswati, and Nihar Ranjan Ray. It is devoted to the Classical Age not merely of Hindu India but of the then Indian people in the widest sense. Observers of contemporary Asian policies and diplomacy may note that this scholarly work includes a chapter on Ceylon by D. C. Sircar and one by Mr. Majumdar himself on "Colonial and Cultural Expansion in South-East Asia."

The Classical Age is itself one of political and imperial ebb and flow. The Gupta Empire whose rise, expansion and consolidation, decline and fall in the Sixth Century A.D. are traced in six of Mr. Majumdar's chapters, itself emerged after the dissolution of the Kushana. The succeeding kingdoms and empires occupy his next three chapters and are followed by Mr. Sircar's contribution on the Deccan in the period contemporary with the Gupta rule. The Chalukyas and the South Indian dynasties are dealt with respectively by him and by Mr. Sathianathaier, Professor of History and Politics in the Annamalai University. By the end of the book the Muslims are breaking in.

The Indian nationalism of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries drew nourish-

<sup>1</sup> B. A. Kuftin, *Archaeological Excavations in Trialeti*: an attempt to periodize archaeological materials, published by the Georgian Academy of Sciences, Tbilisi, 1941. (Text in Russian with summaries in Georgian and English.) For the deer cult which Professor Frankfort regards as characteristic of Alaja-Hüyük cf. Kuftin Plates lxxxviii, xci, etc.; for similarity in Hittite and Trialetian costume, cf. Kuftin, Figs. 94 and 95.

ment from the memory of Hindu empires but the conception of a united and self-governing sub-continent was in great measure a product of Western education and a political unity which was imposed by the British and could not survive their withdrawal. Thus, the Gupta writ ran from the Bay of Bengal to the Arabian Sea but was confined to northern India. Hindu India was a religious and cultural, rather than a political, unity. True, the Hindu of old exalted the memory of *chakravati-samrats*, or universal rulers such as Mandhata and Bharata. But it was a very different conception from the ideal of mediæval Western Christendom of a single empire pervaded and supported by a single Church. As Mr. K. M. Munshi points out in his admirable foreword, the *chakravartis* were the essence of Vishnu, the political and military aspect of Dharma.

It is just, therefore, that less than half of the narrative is given to political history. Literature, administration, law, political theory, education, arts and the religion, social structure and philosophies, reaching from the dirt to the highest heavens, which are the very stuff of Hinduism—these rightly claim the lion's share. The life of ordinary men is portrayed and the intercourse of India with Chinese and other neighbouring countries and cultures. The constant cross-fertilization of the varied civilizations of the world is brought out in a fascinating but all too brief section entitled "Influence of India on the West." Not every Western Christian knows that Indian folk-tales can be traced in mediæval collections such as *Gesta Romanorum* and in the stories of Boccaccio, Straparola, Chaucer and Lafontaine, or that the Bodhisattva, under the guise of Saint Josaphat, was included in the Martyrology of Gregory XIII.

The bibliography, Genealogical and Chronological tables and index are most adequate and helpful.

JOHN BIGGS-DAVISON.

**Malaya, Indonesia, Borneo and the Philippines.** By Charles Robequain. Translated by E. D. Laborde. Longmans. 1954. Pp. 456; 15 photographs, 36 maps, bibliography and index. 30s.

The lure of the Moluccas or "Spice Islands" in the sixteenth century brought European navigators and merchant venturers in ever-increasing activity to South-east Asia. Today the same area, in a far wider sense, attracts the interest of Europe and America. As Mr. Laborde, in a foreword to his excellent translation, says, this archipelagic area has assumed "a leading role in the production of rubber, tin, sugar, tobacco, vegetable oil, fibres and other valuable commodities."

The economic importance of what W. Heyd, seventy years ago, called the Malay world, including roughly the area now dealt with by Professor Robequain, has been for modern statesmen intensified by the political controversies emerging from the Second World War. The Professor rightly observes, in a brief but most valuable postscript to a comprehensive study of the history, economics, geology, geography and ethnology of the area, that "it would be extraordinary if the work of the Western peoples did not tend to make the local population want to lighten and throw off their tutelage and to give them means of so doing, for that is the fate of all colonization, so long as the natives are not exterminated or reduced to helpless minorities." It is often forgotten that the pioneer colonization of the Portuguese, Spaniards, Dutch, French and British followed in the wake of Chinese and Arab traders. The problem of steering nationalism aright is sharply complicated by regional differences to which the geographical peculiarities of an archipelagic zone give special emphasis. At present we are too close to the events of the last war to judge whether the victors over the Japanese were not too precipitate in acquiescing in, if not stimulating, an abandonment of the *status quo* before the realities of the post-war situation had been properly assessed. This applies with much force to the developments in Indonesia and Indo-China. Professor Robequain notes that plans for industrial development are plentiful but for want of experts and technical assistance the pace is slow:

"The great mass of the people is illiterate and those who have had the advantage of a secondary education or better prefer to enter a profession, like Law or Medicine, rather than study mechanical engineering. The serious lack of technicians will disappear as education improves; but it will take time and call for competent instructors and sound financial conditions."

Foreign aid, such as that invoked under the Colombo Plan and the U.S.A. "Point Four" programme, is indispensable, but "investors will not accept, however, the tempting invitations of the new governments without demanding certain guarantees which only a stable government could give." Obviously this is a state of things in which ideological controversies, containing all the dangerous implications of political strife and internecine conflict, are tragically irrelevant.

Yet so great are the benefits which the world as a whole and the inhabitants of "the Malay world" can derive from peaceful and neighbourly co-operation in the working out of destinies in this vast tropical region, it should not be beyond the power of the nations concerned to adopt President Eisenhower's call for total war "against poverty wherever it exists," to quote from the last sentence in this book. For the rest Professor Robequain's massive yet lucid and scholarly exposition of all the factors involved should give encouragement to those who are ready to study the deep-rooted cultures and civilizations of the many races of this part of the world where for centuries the West and the East have met in commerce, trade and on the whole friendly intercourse despite the all too frequent intervals of estrangement and bloodshed.

EDWIN HAWARD.

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**Iran.** By Professor R. Ghirshman. Translated from the French for the Pelican Series. 1951 (1954, translation). 5s.

Even in Britain, those who contemplate the Middle East are apt to think in terms of Arabia, so that, since Percy Sykes, there has been little attempt to deal comprehensively with Persian history. Here is a book by a French archæologist who goes far to fill in the pre-Islamic background of the Persian civilization. The title is not, as some may think, a concession to modern Persian national predilections. It is designed as wide enough to cover the Median, Persian, Scythian, Parthian and other Indo-Iranian strains which combined to make up the complex racial background of life on the plateau before the later infusions of Arab and Turkish blood after the Islamic conquest. Lest any be disappointed, let it be stated that Professor Ghirshman's book stops short with the assassination in A.D. 651 of Yazdgard, the last Sassanian king, after defeat by the Arabs at Nihawand.

This book is remarkably good value. It contains about 100 photographic plates and as many line drawings, all designed to bring history to life by pictures of Iranian architecture, bas-reliefs, sculpture, plaques, jewellery and craftsmanship over more than 1,500 years. The main impression to be derived from these is one of astonishing poverty of thought and execution in the representation of man in comparison with the Greek or even the Roman, but of great success in the stylizing of animals. An art of the camp and countryside, not of the city—a provocative thought.

There is the large slice of prehistory due from an archæologist turned historian. But the impatient are at liberty to start at page 90, where, late in the ninth century B.C., the Medes begin to challenge the Assyrian power.

The author has crammed much into small compass, and the result is a steady accompaniment to the player whose air is fashioned according to the tunes of Æschylus, Herodotus and Arrian. But it is strange how Persian history seems to come to life only when illumined by the Greeks, including, of course, Alexander and the Seleucids. The Romans when they met the Persian power—even in defeat as under Crassus at Carrhæ in 53 B.C. or under Valerian at Edessa in A.D. 260—gave off only flashes, even to one who has seen Shapur's bas-relief showing the captured Valerian kneeling humbly to Shapur. Steady illumination is still lacking.

Professor Ghirshman has much of interest to say on the growth and relationship



of Mazdaism (the original Persian faith), Zoroastrianism and Manichæism, showing how wrong is the belief that only Zoroaster held the field before Islam. Perhaps the deepest message of this book is to prove that Persian civilization is far older and broader based than the Islamic inspiration which it absorbed unconquered; the fact that Transoxiana, Afghanistan and Pakistan west of the Indus are even now Khorasani in culture is due not to Islam but to far earlier Achæmenian, Parthian, and Sassanian influence in those countries.

The author has an annoying habit of continually quoting without giving the source (but maybe this blame should be attributed to the translators). He has also coined the term "Asianic," new at least to this reviewer and meaning apparently neither Aryan (Iranian) nor Semitic but indigenous to Asia. He is too sparing of dates for a book covering so large a span; a table of dynasties with dates appended is needed to provide the skeleton on which the whole may hang. Taxila is not in north-east (or even north-west) India but in Pakistan, nor is it on the Indus bank but 35 miles east of that river (pp. 276 and 323).

This is a chronicle, not a history: to make his account live Professor Ghirshman should have thrilled to something of the wonder of a Curzon when he beheld the glories of Persepolis. But it is a very good chronicle, and a noble effort at the price. It does much to show how it is that, as regards Islam, Persia has taken captivity captive, and to explain the astonishing persistence and resurrection of Persian culture in the face of any and every challenge.

OLAF CAROE.

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**A Bibliography of Painting in Islam.** By K. A. C. Creswell. (Publications de l'Institut Français d'Archéologie Orientale du Caire: *Art Islamique*, tome I.) Cairo, 1953.

This forms part of an ambitious project for a *Bibliography of the Architecture, Arts and Crafts of Islam* which Professor Creswell began in 1912. Other parts already published are a *Provisional Bibliography of the Moslem Architecture of Syria and Palestine* (1924) and *A Bibliography of Glass and Rock Crystal in Islam*, published in the *Bulletin* of the Faculty of Arts, Fouad I University, vol. xiv, part i, May 1952.

The work under review contains 1,008 items arranged under authors' names and listed under the following headings: (1) On the question of the lawfulness of painting in Islam; (2) general, including sale catalogues and the whole field of Islamic miniature painting except books and articles devoted exclusively to Mughal painting, which are listed under a separate section (3); (4) books containing reproductions only; (5) mural painting; and (6) an addenda containing nine further items. It is evidently not Professor Creswell's intention to provide a critical bibliography, though under important books and articles he has provided useful notes and summaries. Students of Islamic painting will be indebted to him for this valuable and almost exhaustive list of publications, which include those in Persian, Turkish and Arabic besides the usual European languages.

R. H. PINDER-WILSON.

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**The Arabian Peninsula.** By Richard Sangar. Cornell University Press, Ithaca, New York. 1954. Pp. 296. Ill. \$5.

A synthesis of recent contemporary, or near contemporary works on Arabia has become an urgent necessity since the meteoric rise in the economic and strategic importance of the peninsula after World War II. Mr. Sangar's attempt at this task is successful insofar as the result is a useful informative book on modern Arabia, in particular on American activities in the country, though the author is far from ungenerous to the pioneer work of the British in exploration and in establishing a basis

of security. The long section on Sa'ūdī Arabia is perhaps the most noteworthy part of the book, but it is careful to avoid criticism of personalities and policies—avoiding thereby the dangerous candour of Van der Muelen; but a practising diplomat cannot afford to tell too much of the truth! The fascinating account of the assassination of the late Imam Yahya of the Yemen with which the book closes is one of its most dramatic and best-told incidents.

Unfortunately it cannot be said that this work has been written with that skill and distinction we have come to expect of writers on Arabia. To those familiar with the literature, the extracts, in précis form, from standard works, coupled with oil company handouts, tenuously linked together and not infrequently misunderstood, are not palatable fare. The author does not always even copy accurately from the sources; typical are the mutilation of the name of the famous Indian Survey vessel *Palinurus* which becomes *Palmuras*, the invention of a Ḥadramī tribe, "the Sabini (Subeihi)", and numerous other howlers. Mr. Sangar avers that, in Ḥadramawt, tribal warfare throughout the Middle Ages resulted in the destruction of the incense-trees—a statement for which he must have drawn entirely on his imagination and for which there is not one jot or tittle of evidence. Nor were the ruins of Timna "only recently discovered by the British antiquities officer" but were, in fact, described some fifty years ago by Carlo von Landberg on the basis of a report by G. Wyman Bury, now, I believe, in the Royal Geographical Society. The very method of uncritical amalgamation of sources gives, where the Aden Protectorate and Ḥadramawt are concerned, an incorrect and misleading picture.

Notwithstanding these defects, there is sufficient of merit in this book for one to hope that, should it run to a second edition, a complete revision will be made, to eliminate the many serious mistakes and misconceptions of the present edition, and to bring some of the sections up to date.

R. B. SERJEANT.

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**Qataban and Sheba. Exploring Ancient Kingdoms on the Biblical Spice-routes of Arabia.** By Wendell Phillips. Gollancz. 1955. Pp. 335. Ill. Price 21s.

This book gives a full account of travel and exploration by a group of American archaeologists in Qataban and Sheba in Southern Arabia and of their varied adventures there.

Dr. Wendell Phillips is a young explorer who has already made a name for himself in Central African exploration and who, attracted by the legendary fame of the Queen of Sheba, resolved to attempt the excavation of her supposed home at Marib in the Yemen. The expedition, which he organized and led, under the auspices of the American Foundation for the Study of Man, was financed by sixteen governmental and academic institutions (including two non-American universities, those of Louvain and St. Andrews), forty-six corporations and companies (whose enlightened generosity might well be imitated by wealthy bodies elsewhere), and twenty-six private persons. Thus supported, it was able to get together a staff of thirty-one persons (including one Belgian and one English scholar), to which other persons or groups of persons were apparently attached from time to time; and they disposed of a massive amount of equipment and means of transport of the most modern kind. They also carried a large number of gifts to facilitate negotiations with local kings and notables whose permission or at any rate benevolence might make all the difference between success and failure.

The expedition began work in the kingdom of Qataban, which is under British administration and where they encountered no official obstruction. Here, then, they were notably successful, especially in the Wady Brihan, where they found a considerable number of inscriptions on the sides of a ravine, and in the cemetery and temple of Timna at Haid bin Aqil, where they discovered many objects of great archaeological and artistic value, including a fine lion in bronze, a beautiful head of a young girl in translucent alabaster, and a wonderful necklace of gold.

Meanwhile several members of the expedition had been working in the library

of St. Catherine's monastery at Sinai, microfilming all the most important manuscripts with the assistance of eighteen American and European, as well as Near-Eastern, scholars and scientists. The most interesting of the manuscripts which they photographed were perhaps two triple palimpsests, one called the *Codex Syriacus* (containing underneath a still unidentified Syriac text, over this another of the fourth century A.D., and on top of this a martyrology dated in A.D. 778) and the other the *Codex Arabicus* (containing at the bottom what appeared to be the oldest Syriac version of the Gospel yet discovered, above this a Greek lectionary of the Pauline Epistles, and again above this an Arabic martyrology of the eighth century and the oldest known Arabic translation of the Book of Job). The publication of all these texts will be awaited with impatience.

The expedition's third task was to make their way into the Yemen and explore Marib, where there was a famous dam on which the prosperity of the place depended and whose collapse in the sixth century spelt the ruin of the whole district. The party working here found a number of inscriptions on the surface of the ground, examined the ruins above ground, some of them magnificent structures, and commenced excavating the great temple of Awwam; but they had to abandon these operations in consequence of the obstruction, if not actual hostility, of the authorities, which was encouraged by the duplicity of the king, although their relations with the local population were excellent. In the end the work terminated abruptly in flight and an almost hazardous escape in which most of their equipment and archaeological records were abandoned.

The book closes with a brief chapter on an archaeological reconnaissance of Dhofar in Oman, carried out with a view rather to future work than to immediate results; but some pre-Islamic remains were brought to light, pushing the frontier of the old South Arabian civilization further than it had previously been thought to extend.

All in all, in spite of final failure, the expedition discovered much of interest and showed where future research must be directed. In Qataban they pushed back the date of the earliest inscriptions, if Prof. Albright is right, to the tenth or eleventh century B.C. and filled in gaps in the sequence of dates; and they found Hellenistic bronzes bearing out the truth of Strabo's remarks on the excellence of the local craftsmen. In Marib they saw the ruins of the immense dam and the lofty columns, still standing, of the great temple of the Moon God, and enough to indicate what might yet be revealed of that ancient civilization when the Yemen is once again as civilized as it was 2,000 or 3,000 years ago.

The story of the expedition is well told, but the first part is hampered by too many petty details of trivial interest and not worth recording; in the second part it comes to life with thrilling accounts of intrigues and double-dealing, patience and courage. The style is brisk and lively but occasionally lapses into such vulgarisms as "okayed," which ought not to appear in a serious work. Finally, the book contains seventy-eight quite admirable photographs, five charts and diagrams, and three more or less adequate maps. It is a book that anyone can read with pleasure and every archaeologist ought to possess and digest, even though he may never hope or have the chance to lead so lavishly equipped an expedition.

G. R. DRIVER.

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**The Old Turkey and the New. From Byzantium to Ankara.** By Sir Harry Luke, K.C.M.G., D.Litt. London: Geoffrey Bles. 1955. Pp. 233. 16s.

Sir Harry Luke has rendered a service to all students of Near Eastern history and contemporary affairs by his decision to republish a revised and up-to-date version of *The Making of Modern Turkey*, first published in 1936 but long out of print. For this is a text-book on the subject that will live with such classics as Sir Charles Eliot's *Turkey in Europe*, revealing the same profound erudition combined with great practical experience as an administrator. The author's chapter on the reform of the Turkish language will be read with deep appreciation and admiration by all who have wrestled with the complications of the Turkish language in the days of the Arabic alphabet. This is vividly illustrated by Sir Harry Luke's delightful story of

a Qadi's interminable and almost unintelligible judgment covering three pages of foolscap in minute Arabic handwriting, concluding with the single verb that gave any meaning to the whole. Although the author ascribes this penchant of the Ottoman Turks for flowery circumlocution in their literary language in part at least to the legacy of the Byzantines, it is interesting to reflect that this same tendency to avoid coming to the point in speech and writing is noticeable in at least one other member of the Turanian group of peoples—the Magyars, who regard it as somewhat uncouth to describe an episode or an idea too briefly, and indulge in what appears to an Englishman a quite unnecessary degree of verbosity.

Even the most ardent admirer of Atatürk's reforms cannot refrain from feeling some sympathy for the author's comments on the abolition of the fez and the subject of male attire in Eastern countries. Although one appreciates the psychological motive behind the encouragement of European dress, one cannot but view with misgiving and dismay the universal abandonment of all traditional and national costumes. For with their disappearance goes also something of a people's individuality and character; and what a dull world it would be if everyone dressed alike, thought alike and spoke the same language! Surely unity and concord between nations can be achieved without sacrificing all local customs and traditions.

In his final chapter Sir Harry Luke brings the story of Turkey's reforms and astonishing progress down to the end of 1954, written, as he remarks in his preface, since his recent tour made exactly fifty years after he first visited Turkey.

H. M. BURTON.

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**The Sūfi Path of Love. An Anthology of Sūfism.** Compiled by Margaret Smith, D.Lit. Luzac and Co. 1954. Pp. 154. 21s.

A reviewer usually reads a book quickly, and that is the wrong way to take this anthology, for the result is mental and spiritual indigestion; the subject should be taken in small doses with meditation. The book is divided into five chapters—the nature of the godhead, the human soul, the beginning of the soul's ascent to God, the mystic path and the end of the path. All the extracts are taken from English versions of Arabic, Persian and Turkish authors; one is surprised at the absence of translations from French. The writers quoted range in date from about A.D. 700 to Muhammad Iqbal in the present century, and some of them are not commonly regarded as Sūfis. But it is hard to decide whether certain ideas came direct from the neo-Platonism of the philosophers or indirectly through the mystics; in either case the results are similar. Presumably this collection is meant for those who have no special knowledge, so it would have been better to have provided some explanations, for certain passages are unintelligible without this help. The introduction contains sixteen descriptions of Sūfism in chronological order, beginning with Sir William Jones and ending in 1950. One feels that this selection ought to be a good idea, but it is doubtful if it adds to our knowledge. It does raise questions about the ethics of quotation. Ought one to preserve the errors of the forerunner? Thus T. P. Hughes used the transliteration *zudh*, which is repeated here, when it should be *zuhd*. On one page occur the forms *turrekāt* (explained as "path") and *tariqats*; something should have been done to show that these two are in fact one and that the former is plural. Again, *sherrah* might have been replaced by *shari'a*. One part of faith is removing obstacles from the path of the blind. The proofs were read carelessly and some of the errors make nonsense of the passages in which they occur; thrice the phrase "sum of life" appears as "sun of life." One must confess that many of the verse translations are deplorable as literature; some few are beautiful. I checked one passage from Ibn al-Fārid; the English goes with a swing and is remarkably close to the original. There are many books showing by analysis and example what Sūfism is and one wonders if it was necessary to add another. It is not the business of a reviewer to blame an author for not doing what he never intended to do, but one may suggest that what is now wanted is a comparative study of Christian and Muslim mysticism. That would break new ground.

A. S. T.

**The Road to Mecca.** By Muhammad Asad. London: Max Reinhardt. 1954. Pp. xiii + 381. Illustrated. 21s.

This book shows us a religious man in search of a faith. Leopold Weiss (now Muhammad Asad) was born in 1900 of well-to-do Jewish parents at Lwow (Lemberg), which, after the First World War, passed from the old Austria-Hungary to the "new" Poland. Amid the confusion and disillusionment which racked Central Europe at the war's end this thoughtful young man could find no good hope in the mere intensification of a materialism which had already failed, nor any satisfaction in what seemed to him the narrowness of Judaism or the harassing negations of the Christian Churches. He was destined to pass from agnosticism to—what?

In defiance of his father's wishes, Weiss abandoned his law studies for journalism and, invited to visit an uncle in Jerusalem, made his first acquaintance with the Middle East, where, at the early age of 22, he entered upon a highly successful period as roving special correspondent of the *Frankfurter Zeitung* (and, much later, of the *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*). "Roving" indeed was the operative word, and—after visits to Transjordan, Egypt and Iraq—his journeys in Syria, Persia, Afghanistan, Cyrenaica and what is now Sa'udi Arabia show plainly that he lacked nothing of the endurance, resource, linguistic gifts and, above all, the clear-sighted tolerance and breadth of humanity which have gone to the making of many good travellers.

Mr. Asad's descriptive powers are admirable, and his use of the English language gives no indication that it is not his native tongue. His sketches of Arab life in town and desert—especially of the nomad life now vanished into the past—are of a high standard. Occasionally, however, in assessing facts, he appears to rely on inaccurate or insufficient evidence, as when he accepts a report that "many people were killed that day" (the day—here antedated by a fortnight—which followed Iraqi ratification of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1924) "by indiscriminate cross-firing into the bazaar" in Baghdad by British troops. Again, he finds Britain guilty, in 1929, of backing Faisal-ed-Dowish in his rebellion against Ibn Sa'ud. No wonder "a flash of sensation followed the publication of my articles in the European and Arabic (mainly Egyptian) press"!

But this is not an ordinary book of travel. It represents a backward glance at a part of the author's life, in which he was seeking not merely adventure in the physical sphere—which indeed he found—but some sort of brotherhood, a synthesis of himself and the world about him, a reconciliation of the material and spiritual aspects of life. Accordingly, he has imposed on his tale an unusual plan. "It is told," he says, "in the context and, it should be kept in mind, *on the time-level* of my last desert journey from the interior of Arabia to Mecca in the late summer of 1932: for it was during those twenty-three days that the pattern of my life became fully apparent to me." This journey provides therefore the thread on which Mr. Asad has strung, by association of persons and ideas, a wide variety of experience and travel bearing, in greater or lesser degree, on his own spiritual voyage. Thus, there is a continual alternation between the "1932 time-level" and various earlier dates—a procedure which, thanks to very skilful handling, escapes being wearisome.

Having found in Islam the faith which he had sought, Mr. Asad rightly feels himself qualified to add his contribution to the enlightenment of the West on that subject. He does not preach, but certainly he has painted an attractive picture of the Muslim way of life. During the quarter-of-a-century that has passed since the events narrated in this book the Muslim world has known drastic changes—not least the intrusion of western materialism into the Arabian desert. In the new State of Pakistan Mr. Asad himself has held important posts, resigning from the last of these, he tells us, in order to write *The Road to Mecca*. Would it be too much to suggest that a world-wide survey of the present state of Islam would come opportunely from his pen?

E. D.

**Danger in Kashmir.** By Josef Korbel. With a Foreword by C. W. Nimitz, Fleet Admiral, U.S.N. Princeton (New Jersey) University Press. 1954. Pp. xvi + 351. Two maps drawn by Waldo R. Barton. Oxford University Press, London. \$5.

In 1948 Josef Korbel became Czechoslovak member and chairman of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan which was charged with the impossible task of mediating between the two Dominions in their dangerous dispute over Kashmir. As a result of the Communist coup in Prague Mr. Korbel is now Professor of International Relations and a member of the staff of the Social Science Foundation at the University of Denver. He has thus been placed in a position to present the free world with an authoritative account of an imbroglio which for more than seven years has gravely weakened the defences and taxed the struggling economies of both India and Pakistan. Despite his background and present environment, Mr. Korbel displays no bias against the late Imperial rulers and even forbears to blame the British, as they may well be blamed, for leaving in suspense between the two successor States a principality of vital strategic import within whose bounds rise rivers which are life to Western Pakistan.

Mr. Korbel holds that it is Communism which benefits from the failure of the parties, of the Commonwealth to which they belong, and of the World Organisation which he served, to settle the dispute. It is certainly preposterous that the fine regiments of two Commonwealth nations should glower at each other in the lovely hills of Kashmir instead of manning a co-ordinated peninsula defence. In the earlier days of the dispute both the troops flown in from the Indian Union and the Pakistan Regular forces which entered the State to avert any Indian advance to the Pakistan border and to maintain the Government and territory of *Azad* Kashmir were responsible to British Commanders-in-Chief. It is discreditable to the Commonwealth that reconciliation has so far been beyond its powers and the inevitable neutrality of the United Kingdom has weakened Pakistan's connections with her and made her increasingly dependent upon the support of the United States.

This is a detailed and careful survey of the origins and course of the quarrel. It is also eminently readable. It propounds no ready-made solution to the problem which has baffled international statesmen. Mr. Korbel brings out how emotional a question it is not only with the Muslims of Pakistan and of *Azad* Kashmir, but also with the Indian Prime Minister, scion of Kashmiri Brahmins, with his passionate temperament. He has written a human as well as a factual narrative and set his story in the wider context of a sub-continent threatened now, as in generations past, by the Great Power beyond the Himalayas.

The rough map on the jacket is in one respect more accurate than one of Mr. Barton's which wrongly shows a common frontier between Kashmir and the U.S.S.R.

JOHN BIGGS-DAVISON.

**The Life of Lord Roberts.** By David James. (Foreword by L. S. Amery, C.H.) London: Hollis and Carter. 1954. 5 $\frac{1}{4}$ " x 8 $\frac{3}{4}$ ". Pp. xxiii + 503; Index, 18 maps, 16 illustrations. 30s. net.

It was very necessary that this book should be written. Most people have read his stirring *Forty-one Years in India*, which points to a notice of this first complete life by this Society.

For Roberts was not only the most successful war leader in the nineteenth century. He also contributed certain constructive policies to our military life without which the Allies might well have been submerged at the Marne. It was a very near thing. German victory in 1914 might have been less easy to reverse than in 1944.

He gave us fire effect. The musketry of the "Old Contemptibles" broke the flower of the German army at Mons and after. He gave us a new rifle and modern guns. This reviewer trained at Woolwich with 64 prs. and round shot.

He gave us extended order. Redvers Buller's Black Week in Natal in 1899, based

on the thin red line of earlier days, might, unless corrected, have led to real disaster and international interference. The flank attack in open order by mounted infantry beat the Boers at their own game. He gave us transport to make such movements possible. The Germans, to our advantage, failed to learn the lesson.

He gave us the General Staff, brought up to date from Wellington's system, happily preserved in India. Without it an army organized for peace could hardly have stood up to Moltke's standards, and indeed left these far behind in the vital matter of Intelligence.

He gave us other things. The human approach and the welfare of the soldier. Without these numbers and quality might well have suffered in 1914.

But to many it will be his training of the staff which at last took its place in war. In the last century routine and set drill were controlled by officers of not usually high mental vigour who had better things to do than stand about parade grounds upsetting the sergeant-major. In all Roberts's campaigns we see that careful study of detail which provided for the unlikely; maintained perhaps a store of beehives in case bees were encountered. In those days it simply wasn't done. Examine any campaign such as the Crimea, the Mutiny and the first Afghan War. Every hour and every page have examples which would shame the most junior "A," "Q" or "G" officer of this era. In Kabul and South Africa Roberts had to do most such organization himself, until he could train helpers. The strain was too great, unthinkable today. Wolsley, Maude and Kitchener, like Wellington, did a great deal themselves. Possibly they preferred it this way, but it does not win wars today.

Roberts spanned these great changes (1832-1914) as an active steersman of events. It may take another forty years before history bequeaths him a substantial credit in our national survival.

Throughout his life "Bobs" had collected every relevant document. The records brought home in 1893 covered 112 alphabetical and indexed box files, thirteen quarto printed volumes of his official Indian papers, and fourteen teak chests of maps and papers. Subsequent records, if less generous, were hardly less complete. His elder daughter had proposed to use these for his biography, so they were not available till her death, when his younger daughter decided to make them available to the public. Nor could she have chosen a better biographer. The campaign stories are especially readable and well informed with opinions from all angles by eyewitnesses and others.

This book had to be written, and it could hardly have been better done.

G. M. ROUTH.

**Jinnah.** By Hector Bolitho. John Murray. London. 1954. Pp. 244. Ill. 18s.

This distinguished author describes the career of the late Mr. Jinnah from modest origins at Karashi to success at the Bar and in politics, and to the foundation of Pakistan. He describes his rectitude and austerity. The author speaks on p. 43 of the inevitable separation of the "two chief races of India." Unfortunately it was not a separation of two races, for most of the Moslems are descended from converts from Hinduism, but a separation of two completely differing religious and social systems. This separation became inevitable when Great Britain, endeavouring to bestow self-government on a sub-continent, transplanted English representative institutions. Nevertheless Mr. Jinnah was long in accepting the idea. The author's informants do not appear cognizant of some events coincident with Mr. Jinnah's youth. He refers to the Moslem attitude of caution at the time of the Morley-Minto reforms, but not apparently to the fact that the late Rt. Hon. Syed Ameer Ali was for long the protagonist of the cause of the Moslems of India, and that fifty years ago he and H.H. The Aga Khan were virtually co-founders of the Moslem League. The Syed was the prime mover in the demand for separate electorates for the Moslems at all stages of any new constitutional advance. Without his advocacy in England it is doubtful if the formidable Lord Morley would have been brought to accept them as the necessary concomitant of a free choice of Moslem representatives. The phrase quoted in this book "Swaraj means a Hindu Raj" was often used by the Syed at that time. Moslem opinion was then strongly pro-British. This was affected by

revocation of the partition of Bengal, and by the injudicious pronouncements of certain British Liberal statesmen and clerics at the time of the Balkan wars with Turkey. Many Indian Moslems thereupon tended to co-operate with the Hindu Congress in opposition to the British rule. Mr. Jinnah was not alone in trying to reach a *modus vivendi* with Hindu politicians, and the measure of their intransigence is shown by Mr. Bolitho's description of his disillusionment, and abandonment of India for some years. On his return he took the course that brought him and his co-religionists through the British abdication and the massacres that succeeded it, to their own state of Pakistan. Starting with a minimum of men and equipment in 1947, he and his splendid coadjutor, the martyred Liaquat Ali Khan, retained the services of many Britons, military and civilians, who helped to establish a new polity that is now in military alliance with the free world. Two minor comments may be permitted on a sympathetic work. It is stated that at the time the Prince of Wales landed at Bombay in 1921, "in another part at Gandhi's behest there was an actual burning of foreign clothes as a protest against the Prince's visit." In fact there were serious riots, with 500 casualties; the local government having been impeded by higher policy in dealing with the agitators concerned. Finally, it appears to be a growing convention with authors on Indian topics to be inclined to overlook the primary duty of the old British Governments in India, that of maintaining public order and to care for the needs of the masses, rather than that of initiating political experiments.

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**Tibetan Marches.** By André Migot. London: Rupert Hart-Davis. Pp. 288; 40 illustrations; 2 maps. 18s.

This narrative is of world-wide interest today for it is an intimate picture of lands and people rarely visited by westerners in the past and to which access by citizens of the free world will be barred for an unpredictable number of years. Doctor Migot, then holding an appointment with the "Assistance Medicale Indo-chinoise" at Hanoi, was entrusted with a mission of research into various aspects of Buddhism in China and Tibet. Accompanied by one porter from Kunming and shunning all modern means of conveyance, he travelled, first northward by the old disused high-way to Chengtu and thence westward to Jyekundo, thus traversing the "Tibetan Marches" of China. He was in no sort of hurry, for his purpose was to get to know the real China, "to soak himself in her civilization, her life, her religion and all her infinite variety." Journeying as he did, he came into close contact with all sorts and conditions of men; peasants, merchants, monks, French and other missionaries, officials and soldiers. Quite early in his venture he found out that it was hopeless to wait for through visas but rather to apply in the capital of one province for a local visa to the next. In this way one could travel the whole length of China. Though frequently finding himself in strange company he had only two serious setbacks. The first was when, stranded in a squalid hamlet, an armed robber gang stripped him of everything in his possession, including footgear, and leaving him only the thin garments he was wearing. His host, the innkeeper, was worse off, with only his underclothing. Nevertheless the destitute pair "took one look at each other and roared with laughter." A few days later the provincial Governor of Sikang (the small buffer province between Yunnan and Chinghai), whom he met at a banquet in Kangting, insisted on making "a trivial measure of compensation" in money. With the exception of this banditry he received everywhere hospitality and courtesy. Moreover he actually dwelt for many days with a lama in a mountain-side hermitage. He had studied Buddhism and lived with monks in other places, and before they parted company his lama-teacher was able to grant him formal entry into the Buddhist church. Soon after this initiation he crossed the narrow Yangtse, and in Jyekundo succeeded in allaying the suspicion of the Chinese garrison commander by planning to accompany a caravan to the Kokonor, (the great "Blue Sea"), some three weeks' march to the north. Then, thoroughly disguised as a mendicant lama, he slipped out with his staunch companion, Gelu, a young lama from the "Shangri La" of his initiation, on to the westward road to his true objective, Lhasa. Seven



marches out, the "long arm of the law" reached them and they were firmly though courteously sent back, fortunately unescorted. A plausible story of sojourn in lamaseries was accepted, and a few days later Dr. Migot set off for the Kokonor. Thence, by way of Sining and Lanchow, he reached the railway to Peking. Here, while visiting the Ming tombs, he was arrested by Communist troops, with whom he spent an instructive month before being passed back through their lines. Not long after, he travelled back across China to Eastern Tibet. But that is another story. Dr. Migot, like Heinrich Harrer, became very fond of the Tibetans. He is very tolerant of the Chinese Communists as he found them, comparing them very favourably with the Nationalists. He saw "behind the Communist lines the young people making a real effort to establish decency and justice. They really wanted desperately to improve conditions, to combat poverty and to restore dignity to the individual." His portrayals of the many and varied people whom he encountered, and their mode of living, are vivid. And he has the ability to describe realistically the country—so much of it wild, so much of it wonderful—in which they live. He gives due credit to the too scantily appreciated work of the widespread Christian missions, and he has rendered fitting tribute to his own fellow-countrymen who preceded him as explorers and lost their lives. This is altogether an outstanding book. It is very well illustrated and has been admirably translated by Peter Fleming.

H. W. T.

**South Col.** By Wilfrid Noyce. Heinemann. London. 1954. Pp. 303; 40 plates with line drawings and maps. 21s.

To quote the author: "There are many books about Mount Everest; some might say too many." This one, unlike most narratives of Himalayan travel, gives the "inside story" of the daily lives of men at high altitudes, their doings, their talk and their reactions to their immediate environment.

Wilfrid Noyce has recorded his thoughts as they came to him from day to day. He takes you from the invitation received while teaching at Charterhouse to the first gathering of the team at the Royal Geographical Society, with John Hunt leading the initial discussion on organization, food, equipment and other countless requirements, "all as businesslike as any board meeting."

Under "Dramatis Personæ" each member of the expedition is introduced, in few words but true to life. Noyce's summing up of his chief's personality deserves reproduction here. "John fulfilled Gino Watkins' proposition that a leader should be able and prepared to do all that his team must do. He must never be on his dignity with them, nor be above mild ribaldry at his own expense. It is not too much to say that in an expedition of this nature admiration, and even love, of the leader is the largest single factor making for happiness, and this team was a more than happy one."

The journey to Kathmandu, the marches through Nepal and the acclimatization period are enlivened with personal reminiscences, and under the heading "Icefall Escapades" the struggle to establish Camp III is recounted in similarly light vein. The epic of the Lhotse fall, for which the chief honours go to George Lowe, the author and six stout-hearted Sherpas, is well told, albeit with some degree of understatement.

The first attainment of the South Col and the arduous but less dramatic build-up conducted in the main by Noyce and Charles Wylie are given but scant space. In a series of vignettes the author goes on to tell of the tremendous achievement of Evans and Bourdillon in the "first assault," when they climbed to the South Summit and, at 28,900 feet, stood higher than man had ever stood before." He tells of the splendid carry by John Hunt and Da Namgyal and lastly of meeting the summit party on their descent, George Lowe hastening up to them, and he quotes Hillary's characteristic first remark to Lowe: "Well, we knocked the bastard off."

Then comes Ed. Hillary's story as given in his "first fragmentary account, full

of mountaineering understatement": . . . "a superb climb by two companions worthy of it and climbing as a rope of two should." At the end of the book are nine poems written at various stages of the expedition.

The book is superbly illustrated with photographs and with line drawings by A. J. Veilhan in collaboration with the author. The "end papers" consist of speaking likenesses, also by Veilhan, of seventeen members of the party, including Tom Stobart of cine-camera renown and James Morris *The Times* correspondent.

Wilfrid Noyce has produced a first-class—it may be said necessary—supplement to Sir John Hunt's excellent official history of the expedition. He has succeeded in what he set out to do by presenting vividly to the reader the scenes which he himself saw and in which he took part.

H. W. T.

**Journey by Junk.** By Willard Price. Wm. Heinemann Ltd. 1954. Pp. 219 and Index. Illustrated. 18s.

Before reading this book the title suggests an almost frivolous "Three-men-in-a-boat" quality. Nothing could be farther from the truth. It is a mixture of an excellent travel book, descriptive of junk journeyings on the Inland Sea of Japan, and a critical exposition of post-war Japan. Nor is adventure lacking—the description of Typhoon "Ruth" is very well done.

The author is an objective observer and his criticisms of General MacArthur's policies and actions are frank and justified by subsequent events. "Tea House of the August Moon" has a similar objective quality.

When Dr. Ackerman of Chicago University wrote his report he pointed out that "Japan is a nation of too many people on too little land . . . its problems stem from this condition." This is known and acknowledged by all students of Japan's situation, but these sentences were removed from the Ackerman report by order of S.C.A.P., or in other words General MacArthur, because of their advocacy of birth control. Five thousand Japanese babies are born every day, and this alarming rate of population increase is a problem full of dynamite. An order to suppress reference to birth control does not make it less explosive.

The problems attendant upon American occupation and the female population are legion and Madame Butterfly situations countless. Many marriages have taken place, but irregular unions are said to be responsible for perhaps 200,000 illegitimate births of mixed blood. Here is a problem of no mean proportions. We have had our perplexities in India over the Eurasian question, but the U.S.A. has to cope with "Americasians" and "Negrasians" owing to the presence of coloured troops.

I hope I have said enough to stimulate interest in this serious and important book written in an exceedingly impartial manner by an American citizen.

H. ST. C. S.

**The Indus Civilization.** By Sir Mortimer Wheeler. A supplementary volume to the *Cambridge History of India*. Cambridge University Press. Pp. 95 and xxiv plates of illustrations. 18s.

The history of civilization begins with the discovery by primitive man that instead of wandering about in packs and living by hunting animals and fruits for his food, he can settle down and grow certain kinds of food for himself and his domesticated animals; but with the primitive tools he had it was not possible to do more than scratch the top surface of the soil and so he remained a semi-nomad and moved on when he had exhausted the fertility of one piece of ground. So the second great step came when he found that in certain more favoured localities Nature repaired the damage man had done by spreading every year a layer of silt over the lands on the

banks of a river, so that he could go on cultivating it year after year. There were no doubt a number of lesser regions where this happened, but real progress was made only where this came about with great regularity and on a sufficient scale to enable man to develop: and these regions were the valleys of the Nile, Euphrates and Tigris, Yellow River, and that which is the subject of this book, the Indus.

The book is, as stated, a supplementary volume to the *Cambridge History of India*, written to put in convenient form the results of recent research into the remains of this ancient civilization—now that a definite stage in its exploration has been reached and it is unlikely that any more will be undertaken for the present. It is a scholarly work and gives a very clear picture of the life that existed, especially at Mohenjo-daru and Harappa.

Much remains to be discovered: the relations between this civilization and that of its neighbours and contemporaries in Mesopotamia; the cause of its downfall and disappearance from history; and, above all, the key to its language, many long texts of which remain but are indecipherable. Should such further study be found possible, this book, which is a complete record of Indus civilization to date, should prove invaluable as a base.

The book is illustrated by a number of helpful maps and plans and twenty-four pages of excellent photographic illustrations.

A. G. N. O.

**Iran.** By Richard N. Frye. George Allen and Unwin. London. 1954. Pp. 120; 2 sketch-maps. 7½" × 4½". 8s. 6d.

The sub-title calls this little work "a concise, authoritative handbook of Iran and its position midway between East and West in the world today—an historical, political, economic, and religious analysis of a vital land and its people." It cannot within its 120 small pages claim to be an encyclopædic, but it is an excellent compendium of the subject, originally written for American readers. The principal components are a section on the land and its people, another on the history of the country ("Empires of the Past") and a third—the longest—dealing with the West and oil. So far as the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company is concerned the author states the position with fairness, about the only error being the statement that W. Knox D'Arcy was an Australian. He was in fact a native of Newton Abbot in Devonshire. There is a workmanlike bibliography of the chief English books and periodicals dealing with Persia, its history, literature and art, as well as a satisfactory index.

R. L.

**Al Yemen. A General Social, Political and Economic Survey.** By Dr. Gamal-Eddine Heyworth-Dunne. Cairo: Renaissance Bookshop. 1952. Pp. x+118; sketch-map. 50 piastres.

This small handbook on the Yemen, written by a well-known Middle Eastern scholar and close friend of the late Sayed Abdullah al Amri, will be a useful addition to the few books in English on this remote Arabian kingdom. It is by no means comprehensive and is similar in style to, and as badly printed as, Farougy's *Introducing Yemen* (New York, 1947). Nevertheless, there is much previously unpublished information here obtained from original sources.

The book has been written "with the special aim of helping experts and technicians proceeding to the Yemen." This it will certainly do if the reader has read no previous books on the kingdom, but to those well versed in Yemeni affairs requiring a more detailed study it will not, and indeed does not claim to, be adequate.

The Revolution of 1948 is dealt with in some detail and many new and interesting facts about it are revealed. It may be said here that the first single account of the revolution to appear in this country, apart from odd newspaper reports, was printed in the pages of this journal.

A bibliography would have been a useful addition to Dr. Heyworth-Dunne's work. Nowhere in any recently published work on the Yemen does an adequate bibliography appear. Dr. Scott included a list of the better-known works in his *In the High Yemen*, but there is a need for the publication of not only a comprehensive handbook on the country but also a full and classified bibliography. Such works exist in MSS., but public interest is such that publishers are naturally loathe to undertake production of literature with so limited potential circulation.

ERIC MACRO.

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**Report from Malaya.** By Vernon Bartlett. Published by Derek Verschoye. 1954. Pp. 128. Ill. 10s. 6d.

The author disclaims any intention to write for the expert, and he is no doubt correct in doing so. It may be pointed out, however, that to be fully qualified to write about the many controversial sides of Malaya requires a long background of residence in that delectable part of the globe, allied to an up-to-date knowledge of it, a qualification possessed by few. Perhaps the author has not the former qualification, but he is a competent and keen observer and his conclusions are apposite and very well worthy of consideration.

It was obviously impossible for the author to draw his conclusions without reference to the officials of the country, to the non-officials and other citizens of Malaya.

From these contacts he has produced an objective and reliable picture of conditions as they are today. The tremendous economic importance of Malaya as a producer of vast quantities of rubber and tin is perhaps sometimes overlooked in Great Britain. Also the immense importance as a dollar-earner. Our gratitude should go out to the tough and determined rubber planters—not forgetting their wives—who keep production going in spite of the ever-present danger of ambush and violence in which they live—or perhaps one should say they exist. Many war ribbons have been earned more easily.

The general impression of the value of General Templer's work remains with the reader. The police force work of Colonel Young ably seconds General Templer's work. Colonel Young is out to show the mixed oriental population that the Federation police wish to demonstrate that they are the friends of the public whom they wish to serve, a state of affairs stemming from our own police force.

Vernon Bartlett claims there is no such thing as Western civilization—there is civilization and that this is spreading one may safely conclude. Democracy may be difficult for the Malayan, the Chinese and the Indian fully to understand, but civilization and its attendant good government will, one feels, come to be appreciated by this rich and prosperous land. To those who know Malaya much in the book will appeal. To those wishing to know something of the country and its problems much will be revealed.

H. ST.C. S.

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**Babylonian and Assyrian Religion.** By S. H. Hooke. London: Hutchinson's University Library. 1953. Pp. 128. 8s. 6d.

Professor Hooke's purpose in writing this book is to provide the ordinary reader with a reliable and up-to-date account of the religious beliefs and practices of the ancient inhabitants of the Tigris-Euphrates valley, whose civilization so greatly influenced the other peoples of the Near East, not least the Hebrews. The book is accordingly addressed to students both of comparative religion and of the Old Testament, for whom a knowledge of Babylonian religion is indispensable. It is concerned in the main with the elements common to the religion of both the Babylonians and the Assyrians, but outstanding differences in the religions of the two peoples are duly noted.

The work consists of ten main chapters. Ch. i deals with the sources which

archæology has made available for the study of the subject; ch. ii with the cultural background of the religion; ch. iii with the names and functions of the most important gods of the pantheon; ch. iv with temple buildings and personnel; ch. v with rituals; ch. vi with mythology; ch. vii with religion and daily life; ch. viii with divination and its technique; ch. ix with divination and astrology; and ch. x with the gods and the moral government of the world. An appendix of twenty pages contains a selection of ritual and other religious texts in illustration of the account of the religion given in the main body of the book. There is a useful bibliography and a general index.

The fact that Sumerian culture has shaped and influenced almost every aspect of Babylonian and Assyrian culture makes it difficult to determine what elements in the religion of the Babylonians are of purely Semitic origin. Professor Hooke thinks it possible, however, that the cult of the moon-god and of the sun-god may have been brought into Mesopotamia by the invading Semites (p. 28). Contrasts in Mesopotamian and ancient Egyptian religion are brought out—for example, there is nothing in Mesopotamia corresponding to what appears to be a totemistic stage of religion in Egypt (pp. 23, 24); and again, whereas in Egypt the Pharaoh was unequivocally divine, it is questionable whether divine kingship was an essential element in Babylonian religion. Professor Hooke is careful to add, however, that something here depends upon the terminology used, for the situation may be regarded somewhat differently if the word "sacral" were substituted for the word "divine" (pp. 35 f.). Professor Hooke is especially interesting when he writes on mythology and rituals. Students of the Old Testament will be much struck, for example, by his description of the *puhu*—or substitution—ritual, and the light it may throw on the Hebrew ritual of the Day of Atonement (pp. 43 ff.). A comparison of the Tammuz liturgies with the Old Testament provides some interesting parallels. As examples may be cited Psalm lxxiv. 3-9 and the descriptions in the liturgies of the ruin wrought in the temples of Lammuz by the powers of the underworld; and again, "the word of Tammuz" and its effects remind us strongly of "the word of Yahweh" and its destructive power when he is angry. Professor Hooke believes that it is here not a question of direct borrowing by the Hebrews from Mesopotamian sources, but rather of the use by the Hebrews of ancient poetic forms and metaphors which lay ready to their hand (pp. 40 ff.). Some of the details given about Babylonian clergy are interesting. We learn, for example, that there was no rule of celibacy, that stipends varied considerably, and that offices could be held in plurality (pp. 53 f.). Those who have been accustomed to think that Yahweh alone of the gods of the ancient world was a moral god will doubtless be surprised to learn that in the proemium to the Code of Hammurabi is to be found "a clear statement that the high gods are animated by a moral purpose, and that the moral standards set forth in the Code represent the will of the gods" (p. 98). Like the Hebrew Psalmist, the Babylonian worshipper could feel conscious of moral offences he had committed (pp. 35, 99). An unusually interesting suggestion is that in the re-editing of the Epic of Creation, and the suppression of many of the more unedifying Sumerian myths about the gods, may be seen something like the prophetic editing of Israel's early history (p. 99).

These few illustrations are enough, it is hoped, to show that in his selection of material Professor Hooke reveals a rare judgment both as to what is important and as to what is likely to arouse the interest of the reader. The comparative brevity with which the subject is treated cannot conceal the wide learning of the author, nor his ability to express, impressively and in a few words, conclusions profoundly important for the history of religion (see, for example, the last sentence on p. 102). It is of the utmost importance that books written for the layman should be trustworthy. This Professor Hooke's work certainly is. While, as he rightly says, "any book on the subject of Babylonian and Assyrian religion is bound to get out of date in a few years, as new material accumulates and is made available" (Introduction, pp. ix f.), he has succeeded in giving an admirable account of the religion of these peoples so far as it is known at the present time.

Two brief comments. The addition of a chronological table would have added to the usefulness of the book. And secondly, on p. 98, line 15, "millennium" is no doubt nothing more than a *lapsus calami* for "century."

D. WINTON THOMAS.

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# NOTICES

## REVISED LIST OF MEMBERS—1956

WILL members wishing to receive a new and revised list of members inform the Secretary, at 2, Hinde Street, before December 1. Requests received after that date may result in disappointment, as only a limited number, based on the demand, will be printed. Each member can have one copy only. Lists are for the personal use of members only.

SECRETARY.

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THE Council acknowledges with gratitude the following:

*Voyages de Chardin en Perse*. Tomes 1 and 2. Par L. Langles. Presented by Lt.-Col. W. French, D.S.O., M.C.

A Select List of Books on *The Civilizations of the Orient*, prepared by the Association of British Orientalists. Published by the Clarendon Press, Oxford. 1955.

*Chinese History and World History: An Inaugural Lecture*, by E. G. Pulleyblank. Published by the Cambridge University Press. 1955.

*Bibliography on South-western Asia*, by Henry Field. Published by the University of Miami Press, Florida. 1953.

*Contributions to the Fauna and Flora of South-western Asia*. Prepared for publication by Henry Field. 1955.

*Pakistan, 1953-4*. Presented by the Pakistan Government.

Map: Sheets, Sven Hedin/Zentralasien Atlas: Sheets, N.K. 43, 44, 45. Alma-Ata, 1942, Aqsu, 1942, Turfan, 1940. Presented by D. P. Barrett.

Pamphlets: *Islamic Swords in Middle Ages*, by Col. A. R. Zaki. Extrait du Bulletin de l'Institut d'Egypte, Session 1953-4. Presented by the author.

*The Story of Kuwait*. Illustrated brochure by the Kuwait Oil Company.

*H.A. Bulletin, a Companion Publication to Historical Abstracts Quarterly*. Vol. I, No. 1. March 1955.

Reprint from Vol. II, No. 1. 1955 Journal of Oriental Studies. *The Return of the Torghuts from Russia to China*, by C. D. Barkman. University of Hongkong.

*Malaya Today*, by W. C. S. Corry, C.B.E. British Commonwealth Affairs, No. 9. Published under the auspices of and presented by the Royal Empire Society.

The Honorary Secretaries will be glad to receive unwanted copies of the Society's JOURNAL as follows:

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Responsibility for opinions expressed in articles published, and for the accuracy of statements contained in them, rests solely with the individual contributors.

## IN MEMORIAM

### COLONEL ALISTAIR M. GIBB

**T**HE Society has suffered a severe loss in the passing of Alistair Gibb. He served on the Council for six years and in June this year was appointed Vice-Chairman. His firm, Sir Alexander Gibb and Partners, afforded valuable financial assistance to the Society, and his own sound judgment was always at the service of the Council at their meetings.

The eldest son of Sir Alexander Gibb, G.B.E., C.B., he was born in 1901 and educated at Eton and Pembroke College, Cambridge, after which he entered his father's firm of consulting engineers. In this firm he became senior partner in 1949. He served in Kenya and was a member of the Executive Council of the Joint East and Central Africa Board, as deputy chairman of the Conservative Commonwealth Council, and as chairman of the East and Central Africa Group.

He unsuccessfully contested Swindon in 1945 in the Conservative interest.

His war service in 1939-45 took him to the Middle East and to Italy. He had a Lieut.-Colonel's command in the Royal Wiltshire Yeomanry and was made Hon. Colonel of the Regiment in 1951.

He was a keen polo player, president of the Cirencester Polo Club and captain of the Cotswold Park team. He also helped his brother-in-law, Lord Cowdray, with the revival of polo at Cowdray Park, Midhurst.

The manner of his death holds a certain consolation, as at the moment of his end he was doing something which he loved to do—playing a game to which he was devoted.

Deep sympathy is felt and tendered to his wife and daughter.

H. ST. C. S.

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### MAJOR-GENERAL H. R. L. HAUGHTON, C.B., C.I.E., C.B.E.

**G**ENERAL "HARRY" HAUGHTON was one of the oldest members of the Society and one whose delightful lectures will long be remembered. He was a very distinguished soldier, orientalist and explorer, and his many exploits covered a very wide field.

He was educated at Winchester and cherished his scholarly association with his great school all through life.

His very distinguished career in the Army began at Chakdarra Fort in "the Malakand" as a young officer in a Sikh regiment, and he was destined to serve for many years on the North-West Frontier of India, where his illustrious military forebears had established his great family tradition.

Steeped in this great tradition and animated by the vigour of its bracing climate, he threw himself into the task of mastering the habits, customs and languages of the many races and tribes that inhabited the north of

India, and especially those that have played such an important part in the military fortunes of the British Commonwealth and Empire.

His tall, dignified presence, genial good humour and outstanding sportsmanship enabled him to obtain an insight into the lives and hearts of peoples and races across the whole field of the Society from the Mediterranean to Peking.

His special talents expressed themselves in his magnificent collection of ancient coins, chiefly of the Græco-Bactrian period, as well as his beautiful collection of ancient sculptures from the tribal areas of the Frontier and of international repute. His enlarged photographs and coloured transparencies cover a very wide field of scenic, architectural and racial subjects of peculiar charm and outstanding merit.

His early service in Gilgit gave him the opportunity of becoming a very experienced big game shot, and his collection of Himalayan big game heads was outstanding.

His special knowledge of the Dardic races of Kashmir remains in his authoritative writings, and Kashmir itself was for him a happy hunting ground. His love of exploration carried him to the borders of Chinese-Turkestan, through the most inaccessible gorges of the Upper Indus Valley, as well as to the rocky screes and frozen lakes of the high Kashmir valleys.

During the serious Frontier civil disturbances between the wars he was in command of the military occupation of Peshawar City, where his masterful handling of the very serious situation elicited universal confidence.

He was especially selected to inaugurate and command the Indian Military Academy at Dehra Dun at its inception.

His happiest command was perhaps that of the Kohat district, where he was actively engaged in the "Watch and Ward" of the Frontier, with scope for studying Roberts' battlefield at the Peiwar, as well as that of "Charikar" in Afghanistan, when he was able to visit Kabul and see the tomb of Babar the Great Moghul as well as Shahjehan's beautiful garden at Mimla, well versed as he was in the art and architecture of the Moghuls.

His occasional visits to Kashmir, Kulu, or Swat with rifle or shot gun, fishing rod or camera, to which his exquisite pictures of mountain glen, river and lake, and the flowers and peoples of the countryside give evidence, confirm his flare for exploration.

A pair of "Ovis Poli" horns from the Pamirs adorned his last resting place at Blewbury beside the Berkshire Downs.

Major-General Haughton's death is a sad loss to the Society. He interpreted to perfection the arts and culture of the West with the deepest appreciation and understanding of the varying cultures of Asia from the Golden Horn to distant Cathay.

E. H. C.

# THE YEMEN

By B. W. SEAGER, C.M.G., O.B.E.

Report of a lecture delivered to the Royal Central Asian Society on Wednesday, April 6th, 1955, Group Captain H. St. Clair Smallwood, O.B.E., in the chair.

The CHAIRMAN: Ladies and Gentlemen, it is my privilege today to introduce to you Mr. Seager from the West Aden Protectorate. He is going to speak to us about the Yemen and, judging by the number present, I realize how topical his subject is at this moment. Only yesterday we were told that the ruler had decided to abdicate, but today the news is that his abdication is over; he is back in power. In the absence of newspapers, to have something direct from the Yemen by word of Mr. Seager is an advantage on which we can congratulate ourselves. Without further ado, I ask Mr. Seager to address you.

I HAVE been asked to speak to you today about the Yemen, that independent Moslem State in South-West Arabia.

Little is known of this country, because its rulers, who are by nature xenophobic, have elected to deny foreigners easy access to it. Its people have had an extremely turbulent past. In the whole of its history the country has been under the rigid control of a strong central government for about twenty-five years. Prior to 1930 the country was never ruled or administered, as we understand these words. The Ottoman Turks were the sovereign power for over 400 years, on and off, but they were never able to get to close grips with the population.

Before the Turkish domination the country had been conquered by invaders. This had its effect on the people, making them fanatically intolerant of outside interference. It has been said that the peculiar geographical configuration of the Yemen has been the prime factor in determining its fortunes. I think that there is a lot of truth in this. Thousands of square miles of the country are mountainous, with natural barriers dividing clan from clan and tribe from tribe. Blood feuds, which raged for centuries, were certainly prompted and nourished by enforced confinement behind these barriers. Today the people are still intensely suspicious of outsiders, Christians in particular; ignorance and fear of the outside world have combined to engender an anti-foreign bias. In their minds a foreigner can never be up to any good at any time. When I was a guest of the Yemeni Government in San'a—and I was a constant visitor—the Guard of the Guest House obviously had orders to intrude on my privacy at unexpected moments. After a time I got used to having my bedroom door flung open without warning and being subjected to a careful scrutiny by the Guard Commander. His superiors, with their ingrained suspicion, felt impelled to find out whether the curious foreigner was up to any mischief.

The Yemen's superficial area is about 80,000 square miles, and its population—now all Moslem—does not exceed 3,000,000. This figure is approximate; there has been no census in the Yemen, and no statistics are available. The country is bounded on the north by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, on the west by the Red Sea, where it has a coastline of about 260

miles, on the south by the Aden Protectorate, and on the east by the Rub al Khali, or Empty Quarter. The Moslem population is divided into two sects. The Shafais, or orthodox Moslems, form two-thirds of the total population, and the Zeidis, a branch of Shiism, form the remainder.

It is still difficult to trace Yemeni history with any accuracy. For hundreds of years at a time there have been blanks which to this day remain obscure.

The early Egyptians were greatly interested in the south Arabian spice route, and their voyages are recorded far back before the Christian era. Queen Hatsheput, of the eighteenth dynasty, about 1500 B.C., sent an expedition down to the Red Sea to bring back myrrh. It is likely that this expedition touched at some Yemeni port. Towards the end of the third century B.C. the Egyptians under Ptolemy did a lot of exploring in the Red Sea, and it is fairly certain that they visited the Yemen.

The earliest recorded State in the Yemen was that of the Minæans at Main in Jauf in the South-East Yemen. It rose to power in 1000 B.C. and flourished until 600 B.C. The Minæans were merchants of repute. Another well-known Yemeni State was that of Saba (from 950 B.C. to 115 B.C.). Its capital was also in the south-east. Incidentally, no concrete evidence is as yet available from inscriptions of the existence of the Queen of Sheba, although it is not impossible that she did exist. There have been other female rulers in Arabian history. Another Yemeni State was that of Qataban, said to have arisen at an early date before Christ; but it was absorbed by the Himyarite Kingdom in the Christian era.

The Himyarites came into being in the second century B.C., and continued until early in the sixth century. They were overthrown in A.D. 525 by the Abyssinians. The Himyarites absorbed the Kingdom of Qataban and Saba, and at one time claimed that they were overlords of what we now know as the Hadramaut. It is interesting to relate that a section of a tribe in the Eastern Aden Protectorate is today known as the Beni Himyar.

South-West Arabian history from the seventh to the sixteenth century remains confused. Tradition has it the conversion of the Yemen to Islam was the work of Ali, the Prophet's son-in-law. In the Ali mosque in San'a there is said to be a Quran written by him and stained with the blood of the children of the Governor appointed by him.

In the tenth century we hear of the Zeidi sect for the first time. This sect takes its name from Zeid, a grandson of Ali. Zeid never lived in the Yemen; he was killed in Iraq, and became a martyr. We next hear of two Zeidi colonies, the first on the shores of the Caspian and the other at Sada in Northern Yemen. Here the line of the Imams of the Yemen was founded by Al Hadi Yahya Arrasi, a descendant of Ali and Fatma, daughter of the Prophet. It is certain, therefore, that the present Imam is a descendant of the Prophet and that his house is that of the Rassid dynasty. The succession has not always passed from father to son, but the Imamate has continued in the Rassid dynasty for at least 900 years. After being defeated by the Rasulids (successors of Selaheddin's governors) at Taiz (which is now the temporary capital of the Yemen and residence of the Imam Ahmed) in the thirteenth century, the Zeidi Imams retired into obscurity until the Turkish conquest in the sixteenth century. In spite of

its ups and downs and even disappearance for long periods, the Rassid dynasty has been remarkable for its persistence, and it has always come out on top.

The Turks first established themselves in the Yemen in the sixteenth century, and until forced to leave it, after World War I, had a hard time. There were continuous rebellions and revolts; sometimes they had the upper hand, sometimes they were powerless. In the seventeenth century they completely lost control over the lowlands, which were ruled by local Sheikhs under the nominal suzerainty of the Imams. A war of independence started with the accession of the Imam Al Mansur Billah Al Qasim in 1597, but he failed to drive the Turks out. His successor, Al Muayad Billah Muhammed, however, drove them to take refuge on Kamaran Island, in the Red Sea. After 1635 the rule of the Imams was not seriously challenged, though in 1727 they lost control of the parts of what is now the Aden Protectorate. In the nineteenth century the Turks reasserted themselves, and there was a resumption of Turkish rule. Revolts and disturbances continued, and in 1891, and again in 1904, there were general risings.

The father of the present Imam, Imam Yahya Hamid ud din al Mutawwkil ibn Muhammed al Mansur ibn Yahya Hamid ud din was born about 1868. He succeeded to the Imamate in 1904. At that time relations with the Turks were again very bad. He marched south from Sada and took San'a, the capital, putting the Turks to flight. A new Turkish expeditionary force, under Ahmed Feizi Pasha, returned in strength and retook San'a. So it went on. In 1911, Izzet Pasha, the Turkish Governor-General, thought it wise to seek a *rapprochement* with the Imam Yahya. The latter met him half-way, on account of hostile action by the Italians against Yemeni Red Sea ports. In 1913, Izzet Pasha, with great difficulty, obtained an imperial firman from the Sultan of Turkey which proclaimed a mediatized State, or *entente*, with the Imam. Relations with the Turks improved out of all recognition. In 1915, with the concurrence of the Imam Yahya, Ali Said Pasha, the Turkish commander in the Southern Yemen, invaded the Aden Protectorate and tried to take the colony but without success. In 1918 the Turks had to evacuate the Yemen altogether as a result of the 1918 Armistice terms.

The Government of the Yemen is centred in the Imam, or King—the head of the Zeidi sect and Commander of the Faithful. He and his predecessors claim to be direct descendants of the Himyarite Princes. It was in Himyaritic times that the Romans made an attempt to open up South-West Arabia and to incorporate it in the Roman Empire. In 24 B.C. Ælius Gallus, the Prefect of Egypt under Augustus, landed with an army at Yenbo on the Red Sea coast, north of Jedda, marching south-eastwards for about 900 miles, suffered abominably from sickness and thirst, but in spite of this reached Mariba in Aulahi country about 170 miles north-east of Aden. The Arab sheikh of this region recently asked us to help him restore the system of aqueducts which he said an occupying force from the north had destroyed prior to their withdrawal. When told that no British army had ever been there, he still insisted that a Frankish people from the north had damaged the irrigation system. It is likely that he

was repeating a tale passed on to him by his father and the latter's ancestors before him.

As you are no doubt aware, the descendants of the Prophet are known as Seiyids (plural: Sada). From these Seiyids the Imams of the Yemen are selected. Any Seiyid may be a candidate for the Imamate. The new Imam should be elected by the Zeidi Ulema, or learned men, immediately after the death of his predecessor. It is likely that the Ulema find it convenient to elect as the new Imam the most powerful Seiyid in the country likely to be able to reward them for the brilliance of their choice. The late Imam Yahya was the first Imam in history to break with tradition and nominate a Crown Prince in his own lifetime. This Crown Prince, the eldest son of Imam Yahya, rules today. Imam Yahya's action created a storm at the time, but he was powerful enough to weather it.

The Seiyids in the Yemen are the privileged class and the country is run by them, but under the Imam, who ultimately controls everything. No decision is taken without reference to him. Once in 1937 I ran short of petrol. When I was enquiring how I could replenish my stock I was advised to write personally to the Imam. This I did, and in due course the order to supply me arrived, signed by His Majesty. In the same way, if schoolmasters want chalk or dusters, or doctors require drugs or dressings, Imamic approval has to be obtained in writing.

While the Imam is the absolute head of the state and handles all its affairs personally, he has the assistance of, shall we call it, a Cabinet (for want of a better word). Some of his many brothers are Ministers and look after various departments, such as Health, Communications, Education, Justice, etc. The present Yemeni Foreign Minister, for instance, is Seif al Islam Abdullah, a brother of the Imam. There is also a Grand Council, or Majlis, composed of leading personalities, who are summoned when important matters are to be discussed. This Majlis has no executive function; it is purely advisory. For the main part, the Imam and his secretaries do all the work, and they have a lot to do.

There are two systems or sets of laws, the Civil Law, administered by the Governor or Sub-Governor, and the Quranic Law, or Ahqam Shariya, administered by the Hākim, or local Judge. In civil cases, appeal goes as high as the Imam himself. In Sharia cases there is a right of appeal to another Hākim, and from him there is a final appeal to the Istinaf, which is the highest court of appeal in San'a. Punishment under Sharia Law is severe. It has to be, as the people are tough and undisciplined. For theft the thief loses his right hand; for adultery the punishment is stoning to death. Wine-drinking is punishable by flogging.

Taxation in the Yemen is heavy, though not so crippling as in the United Kingdom. The Quran proscribes almsgiving, and the Yemeni Government has reduced it to an art. All taxes go to the Treasury, or Beit al Mal. There is the "zakāt," a fortieth of a man's capital ( $2\frac{1}{2}$  per cent.); "ashur," or a tenth tithe, on crops; there is "fitra," a poll tax which works out at less than a shilling a head at the end of the fasting month of Ramadhan. The last tax is the "idda," which amounts to about one dollar (say, six shillings) on every twenty sheep owned. The bane of the Yemeni farmer is the tax assessor, or Muthemmir, who comes round

annually to assess the crops. He is arbitrary, usually oppressive, and what he says goes. I once ventured to bring this to the notice of the late Imam, Yahya, who said he was well aware of the abuses and did all he could to punish offenders.

The Yemeni Government controls the country rigidly by the Hostage system, "Rahina" (plural: Rahayin). Nearly all the tribes furnish hostages for their good behaviour. The naughtier the tribe, the more the hostages. They range in age from four to fifty years. I should say at least 2,000 hostages are held in various administrative centres and rural prisons. The system is a harsh but effective one. The tribes live in savage, inhospitable country in fort-like dwellings; they are a wild and turbulent people, and ordinary democratic laws would be quite useless to check their excesses. If the Imam were to abandon this system he would have to double his security forces. The tribes do not like furnishing hostages, but they are well aware that their behaviour merits such a system. Sometimes a hostage gets away, but he is always brought back by his sheikh in due course. There is trouble if he isn't. A tribe, when called upon to furnish a hostage, is not allowed to send just anyone they like; he must be the sheikh's son, nephew or first cousin. If the tribe in question is behaving itself well, the hostage or hostages will be allowed to go home on holidays and feast days. A hostage does not remain a hostage for life; he is changed every year or two unless the tribe is being really tiresome.

Education is not far advanced. There are hundreds of Quranic schools, but only two secondary schools. There is sufficient education for the sons of the great houses, who will be the leaders of the future. There is an orphanage in San'a and a university at 'Ibb, where theology is taught. There is a move to extend education, but it has not gone very far as yet.

Currency in the Yemen is the Maria-Theresa dollar, or riyal, a very large silver coin weighing one ounce. It is still manufactured in Europe, some by the Royal Mint.

The people of the Yemen vary a great deal in type from district to district, owing partly to differences in origin and partly to climatic influences.

In the Tihama, or lowlands, the people are dark and slightly built and betray a negroid slave element. In the highlands we find the true mountaineer, taller and bigger limbed; here there is no negroid taint.

There are roughly four social classes: (1) the Seiyid (plural: Sada), or the descendant of the Prophet. This is the privileged class, and everyone does their bidding. If they are not landowners they are senior or junior officials and are held in high esteem. (2) The next is the tribesman, or "kabilli," who forms the bulk of the population, (3) After the tribesman comes the "subject-cum-citizen," or "rawi" (plural: "raya"). This class includes traders, merchants, artisans, those farmers who are not tribesmen, and others lower in the social scale. Lastly there is the "khadim" (plural: "akhdam"), who is probably the descendant of slaves imported during the Abyssinian domination of the sixth century A.D.

The dress of the women varies considerably. The tribeswoman or peasant wears trousers which are a cross between Jodhpurs and the baggy "shalvas" of the Ottoman Turks. In San'a the outdoor dress of the more



leisured classes is startling. The whole body is covered in a long, brightly coloured printed or embroidered shawl. Beneath this the head is shrouded in a long blue veil printed with diamond-shaped rectangles, each having a white inner and a black outer border. Anyone seeing them for the first time might easily imagine that they were members of a secret society in full regalia. My wife tells me that, in the privacy of the harem, the dresses worn are gay and diverse, and fashion varies from place to place; thus, in San'a, small coronets (made of rolls of paper covered in material) are worn on the head to hold the veil in place. Much intricately designed silver-gilt jewellery is worn, though this may now have become rare, as it was all made by the Jews. Amber and other semi-precious stones found in the country are used a great deal for necklaces, set in heavy silver mountings.

Until 1948 there must have been close on 40,000 Jews in the Yemen. They lived mostly in the towns, but there were a few rural communities. The Jews themselves hold that the Yemeni Jews, the very oldest Jewish community outside Israel, arrived in the Yemen forty-two years before the destruction of the Temple. Seventy-five thousand of them are said to have left Jerusalem when the Prophet Jeremiah declared, "He that goeth forth from this city shall save his soul, and live." Many crossed the Jordan, turned southwards towards the deserts, and finally reached the Yemen. They were of the warrior class and made themselves masters of the area in which they settled. In the third century A.D. the Yemeni Jews sent their important dead to be buried in the Holy Land. Inscriptions discovered in Lower Galilee prove this.

On my many journeys to San'a before 1948 I saw quite a lot of the Jews. In that year there must have been not less than 20,000 of them in San'a alone. Here they lived in their own quarter, the Haret al Yahud, surrounded by a high wall, and were the artisans and craftsmen of the country—jewellers, glaziers, leather workers, builders, etc.

At one time these Jews in San'a could live anywhere in the city. One of the Imams, however, expelled them to the Taiz area, over 150 miles to the south, where they were badly treated. At that time in Taiz lived a renowned Jewish scholar and philosopher named Shepezi, whose representations to the Imam prevailed, and in due course all the expelled Jews returned to San'a; but this time they were confined to one quarter, where their descendants lived until 1948.

Shepezi's tomb is in Taiz, and Jews from all over the world have made pilgrimages to it.

Over the years prior to 1948 only a few thousand Jews managed to reach Palestine. They left secretly in twos and threes, as the Imam did not like to see them go, not wishing to lose his artisans. In 1948, however, the call to Israel was insistent, and all the Jews in the Yemen trekked painfully southwards to Aden, whence they were flown by four-engined aircraft direct to Israel, 150 at a time. It was a remarkable sight to see them arrive in Aden, some on foot, some on camel-back, many on lorries. Most had never seen a car or lorry, let alone an aircraft; and of course they had never seen the sea. The Aden Government established a transit camp for them; at one time the camp must have held at least four thousand. As fast as they were flown away others arrived to take their place.

The State of Israel should be grateful to the Imam Ahmed for putting no obstacles in the way of the Yemeni Jews mass exodus. I know that Yemeni governors had explicit orders to expedite them on their way. I think I am right in saying that not a single Jew was attacked or molested on his way southwards. Some must have trekked over 600 miles through Arab territory. It is true that they had to pay a lot of money on the way, but the important thing is that they got through, though inevitably many of the sick and elderly fell by the wayside.

The Yemeni Jews were extremely strict in the observance of their religion. I once passed a remote Jewish village which was surrounded, at intervals of about ten yards, by strips of mud walls four feet high by four feet long. When I enquired the reason for the walls, I was told that no Jew must go beyond these barriers between sunset on Friday and sunset on Saturday, in case he might be tempted to go for a walk or to play a game.

It is a popular conception that Arabia is a hot land, and for the most part it is so, the peninsula being practically bisected by the Tropic of Cancer; but the height of the western half greatly lowers its temperature, so that in the winter the weather can be very cold, with night frosts.

On the whole, the Yemen enjoys a climate superior to, and entirely different from, that prevailing in other parts of Arabia, because it is dominated by high mountains, except on the coast. Inwards from the coast the desert extends up to twenty-five miles. Here rain is rare, but there is mist and drizzle.

The Yemen is an agricultural community. For 4,000 years at least a dry farming system has been developed which is based on the conservation of soil and moisture. In the highlands, only by very hard work and amazing skill have the inhabitants made intensive farming possible. The soil in the mountains is conserved by an elaborate terracing system which has to be seen to be believed. The fields depend on rain and on the collection of water streaming off the slopes, carrying with it fertilizing agents derived from the excreta of animals. On steep slopes the terraces are so narrow that they can only be cultivated by hand, some being only three feet long by two feet wide at the tops of slopes. On the middle slopes the terraces are broader and are supported by massive stone walls. Water is led to these fields by an intricate system of channels, descending from terrace to terrace. It is courting death for a farmer to move a single stone from the channel of one of his neighbours; each channel is guarded jealously in the rainy season. In the valleys and wadi-beds the cultivators rely on controlled flood water. Deflectors made of sand are built diagonally across wadi-beds. After rain or thunderstorms the farmers gather at these deflectors. As the flood waters rush down the wadi and reach the first barrier the water is deflected by it and is made to irrigate the quota of land for which it was constructed. When this has been completed, the deflector is breached and the water races down to the next one, where the same thing happens, and so on.

The main crops are millet or corn (dhurra), bulrush millet (dukhn), wheat (burr), barley (shair) and maize (hind). Wheat and barley are grown to a height above the middle altitudes. Some cotton is grown in the lowlands.

There is plenty of fruit—quinces, plums, apricots, peaches, pears, pomegranates, figs (introduced by the Turks), mangoes, tamarind, pawpaws, bananas, sweet-limes, custard apples, and a great variety of grapes. In the highlands round San'a twenty-five different kinds of the latter are grown. My favourite was the "bayadh," a small, sweet, stoneless grape. There are date-palms in the lowlands and at 4,000 feet; this crop is not exported, but consumed locally.

There are no manufacturing industries in the Yemen, only local handicrafts, the textile industry being an old-established one.

There is dhow building on the sea coast. The wood used is the Yemeni acacia, which is very hard and enduring. As there is no planned afforestation, South-West Arabia is gradually being denuded of trees, largely in order to produce charcoal, which is the principal fuel used.

The Yemen's most important export is coffee—coffee "Arabica," which I believe is the only kind grown in Arabia. It flourishes at high altitudes, usually from 4,500 to 8,000 feet. Up to the middle of the nineteenth century most of the Yemeni coffee was either exported through the port of Mocha on the Red Sea coast, or was picked up by camel caravans that came from far and wide in search of it. These caravans also brought merchandise from the Middle East and Europe and sold it in Mocha. There is a record of a caravan of a thousand camels which actually brought goods from as far away as Hungary and Venice. After 1850 Mocha declined, and today it is a pitiable and depressing sight.

Apart from coffee, the only other Yemeni exports are hides and skins, some ghi (or semin) and a limited amount of cereal. And, of course, qāt . . .

It is quite impossible to talk about the Yemen without mentioning qāt.

The habit of chewing young leaves of this shrub is a noxious form of drug-addiction which has taken possession of the people of South-West Arabia, but particularly of the Yemen, where the practice is almost universal. The shrub, said to have been introduced from Abyssinia, is cultivated in small plantations, on terraced fields or in walled gardens. It flourishes at altitudes between 4,000 and 8,000 feet. Every house has at least one qāt chewing-room, and very often two—one for the women as well as one for the men. Wealthy people hold large qāt parties, often repeated day after day among the same group of friends. These parties generally begin after lunch and may last well on into the evening.

Anything from twenty to forty people may gather in one ill-ventilated room, where they sit round the walls, each with his bundle of qāt and a spittoon in front of him. When a man has chewed for some time, swallowing only the juice of the plant, his cheeks become uncomfortably distended with the paste of chewed leaves, which is then ejected into the spittoon with the aid of a finger. He then drinks water noisily, swilling out the mouth preparatory to another chew.

There is little or no conversation during a chewing session. A feeling of contentment and well-being is said to be experienced, though not drowsiness. In fact, most people will tell you that it produces wakefulness and mental alertness.

I have chewed it myself and found the taste bitter but not unpleasant.

It did not make me feel particularly happy or contented; in fact, at the time the effect on me seemed to be nil, but I did find, later, that it kept me from sleeping, rather in the same way that a high altitude will keep one wakeful and alert.

The social results of qāt-chewing are very considerable, because, apart from any physical ills it may produce, it is such a waste of time, money and land—the latter because the qāt trade is so profitable that ground formerly devoted to the production of coffee or vines is very often given up to the shrub, which can produce as many as three crops a year.

By way of explaining my presence in South-West Arabia, I must go into a little personal history. In 1933 I was serving in the British Legation in Jedda in Saudi Arabia; at the end of that year I was seconded for three months to Aden to assist indirectly in the treaty negotiations in San'a. I returned to Jedda at the end of my secondment, but joined the Colonial Administrative Service in Aden in September 1934, as a direct result of that treaty, as I will explain.

During the negotiations in San'a it emerged that the Yemeni Government were not then prepared to consent to the exchange of diplomatic representatives. It was agreed, however, that in order to regulate frontier affairs the Aden Government should appoint a Political Officer to act as their representative at frontier discussions with the Yemeni authorities. I had the good fortune to be appointed to this post, and acted as Frontier Officer from 1934 until 1942, and continued to carry out this duty on my promotion to British Agent.

Frontier work was extremely interesting, if at times hazardous. I will give, briefly, an example or two of the kind of work I had to do. One assignment, lasting three months, was to study the *status quo* line in the west-north-west sector of the frontier and settle disputes as we went along. This was an excellent idea in theory, but we soon found out that it was an entirely different matter in practice. One decision we had to make was whether a certain house was inside or outside Protectorate boundaries. On the day of the examination of this sector I was amazed to find nearly 1,000 Protectorate tribesmen, armed to the teeth, awaiting my arrival. Shortly afterwards I heard a great commotion—the blowing of bugles and the rattle of musketry; it heralded the arrival of my Yemeni colleague, with a following of over 600 Yemeni tribesmen, also armed to the teeth. He and I climbed up to the house in question—it was high up on a spur—and I asked its owner whether he considered the house to be outside or inside the Protectorate. He replied that without a shadow of doubt it was inside. No sooner were the words out of his mouth than I heard the loud rattling of rifle bolts. I looked round, and, sure enough, about 100 Yemenis (near neighbours of my informant) had loaded their rifles and were looking menacingly at the house-owner and his friends. The next development was an even louder rattling as over a hundred Protectorate tribesmen loaded their rifles and looked daggers at the Yemenis. Other tribesmen started to back away, and I felt exactly like a customer in the bar of a Wild West film when the villain and the hero are about to shoot it out. I appealed to the mob to disperse, but I might have been threatening the moon for all the good it did. The tribesmen of both sides were screaming

and gesticulating at each other and saying all sorts of unprintable things; rifles were brandished in the air, and some of them had their hands on their daggers. Among other things, both tribes were at blood-feud with each other, and it was obvious that no argument would stop a battle. With the wholehearted consent of my Yemeni colleague, I announced that no decision would be taken that day. So with an ill grace we departed from the scene, each in his own direction, taking our unwelcome following with us. That day we learnt a valuable lesson: that in cases of this sort it was sheer folly to announce the date and time of our arrival in advance.

The commonest cases we had to handle were those concerned with tribal killings and lootings. A Yemeni tribe, for instance, might cross the border, loot a number of camels, and in the inevitable fight that ensued blood would be spilt. To stop retaliatory raids we would at once arrange for the return of the loot, and insist on the payment of "dia," or blood-money. The amount of blood-money varies in South-West Arabia. We usually worked on a tariff of 777 dollars (about £230) per male killed, and half that for a woman. If an important man were killed, such as a sheikh's son, it was customary to impose a heavier "dia"—twice or three times the ordinary amount. Besides "dia," a fine known as "hashem," or "lom," was payable in most cases. The translation of these words is difficult. The nearest I can get to it is "honour money" or "face-saving money." This payment varied considerably; it could be anything from fifty to a thousand dollars. If, for instance, there was a killing during the period of a truce (and this happened not infrequently), "hashem," or "lom," would be insisted upon, and my colleague and I had to fix the amount. If a sheikh were killed, the immediate payment of "lom" was imperative. In many cases, relatives of the deceased refused to accept blood-money, the reason being that the acceptance of the money would imply that the victim had been a man of no consequence. In such cases we would bind the tribes to a short-term truce (to be enforced by both Governments if there should be a breach), and when tempers had cooled (sometimes months or even years later) arrange for the payment of the blood-money.

When we held sessions to settle such disputes, we invited the interested parties, who would always insist on bringing supporters with them. We learnt soon enough that if we did not limit the number of supporters, hundreds would turn up, and a battle be fought outside the council chamber. We would therefore state arbitrarily that each side could bring, say, ten supporters, and that any over that number would be sent away. As the rival parties entered the council chamber, guards at the door would remove each man's rifle and dagger, as it was courting disaster to allow anyone to have a weapon. During these meetings the parties would storm and rage and quite often, in the heat of the moment, their hands would automatically seek their daggers; on finding the empty sheath, they would dash their hands on the ground in rage, swearing that sooner or later they would kill each other. Others would get so excited and carried away that they would fling themselves out of the council chamber until their tempers had cooled; if this happened just when we were on the point of settling a

dispute, I or my colleague, or one of our advisers, would jump to his feet and drag the man back again. Sometimes a tug-of-war would ensue, but usually the man could be persuaded to sit down again. There was never a dull moment, but one had to be infinitely patient.

H.M. Ahmed bin Yahya Hamid ud din succeeded to the Imamate early in 1948, after the assassination of his father. Following the assassination, and as a result of a *coup d'état* engineered by elements led by Seiyid Abdullah ibn Al Wazir, who was subsequently beheaded, there was civil war for some weeks. In the end the Imam Ahmed prevailed, but not before San'a, the capital, had been looted from end to end.

I had the honour of meeting the present Imam for the first time in Taiz early in 1939. He was then Seif al Islam Ahmed, Governor-General of the Taiz Province, which has a contiguous frontier with the Aden Protectorate. Imam Ahmed is short in stature, with immensely broad shoulders and a large head. He has a wide, gold-toothed smile and huge protruding eyes. He is, in my opinion, by far the strongest personality in the Royal Family, and is renowned as a poet and a soldier. He is an absolute Ruler and, like his father before him, attends to every little detail in State and other matters.


His Majesty, though endowed with a powerful constitution, has not been really well for years. His many indispositions have affected him mentally as well as physically. Unlike his father, Imam Ahmed is imbued with a desire to introduce reforms and to modernize the Yemen. But at the same time he is the captive of Zeidi conservatism, and though he has the urge to go full speed ahead, caution and suspicion cause him to apply the brakes.

Since succeeding to the Imamate he has started a salt industry, introduced electricity in some towns, employed engineers to study the possibilities of new harbours, opened up new tracks and built roads, introduced aircraft, and generally made beginnings in the right direction; but he has not yet launched a major project which would benefit the country as a whole, and the country badly needs development.

The Yemen has vast possibilities. Its agricultural potential alone is immense. In the Tihama, on the Red Sea littoral, 200,000 acres could be put under cotton, with success practically assured from the outset, since water is there in abundance and the land is fertile. In that area, after rain, you merely have to drop a seed in the sand and in a twinkling it starts growing like a beanstalk. It has to be seen to be believed.

The Imam is much feared and he is not popular; there are many enemies of the régime, and he rules with an iron hand. Nevertheless whatever his shortcomings, deep within themselves, and often in spite of themselves, most South-West Arabians hold him in veneration.


After the Imam there are at present only three leading personalities. Seif al Islam Hassan, the Prime Minister, who, as a dyed-in-the-wool conservative, is opposed to all modernization; Al Bad'r, the Imam's eldest son, who at one time was his father's bitter political opponent; and another brother of the Imam, Seif al Islam Abdulla, who is the Foreign Minister. It is likely that one of these three will succeed to the Imamate in due course; but this is by no means assured, as any descendant of the Prophet is eligible



A CORNER OF THE YEMENI CAPITAL



RIDHA: A PROVINCIAL CAPITAL.



YEMENI SOLDIERS



MUHAMMAD AL-BADR, CROWN PRINCE  
AND PRIME MINISTER





ZEIDI WOMEN IN EVERYDAY OUTDOOR DRESS



YEMENI SOLDIERS QAT CHEWING



YEMENI LOWLANDERS FROM THE TINAMA OR COASTAL BELT



ZEIDI YEMENIS. NOTE TWO JEWS WITH CORKSCREW

to submit his candidature. It is possible that Ahmed's immediate successor will be the person who can first lay his hands on the State Treasury, or Beit al Mal, using the funds to pave his way to office. (See postscript.)

I will divide the subject of Anglo-Yemeni relations under three heads or, rather, into three periods of time.

Firstly, 1918 to 1934. As a result of the Armistice terms at the end of World War I, the Ottoman Turks had to leave the Yemen. With their departure in 1918 the late Imam Yahya (who was assassinated in 1948) started to consolidate his hold on the country. His task was a tough one, and there were many revolts and rebellions before he succeeded in imposing his will on his independent-minded countrymen. In the time of the Turks the people elected their own tribal sheikhs and had a measure of local autonomy. The Imam's policy was to weaken the cohesion of the tribes, and to this end he himself nominated the sheikhs, either directly or through his Governors in the provinces. Centralization was his aim; and the tribes, used to years, if not centuries, of semi-independence, objected forcibly to this revolutionary policy. There were many bloody encounters, but the Imam won in the end. During this period of consolidation Imamic forces crossed the Anglo-Yemeni frontier at more than one sector in the Western Aden Protectorate. In spite of protests on our part, and in some cases the use of air and land forces, Imamic troops did not withdraw entirely until February 1934, just before the signature of the Anglo-Yemeni Treaty of Friendship. In spite of these differences, Anglo-Yemeni relations were seldom badly strained, and at no time were they bitter.

From 1934 to 1952 relations were on the whole friendly. We had many differences, of course, and at times had to enforce the sanctity of the Protectorate borders by air operations. During this period I spent a lot of time walking about the Southern Yemen, and frequently found myself better acquainted with it than were the Yemeni officials, since they did not tour very much. At a session with the Imam in San'a in 1939, I jestingly remarked that if he ever wanted to know anything about the Southern Yemen he would do well to consult me. He thought this a huge joke, but I had obviously been tactless; his entourage were not at all amused by the remark. During this period the Yemeni Government afforded me every facility, and I remain grateful for their many kindnesses.

In 1952-1953, however, the Yemeni attitude began to change for the worse, although it was not at once apparent except to the closest observers. Things started to go wrong, and real hostility was manifested by officials, although my personal relations with them remained cordial. When I remonstrated with my opposite number, the Yemeni Frontier Officer, he retorted by saying that we had no right to be in the Western Aden Protectorate at all; it was an Arab country, and times had changed, and if we did not appreciate this fact we would have to learn the hard way. After August 1953 there were dozens of frontier incidents, which still remain unsettled. Relations went from bad to worse, and at the end of 1954 the Governor of Aden visited the Imam in Taiz in an attempt to solve outstanding differences. The peoples of the Aden Protectorate have been much shaken by these events, and they have caused certain dissident elements to defy the Aden Administration. It is possible that this defiance

may lessen as our relations with the Yemen improve, or if the Yemen believes that we will not proceed with the federation of the South-West Arabian States.

In order to explain the reasons for the deterioration in Anglo-Yemeni relations, I have to go back to the Anglo-Yemeni Treaty of 1934, Article III, the second half of which reads, "Pending . . . the high contracting parties agree to maintain the situation existing in regard to the frontier on the date of the signature of the Treaty . . ."

When the Anglo-Yemeni Treaty was signed in 1934 the Aden Administration in the Protectorate consisted of a Political Secretary and one Political Officer, to look after an area larger than England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. It is more than likely that the Imam Yahya assumed at the time that the size of the Administration would continue to remain the same, and that things would proceed as heretofore. It could not have entered his head—we did not know it ourselves—that the Aden Government, in consultation with the Protectorate Chiefs, would embark on a forward policy designed to improve the lot of the Protectorate peoples. But this is just what happened. The Protectorate administrative and technical staffs were increased 3,000 per cent. over the years following the signing of the Treaty, and anyone who had known the place in 1934 could not have recognized it in 1953, so vast were the changes. There is no doubt at all that the Imam was startled, and he must have viewed with consternation the improvement in the lot of the Protectorate peoples as compared with the continued stagnation in his own country. But there was worse to follow. The Protectorate Chiefs recently agreed in principle to federate their States. Whereas in the past each petty ruler had been an independent chief, usually at loggerheads with his neighbours, here now was a movement to join them all together and form a single federated State.

To return to Article III of the Treaty which I have just read to you. The Aden Government interpreted this article to mean what it said—namely, that we had agreed to maintain the situation existing in regard to the frontier as it was on the date of the signature of the Treaty. In other words, we interpreted "frontier" to mean "frontier" or, at the most, frontier area. Quite suddenly the Yemeni Government insisted, and still insists, that in that article we had not only bound ourselves to maintain the *status quo* on the frontier, but *inside the Aden Protectorate as well*. This, in effect, meant that any changes we made after the signature of the Anglo-Yemeni Treaty in 1934 in the set-up of the Protectorate constituted a breach of Article III.

The Yemenis supported their contention by saying that the Arabic version of Article III (as distinct from the English version) meant what they said it meant. The word for frontier in Arabic is "hadd" (plural "hudud"), and the plural was used in the article in question. They say that in this context "hudud" means the whole of the Protectorate and not just the frontier areas. Over the years, in casual conversation with Arabs, I have heard them refer loosely to countries in this way; but I am sure when the negotiators of the treaty drafted this article it did not enter their heads that anything but the *frontier* was being referred to. In any case, it

is illogical and unreasonable to assume that any contracting party to a treaty could, or would, tie itself down in advance to make no changes of any kind in a territory for which it was responsible. It just does not make sense at all.

However, the Yemenis hold to their contention and stated not long ago that as we had repeatedly and consistently violated the Treaty, they considered themselves free to do the same thing. Today they claim that the Western Aden Protectorate is an integral part of the Yemen and, this being the case, that we are unlawfully colonizing it.

It is true to say, therefore, that an impasse has been reached in Anglo-Yemeni relations.

The Yemenis have exacerbated the situation by encouraging dissident elements in the Aden Protectorate. This has been the main feature of their policy in the past two years. Curiously enough, we have helped them to further this policy by drawing up a complicated plan to federate the many South-West Arabian States. While the rulers of these States are not unwilling, in principle, to associate themselves more closely with one another, the very complexities of the federal plan have frightened some of them and their followers, for the simple reason that they do not really understand its implications. This has made them wary, and Yemeni propaganda and Arabic broadcasts from the Middle East have made them suspicious.

Basically, Yemeni objections to the federal plan go beyond the interpretation of Article III of the 1934 Treaty. It will be recalled that nearly two-thirds of the Yemeni population is Shafai and that the minority is Zeidi, the ruling class. All the people of the Aden Protectorate are Shafais, and so are the greater majority of Arabs in the Crown Colony of Aden. The Imam of the Yemen therefore views a federated Protectorate with real alarm, since certain repercussions in his own country could bring about an attempt by his Shafai subjects to link up with the Protectorate Shafais, and possibly assure the downfall, if not the total extinction, of the Rassid dynasty.

The present impasse in Anglo-Yemeni relations suits the Yemenis only so long as the morale of the Protectorate Chiefs remains low, and as long as the Administration remains poor, and the country inadequately developed.

The Imamic succession may convulse the Yemen in due course, but such a convulsion will not last indefinitely. A new ruler, undoubtedly a Zeidi, will emerge, and will continue by all means—fair or foul—to try to unite all Arabs in South-West Arabia. In the coming years no self-respecting Arab ruler could do otherwise.

It is interesting to recall at this stage the views of the late Colonel Jacob, who was, in his day, the authority on the Yemen. He was a senior official in the Aden Government, having served there for over twenty-three years. This is what he wrote in 1923:

“We made our inland Treaties, *i.e.* with the Protectorate Chiefs, in the face of an expanding Turkey. The Turks have left, and the *raison d'être* of these Treaties no longer holds. An Arab King has come forward [he was referring to the late Imam Yahya] and claims these Arabs as his

ancestral heritage. He [the Imam] spoke truly when he asserted that for the sake of greed these folk [he refers to the Protectorate Chiefs] have leaned to outsiders [meaning Britain] but this fact would not bar their return to the fold when times had changed and Arab ascendancy was once more revived. . . . Their end will be happier than their position under the surveillance of a foreign power, even if that power be England. To quote my favourite saw : ' the hand is still thy hand, be it ever so leprous.' It is the call of Arab to Arab. The Shafais, by their own admission, cannot combine. They have no leader. I believe that we cannot be justly charged with a breach of faith if we let these go over to the Imam. Too much has been written of the hostility of the creeds [he means Zeidi and Shafai] but all will flock to a strong Arab protector. Our interests in the country can best be conserved by consolidating our position in Aden, and letting the interior develop on Arab lines. It is by trade that we can prosper. If we require a buffer state to bring into relief the blessings of British rule, let us draw a line a little above Lahej, and cut the rest. . . ."

Although times have changed considerably since Colonel Jacob wrote those words, I quote them because they could have been written by any responsible Zeidi Yemeni official today.

#### DISCUSSION

Mr. LANGE : I have always understood that San'a was the capital of the Yemen, but a few days ago I heard a B.B.C. announcer say that our present diplomatic representative was located at Taiz. Has the capital been diverted from San'a to this other place?

Mr. SEAGER : San'a is still the capital of the Yemen, but in 1948, when the Imam succeeded, he elected to make Taiz his temporary capital.

Sir RONALD STORRS : Is there yet any Communist penetration into the Yemen?

Mr. SEAGER : None whatsoever, and I do not think there is any likelihood of it, because the method of dealing with people in South-West Arabia who have not the same political views as the ruler is quite effective.

Mr. GORDON WATERFIELD : What is the present position in regard to federation with the Aden Protectorate?

Mr. SEAGER : The present situation in regard to federation is, as I think I said, that the rulers wish to associate themselves more closely with each other, but that they have been rather frightened by the complicated federal plan, which they do not understand. It seems that the Aden Administration is at the present moment marking time. I could add a good deal more in regard to Federation, but it would not be judicious to do so at this moment.

Sir RONALD STORRS : Is Sultan Abdul Karim still going strong?

Mr. SEAGER : He died about eight years ago and was succeeded by his son Fadhl, who was mentally unstable and had to abdicate. Ali, who now rules in Lahej and was recently awarded the K.B.E., is a younger son of the famous Sultan Abdul Karim.

Asked what was the effect of the exodus of 40,000 Jews from the Yemen, they being the principal artisans,

Mr. SEAGER replied : When the Imam realized that in course of time all the Jews would be leaving, they were told to teach their trades to the Arabs. I do not say that they taught them very well, but they certainly taught many of them. Strange to relate, the Yemen does not seem to have suffered very much as a result of the exodus.

Mr. WHITTERON : There are rumours that some Germans have been granted oil and mineral rights in the Yemen.

Mr. SEAGER : Maybe there are some German technologists in the Yemen at present looking for oil; in fact, there have been in the past all kinds of technicians wandering about and writing lengthy reports, with no result. As far as I know, no Germans have been granted any exclusive rights to do mining in the Yemen, but I confess I am some months out of date. If that has happened during the last twenty months, I would not know about it.

Mrs. KINGDON WARD : Is Great Britain diplomatically represented in the Yemen?

Mr. SEAGER : Diplomatic representation commenced in 1951, when a Chargé d'Affairs was sent out.

Mr. KINGDON WARD : I was told by Colonel Meinertzhagen that he found an iris growing at 8,000 feet in the Yemen. Has the lecturer heard of that?

Mr. SEAGER : I met Colonel Meinertzhagen in Taiz, but I do not know what flowers he found.

Colonel ROUTH : What is the future of the Yemen? Where does the country go from now on?

Mr. SEAGER : A German engineer who spent ten years in the Yemen said that if the country was adequately developed it could easily take a population of 25,000,000. As I said earlier, it has not now more than 3,000,000 inhabitants; it has a tremendous potential. A British Director of Agriculture who went through the coastal strip some years ago said if he had that area to deal with he would put a vast acreage under cotton forthwith. Therefore, to answer the question, if the rulers of the Yemen ever agree to have the country developed it could become one of the richest Arab states in the Middle East.

Professor TRITTEN : The lecturer told us that there are only two sects in the Yemen. Have the Ismailis entirely disappeared?

Mr. SEAGER : Entirely disappeared, I think.

Mrs. ST. JOHN COOK : Is there any prospect of oil ever being found in the Yemen?

Mr. SEAGER : As I have said, many people have wandered round the country looking for oil, but I have been told that the Yemen is not likely to yield any because the configuration of the ground shelves away to the east. Nevertheless, the Yemen Government is always hoping to find oil. They will not yet allow a major company to do a proper job.

Mr. DAVID SCOTT : What is the proportion of Zeidi to Shafi?

Mr. SEAGER : One-third Zeidi and two-thirds Shafi. The Zeidi is the highlander, the Shafi the lowlander.

Mrs. KINGDON WARD : What precisely is the qāt to which the lecturer referred?

Mr. SEAGER: It is the equivalent of the British spindle tree. The botanical name is *Catha edulis*.

The CHAIRMAN: I feel now that I must thank Mr. Seager on your behalf for his intensely interesting lecture. It is always a joy to listen to one who is a complete master of his subject and you, I feel sure, agree that our lecturer has proved himself to be that. We should all offer him a word of sympathy in that he has had to try to concentrate his many years' service in such interesting countries into the few short minutes which are available to him here. We do all thank you very much indeed, Mr. Seager. (Applause.)

#### POSTSCRIPT

When this lecture was delivered the Yemen was in the throes of a civil war. It has since transpired that the Foreign Minister, Seif Al Islam Abdullah, made a bid for power and compelled Imam Ahmed to sign an instrument of abdication. Subsequently, Al Badr, Imam Ahmed's son, rallied loyalist forces whose action resulted in the reinstatement of his father, the arrest of his uncles Abdullah and Abbas, and their execution for high treason. It is likely that Seif Al Islam Hasan, the Yemeni Prime Minister, was a party to the plot, but he was in Cairo when the *coup d'état* took place. Hasan, Abdullah and Abbas were united in their dislike of their nephew, Al Badr, since they feared that the Imam had marked him out as his successor.

It is of importance to record that Al Badr (now Crown Prince and Prime Minister) is the only member of the Hamid ud din royal family who has a following among the Shafais, who have always persisted in their hatred of his family and their rule. If he should succeed to the Imamate, his accession may have a profound effect in British South-West Arabia, since most Shafais, for the first time in their history, may be favourably disposed towards a Zeidi Imam of the Rassid Dynasty, and may even seek a general union with the Yemen.



# THE BANDUNG CONFERENCE

By DERRICK SINGTON

Report of a lecture delivered to the Royal Central Asian Society on Wednesday, June 1, 1955, Admiral Sir Cecil Harcourt, G.B.E., K.C.B., in the chair.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Sington, who has kindly come to talk to us this afternoon, described himself to me as a broadcasting journalist. He did not start his career in that way but became a free-lance journalist shortly before the recent war, during which, amongst other things, he was in the Intelligence Corps and at one time was in command of a propaganda unit in north-west Germany, which included being in command of the first unit to enter Belsen. Since the war Mr. Sington has been a whole-time broadcasting journalist and connected with various papers, including *The Manchester Guardian*. He has made a special study of the Bandung Conference and I now ask him to address us.

**I**N the first place, I should make clear that I was not at the Bandung Conference, much to my regret. I have, however, been able to talk at length with those who were there; I followed the Conference with a fair amount of care and concentration and have since tried to analyse the results of the Conference as carefully as I have been able to. Moreover, I was out in South-East Asia in February and March, just before the Bandung Conference in April, when I attended the SEATO Conference at Bangkok and had an opportunity of gauging the feeling and mood of the inviting Powers, India and Burma, as well as of Thailand.

Secondly, it may be helpful, in gathering the results together, to consider who eventually took part in the Asian-African Conference at Bandung, a conference of African and Asian countries which may prove to be historic. By my reckoning the countries which took part in the Conference fall into four fairly neat groups. As far as I can count them up, there were 15 East Asian countries represented—that is, countries roughly east of Afghanistan—5 African, and 9 Middle Eastern countries. The large number of Middle Eastern countries that attended the Conference is significant and important, because they represented points of view in many ways radically different from those of the Colombo Powers under the leadership of India, Burma and Indonesia. Up to that time attempts to co-ordinate and group all the countries of Africa and Asia had been largely confined to those Powers. For the first time the Colombo Powers, led by Mr. Nehru, with his ideas of neutralism and areas of peace, have been jostling up against other groups of Asian countries. As I have said, the group of Middle Eastern countries displayed at the Bandung Conference points of view very different from those held by the Colombo bloc, and, in some ways, they tended to counterbalance what one might call the Nehru-Nu axis, the India and Burma leadership, in which of course East Asia, Ceylon, Pakistan also play their part.

Having said that, I confess that when I heard the results of the Conference and read the lengthy *communiqué* it seemed amazing that such a long and complex *communiqué* had been agreed upon, because the twenty-

nine countries had such immensely different interests, different régimes, different states of development, different degrees of dependence. That all the countries concerned could reach so much common ground seems to have been a most remarkable achievement—in fact, a surprising achievement.

Also, to come to the next point—and I have heard this from a colleague of mine who has interviewed the African delegates to the Bandung Conference—one of the results the African delegates found they got out of the Conference was an understanding of what it meant to work out a compromise. The delegates had to hammer out compromises on all sorts of problems and, in the end, they succeeded in issuing the unanimously supported and skilfully drafted final *communiqué*, an agreed declaration by twenty-nine different countries of Asia and Africa.

I cite as an example the probably most crucial issue on which delegates had to compromise, the issue of the Nehru thesis, which is an extreme version of what the states in Asia tend to believe, the clash between the Nehru thesis and the thesis, we will say, of Mohammed Ali of Pakistan, the clash between the thesis that defensive alliance groups, blocs of Powers or military blocs, are undesirable because they lead towards war, and the thesis of many other countries represented, such as the Iraqis and Turks, that their security can only be built up within some sort of defensive alliance. That was a very formidable clash at Bandung, but in spite of it a compromise was worked out in the end.

In the *communiqué* there are two clauses which seem to me to form the most interesting part of the *communiqué* issued by the Conference because they show the sort of struggle that went on. Article 6A, Section D, says: "The Asian-African Conference recommend respect for the right of each nation to defend itself, singly or collectively, in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations"—"singly or collectively." Then a modifying clause says: "Abstention from the use of arrangements of collective defence to serve the particular interests of any of the big Powers." Thirdly, "Abstention by any country from exerting pressure on other countries through such means." In other words, a clear compromise. While there was the Nehru thesis that defensive alliances are dangerous, there was agreement that such alliances may be desirable but, at the same time, agreement that defensive alliances should not put the smaller Powers in the hands of or at the mercy too much of the policies of the Great Powers. That is an interesting example of compromise.

Clearly there had to be omissions at Bandung. Out of the final *communiqué*, the Conference dropped any reference to Formosa, clearly because on that there would have been too many conflicting views. Sir John Kotelawala, the Ceylonese Prime Minister, did, in fact, propose at a Press Conference that Formosa should be put under trusteeship of the Colombo Powers, but I understand that this was not taken up in the committees or in the plenary sessions, and it was not embodied in the final *communiqué*. So that the Conference decided that Formosa was not a problem that could be satisfactorily handled. That seems to have been a wise decision and is, perhaps, an indication that the countries represented realized that it would be unwise to set their sights too high, and so try to

inflate the Conference into a gathering which could quite easily settle the problems of the world by declarations and attitudes on platforms. It showed a certain maturity that some of those at Bandung did not try to work out their own solution of the Formosan problem.

I am trying to set forth what I believe to be the positive side of the Bandung Conference and, to go on to another point, it seems that the *communiqué* shows a spirit of restraint on some of the issues, particularly that of colonialism on which all the delegates present had undoubtedly strong feelings to which they were deeply committed. For example, there was a tendency in all the pronouncements about colonialism, such as in regard to West New Guinea, to make the phrasing quite diplomatic and try to bring in the United Nations—not a suggestion that one side must climb down but a suggestion that problems should be settled by negotiation. In fact, the resolution regarding West New Guinea simply urged the Netherlands Government to reopen negotiations and hoped the United Nations would assist the parties concerned to find a peaceful solution to the dispute—not getting hot under the collar, which seems to me to be a sign of maturity.

Perhaps an obviously positive though not a spectacular side of the Conference was the educative influence among all the delegates. I believe, for instance, that it took Colonel Nasser, the Egyptian Prime Minister, quite a long time to get his bearings because he had not had much experience of the Far East; and certainly the African delegates at the Conference told my colleagues that they had profited greatly simply from the unique contact which really amounted to contact with the whole of Asia, and of course a number of arrangements for visits to various countries have sprung out of the Bandung Conference. There is already an Egyptian delegation in Peking and I read this morning that they have signed a cultural agreement with China. That is, at any rate, one result of the Bandung Conference. Whether a further development will be recognition of Peking by the Middle Eastern countries remains to be seen. None of the Middle Eastern countries, so far as I know, have yet recognized the Peking Government, and one wonders whether one of the concrete results of the Bandung Conference might not be recognition of Peking by Egypt, Syria and so on.

The Conference at Bandung was not spectacular in the sense that it could alter the situation in the world to a great extent in the short term. Having said something about the positive side as seen in the maturity of the discussions, the spirit of compromise, the educative value of the Conference, the restraint shown on the whole, I would like to say a word or two in regard to some of the impulses behind the Conference.

What was it that caused these twenty-nine countries with so many differences of view, so many different and conflicting ideas, to compromise as they did? From what I have heard from those who have returned from the Conference, and also from my own knowledge of Asia throughout the years, it seems that the binding force was a consciousness among all the delegates and in all the countries represented, of an emergence from rule by a foreign country or foreign countries; a feeling of emergence, a feeling of newly won freedom and, in some cases, of course, the problem arose in

countries which were still under colonial or a similar form of rule. But the binding threat was the consciousness of newly won nationhood, and the problems which faced the countries which had newly won their freedom. That was the binding thread, and it seems to have been strong enough to bind Turkey, Japan, the Gold Coast; in fact to bind countries right across the greater part of the world's surface. That came out in Sections C, D and F of the *communiqué* which deal with the principles of human rights and self-determination and the problems of dependent peoples. These sections which, again, were temperately phrased, covered the general urge for independence and national freedom which is felt over the greater part of Asia and, I believe, Africa.

When we come to the actual points on colonialism which were raised at the Conference, the specific countries and areas referred to, the Conference becomes interesting in a rather more concrete way, because the actual cases touched on at Bandung of survival of colonial rule and so on, form rather a mixed bag, though in some ways a highly selective one. While there are some striking omissions, it is not surprising that the South African Government policy of racial discrimination is condemned. It is not surprising, in view of recent history, that North Africa and Algeria were included in the resolutions as surviving colonial rule; it is more surprising that Palestine was included and that claims to Aden by the Yemen were included; Palestine particularly, because it is perhaps not a case of colonial rule; it is, rather, a conflict between two races. Three of the countries included—North Africa, Palestine and the Yemen—all concern Muslim areas or areas which have been Muslim. There one can go back to the strength of the Middle Eastern delegation to the Conference, nine countries out of the twenty-nine; those nine were able to get the Yemen and Palestine mentioned in the *communiqué*.

But what was omitted which one might have expected to appear? There was no mention of Cyprus, although Archbishop Makarios was at the Conference. There was no mention of Malaya, although the Malaysians were at Bandung; no mention of Sarawak, although Sarawak observers were present; and there was no mention of Kenya by name, although one does hear a good many attacks on British policy in Kenya by Asian and African people. The policy in those areas was not attacked at all, and they are all British—Kenya, Sarawak, Malaya and Cyprus. Undoubtedly one reason for that was that there was not a strong enough element among the delegates to push their claims. Probably another reason is that Britain has acquired a good deal of credit in Asia and Africa over her policy of granting independence to countries which are ready for nationhood—Pakistan, Ceylon, Burma and, more recently, the Gold Coast and Nigeria. And perhaps the reason why there was no direct attack on British policy in those four remaining colonial regions was due to the reserve of goodwill the British have accumulated in Africa and Asia through their enlightened treatment of the people, training them and finally handing the people their independence.

I have omitted one country—Holland—which came under attack, in a sense, in the *communiqué*, Indonesia, with claims to West New Guinea, which claims got into the *communiqué* largely because Indonesia was the

host country of the Conference and the claims had been discussed by the five Colombo Powers. The Bandung Conference decided to support the Indonesian claims to West New Guinea probably as a *geste de politesse* to the host country.

So much for what the *communiqué* had to say about colonialism, the problems of dependent countries; so much for what it had to say by way of criticism of ruling countries. All that part of the *communiqué* dealt with what is essentially European colonialism.

Let me now pass on to what many regard as the Newer Colonialism and potential colonialism; in other words, Communist colonialism. In this regard the Conference is extremely interesting, because there was an exceedingly fierce debate in the Political Committee as to whether when the Conference condemned colonialism it should mention Communist colonialism by name. One of the surprises of the Bandung Conference was that a clear majority of all the countries represented took a very strong anti-Communist line or anti-Communist colonialism line. As far as I have been able to gather, as many as eighteen out of the twenty-nine countries took a very strong line in condemnation of Communist colonialism. In passing, one might mention that there were present at the Conference observers from some areas of the Russian Asiatic Republics; from the National Turkestan Unity Committee which represents the anti-Communist refugees from Asiatic Russia; but, again, their complaints about being colonized by Russia and dominated by a foreign people did not get into the *communiqué*. I asked several colleagues who were at the Bandung Conference about this and they said it was true that they had not had their complaints dealt with. That seemed extraordinary because they are largely Muslim republics, Asiatic republics or colonies in Russia, and there was at the Conference a strong Muslim element, but still there was no mention of those republics in the *communiqué*, probably because they were remote and far away compared with the Yemen and Aden; being very remote from Eastern Asian countries these peoples in Central Asia who complain of Russian colonialism have not aroused much sympathy. At any rate, they did not get into the *communiqué*, although there was a strong move in the Political Committee to mention Communist colonialism by name, and these eighteen countries, eight or nine of them Middle Eastern countries, voted against Communist colonialism.

What happened ultimately, I understand, in regard to Communist colonialism was that a compromise was arrived at on the suggestions of the Indians that instead of mentioning Communist colonialism by name there should be in the final *communiqué* a statement that colonialism was condemned in all its manifestations. I believe Mr. Chou En-lai from Peking was against that; he fought quite hard because of the implication that it was Communist colonialism. It was the Turks, I gather, who said finally that if this was not accepted they would not sign the *communiqué* and therefore there would be no unanimous *communiqué*; so that there was something of a showdown, I understand, on that actual course.

Now is the time to try to say something as to, perhaps, the most important practical aspect of the whole Conference, and that is the Chinese part in the Bandung Conference. From what observers have told me,

there seems to be no doubt that Mr. Chou En-lai achieved a good deal. He had gone to Bandung with the intention of being as friendly as possible towards the Conference as a whole, and he seems to have succeeded. He seems, according to my information, to have made quite an impression to the effect that the intentions of the Peking Government may not be expansionist and aggressive. He did not, as is clear from what I tried to say earlier, convince the Conference that Communism itself was not in many ways a threatening force, but he did succeed, as far as I have been able to ascertain, in making a number of contacts which are likely to be fruitful, and he also impressed many of the delegates, particularly a number of the Middle East delegates, with his personality and, to some extent I gather, with his possible sincerity. So that there would seem to have been considerable success for Peking and Mr. Chou En-lai. Whether you regard that as a sinister or good thing depends entirely on what you think are the motives and intentions of the Peking leaders. If you believe, as I do, that the People's Republic of China needs years of the most intensive domestic reconstruction in order to solve the most desperate economic problems that any country has to face, that is, catching up with the giants of the East and West on a very small industrial basis in a somewhat overcrowded country with a rapidly increasing population, if you believe that for that reason alone the Peking leaders most need peace at the moment, then you will understand that the conciliatory attitude of Chou En-lai, Mao Tse Tung's Foreign Minister, may have been sincere. It, at any rate, entirely altered the conclusions about China's predicament and China's future policy.

The preference for China at the Bandung Conference seems to have led to a small conference within the larger one, because China, of course, was not directly concerned with the Middle East and not directly concerned with Africa. China was concerned with her relationship with Indo-China, South-East Asia, Burma, Thailand, and also concerned with the Formosa problem. But China was mainly concerned at Bandung with her South-East Asian neighbours. The small conference within the big one included Burma and Thailand, but it did not take place in the Conference Hall; it took place in corridors and at the hotels. Burma, Thailand, North and South Viet Nam, Laos and Cambodia came into this smaller conference, together with Indonesia. It was a diplomatic offensive by Chou En-lai and also, in a way, by Mr. Nehru, to try to establish what he calls his "area of peace" in South-East Asia, and Chou En-lai's diplomatic efforts to reach the most advantageous outcome in Southern Asia.

We know, of course, that Chou En-lai did a number of things: he signed an agreement with the Indonesian Government over the nationality of the Chinese minority in Indonesia, making their position much clearer and starting, perhaps, to solve the problem of the divided loyalties in overseas Chinese minorities abroad in South-East Asia. I am told also that Chou En-lai made a general declaration in regard to Chinese minorities in South-East Asia, saying he was prepared to settle their status in the same way as he had settled the status of the Chinese in Indonesia. That would mean that his declaration applied to Chinese in Malaya, which is interesting. I heard that in official circles recently there has been some discussion

as to whether Chou En-lai intends that this should mean that the Chinese in Malaya will help or whether he conceives it possible to exercise some influence in forwarding a settlement in Malaya. That was one aspect of Chou En-lai's proposal.

He also invited Prince Wan, the Siamese delegate, to visit the Chinese border areas to assure himself there were no aggressive build-ups or aggressive intentions in that part of the world. And of course Chou En-lai supported very strongly the declaration of the five principles of co-existence. It can be said that in his efforts Chou En-lai received a great deal of support from Mr. Nehru and from U Nu.

Chou En-lai also had contacts with Mohammed Ali, and this is of interest because Mohammed Ali represents Pakistan. Apparently their conversations were friendly and assurances were given on both sides as to their intentions, and so on. That was yet another of Chou En-lai's efforts. There was also an interesting contact within Indo-China, not only between China and the rest of South-East Asia, and this was the contact between the Prime Minister of Laos and Ho-Chi-Min's Prime Minister. They signed a special bilateral declaration of friendly co-existence by which Vietminh have committed themselves not to interfere further in Laos, which, if carried through, will be very important because Laos is one of the remaining states of Indo-China which is not yet in the hands of the Communists. It might indicate that there is a real will to meet an emergency in that area at the moment, by means of the agreement between Laos and Vietminh which I understand was reached between Mr. Nehru and Chou En-lai trying to settle a disturbed area between China and South-East Asia.

I have dealt with everything except two very long sections of the *communiqué* which concern an important though not spectacular side of the Conference, perhaps one of the least spectacular, namely the economic and cultural co-operation which the Conference was to encourage, without being too ambitious, between Asian and African countries.

The most interesting part of this long *communiqué* is an agreed testimony to the help that has been received from the Western countries. The whole of this *communiqué* was, of course, signed by Mr. Chou En-lai. It records, for example, that there have been "valuable contributions already" of economic assistance for the Asian and African countries from those outside; in other words from the West. It is quite clear that Chou En-lai signed that *communiqué* with his tongue in his cheek, because when he made his report in Peking to the National People's Congress he said something quite different: that the Asian countries should rely on their own resources instead of relying on help from the Western colonial Powers. Nevertheless, he signed that *communiqué* which records a great amount of help from the non-Communist Powers.

Another aspect of interest is the stress on the United Nations, recommending the establishment of a United Nations Committee for economic development; the allocation by the World Bank of a greater part of its resources to the Asian and African countries; the early establishment of the International Finance Corporation, and so on—all carefully avoiding any mention of the Colombo Plan and carefully avoiding also, as far as I can

see, any specific mention of the United States of America. There is great concentration and emphasis on the help which has been received from the United Nations. That is understandable because most of the Asian countries are nervous about aid which comes from an individual big Power in view of the possibility of strings being attached to it. On the whole, the United Nations economic aid, although there is little of it in some ways, is much more popular in Eastern Asian areas, and that is evident in the *communiqué*.

Another item of interest is in connection with discrimination against Asian and African nations, the "expressed concern that the shipping lines reviewed from time to time their freight rates, often to the detriment of participating countries." I heard it said in Indonesia that a certain shipping company did sometimes discriminate to the disadvantage of Indonesia. That kind of discrimination is referred to in the *communiqué*.

I gather that there is not to be a secretariat or anything of that nature as a sequel to the Bandung Conference. Mr. Nehru was opposed to that on the ground that already secretariats are multiplied beyond all reason and that, in any case, secretariats do nothing. There is, however, provision for "liaison officers for the exchange of information and ideas" and I suppose, depending on how they are followed up, the recommendations for economic co-operation, exchange of students and facilities between African and Asian countries, will speed up co-operation of that kind.

A final word as to the attitude of Japan. I gather that the Japanese delegation to Bandung was very heavily weighted with economic delegates and experts, and that the interest of Japan seemed to be very strongly in trade with all the countries concerned. I notice that a number of visits have already been planned. I am not sure whether or not Saudi Arabia is going to be visited by the Japanese. I take it that the interest of Japan is primarily in increase of trade, which is a pressing problem if Japan is to meet the needs of her over-populated island. Secondly, I am told the Japanese showed considerable emotion and were very emphatic in supporting the parts of the *communiqué* which urged international control and eventual abolition of nuclear warfare. Japan, being the first victim, felt this to be an important problem. Those were the salient features of Japan's attitude to the Bandung Conference.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Singleton has kindly offered to answer any questions members of the audience wish to ask.

Group-Captain H. ST. CLAIR SMALLWOOD: I would like to ask Mr. Singleton whether the question of population was discussed at the Conference. He mentioned the attitude of Japan in regard to economics, a matter largely ruled by her very rapidly increasing population. I have a pet theory that the number of people in China is deliberately exaggerated by the Chinese Communists. One hears the figure of 600,000,000 being accepted generally, but my feeling is that there are not more than 500,000,000 Chinese, but China went to the Conference with the backing of the higher population figure. It would be interesting to hear whether Chou En-lai used that factor in order to hammer home China's arguments at the Bandung Conference.



Mr. SINGTON: That is an interesting question. I have not heard of any discussion on population at the Conference and I cannot find anything in the *communiqué* on that subject. As to the second point, the 600,000,000 includes Chinese abroad, and they account for 28,000,000, which would bring the total down to 572,000,000, which is still a high figure. There seems to be a great deal of substance in Group-Captain Smallwood's suggestion, but actually more interesting is the fact that parts of those countries within Asia are under-populated and parts over-populated. India and China are immensely over-populated; Malaya and Burma are under-populated. Some arrangement within the region so that the middle area might be open to controlled immigration would be beneficial.

Mr. CORRY: Could Mr. Sington give a broad outline of what was agreed at Bandung in regard to the Chinese in Indonesia?

Mr. SINGTON: I am not very well up on that problem. I know there is a period of a year within which they can deem to opt either to take Indonesian or Chinese nationality. What I am not sure of is what happens to those who do not so opt. The Indonesians certainly will not opt not to be Indonesians.

Mrs. ST. JOHN COOKE: There were twenty-nine nationalities represented at the Bandung Conference. What language was used?

Mr. SINGTON: English, I understand.

Colonel G. ROUTH: What was the effect of Sir John Kotelawala's attack on Communism?

Mr. SINGTON: I tried to outline what happened in the Political Committee, where the attack took place and where the support for this kind of attitude was forthcoming from about eighteen out of the twenty-nine countries. Mostly the leading countries supported the condemnatory attitude. Turkey, the Philippines, Thailand, Pakistan and Iraq all took a very critical line towards the Communists, and a number of other countries supported them, including, I understand, Egypt, which is surprising.

Miss M. W. KELLY: What was the Persian attitude, sir?

Mr. SINGTON: The Persians supported the very strong line taken in regard to Communism.

The CHAIRMAN: As there do not appear to be any further questions and our time is nearly up, I now thank Mr. Sington very much indeed for coming and giving such a clear analysis of what took place at the Bandung Conference. That was a most important event in the world's history and, to my mind, it was quite a forward step. We thank you very much, Mr. Sington, for taking so much trouble to give details as to what took place at the Conference. (*Applause.*)

## ANNUAL MEETING

**T**HE Annual General Meeting of the Royal Central Asian Society was held at the Hall of the Royal Society of Arts, 6, John Adam Street, Adelphi, W.C.2, on Thursday, June 9, 1955.

The President, Lord Scarbrough, was in the chair, and the Anniversary Lecture was given by Lord Birdwood, who spoke on "Kashmir Today."

The PRESIDENT, on taking the chair, called on the Chairman of the Council, Sir Cecil Harcourt, to report on the events of the past year.

Admiral Sir CECIL HARCOURT then said: Mr. President, My Lords, Ladies and Gentlemen,—The principal event of concern to the Society since the last Annual Meeting was the resignation of Sir John Shea, who had been President of the Society for five years. We regret his resignation but are very grateful to Sir John Shea for carrying out his duties as President, Hon. Vice-President, Chairman of the Council and Councillor, in which capacities he has served the Society steadily for twenty years. I am glad to say that Sir John has accepted the position of Hon. Vice-President, so that we shall have not only his continued wise counsel but also his cheerful and vigorous presence with us in continuation.

I am happy to say that in Sir John's place we have managed to persuade Lord Scarbrough to take on the duties of President. ("Hear, hear.") We are most grateful to Lord Scarbrough for taking on this duty because, as everyone here knows, he is a very busy man and holds a number of very distinguished and important offices in connection with which he does a large amount of work. It is a great encouragement to the Society to have Lord Scarbrough as its President; we shall benefit from his wise counsel. On behalf of the Society I thank you very much indeed, sir, for accepting office. (*Applause.*)

During the past year there have been a regrettable number of losses by death, particularly during the past winter; also there have been resignations. During 1954 these totalled 82, but happily there are 85 new members, so that we have caught up on that. Since the beginning of 1955 we have lost 32 members, but again we have caught up, there being 37 new members.

Amongst members lost there are two I wish to mention, Major-General Beynon and Dr. G. M. Lees, whose obituaries appeared in the last issue of the Society's Journal. Their passing is a great loss to the Society, for they helped us over a number of years.

The most refreshing aspect about the Society, to my mind, are the lectures, which during the past year have been not only exceedingly well attended but the audience has been different pretty well every time, according to the particular lecture in which members and their friends happened to be interested, and the audiences contained a high proportion of younger members. In every society there are a number of old stagers who are of great value; at the same time, it has been most heartening to see the younger members attending.

And that, Mr. President, is all I have to say.

The PRESIDENT: If I might comment on the Chairman's remarks, I would like to take this opportunity of saying to the members of the Society what an honour I consider it to be their President and to succeed Sir John Shea.

I now call upon Group-Captain Smallwood to present the Honorary Secretary's Report.

#### HONORARY SECRETARY'S REPORT FOR THE YEAR 1953-54

From what the Chairman has already said, members will realize that the Society can look back on a successful year. There were some twenty lectures, without any geographical repetition except in the case of Iran, in which, of course, nearly all the members of the Society are greatly interested.

Members will have noticed that in the latest issue of the Journal there are illustrations, a new departure which has been rendered possible by the generosity of certain oil companies and commercial undertakings, in which regard I wish also to mention Mr. G. D. Birla of New Delhi.

In addition to ordinary members there are now 230 subscribers to the Journal, mostly libraries and colleges, 87 of them being in the United States of America.

We still need new members who are interested in Central Asia and the countries surrounding it, for while, as the Chairman has told you, we have gained 85 new members, we have lost 82 by death and resignation. A new list of members is being prepared, and all members are requested to send in any alterations of address and such emendations as are necessary. Owing to the printing cost of this list, it will be sent only to those members applying for it.

#### THE HONORARY TREASURER'S REPORT

Major E. AINGER presented the financial statement, as audited, and the Honorary Treasurer's report as follows:

The Income and Expenditure Account for the year ended December 31, 1954, calls for little remark. The increase in office expenses is not great, nor is that for printing and postage.

On the Income side, similarly, there has been no great change from 1953, and we continue to be grateful to our subscribers, and here I underline the Honorary Secretary's words by saying both individual and corporate subscribers.

Turning to the Balance Sheet, it will be noted that we have slightly increased the reserve for contingencies, in view of the remote danger that we may one day have to find new office quarters. Beyond this, I think that no other remarks on my part are called for, but if there are any points on which any members wish explanation I shall be pleased to give it.

There being no questions or comments,

Admiral Sir CECIL HARCOURT proposed that the accounts for the year ended December 31, 1954, be adopted.

Colonel GASTRELL formally seconded the motion, and the accounts were unanimously adopted.

# THE ROYAL CENTRAL ASIAN SOCIETY, 2, HINDE STREET, W.1.

## BALANCE SHEET, DECEMBER 31, 1954

1953	LIABILITIES	£ s. d.	£ s. d.	1953	ASSETS	£ s. d.	£ s. d.
£	£ s. d.	£ s. d.	£ s. d.	£		£ s. d.	£ s. d.
	<b>I. Capital Funds:</b>				<b>I. Capital Fund Investments (at cost):</b>		
	Life Subscription Account	327 5 0			Persia Fund:		
	Add: Amount recd. 1954	20 0 0			£531 6s. 7d. 3% Savings Bonds		
327			347 5 0	537	1965-75 .. .. .	537 1 6	
	Entrance Fee Account	1,294 18 0			General Funds:		
	Add: Amount recd. 1954	73 10 0			£280 12s. 0d. 3% Savings Bonds		
1,295			1,368 8 0	284	1965-75 .. .. .	283 18 7	
850	Legacy Account	850 0 0			£1,939 7s. 11d. British Gas 3½%		
	Lawrence of Arabia Medal			1,844	Guaranteed Stock 1969-71 ..	1,844 0 10	
	Fund .. .. .	96 11 0			£1,000 0s. 0d. Aden 4½% stock		
	Less: Medal awarded in				1972-74 .. .. .	1,034 1 0	
	1954 .. .. .	9 10 6			P.O.S.B. No. 2 a/c: .. .. .	£ s. d.	
97			87 0 6	166	Sykes Medal Fund .. .. .	165 1 6	
578	Persia Fund .. .. .		578 4 10	45	Persia Fund .. .. .	45 8 0	
	Sykes Medal Fund	150 0 0		172	General Funds .. .. .	177 12 6	
	Add: Accum. Interest	19 11 6				388 2 0	
				3,048			4,087 3 11
168		169 11 6			Note: The Market Value of the above		
	Less: Medal awarded in				Investments at 31st December,		
	1954 .. .. .	4 10 0			1954, was approximately £4,169.		
			165 1 6		<b>II. Fixed Assets:</b>		
304	Investment Reserve Fund		304 2 7		Society Premises Account:		
					Balance as at 1st January, 1948	110 19 3	
3,617			3,700 2 5		Add'l Expenditure since that date	53 8 6	
	<b>II. Income and Expenditure Account:</b>			160			164 7 9
841	Balance, 1st January, 1954		840 18 1		<b>III. Current Assets:</b>		
	Add: Excess of Income over Expendi-			600	Income Tax Repayment Claim ..	650 0 0	
	ture for the year .. .. .	278 13 7			Payments in advance .. .. .	13 10 9	
			1,119 11 8		Cash:		
1,080	III. Reserve for Contingencies		1,500 0 0	930	P.O.S.B. No. 1 a/c .. .. .	953 2 4	
	<b>IV. Liabilities:</b>			1291	At Bank and in hand .. .. .	1,058 14 11	
491	Sundry Creditors .. .. .		607 5 7			2,011 17 3	
							2,675 8 0
6,029			£6,926 19 8	6,029			£6,926 19 8

### AUDITOR'S REPORT TO THE MEMBERS OF THE ROYAL CENTRAL ASIAN SOCIETY.

We have examined the above Balance Sheet and have obtained all the information and explanations that we have required. In our opinion such Balance Sheet is properly drawn up so as to exhibit a true and correct view of the state of the Society's affairs, according to the best of our information and explanations given us

**THE ROYAL CENTRAL ASIAN SOCIETY, 2, HINDE STREET, W.1.**  
**INCOME AND EXPENDITURE ACCOUNT FOR THE YEAR ENDED DECEMBER 31, 1954.**

1953				EXPENDITURE				1953				INCOME				
£				£ s. d.				£				£ s. d.				
1,238	Office Expenditure:			1,253	18	9	2,242	Subscriptions	..	..	..	..	..	2,345	12	5
130	Salaries and National Insurance	..	..	225	5	3	395	Journal Subscriptions and Sales	..	..	..	..	..	414	18	9
19	Rent, Light and Heat, Rates	..	..	21	3	3		Interest Received on:								
74	Telephone	..	..	181	12	6	53	Government Securities (net)	..	..	50	14	8			
152	Stationery and Printing	..	..	98	1	10	25	Post Office Savings Bank	..	..	28	13	3			
218	Postages	..	..	249	6	10	7	Bank Deposit Account	..	..	7	3	0			
11	Cleaning and Upkeep of Premises	..	..	10	10	0	44	War Damage Compensation (net)	..	..	—					
6	Audit Fee	..	..	5	19	10	—	Aden 4½% Stock 1972-4 (net)	..	..	21	6	3			
12	Insurances	..	..	12	0	4								107	17	2
36	Bank Charges and Cheque Books	..	..	75	19	7	600	Income Tax Repayment Claim	..	..				647	18	2
	Sundry Expenses	..	..				1,023	Donations Received	..	..				413	5	11
1,896				2,133	18	2	346	Sundry Receipts	..	..				3	5	0
	<i>Less:</i>															
200	Contribution from Palestine Exploration Fund	..	..	205	4	0										
1,696				1,928	14	2										
	Journal:															
997	Printing	..	..	923	17	8										
78	Postages	..	..	49	0	5										
58	Reporting	..	..	44	4	4										
							1,017									
174	Lectures and Study Group	..	..	237	4	9										
1	Library	..	..	2	6	6										
46	Legal and Professional Expenses	..	..	42	0	0										
7	Persia Fund Lecture and Subscription to "Iraq"	..	..	6	16	0										
1,080	Reserve for Contingencies	..	..	420	0	0										
							3,654									
4,137				3,654	3	10										
598	Excess of Income over Expenditure carried to Balance Sheet	..	..	278	13	7										
4,735				£3,932	17	5	4,735							£3,932	17	5

## ELECTION OF COUNCIL AND OFFICERS FOR 1955-56

The PRESIDENT announced that the Council had elected for the ensuing year: As Chairman of the Council, Admiral Sir Cecil Harcourt; as Vice-Chairman, Mr. Alistair Gibb; as Vice-Presidents, Sir Clarmont Skrine and Mr. Geoffrey Stephenson.

The PRESIDENT added that the Council had recommended the following as members of the Council: Sir John Troutbeck, Lt.-Colonel A. C. Galloway, and Major E. Ainger as Honorary Treasurer.

General Sir JOHN SHEA proposed that these members be elected *en bloc*.

Brigadier S. H. LONGRIGG formally seconded the motion, and it was carried unanimously.

## AWARDS

The PRESIDENT announced the award of the Lawrence of Arabia Memorial Medal to Mr. Wilfred Thesiger—a member of the Society since 1934—for his travels and work among Arabs, particularly Marsh Arabs, and the award of the Sir Percy Sykes Memorial Medal to Mlle. Ella Maillart—a member since 1936—for her travels in Central Asia. (*Applause.*)

This concluded the business of the Annual General Meeting.

# KASHMIR TODAY

By THE RIGHT HON. LORD BIRDWOOD, M.V.O.

Anniversary Lecture delivered at the Annual Meeting of the Royal Central Asian Society on June 9, 1955, Admiral Sir Cecil Harcourt, G.B.E., K.C.B., in the chair.

PERHAPS the best way in which I can emphasize the nature of this international curiosity, Kashmir, is by pointing out that the map now before you showing a red Cease-fire Line running through the country is the same map as I used three years ago when I first became interested in the problem of Kashmir. At that time the Kashmir situation could be regarded as both dramatic and dangerous, dramatic in that there was no precedent for a situation in which two members of the Commonwealth might conceivably go to war with each other, facing each other with the apparent intention of doing so; dangerous in that if they did go to war then a whole set of friendly understandings—understandings as between Pakistan and Middle Eastern countries, understandings between India and the Far East—might have been thrown into the melting-pot and the conflict over Kashmir might have reflected the great division of the world in much the same way as Korea and Formosa have done. That was avoided. Seven years have gone by, and those seven years have blunted the edge of controversy, so that to-day it cannot be said that the situation is explosive. But give the wound a prod and I would not deny that the situation might once again become dangerous. It is said that if an arm is put in a sling and kept there, sooner or later the arm will wither and die. Perhaps in some such way as the years go by a new age and new generation of Pakistanis and Indians will be born who will not remember how the trouble began. But let the two Prime Ministers meet and let there be angry words exchanged, let the two Prime Ministers receive a prod from one of the fanatical religious groups or from a very vigilant Press in Pakistan, let them lose their tempers with each other, then the trouble at this moment is ready to boil up again. Irritate the wound, and again it will become infectious. It is true that when the Prime Ministers met on the last occasion, so far as Kashmir is concerned they might have discussed the weather: there seems to have emerged a new interpretation of what is the normal meaning of a plebiscite. It seems that so long as it can be said that the will of the people has been met—well, then “the will of the people” covers a great many interpretations. The Prime Ministers have said they are going to meet again, and I would not like to say that trouble might not be stirred up. On the whole, I would not say that we can necessarily expect a peaceful solution so much as a solution of non-violence.

This afternoon I am going to adopt a slightly different approach to that which I have attempted previously. I am going to assume that you in this audience know the rough outline of the story, the sequence of events starting, shall we say, from the partition of the continent, the tribal invasion, the kind of spark that set the fire alight, the accession to the

Republic of India, the war that followed, the demarcation of the Cease-fire Line by the United Nations Commission, the efforts of General McNaughton, the Canadian, and Sir Owen Dixon, appointed by the Security Council as Mediator, and Dr. Graham's repeated returns, rather in the nature of the opera singer who keeps on giving a farewell performance, and so on. I am not going to recount the factual story; instead I propose to take certain facets and aspects of the situation which are not understood and are not fully appreciated, with a view to illuminating them and at the same time removing certain misconceptions for which I myself have perhaps sometimes been responsible. The more one studies the problem, the more obvious it becomes that there is light to be shed on many aspects. I am about to do what can be likened to dipping into a bran pie; and though I fear the resulting presentation may be rather disjointed, I have come to the conclusion that this sort of piecing together of odd pieces of the story will prove more valuable to this audience than if I were simply to recount again the factual story.

Let us dip first into ancient history. I recall that there was a period of some 500 years in about the eighth century, particularly during the reign of a Hindu king, Lalithaditya, when, so far from Kashmir being conquered from outside, the conquests were from the centre outward, outward from Kashmir instead of into Kashmir from India. The rulers of Kashmir carried their conquests down to the Punjab.

Later, in the time of a Muslim ruler, Zain ul-Abdul-din—just before the coming of the Moguls in the fifteenth century—there was law and order, taxes were collected properly, a library and university were established, the arts and crafts flourished under the ruler's patronage. I draw attention to those features because it seems to me that before we make up our minds as to whether the Kashmiri is or is not capable of cutting a more impressive figure on the world stage, is or is not the hypnotized rabbit we have come to think him through the subsequent dominations—by Durani Afghans, Sikhs and the Dogra dynasty—before we make up our minds as to whether or not that is so, we should remind ourselves, as possibly Sheikh Abdullah, the leader of the National Conference, did, that there was a time when the Kashmiri could look the world in the face and cut an altogether more impressive figure.

I pass over the years of conquests from outside and come to the era of Gulab Singh, Raja of Jammu, who had been a Diwan at the court of Ranjit Singh and had gained great influence and authority. It was, however, not on Ranjit Singh's account but on his own account that Gulab Singh in 1834 turned to the north and conquered Ladakh, a territory about the size of Wales. In 1840 he reached still farther north and captured Skardu, and in 1842 he turned his attention towards Hunza and Gilgit, but was not equally successful in that regard. Flushed with his earlier success, he tried to extend into Tibet, but his Dogra army met their fate on a pass 15,000 feet high and were cut to pieces in the same way as Napoleon's men met their fate in front of Moscow.

The significance of that period lies in the fact that any serious student of the history of Kashmir will ask himself how it was that one enormous country, geographically, came to enclose such a variety of people—Dogras



from Jammu, followers of the Aga Khan up in Hunza and Nagar, Buddhists and hardy Muslims from Poonch. The answer is, in broad terms, that it all happened through Gulab Singh's conquests between the ten years 1834-44.

Then there came the Treaty of Amritsar by which the British confirmed the possession of that great territory between the Indus and the Ravi to Gulab Singh of Jammu and his heirs in return for the help which he had given the British in their war with the Sikhs. At one time I referred to that treaty as of "doubtful wisdom and integrity"; but on second thoughts I am not so sure. How splendid it would have been if in 1846 after the conquest of the Sikhs the British administration could have taken over the country, but remember that the British administration in those days did not extend west of the River Sutlej. It is true that once before the British had marched from the Punjab through Sikh territory to fight that ridiculous war against the Afghans in 1839. In 1846 British administration would have been in complete geographical isolation unless prepared as a result of the victory over the Sikhs to go forward up to the River Ravi, which probably was not a practicable possibility. And so perhaps the best that can be said about the Treaty of Amritsar confirming Kashmir to Gulab Singh and his heirs for ever is that in the circumstances it was unfortunate but inevitable.

I draw attention to the communities and their variety which composed this State in 1846. In Ladakh there were 40,000 Buddhists with, in the old days, far more allegiance to Lhasa than to anywhere else. The present representative, Lama Bakula, goes and represents his community in the Assembly in Srinagar and Jammu, and he occasionally participates in debate in a language which nobody else can understand. Farther to the north in Baltistan and the frontier districts there are 270,000 Muslims, including some followers of the Aga Khan. Coming south, there is the Jammu Province of 2,000,000, of whom, according to the 1941 Census, 1,200,000 were Muslims and 760,000 Hindus. These figures have been considerably modified as a result of events since 1947. For example, Jammu city itself, which had a population of about 60,000 or 70,000, of whom about 20,000 were Muslims, now only contains about 3,000 Muslims. In fact, if Jammu Province could be divided it could be said that north and west of the river there are mainly Muslims; south and east mainly Hindus.

Coming to Kashmir Province, which includes the valley round Srinagar and the Wular lake, and is regarded as the prize worth the whole of the rest of the State put together, there were 1,600,000 Muslims and 113,000 Hindus. The total population of the State was just over 4,000,000, of whom 920,000 were non-Muslims and 3,200,000 Muslims.

I in no way wish to moralize in regard to the secular State in contrast to the religious State, but I draw attention to the *fact* that previous to the conversion of the country to the Muslim religion Kashmir was for centuries associated with Hindu life, mythology and folk-lore, conditions of which Indians now like to remind us. Today the pilgrimage takes place, year after year, to the great cave at Amarnath. India publishes monthly a journal called *Kashmir* which discreetly and innocuously avoids any reference to politics and concentrates on such matters as Hindu monu-

ments and the flora and fauna of the country. Though perhaps unpremeditated, the magazine, to my mind, constitutes an effective and clever piece of propaganda.

I assume awareness of the general conditions of oppression under which Muslim peasants suffered latterly through the Dogra dynasty and formerly through the Sikhs and the Durani Afghans before them, conditions under which the taxation of tobacco, wine, silk, vegetables, etc., was quite overwhelming. The slaughter of a cow was punishable by death; arms licences were not granted to Muslims and so on. At last in 1930 the Kashmiri Muslim peasant was able to express his protest, largely through the efforts of one Sheikh Abdullah, who had returned from Aligarh University after receiving his degree. In 1931 Sheikh Abdullah formed his Muslim Conference, the first Kashmiri political party charged with the task of bringing recognition, and particularly political recognition, to the Muslim majority. But do not think that Sheikh Abdullah was communal-minded. He was opposed to oppression in any form, whether directed against Muslims, Hindus or Sikhs. It so happened that the community in regard to which he had to voice his righteous indignation were his own Muslims. As a result of the agitation a Commission under Sir Bertrand Glancy was set up; the Maharaja was forced to accept the situation; a Legislature was established and the Muslim Conference took most of the seats in the elected element of the Legislature. Then one day Sheikh Abdullah realized the weakness of a political party based entirely on a communal grievance. There was a schism within the Muslim Conference and Abdullah broke away to found his own National Conference. Thereafter there were two political parties in Kashmir, both charged with the same object, both hoping to rid the country of the Maharaja and his dynasty and yet both cutting their throats in attempting to do so.

Some curious situations arose out of that rivalry. In March 1946, Sheikh Abdullah was arrested by the Maharaja's Government in connection with his "Quit Kashmir" campaign which he had launched, while Ghulam Abbas, leading the Muslim Conference, refrained from joining the "Quit Kashmir" movement, thereby giving the Maharaja, whom he hated, tacit support. That situation could not continue, and Ghulam Abbas was himself locked up in September 1946, so that the two leaders had to talk to each other in gaol, if they were not able to do so outside. It is a great pity that they could not reconcile their differences while in prison, because, had they been able to do so, subsequent history might have been different. There might then conceivably have been co-operation, whereas, as it is, the leaders on both sides are about as far away from each other as Mao Tse-tung is from Chiang Kai-shek.

I would like, in parenthesis, to add a word of assessment of Abdullah. He cut no sort of figure at the United Nations. He thought the kind of oratory which could go down in a Kashmir village would impress the Security Council. It did not do so. He, however, can impress Kashmiris, and I have heard it said that if and when he is released they will follow Abdullah wherever his sympathies may lie. Abdullah is conceited. He has a fair appreciation of the value of propaganda and its technique; he is impetuous; he has no sort of judgment whatsoever; and

yet I have heard it said by an English friend of his that in spite of all those disabilities there is still an attraction which outweighs the disabilities.

Now as to another "vacuum" in negotiation—the relationship of Mr. Jinnah to the Maharaja and to Sheikh Abdullah. How was it that Mr. Jinnah could never come to talk together with these two men? In March 1944 Mr. Jinnah was asked by those two Kashmiri political parties to go up to Kashmir to arbitrate in their quarrel. He went to Kashmir in May, and after spending two months there at their expense he delivered his judgment, which could equally well have been given from India within twenty-four hours. He advised the Muslims of Kashmir "to unite around one platform, one organization and one banner . . . 99 per cent. of the Muslims who met me are of the opinion that the Muslim Conference *alone* is the representative organ of the State Muslims." His percentage was not quite correct. The judgment infuriated Abdullah, and it seems to me that from that point onward the likelihood of Mr. Jinnah and Sheikh Abdullah getting to know each other's point of view had gone.

Mr. Jinnah's approach to that old order of Princes in India, which went for Kashmir also, was always entirely constitutional. The Moslem League, which he led, was never interested in what happened inside the princely States, and if only the Maharaja of Kashmir could have realized it he would have received a far more sympathetic approach from Mr. Jinnah than he was to receive subsequently from the Government of India. Only at one time did Mr. Jinnah allow himself to break away from the constitutional approach, and that was when leaving Kashmir on the occasion of his visit in 1944. The "ugly look" of Kashmir seems to have impressed him, and he used these words: "As I said at the moment I reached Jammu, it is *not* the policy of the Moslem League to interfere with the internal administration of this State or the grave and serious issues that face the Maharaja and his Government as between him and his people, but we are certainly deeply concerned with the welfare of Moslems in the State, and I must say that even a casual visitor cannot but be shocked to see the condition of the people, even in matters of their elementary needs and necessities."

I pass to the folly of the tribal invasion of the State on October 22, 1947, when tribesmen from the Frontier came through Abbottabad and went on up the main road to Srinagar. Three months ago I stood on the pass above Muzaffarabad and looked at the corner where the lorries must slowly and laboriously have climbed the hillside from the Pakistan side and turned the corner at the top. I climbed up into the trenches which the Dogra State troops had been holding on each side of the pass, and I came to the conclusion that had there been one stout Dogra battalion there which stood its ground, the lorries could have been picked off as they changed gear laboriously. The tribesmen would have tumbled out of the lorries and, with all their fleetness of foot in the hills, they would have left most of their bodies dead in the hills. But what happened? The battalion, the 4th Dogra Infantry—two companies of Muslims and two of Dogras—the Muslims turned round and killed their Dogra commanding officer, and in those conditions it was natural that the two Dogra companies broke and ran.

Another curious corner of that tribal event : on October 25 the tribesmen delayed at Baramulla to loot the town and thereby they lost twenty-four hours. Had they not paused but gone straight on to Srinagar, they would, as I see it, probably have been there before the Indian-born troops could have staged their airborne intervention and Srinagar would have fallen to the tribesmen. There would undoubtedly then have been bloodshed, but it is impossible not to believe that Pakistan's intervention would immediately have been sought, and Mr. Jinnah's influence could then only have been exerted to bring the situation under control. India has always claimed that it was her intervention that saved Srinagar and the whole State from a dreadful fate. I asked the Azad Kashmir Government their view, and they pointed out that there were in Srinagar leaders of the Muslim Conference in gaol, they having been gaoled by the Maharaja; there were also any number of Muslim police officers of the State Police and a number of military leaders, Muslims of the State, in custody with machine-guns trained on them to see that none escaped. The first thing that would have happened would have been that these men would have been freed; and it is hardly believable that the Muslim Conference leaders would not have set about trying to bring the situation under control. Pakistan's intervention would surely have had to be sought straight away, and it is also not possible, as I said before, that Mr. Jinnah's intervention could have been otherwise than to bring these tribesmen to heel and bring the situation generally under control. That is to put the matter into its perspective.

India's sin, as I see it, was a sin not so much of commission but rather of omission. The only achievement of the tribesmen was to make up the Maharaja's mind for him, and he hurriedly acceded to India, thereby legalizing the accession of the State, and the accession followed. But India's sin was not so much trying to rescue Srinagar; that was obviously the thing to do from her point of view; India's sin was the sin of omission. Why was it that nobody in Delhi, from the highest downwards, took the trouble to get on the telephone to Karachi before any troops were sent, and to point out that the problem was one for both India and Pakistan; that it might be an international problem, anyhow a problem for two Commonwealth countries to tackle? Could not both get together and quell the tribal invasion and then sit round a table and talk about the future of Kashmir?

In that ridiculous 1948 war between the two countries, ridiculous in that both India and Pakistan scrupulously avoided fighting each other across their mutual frontier and confined themselves to action inside Kashmir territory, it was Pakistan's claim that, whereas of course orders for battle would have to be given in Pakistan, in fact no gun was ever fired from off Pakistan soil. They simply went for each other inside the State, and it is not difficult to realize the great strategic advantage there was to Pakistan under those conditions in relation to India, the latter having to build up a long line of communications. In contrast Pakistan could choose her point of attack at any one of several places along the frontier and not have to move her troops very far in order to attack. It was an advantage not unlike that which the Chinese and the North Koreans

enjoyed when they knew that North Manchurian soil across the Yalu River was immune. The strategic advantage to Pakistan was very real and the significance of it is this: in 1953, Mr. Nehru chose to raise the question of United States military aid to Pakistan as a means by which the war and the Kashmir question could be thrown into the melting-pot again. Mr. Nehru was condemned for that, but he must surely have taken the advice of his soldiers. Mr. Nehru did not believe Mr. Mohammed Ali—I do not say he was right or wrong not to believe, but he did not believe him—and therefore his military advisers could only advise him that military aid to Pakistan from outside would place India at a great disadvantage strategically and that the situation, so far as strategy was concerned, must be regarded as in the melting-pot. Any military adviser who failed to advise his Prime Minister on those lines in the light of increased military aid to a potential enemy would have been neglecting his duty. That seems a fair way in which to look at the matter. After all, soldiers are concerned not with political motives but with the hard facts of strategy.

Yet another misconception concerns the analogy of Hyderabad and Junagadh. It was said that if Mr. Nehru was able to take over Hyderabad and Junagadh in the high-handed method which he did, why did he not allow Kashmir, which was a Junagadh situation in reverse, to go to Pakistan? Junagadh had a Hindu population governed by a Mohammedan dynasty; but here was a Muslim population governed by a Hindu dynasty. The analogy is hardly valid. In my view Hyderabad and Junagadh were islands surrounded by Indian territory; in the case of Hyderabad completely surrounded; in the case of Junagadh nearly surrounded, with the sea only on one side. Both were entirely dependent upon India for communications, for trade; in fact, for life itself. Compared with that, Kashmir is geographically placed outside both India and Pakistan, yet shares a common frontier with both, dependent to a certain extent on both. Kashmir is able to develop communications with India in a way which Pakistan could never have done with either Junagadh or with Hyderabad. It seems to me that an apt comment on that situation is this: How much stronger would Mr. Jinnah's position have been had he renounced the accession of Junagadh to Pakistan instead of accepting it; how much stronger would his position then have been when it came to accusing Mr. Nehru of doing the same thing in relation to Kashmir.

I pass over the fruitless years of negotiation from 1949 onwards. It will be realized that both sides have agreed to a plebiscite. Mr. Nehru proposed the plebiscite and appears to have been regretting it ever since. It would seem that he has been trying to rationalize what has been in fact an irrational process at work in his own mind.

On the water problem there is another slight misconception, the question of the water available in the canals having been raised. It has been loosely said that he who controls Kashmir controls the water. That is true, but it is not of such drastic or profound significance as we are apt to think. The availability of water has to be related to the ability to remove it, and of the six rivers concerned—the Indus, the Jhelum, the Ravi, the Chenab, the Beas and the Sutlej—only three pass through Kashmir territory into West Pakistan. Therefore a Kashmir entirely in Indian possession could

interfere with only three of the rivers. It might interfere with the Ravi along a short common frontier, but the main interference would be in connection with only three of the rivers. What is the use of India interfering in the three rivers if all she can do is to block the rivers to store up a useless accumulation of water in Kashmir? The only point in attempting to interfere with the Indus would be if India wanted to form a lake up in Ladakh! If she swept forward and lapped up the last token corner of Azad Kashmir, she would find herself in possession of the headworks of the Jhelum canal at Mangla, but again she could not remove the water to her territory.

The quarrel in regard to the water arises from a different reason, and that is that the River Sutlej is under Indian control. If India is to take off more water from the Sutlej, a great tract of country in South Pakistan will be deprived of water. Pakistan has therefore in compensation to bring water across from her three western rivers to territory to the east and south of West Pakistan; and that is what the World Bank has been trying to work out, in conjunction with the two countries. India has to pay Pakistan to the extent of the benefit she will derive from works on the Sutlej River and which entail building link canals running across the grain of the country in West Pakistan. The water problem, in fact, is not the simple normal problem recognized all over the world concerning a country up-stream and a country down-stream. If Kashmir were a country like the Sudan with great arid wastes and deserts waiting only for water to turn them into green fields, then an Indian-held Kashmir would be a problem for Pakistan. But the problem here is not that of moving water up and down stream but of moving water across the country; in other words, sideways.

Now at last coming to the present political situation, I take as a point from which to develop a few arguments my impression of the two Governments on either side of the Cease-fire Line. In the Azad Government there is a modest set-up, a Cabinet of four, and a President, Colonel Sher Mohammed, who controls only three districts, the Muzaffarabad district, two-thirds of the Poonch district and most of the Mirpur district. It has been said that the Azad Government is unrepresentative. Representation means an election and an election means a Legislature. Before you know where you are you have the whole paraphernalia of Government, whether it be three or thirty districts which are concerned. I would say that the little Azad Government is in no position, economically, to support the machinery of government to that extent. Nor, of course, is Pakistan in an economic position to be able to subsidize Azad Kashmir to the extent of setting up a Legislature. Neither is Pakistan interested to do so. The Pakistan case is that nothing should be done to consolidate the Cease-fire Line; that they regard the situation as fluid, open and flexible. If they were to set up a representative Government in Azad Kashmir they would be doing exactly what they accused the Indians of having done in forming their Assembly on the other side.

The situation from the Pakistan point of view is certainly disadvantageous in that it invites comparison between the two divisions. The onlooker is apt to contrast what is being done on either side, and in that

comparison the Azad territory comes off much the worse because the Azad Kashmir Government inevitably suffers in a comparison with the Indian achievement. I would say that the Azad Government suffers very definitely by the fact that there seems to be no figurehead capable of saying: "I have a stake in the other side of the Cease-fire Line; that is my country and I am quite determined to get back to it." The President, Colonel Sher Mohammed, is a very brave soldier who fought hard in the 1948 campaign; he is a man from Poonch, not from Srinagar. There are two from Srinagar in the Cabinet. The Azad Government does, in my view, lack certain conviction from not appearing to have now the passionate desire to get back into Srinagar.

Compare that with the situation on the other side. First, I draw attention to a series of political moves which have been made as between India and "Indian-occupied Kashmir," as the Pakistanis like to call it. In October 1951 there were elections held to an Assembly, elections held under no known democratic process whatsoever. Seventy-three of the seventy-five seats went to the National Conference Party; in fact, the opposition had more or less boycotted the elections. In July 1952 an eight-point agreement was signed in Delhi as between the National Conference Government in Srinagar and Delhi. One year went by, and we witnessed the switch of Sheikh Abdullah and his arrest—incidentally, he has got to be released at some time—so that it was left to Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed, the successor of Sheikh Abdullah, to ratify that eight-point agreement, which he did in February 1954. Finally, on May 14, 1954, the Indian President issued an order under Article 370 of the Indian Constitution which further confirmed the constitutional tie-up with Kashmir. It has had the effect of applying almost the whole of the Indian Constitution to Indian-held Kashmir. Kashmir is in fact a "Part B State" under the Indian Constitution.

All these measures have usually been accompanied by assurances that the plebiscite still remains the goal, that the will of the people is still to be tested; but one cannot resist the impression that the Government in Indian-held Kashmir and the Indian Government have a very convenient arrangement between them so that they can play ball backwards and forwards, and that whenever a situation emerges which looks as if it is going to be criticized either by Pakistan or by the Security Council they can say: "Well, it is the responsibility of the other side; we are sorry, but the Constituent Assembly in Srinagar took the action and we *must* not interfere." Or: "We are sorry the Indian Government took the action and we *cannot* interfere."

Now what of the Kashmir Assembly? I watched it in action and I must admit that, in spite of its unrepresentative nature, it is going to be very difficult to replace it. One has to face the fact that the Assembly has already achieved much. It includes two men of great ability, Mr. Ghulam Mohammed Sadiq and Mr. D. P. Dhar. They have been accused of being Communists. My impression is that they are not Communists, in the sense that they are not in touch with an outside Power. That surely is one of the tests of a Communist leader. They drew my attention to the fact that the Indian Army is responsible for seeing who comes into the country from

the north, and they also reminded me that when those unfortunate Khazak refugees passed through the country they gave them shelter. That action brought forth condemnation by the Chinese. So that, in that sense, the two men are not Communists, but they certainly have a great appreciation of Left Wing Socialism as applied with totalitarian methods to an ignorant community. They would claim that they have the interests of the Kashmiri at heart; that they have no outside interests; and that all they want to do is to spend twenty-four hours of the day working in the interests of Kashmiris.

As I see it, that raises an interesting problem of political morality. They see money pouring in from India. India has contributed to the Kashmir Five-year Plan to the extent of Rs.880 lakhs, which is just over three-quarters of the total expenditure under the Plan. They see that money pouring in. They want to put through their schemes of development, to go ahead with the Banihal tunnel scheme, the canal flood relief scheme, the Sind Valley hydro-electric scheme. They say that so far as they are concerned those schemes are not going to be jeopardized; that so far as they are concerned the issue is settled. That raises, as I say, a problem of political morality, because to allow these men to see through the schemes of development which they have initiated will cut right across the terms of the plebiscite and the conception of its being held according to normal procedure.

The alternative view is that Kashmir must be allowed its choice, right or wrong. The Kashmiri has never been allowed to choose properly. Must he never start? Must not he, if he is to become democratic in any sense of the word, be allowed to start to make his choice, right or wrong? Must not he be allowed to make his mark on the ballot paper and drop it into the box? I suggest a simple choice between the white crescent on the green background and, I would not say a white elephant but a white tiger on a saffron background. Should not it be put to the Kashmiri in that simple way? Let him make his mistake, if necessary. That is the view held by a very enlightened but subdued minority in Delhi, where there is a Kashmiri Brahmin Pandit, Prem Nath Bazaz, a former leader of an obscure Kashmir party who publish a monthly journal, *The Voice of Kashmir*, from Delhi. Bazaz takes the view that the plebiscite must be held, not because he is pro-Pakistan but because he supports a principle. Although he dislikes Sheikh Abdullah, he has advocated his release as a matter of principle. Prem Nath Bazaz is supported in his advocacy of the plebiscite by certain small enlightened political parties in India, particularly the Praja-Socialists. Asoka Mehta, the Praja-Socialist leader in the House of the People, went up to Kashmir with a view to establishing groups of his party.

Is it possible to envisage a compromise by which all these elements combine in the common interest? Firstly, the Kashmiri political prisoners should be released and enabled to sit round a common conference table. Secondly, it would assist the situation if Pakistan could in advance pre-judge the situation to the extent of indicating that in the event of a plebiscite confirming her possession of the Valley she is not going to scrap the plans and schemes already in hand. Is Pakistan going to be able to



put up the money to continue the schemes which have been started on the Indian side of the Cease-fire Line? What is she going to do about the Assembly in Srinagar? Is all the present personnel to be scrapped and replaced by Pakistan's own men? I believe if the intentions in the event of the plebiscite going in favour of Pakistan could be mildly stated, it might ease the situation in preparation for the plebiscite.

I have already indicated that a new conception of the plebiscite seems to have emerged. One has the impression that possibly some of the old fire has gone out of the Pakistan case. Sir Zafrullah Khan has gone and, with him, some of the old indignation seems to have departed. It may be that the Pakistanis are having second thoughts; perhaps they are not themselves sure which way the plebiscite will go. Perhaps they are not sure whether they are now in an economic position to subsidize the country should the plebiscite go in their favour. If there are second thoughts it is hardly for us to moralize on the situation. Rather we should be grateful that we have been spared the spectacle of two Commonwealth countries, two countries to whom we handed independence in some sense of achievement in 1947, are not by going to war creating a situation which would call into question the whole future status and evolution of the Commonwealth. Burke has usually something to contribute to the consideration of such situations, and in this case I find comfort again in his reflection: "The individual is foolish and the multitude is foolish when it acts without deliberation. But the species is wise and, when time is given to it, it will always act right." Let us hope that in the case of Kashmir Burke is right. (Applause.)

The CHAIRMAN: We have a little time remaining. If any member of the audience would like to ask a question, Lord Birdwood has said he would try to answer it.

Mr. PRESTON: Given goodwill, both on the side of Mr. Nehru and of the Prime Minister of Pakistan, what would Lord Birdwood suggest as the solution of the Kashmir problem?

Lord BIRDWOOD: I would suggest, first, the release of all political prisoners; secondly, the calling of a Round-Table Conference of all Kashmiris, particularly all elements of Kashmir, bringing in the Azad Government, bringing in all political prisoners released and bringing in the Government of Srinagar. Let them sit round a table without an agenda and simply feel their way, with Indians and Pakistanis listening and chipping in, with a view to the holding of a plebiscite of sorts. Pakistan is never going to claim Ladakh, nor is India likely to be so foolish as to claim Hunza and Gilgit. Thus the plebiscite is knocked down to the Kashmir Province and the Jammu Province. If the Pakistanis as a result of sitting round a conference table were also prepared to say they recognized that south and east of the Chenab River is mainly a Hindu area with a Hindu background, and they let that go, then the plebiscite is further reduced; but in the remaining area I would say the plebiscite should be held. I do not think a plebiscite can be held if the Pakistanis and the Indians are allowed to go round the country electioneering and stating their case. When reading the past history of Kashmir one realizes that

political parties become terribly excited when anybody tries to put a political problem to them. For instance, on the occasion I mentioned when Mr. Jinnah went up to arbitrate between the Kashmir parties, of course they both went to greet him on the road at his meetings, with the result that there were some very sore heads. The Kashmiris are so volatile. They are all aware of the issue. Therefore, do not allow the Pakistanis and Indians to enter the country while the issue is being decided. Simply let it be stated plainly, with as little talk as possible about it to Kashmir peasants in the areas I have indicated, as to which country they are prepared to link their future fate with. That having been done, everybody else will have to agree to the final verdict. That final verdict would be more acceptable if the Pakistanis could forejudge the situation sufficiently to say what they are going to do if, as I believe, most of the Valley would still vote in their favour.

Colonel G. ROUTH: I am not sure whether this is a fair question, but Lord Birdwood has mentioned Mr. Nehru personally. As a Kashmiri Brahmin, he seems to be the nigger in the wood-pile. What is the answer to that?

Lord BIRDWOOD: Yes, Mr. Nehru is a Kashmiri Brahmin; his family came from Kashmir, having left there about one hundred years ago. They settled in Delhi. That, of course, colours the whole of Mr. Nehru's approach to the problem, and when the two Prime Ministers meet Mr. Nehru has a Kashmiri background, whereas Mr. Mohammed Ali has a Bengali background. That, to a certain extent, must prejudice their approach to the problem. As regards other Indian leaders, I do not believe they feel so intensely about the problem as does Mr. Nehru; many would probably welcome some kind of compromise settlement.

Mr. PRESTON: Would not the result of the plebiscite depend on how many troops there were on either side in any given area in which the plebiscite was held?

Lord BIRDWOOD: Of course, all troops would have to withdraw. Always international negotiation has broken down over the number of troops to be left behind during the plebiscite. Mr. Nehru was prepared to leave 21,000 troops, which is quite a large number.

Professor CRESWELL: Roughly speaking, are the Muslims for union with Pakistan and the Hindus for union with India, or is there no such division?

Lord BIRDWOOD: All Muslims in Azad Kashmir are for union with Pakistan; in the Jammu Province there are very few Muslims left, but I imagine they are for union with Pakistan. In the Valley, which is an oval-shaped tract of country about 120 miles long and 40 broad, one could say that the issue in Srinagar, the capital, is in doubt, because the capital, although mainly Muslim, consists of the Kashmiri trader. He is a fickle but human individual and will follow the money. The money, so far, is coming from India. Go west from the city, and the farther one moves away from Srinagar so it seems the more probable that the country would go to Pakistan.

Major FOWLE: Who would take part in the plebiscite? The population seems to have changed so much during the last five or six years.

Lord BIRDWOOD: The question of allowing refugees from the country to take part in the plebiscite is always a stumbling-block; it comes up over and over again. Mohammed Ali tries to insist that all former occupants of the State should be allowed to register their vote. Mr. Nehru says that is not a practicable proposition because it is impossible to trace everybody. What the answer is I do not know.

The CHAIRMAN: Our time is now up. We have listened to a most instructive Anniversary Lecture on an extremely knotty problem. The Railway Strike has prevented a large number of members being present to hear the lecture, but they will read it in due course in the Society's Journal, and read it, I am sure, with great interest. I would like on behalf of all here to thank Lord Birdwood very much indeed for coming and addressing us. (Applause.)

[EDITOR'S NOTE.—The arrest of Prem Nath Bazaz by the Indian Police, under the Preventive Detention Act, was reported in *The Times* dated Delhi, September 15.]

## ANNUAL DINNER

The Annual Dinner of the Society was held at Claridge's, Brook Street, London, W.1, on Tuesday, July 12, 1955. The President, the Right Hon. The Earl of Scarbrough, K.G., G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E., G.C.V.O., T.D., was in the Chair.

### PRESENTATION OF THE LAWRENCE MEMORIAL MEDAL

**A**FTER the loyal toast had been honoured, the PRESIDENT said: Before we proceed with the speech making I have as President of the Society a very pleasant duty to perform. As I think many of you know, the Society presents annually the Lawrence of Arabia Medal, and this year it has been awarded to Mr. Wilfred Thesiger, D.S.O., for his work and travels in Arabia, particularly amongst Marsh Arabs. (Applause.) Some of you will remember an extremely interesting lecture he gave about two years ago on that subject. Mr. Thesiger is not here to receive this—he is, as far as anyone knows, not far from Bagdad at this moment—but in his place, I have the very great pleasure and privilege of asking his mother, Mrs. Astley, to receive this Medal.

Mrs. Astley, I have the very greatest pleasure on behalf of the Society in asking you to accept this Medal which has been awarded to your son. (Applause.)

Mrs. Astley duly accepted the Medal.

### ADDRESS BY THE PRESIDENT

The PRESIDENT: As you will have seen from your toast list, the next item is an Address by the President. Although we have present tonight many very distinguished guests and, amongst members of our Society, many very distinguished persons who could talk with great authority on any part of Asia, it is I believe the custom at the Annual Dinner of the Society for the President to deliver an Address at any rate connected with the subject of Asia. I do not know how long that custom has gone on for. Perhaps it started a very long time ago when it might have been true that the East was unchanging. But when you look round the continent of Asia and notice what has happened in only the past year I think you must all come to the conclusion that things are happening in Asia entirely differently from what our forebears might have expected 50 years ago.

May I start from the centre of Asia? As we are the Royal Central Asian Society that seems a good point from which to start and it is a part of Asia which at any rate ten years ago I knew something about. Let us think for the moment of India. During the past year we must all have been struck by the way in which the Government of India has been taking part in international affairs and has been laying out for itself a rather special kind of part. I take the view, which I ventured to express on a previous occasion, although not in this gathering, that that is a matter which we in this country should take very seriously and we should endeavour as far as we can to understand the new ideals which are behind the policies which

the present Government of India supports and we should try to realize the rather different outlook which they are going to bring in world affairs as far as they lie in Asia. I do not think we shall find that a very easy thing to do. Nevertheless, I think that unless we can adjust our minds and understand what India is driving at we shall miss the opportunity of enabling India to take a position in which she might be able to play a very important part in international affairs.

Then if we turn to the other part of the Indian sub-continent for a moment and consider Pakistan, I have always taken the view—and I am sure many here present subscribe to it also—that considering the very raw beginning which Pakistan had as an independent state it is quite remarkable how she has carried on in the past few years. Considering, too, what extraordinary hard luck she had in the very early death of the man who was in fact her founder, Mr. Jinnah, and his great successor Liaquat Ali Khan. In spite of all those difficulties, it remains true Pakistan has become a very important part of Asia and particularly of the Middle East, and I know that all those who have served in that part of the sub-continent of India can only wish her well in her voyage amidst the very many difficulties with which she is encompassed.

Then if you look further afield, first to the west of Pakistan, many people here will be delighted that our very old relations with Iran have once again got on to an even keel and we hope that the arrangements which have been made in the past year or so will enable those relations to prosper in the way many of us would like to see.

Going further west, we have noticed in the past year our relationship with Iraq has undergone another change and a change which has been made with complete goodwill and friendliness on both sides and bringing both to Her Majesty's Government and the Government of Iraq a new situation which is welcome, I believe, to both sides.

Then going still further west on to the borders of Africa we come to Egypt and again we note a very important change which has taken place in the past year. Some of us may feel a little doubtful as to how solidly based that change may be, but, nevertheless, we must all feel happy that in that extremely important part of the world we have managed something which, if it can work in the years which lie before us, will ease our situation and bring about happier relations with that very important country.

I have thus extended my brief voyage westwards as far as Africa. If you look on the other side of India you will see a long peninsula which we used to know as Indo-China. I am not quite clear what it should be called at the moment. We recollect that not long ago, thanks very much if not almost entirely to the efforts of our present Prime Minister, an extremely difficult situation in that part of the world was at any rate for the time being brought a little under control, and we must all hope that the work he did and which many nations have put their signatures to will prosper. Then we go still further east. I do not know whether it is right to include all these wide areas in the view of the Royal Central Asian Society, but I have noticed in the past year or two that the Society has thrown its arms rather wide and in fact embraces almost the whole of Asia. During this past year, particularly these past months, looking furthest east, we have

found certainly much to interest us and a great deal to cause us a good deal of anxiety with regard to Formosa and its vicinity.

I have just touched for a very brief moment on these many matters which have arisen on the continent we know as Asia in order to present to you just one or two final remarks. Our Prime Minister is going in a few days' time to Geneva to meet his colleagues at what I think has been called the Conference at the Summit in the hopes that an easier way of life between the great nations of the world may be found. It seems to me very clear—I am sure it does to him, as it does to you—that a very large part of the difficulties which will confront that Conference lie in the continent of Asia. I think we may feel reasonably happy that the fortunes of our own country will be led at that Conference by a Prime Minister who has immense experience of many parts of Asia, during the many years in which he has been Foreign Secretary, and also perhaps an even more deep-seated understanding of the problems and aspirations of Eastern peoples from the fact that he was a student of oriental languages and studies when he was a younger man.

But does not all that is happening in Asia make it really true to say that our own Society, the Royal Central Asian Society, has a great deal of work to do and a great deal of work is demanded of us by continuing to stage lectures and discussions on the many problems which refer to that part of the world? I hope the members of the Society would agree with me that your Chairman and Committee have done a wonderful job during the past year by the excellent lectures and discussions which they have arranged, and the response that has been made to their arrangements in the large and interested audiences which have attended those lectures shows how large a work this Society can undertake.

I have only one other thing to say in following that up. If I am right—and I am sure you would all agree with it—that matters which concern the continent and peoples of Asia are of very great importance not only to the world but particularly to our own country, then how important it is that our own country and our own countrymen and women—I do not mean only the distinguished people who are present here today and who might be described as specialists in these matters, but also the rank and file of our countrymen and women—should be brought to know a little more about the peoples, the many peoples, of Asia.

That is why I hope that as the years go on the efforts which the Universities are making to encourage Oriental Studies, not only for the few but to bring in particularly the history and culture and philosophy of oriental peoples to the general outlook of university teachings, will increase rather more than they have done in past years. As I think some of you know, a very considerable advance has been made in this respect at any rate in the London School of Oriental and African Studies and to some extent, but not such a large extent, in other universities as well.

I believe Her Majesty's Government are fully alive to this matter and in due course they will do what they can to help it on still further.

I trust that at not too great a length I have ventured to pass just a few comments on the rapidly changing scenes which are taking place in many countries in the continent of Asia, and I hope that our own Society, the

Royal Central Asian Society, will continue as it has in the past year to provide information and opportunities for discussion which may be fruitful on these many and important problems. (Applause.)

#### THE GUESTS

Admiral Sir CECIL HARCOURT, G.B.E., K.C.B., (Chairman of Council), in proposing the toast of The Guests, said: I have the pleasant task of proposing the toast of the guests, but before I do that I should just like to take this opportunity of welcoming many of our new members who have come to this our Annual Dinner for the first time. I am glad to say that they range from some with long and distinguished careers to many of the younger generation the bulk of whose work lies ahead of them. And now to my task of proposing the toast of the guests.

We have so very many distinguished guests here tonight that if I were to name all of them you would have to listen to me for a very long time, and I am not going to inflict that on you; but there are some I really must mention by name. I start with some of the distinguished representatives from foreign countries here and as A is the first letter of the alphabet and stands for Afghanistan I first welcome the Afghan Ambassador Dr. Najib-Ullah. His Excellency has become a member of this Society since he came here and, as many of you will remember, he addressed us and showed a really excellent up-to-the-minute film of his country at one of our Wednesday lectures not very long ago.

I should like also to welcome the Minister from Viet Nam, Mr. Nguyen Khac-Ve. We are very glad to see him here tonight and, as our President indicated, we do hope he and his countrymen will soon manage to master their many problems.

Also from Asia, I welcome tonight the Chargé D'Affaires of Saudi Arabia. He is representing his Ambassador tonight. His Ambassador, as most of you know, is an old member, an old friend, of this Society, but we are very glad to see M. Omar Sakkaf and welcome him for his own sake here.

We are glad also to welcome Mr. Evan Wilson of the United States Embassy.

To turn now to our home Government, I first should like to welcome the Minister of State for Colonial Affairs, Mr. Hopkinson, who is very kindly later on going to propose the toast of the Society. Mr. Hopkinson has taken a great interest in Asian affairs for some time and that is why we particularly welcome him here. Parliament is also represented by Sir Robert Boothby who we are very glad to see in the flesh and do not have to possess a television set in order to see him.

Other servants of the Crown include Vice-Chief of the Air Staff, Air Chief Marshal Sir Ronald Ivelaw-Chapman. Him we are very glad to welcome particularly as amongst the higher commands he has held was that of Commander-in-Chief of the Indian Air Force and therefore he knows that sub-continent well.

In the realm of defence we are also glad to welcome the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Defence Sir Harold Parker.

Another servant of the Crown of a different calibre we welcome here

tonight is Sir Bernard Burrows, political resident in the Persian Gulf. We are glad to have the opportunity of congratulating him on his knighthood which the Queen conferred upon him last week.

In another realm altogether, I am glad to welcome Sir Mortimer Wheeler. He has, as you all know, had a long and varied and distinguished career and is now known to many millions through television for his talks on archæology and we very much welcome him here tonight.

Finally, I am going to welcome our guest who is going to reply to the toast later on, the Chief of the Air Staff, Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir William Dickson. Sir William has been a member of the Chief of Staffs Committee for the last two-and-a-half years—a most difficult time, when the shape and size of all three services has had to be adjusted and changed to meet this new atomic era. Many of you will probably realize that such is the shape of modern warfare that no senior officer of any of the three services is really fitted to hold a high command unless he knows not only his own service thoroughly but also has an understanding of the other two services and of their problems. Such is the unity that has to be and is between the three services now.

We in the Navy are particularly glad Sir William has been Chief of the Air Staff during this very difficult period, especially as he started his flying life in the Royal Naval Air Service. After the R.A.F. was formed he did service in the Fleet Air Arm and therefore knows our problems well. Amongst the other things that he is noted for is that as a young man he was one of the first men to fly an aircraft off the turret of a battleship. I might just explain what that entailed. Towards the end of the 1914 war when we were trying to use aircraft at sea a platform was built on the top of the highest turret in the fore part of a battleship. On this was perched, rather perilously, an aircraft. Then young William Dickson, as he was then, climbed into his aircraft, revved up his engine and took off in a few yards, much to the admiration of everybody in the Fleet. That was just a sideline in his long and very distinguished career and it is with great pleasure that we have him with us tonight.

With that, I will ask all the members of the Royal Central Asian Society to be upstanding and I give you the toast of our guests. (Applause.)

Marshal of the R.A.F. Sir WILLIAM F. DICKSON, G.C.B., K.B.E., D.S.O., A.F.C., in replying said: Some time ago your Chairman, in that very kindly way of his, sidled up to me at a party and asked whether I would accept this great honour of replying to the toast of the guests on this occasion. Because it was a long time ago and because, like so many people, I am a great admirer of your Chairman, I gave my promise. I do hope all my fellow guests will realize and understand I have not been chosen because I am the most worthy person. That is obvious if you look at the list of guests, and you have heard what the Admiral has had to say about them. But what you do not know is that the year before last the Society had a famous First Sea Lord, Sir John Cunningham, to speak for the guests and last year my colleague, Field Marshal Sir John Harding, and in the records of the last Dinner Admiral Harcourt is recorded as saying, "the score of the Army and the Navy is equal and next year we



must try and get the Air Force on their feet." That, my fellow guests, is the explanation. Moreover, the Chairman has rubbed it in by asking me to speak about the Royal Air Force especially in regard to Asian affairs.

In the very short time at my disposal I will try and do what he asks but it will be very sketchy and hardly worth saying, it is so short. It is unrealistic, of course, to speak about the Royal Air Force alone in present and future affairs over those large areas vaguely known as the Middle East and Far East. The activities of the Air Force in maintaining the security and in assisting the development of these great areas is part of a much wider policy which embraces political, Navy and Army activities and links with the Commonwealth and international defence organizations and treaties.

This wider policy, from a Chief of Staff's point of view, has two aspects. The first is to defend or help defend the frontiers of free Asia against attack, and we have to say Communist attack because that is the potential threat, whether it is in a limited type of war or a global war. The second aspect is to give stability to those areas for which we are responsible, or in which we share responsibility, and to assist them themselves to build up their own means to protect themselves. The main problem here is in dealing with internal subversion.

Let me take you very quickly—the President took you even further—to the Far East, because that is one of the frontiers of Asia, and illustrate how the Air Force does contribute to this policy, first against attack. As you may know, we are now engaged in building up an Australian, New Zealand and United Kingdom strategic reserve in Malaya. That is firm policy. These forces are only a part of the wider defence organization known and referred to as S.E.A.C.D.T.O.—South-East Asia Collective Defence Treaty Organization.

The Royal Air Force components are the Far East Air Force, supplemented when necessary by reinforcing squadrons, mostly of bombers, from this country. Here I will digress for a moment to remind you that we are building up in this country, according to Government policy, a force of modern long-range bombers with great potentialities. We also have a formidable force of Canberra bombers, light jet bombers of great efficiency. Both these types are able rapidly to reinforce these overseas areas either to demonstrate our power to support, or actually to support those areas in the event of local emergency. The Canberras are constantly moving up and down the routes and some are operating in Malaya today.

Linked with this is the air transportation of the Army's strategic reserve. Under the treaty arrangements with Egypt, the army reserve which was situated in Egypt is now being concentrated in this country. This reserve is being organized and adapted so that we can despatch large or small portions to the threatened areas in any part of the world in a way that they can operate immediately on arrival.

What I have said applies to the Middle East as well. In the Middle East we have had big changes. The time has gone when we relied on the slow building up of large forces. The events in this area now demand the building up of the defensive capabilities of the areas threatened by major war and linking them up into a defensive organization with their neigh-

houring defensive arrangements such as N.A.T.O. The British part is to use our Middle East forces and the rapid movement of squadrons from Europe and reinforcements to contribute to this defence. It is also our part to provide all the material and other assistance we can to strengthen the forces of countries such as Iraq and others on that front line; countries with which we have had such a long and intimate association.

You may say there is a big discrepancy between the possible threats to those areas and the means of meeting them, but the atomic weapon is an enormous contribution as a deterrent and towards redressing the disparity if war should happen. Then for the promotion of confidence and for the building up of mutual defence there are the pacts that have been born in recent months; the Turko-Iraq Pact, which is now being linked with the Turko-Pakistan Pact and with our own defence agreement with Iraq and with our own treaty arrangements with Jordan and Egypt. The whole of that is a complex which is beginning to be something which we hope will build up, and we hope will give security to these Asian countries to which we are so attached.

So far as the Air Force is concerned in this cold subversive war, there are the large-scale Army/Air operations in Malaya, to which the Navy also contribute. There is the control of the Aden Protectorate. There are operations in the Persian Gulf. There are also air operations in Kenya, now diminishing. And there is the all important operation of the air routes.

One can sum up the role of the Air Force in these varying degrees of cold war and defensive policies as: offensive operations, reconnaissance, photography and air survey, air supply and air support, communications and casualty evacuation. All these services have to be maintained and, above all, there is transportation with the accent on mobility and reinforcement—the analogy being the Fire Brigade.

Mr. President, my time I think is up. I have spoken about the Air Force because I was told to. I would have liked to speak about Asia. All of us who have been to Asia like to talk about it. I will end by saying that perhaps one advantage of being an airman is you do get a bird's-eye view and this view does show the rising influence of Asia. It is playing an increasing part in determining our policies and actions. It will be disastrous if we do not understand, explain and co-operate with these Asian countries with which we have, all of us here, had such long and happy associations.

Your guests, I am sure, sir, are proud to have been present at the Annual Dinner of a Society whose objects lie so very directly and closely in these directions. On behalf of your distinguished gathering of guests, and I can certainly speak for them on this, I thank you most cordially for your most generous hospitality and for the very kind words your Chairman has said about us. (Applause.)

#### THE ROYAL CENTRAL ASIAN SOCIETY

The Rt. Hon. HENRY HOPKINSON, C.M.G., M.P. (Minister of State for Colonial Affairs), in proposing the toast of The Royal Central Asian

Society, said: I was very flattered when Admiral Harcourt invited me to come here tonight to propose the toast of this Society. Incidentally, I am very lucky to be here because at the very last minute this afternoon I was warned that I must be on the front bench this evening to answer for the Government on some supplementary estimates. However, my friend and colleague Mr. Douglas Dodds Parker, who asked me to give you his apologies for not being able to attend tonight, very kindly undertook to answer for me, so I am able to carry out this very important duty.

The interests of the Colonial Office in the area with which your Society is concerned are not only very important from the point of view of the Department but also I think from that of the world as a whole. Last year my opposite number in the Foreign Office, Lord Reading, when he was addressing you and proposing this toast, was able to congratulate himself on the large number of visits which he had paid during the course of his period of office to the territories which your Society covers. He was a little more lucky than I have been because, with one exception to which I will refer in a minute, I have not been able to visit any of your territories at all, although, in fact, in a different incarnation, as a diplomat, I did spend many years in the Middle East. I was so glad to see my old chief, Lord Killearn, here—one of your distinguished members—and also my friend Bernard Burrows who, as I am, is also indebted to Lord Killearn for our early training in Middle East Affairs.

My own visits in these three years during which I have been Minister of State have taken me to other parts of the world—Africa, the West Indies, British Guiana—and each year to New York and the United Nation where Colonial Affairs are not always the easiest matters to deal with. But I should like to say that our Secretary of State, Mr. Lennox Boyd, is visiting some of your territories in the very near future. He will be going out to the Far East in a few weeks' time, on the 23rd July to be precise, to Malaya and Singapore—where he is going to open the new airport—to Sarawak, Borneo, and Brunei, and he will have the advantage there of seeing what tremendous strides have been made in the past few years during what is called, I must say rather mildly, the emergency in Malaya. He will also see something of the working of the new Government, the first popularly elected Government in Singapore, which has met with so many great difficulties on taking office, and he will in fact be in the Far East when the first popular elections to the Federation of Malaya take place.

He is also going on to Hong Kong which is I think a part of the world—all of you who know very much about these things will agree—where British influence has been a very important stabilising factor and where, quite apart from the commercial value we have been able to exercise, our influence has been for good in these very difficult years.

He will not be able to go, despite the scope and rapidity of modern air travel, to the one Asian territory which I have been able to visit during my period of office—the Colony of Aden and the Aden Protectorate. I was I think the first Colonial Minister ever to visit the Aden Protectorate when I went there last January. No doubt there are many of you here who are familiar with the Colony of Aden, but I think unless you have been there

very recently you would be very struck by the fantastic growth and development which has taken place there in the past few years. There is a fuelling port, a commercial port, and, now the new oil refining plant has been constructed at a cost of £45 m. or rather more, Aden has become very much more important than ever before in spite of the fact that air travel tends to overshoot it at times.

We all hope this Colony of ours in Aden, quite a small territory in itself but one in which many races live happily side by side—Indians, Jews and Somalis and, of course, Arabs, with a very happy community of British officials and British businessmen—will continue to make progress and develop. The atmosphere which I found there was the best I have ever met with between officials and the commercial interests, and it will do a great deal to contribute to that end.

In contrast to the Colony of Aden there is the Aden Protectorate and I must say I knew very little about it when I went there and I am surprised to find how little people do know about that territory. It is about half as big again as the United Kingdom. It has a population of about one million and it really is a most fascinating country. Much of it is very wild and mountainous. There are a series of little sultanates and sheikhdoms scattered about, all bound to us by treaty relations, all in various stages of development. As I flew over I was astounded to learn there are parts in fact not administered by us at all. They cannot be entered by British officials of any kind. There are two or three sultanates on top of a mountain on a winding road which give access only to camels or donkeys.

I must say it was fascinating to find how the major part of this territory is making great progress, above all in the field of agriculture. A great deal is being done and it is due to the very happy relationship that exists between ourselves and the rulers and the people of those territories. It is a very happy example of Anglo-Arab co-operation.

The Abyan cotton scheme struck me as a very remarkable example of how even today the Briton working in these out-of-the-way territories can do a great deal to further development and prosperity and happiness of these backward people.

Part of the territory where the cotton scheme is going ahead was only in fact administered for the first time in 1938 when British forces went in to restore order between the two tribes living there, the Faduli and the Yafei, and at that time there were only some 1,000 acres of land under a sort of desultory cultivation. In 1947 the Aden Development Board was created for developing some 120,000 acres on the basis of flood irrigation from the overflow of the Wadi Valley and special emphasis, though not the sole emphasis, was placed on the growing of cotton.

I can give you some idea of the extraordinary development there has been when I say in 1949 1,500 bales of cotton were produced, worth £115,000, while last year the bales numbered no fewer than 40,000, worth £2½ m. We are hoping the figure will rise to some £5 m. in the next five years. That is a tremendous development in a backward and sparsely populated territory such as that.

Of course, the population of the area has increased as a result and gone up ten-fold since 1947. The standard of living and of public health have

gone up, roads have been developed, and peace and security have been achieved.

You will be aware from what you have been reading in the Press recently that there are parts of the Aden Protectorate, and again I am referring to the Western Protectorate, where the situation is not as happy. It is an area in which the Royal Air Force has for many years been responsible for keeping law and order. In the Anlaqui sultanate some of the tribesmen are in a state of revolt against the Sultan and have taken opportunities of attacking our security forces operating in that area. It is with regret that I must tell you that these dissident elements, not very numerous, have been encouraged in their activities by gifts of cash, grain, arms and ammunition which have been supplied by certain elements in the Yemen.

You will have read that there was an attack on a Government guards convoy on the 15th June which resulted in the death of two British officers and one Arab officer and two members of the Aden Protectorate Government guard. Our information is that after this the tribal leader returned to Beidlia in the Yemen to collect more ammunition and to receive awards and so on for the casualties inflicted on our forces.

I think everybody would agree that this sort of trouble which is being fomented in what is British protected territory is regrettable, in fact intolerable, and I would say all the more regrettable because we have an old friendship with the Yemen and we have always hoped to be able to work and co-operate with them in the development of their country which is one which also holds out tremendous promise. I hope the measures now in train will soon remedy the military position. But I should like to say this, that I do feel in this matter we are entitled to the co-operation of the Yemen Government and we must hope for their support in bringing this unhappy situation to an early end.

I have not made these few observations tonight in any hope that I have thereby added to the vast wealth of knowledge which I know is always available to this excellent Society both through its members and through the lectures. I have simply made them in the hope of drawing the attention of those here to one or two of the perhaps smaller problems, forgotten problems sometimes, which we in the Colonial Office have to deal with and indeed are determined to solve.

I know that members of all Government departments, and there are many of them represented here this evening, would agree with me in saying how deeply grateful we are to the Society for the way in which it has aroused and keeps alive the interest of the people of this country in the affairs of Asia and has always stimulated the growth of an expert body of knowledge on this subject. Certainly as far as we in the Colonial Office are concerned we hope indeed that your Society will continue its good work in the future as in the past. I can assure you, you can always count on our co-operation and help in any of your problems.

I have great pleasure in proposing the toast of the Royal Central Asian Society. (Applause.)

The PRESIDENT: There need be no fear, I am not going to undertake

another trip round the world, but I do want on behalf of the Society to thank Mr. Hopkinson for his speech and for proposing the toast of the Society. We are very grateful to a very busy Minister for finding time to come here this evening. I know very well that before he came here this evening he was in urgent consultation with the Secretary of State. Such are the calls which are made on him and we are very grateful that he has found the time to come and speak to us in the way he has done. May I say to him that many members of this Society were extremely interested in the reference he made to Aden. As he has pointed out to us, it is the first time one of her Majesty's Ministers has been to the Colony, and I venture to say that that shows that Her Majesty's present Ministers are a very enterprising body of men. We thank you very much for honouring us and proposing the toast. (Applause.)

# CHINA'S FIRST FIVE-YEAR PLAN

By E. STUART KIRBY

*(Professor of Economics, University of Hongkong)*

ON the plane of foreign policy the intentions of the Chinese Communist Government remain largely conjectural. Evidently the immediate commitments are to consolidate Vietminh gains and insist on the "liberation" of Formosa; but no details are yet available of the exact means and methods proposed, even for these comparatively limited and localized objectives. On the larger issues, of what position the New China hopes or expects to take in Asian or world-wide affairs, the indications are still less specific.

In terms of internal policy, however, the prospect has been made clear and explicit. The aims have been bluntly stated, the methods defined and the programme fixed. The People's China is to follow very closely the economic model and social pattern of the Soviet Union. China's First Five-year Plan, following comprehensively on the historic lines laid down in Russia, was inaugurated at the beginning of 1953. Like the Soviet original of 1928-32, this programme is designed to hasten the transition from a mixed economy towards Socialism by a policy of guided and enforced industrialization and collectivization, with a frank stress on the creation of heavy industries.

The rapidity with which Chinese Communism moved, within five years from the revolutionary seizure of power, through certain transitional and preparatory stages into this phase of "full-plan Socialism" was unexpected, even by the great majority of Party members. The corresponding evolution in the U.S.S.R. took more than twice as long. The intermediate phases, designated in the Russian case as the periods of War Communism and New Economic Policy, were differently conditioned in the case of China, and the order of events was different. Political doctrine and procedure were also dissimilar; the Party Dictatorship, explicitly intensified in Russia during the nineteen-twenties through the political machinery of the local and central Soviets, was enveloped in China in the broad and ostensibly liberal doctrine of the "New Democracy," which promised a comparatively painless and gradual reduction of the "national" bourgeoisie and the petty bourgeoisie.

But now the die is cast; some sharp lessons have been learnt by all those in China who anticipated that there would be a protracted period of relatively peaceful "co-existence" between the classes. The turnover to a "planned basis of society" is in itself a sort of Rubicon, where the last bridges out of Capitalism are destroyed and the frontier into Socialism is crossed. The aim of the Five-year Plan is significantly proclaimed as being "to transform China into a powerful, industrialized Socialist state."

"Powerful, industrialized, and Socialist": the three criteria—though in Communist thinking they are largely synonymous and wholly inter-

connected—clearly announce to the world the main desiderata, and the general position which China is expected to take in the world of the future. No secret is made of the fact that national power means armament, and that industrialization is first and foremost to subserve a great expansion of China's military potential. Industrialization is proclaimed, in the second place, as the means of securing the economic as well as the political independence of the country. Thirdly and concomitantly, China is to stand firmly at the side of Russia in the Socialist "camp."

The achievement of all these objectives depends heavily on the success or failure of the Five-year Plan, now in its third year. This is the first and perhaps the greatest testing time for China as a fully Communist state. The other Asian nations, in particular, are vividly aware of this and closely watching the outcome. The success or failure of China's first Five-year Plan may have an influence on the course of world events, far beyond its own frontiers, comparable to that of its famous predecessor in Russia.

It is only in the last year that any precise figures or indications have been given concerning either the objectives of the Plan or its progress to date. In the first stages, the reports and claims were invariably expressed in terms of percentage gains over "the highest figures previously recorded." Recently, however, some absolute figures have been forthcoming from Chinese and other Communist sources. It is now possible, and more than timely, to present some specific conclusions as to what is being attempted and achieved in China today.

"General planning" as a cardinal and urgent principle was clearly proclaimed in the "Common Programme" of the régime when it came to power in 1949, and is now duly incorporated in the formal Constitution of 1954 (Article 15). It is only since the latter date, however, that any such system has been fully applied. The whole period from 1949 to 1955 was in fact occupied with preliminary and preparatory measures. Severe and sweeping as these were, official warnings are still given that in some respects the Chinese economy has not yet emerged from a "pre-planning" and transitional stage; thus Premier Chou En Lai announced on September 23, 1954, nearly two years after the formal inception of the Five-year Plan, that "its schedules are not yet completed or finalized, and it is subject to addition or amendment in various particulars."

Mr. Chou's main or most immediate anxiety at that time must have been the difficulties in the whole agrarian "sector," particularly the extremely bad weather of 1953, which brought the worst floods in recent history. The Plan, beginning with that year, was to raise grain production by 30 per cent. in five years, or from about 160 million tons in 1952 to about 213 million in 1957. About one-tenth of China's cultivated area was waterlogged in 1953, and the highest official claims for the 1954 grain output were 170 million tons—*i.e.*, only about one-sixth of the planned increase by the time half the planned period had expired.

The social difficulties on the rural "front" are acute and complicated. Most parts of the country had hardly settled down after the violent movements of land reform, redistribution and "liquidation" of the landlords, which occurred in the first years of "liberation." A significant change dates from the codification and application of the New Land Law in the



last three years; thenceforward, the attack on the richer peasants was halted, but any new land expropriations were not to be distributed among the poorer peasants but to go to the State for operation as collective farming units. Currently the emphasis may be said to be—as it has been in Soviet Russia—on collectivization, not so much as a means of raising agricultural productivity, but as a means of increasing the proportion of the product which is gathered into the hands of the State.

The original target of the Five-year Plan was to establish 800,000 farm-production co-operatives by 1957, which would represent not more than a quarter of the total number of peasant households; but late in 1954 these aims were enlarged to 3,000,000 co-operatives enlisting some 60 per cent. of all the farm households, and supplementary measures such as the organization of “mutual aid teams” were also intensified. Meanwhile a State monopoly of all trade in cereals, cotton and other main products has been instituted, and commodity rationing imposed in much of the countryside as well as all the main cities.

In no other aspect of the Plan has there been quite such a striking intensification; some of the industrial objectives were in fact scaled down at the same time. It is thus proper to keep fully in mind the priority of the agrarian “front” in China’s internal problem, and to suggest that the following points are of special importance. The basis of any solution in China must be the agrarian issue. The overwhelming majority of the population is rural and agricultural. The possibilities of industrialization depend very largely on the extraction of savings which must come principally from this rural society, and the mobilization of labour by displacing the surplus or marginal labour from a rural society characterized by over-population and concealed unemployment.

Moreover, it must be borne in mind that from the Communist point of view any plans for increasing production are concomitantly (indeed *ipso facto*, by Marxist reasoning) campaigns for intensifying the class struggle. The peasantry and the petty bourgeoisie of rural and small-town or suburban handicraftsmen, shopkeepers, etc.—the two classes are especially closely related in China—are to be controlled and absorbed into the Socialist society in certain programmatic stages.

First, they are drawn into mutual aid teams and other forms of *ad hoc* co-operation. Second, they will be “brigaded” into co-operatives of more permanent and formal kinds; this step will be facilitated by the State control of all “key points” and essential activities (such as the State monopoly of trade in staple commodities) and the existence of State-managed and operated farming units providing the nuclei for widespread collectivization. Thirdly, the phase of Socialism will be entered, with universal collectivization.

The “General Line,” with some adaptations, is thus broadly similar to that of the Soviet Union in about 1928-29 before the great drive against the kulaks. If the revised Five-year Plan were fulfilled in this respect the corresponding social, political and economic crises would mature relatively earlier in China than was the case in Russia. Fulfilment would appear, however, to be lagging behind prescription. Official statements disclosed that by the summer of last year there were only about 100,000 farm-produc-

tion co-operatives, comprising only about 2 per cent. of the rural population and about 7 per cent. of the cultivated area, and some 50 State farms, most of the latter being in the wheat lands of North China and Manchuria.

Turning to the schemes for industrialization, it must be noted that the dynamics of the matter are essentially similar. Schedules of figures for production goals and current successes in achieving them are only one face of the situation, the obverse of which is a programmatic policy of social transformation by class war, deliberately applying specific pressures. From the initial basis of co-existence of private and state enterprise, the country is to pass in several stages through State Capitalism into Socialism. The State had from the beginning control of the "key" positions: heavy industry, taxation, banking, fuel and power, sources of raw materials, aspects of distribution, and business information. Its control in all these respects has been rapidly extended and tightened. Much of the economy is now fully nationalized, or under "joint" (State and private) management, which means subjection and absorption of the private element. Some 60 per cent. of all modern industry in China is now State-owned, according to official statements; no figure is given for the aim of the Plan in this respect, but the suggestion is that it should be 90 if not 100 per cent.

The industrial Five-year Plan, like its Soviet prototype of 1928-32, lays overwhelming stress on heavy industry. Its landmarks and main pillars, in terms of actual projects, are 141 undertakings in the field of "great industry," in connection with most or all of which Russian technical assistance and equipment will be given. It is uncertain to what extent these represent new installations, extensions to existing plant, or merely restorations or renovations; but they must total a great addition to productive capacity. Details have been given for only about a quarter of these basic projects; these show the developments in question to be concentrated almost entirely in the north-east, north and north-west of China. In conformity with the geo-strategic requirements of the Sino-Russian alliance on the one hand, and the resource-pattern of the country on the other, the south appears to be a residual legatee in the matter of investment for industrialization.

A large administrative reform was effected in the latter part of 1952 to prepare the way for the inception of the Plan. Six entirely new Ministries were created to facilitate its execution, besides the establishment of special sections and a general recasting of functions in all the existing offices. Organizational readjustment is in fact still proceeding.

An entire reorganization of the country's educational system was also involved, which is still far from complete. Universities and colleges were entirely "regrouped" and "converted" to fulfil primarily the rôle of technical colleges or centres for the rapid training of engineers and managerial staffs. Corresponding changes were instituted in the rest of the educational system. At the same time—or rather in conjunction, as students were brought into "practical work in production"—a wide policy of training within industry was inaugurated.

A rough assessment of the quantitative results to date is possible, at least in respect of the changes at the university and college level, but the

quality of the new technicians is a matter of doubt and surmise. The Plan calls for over 700,000 additional "technical and managerial personnel." About 100,000 students from high and middle technical schools, and about 50,000 from universities or colleges, participated in "production practice programmes" in 1953, and the plan was to increase the total number to over 250,000 in 1954.

The Plan calls for 150,000 to 200,000 engineers and 500,000 technicians. The number of university and college graduates in 1953 was just under 35,000, of which about one-third were classifiable as engineers. There are about 100,000 students in technical schools who might be brought into that category. Hence the requirement in respect of engineers appears hardly likely to be fulfilled. There are, however, nearly 400,000 students in technical schools of the middle and higher grades; the number of the latter is increasing and, if training of workers already in factories is added, the requirement of 500,000 technicians may be more easily realizable.

However, there is some evidence that new needs arise while the old ones are being met. During the first years of the régime "planning" was on a relatively simple basis: the rehabilitation of the pre-existing plant and the restoration of pre-war levels of output. As the Five-year Plan moves the perspective into the longer-term period, when it is no longer a question of changing the use made of existing plant, but of extensive creation of new plant and general changes in the industrial structure, many new variables are introduced and the matter becomes very much more complex. The Plan has been repeatedly revised, in particular to allocate a greater proportion of investment to matters which had evidently been underestimated, such as geological surveying, the training of statisticians, accountants and others, and inspection and supervision; apparently at the expense of reducing other items, especially the provision for training engineers or technicians.

Analysis of statistical results is a task too complicated to attempt in brief space. The results for 1954 are not yet available, but high "target" figures for that year were announced, at so late a date as September 23. In respect of most items, these are startlingly higher than the figures which were previously indicated; if they are to be believed, the work of the whole five years 1953 to 1957 would be largely accomplished by the end of 1954.

But the pronouncements are full of self-contradictions and contrasting admissions of failure, which make such an optimistic version untenable. The following are random instances. Coal production (the chief laggard) admittedly did not recover to pre-war levels till the end of 1953; yet it was supposed to increase 50 or 70 per cent. in 1954. Only 30 per cent. of enterprises fulfilled their plans "in all respects" in 1953. Of the 141 Russian-aided "key" industrial plants, 17 were recently claimed to have been "wholly or partially completed" (*sic*), while 34 were "in construction", leaving 90 presumably not yet in hand. Readjustments and revisions have been bewilderingly frequent, but it is broadly clear that the rate of increase of production in 1954, according to the Plan figures for that year, was less than the rate of increase in 1953. Half the increase in industrial output in 1954 was to come, it was stated, from new plant starting production in that year and half from increased output in existing enterprises.

These and many other fragmentary or paradoxical utterances fail to convince any but the already devoted. Other general grounds of scepticism are the belief that recent increases have been achieved by "shock" tactics, overdriving the plant and the producers; and the realization that the claims are all in quantitative or monetary terms, giving no indication of the quality of all these efforts, installations and results.

#### IMPORTANT

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# THE RUSSIAN OCCUPATIONS OF BEIRUT, 1772 - 74

(Being a paper submitted by Wm. Persen, Assistant Professor of History, the American University of Beirut, who informs us that research for this article had the support of the Arab Studies Research Program of the American University of Beirut.)

THE Russian occupations of Beirut in 1772 and 1773 were not important events in the history of the eighteenth century; they did, however, form part of a broader development in Middle Eastern history which was of great significance. They were symptomatic of an advancing Western civilization and a decaying Ottoman Empire. The Russian fleet acted as the representative of the new force of Western penetration in the Middle East, while the decaying Ottoman Empire attempted to hold itself together against the Western advance. Russia in the eighteenth century was interested only in acquisitions in Europe; her real and only goal in regards to the Ottoman Empire was Constantinople, city of the Cæsars. In 1682-89, 1696-99, 1710-11 and 1736-39 wars had been fought between the Porte and Russia. In each Russia penetrated deeper and deeper into Ottoman territory, but in 1739 the Ottoman State still seemed a powerful force. Each Russian gain was accomplished only with the greatest sacrifice in men, time, and money. The Sultan was not yet the sick man of Europe.

In 1768 Russian expansion toward the South became involved not only with the maintenance of the Ottoman northern frontier but also with the maintenance of their control over some of the Arab areas of the Eastern Mediterranean. The Russian advance set the stage for local leaders in Egypt and Syria to revolt against the Porte. When Catherine ordered the Russian fleet to the Mediterranean, Russian policy became directly involved with these regions. As will be shown, the Russians missed a golden opportunity to secure political advantages in Ottoman areas occupied by Arabic-speaking peoples. Despite the Russian failure to seize their chance, the stage was set for the Eastern Question. Instead of Constantinople and the Balkans being the only points of conflict between French, British, Austrian and Russian desires, the area of clashing aims becomes the whole Middle East.

## I

For reasons which are outside the limits of this paper, the Sultan declared war on Russia in 1768. The Russians, under the energetic Catherine the Great, immediately decided to go on to the offensive and to drive the Ottomans from the northern shore of the Black Sea. They planned a military campaign of invasion of the Balkans along the route inaugurated by Peter the Great in 1710 and repeated by Russian armies in 1788, 1827 and 1877; a campaign begun with the occupation of the

Rumanian principalities, continued with the crossing the Danube, and completed with a direct assault through Bulgaria on Constantinople.

But this direct frontal attack was not to be the only one. Catherine and her favourite, Alexis Orlov, conceived the idea of attacking the Ottoman Empire in the rear. Their idea was to send the Russian fleet, expanded by the building and purchase of new ships, from the Baltic to the Eastern Mediterranean. This fleet would be staffed by British, Venetian and Greek officers and seamen under Russian command. The fleet would then establish itself in the Ægean, destroy the Turkish fleet, and attack the Straits from the south. It was hoped that its presence in the Eastern Mediterranean would raise the Greeks in rebellion.

The Russian fleet,\* under the overall command of Orlov, set sail during the summer of 1769, the first elements reaching Gibraltar in November. By April 1770, Russian warships began landing men and arms at various points in the Morea and later on the islands of the Ægean. A Russian squadron under the English admiral, Elphinston, first engaged Turkish vessels in May. On July 5, 1770, at Chesma, the Russian fleet cornered the Kaptan Paşa and the main Ottoman fleet, and practically destroyed it completely. In this engagement the Ottomans lost twelve battleships, six frigates, six xebecs, thirteen galleys and thirty-two other smaller craft; the Russians lost eleven men. After this victory the Russian fleet had almost complete control of the Eastern Mediterranean. What was left of the Turkish fleet retreated to the Dardanelles and other protected harbours and never seriously attempted to challenge Russian supremacy during the war.

## II

Internally, the Ottoman Empire was not as yet rent by obvious divisions. The glory and power of Suleyman seemed to have been left behind; but not too far behind. The Ottomans had never really centralized their conquered Arab areas. When Selim destroyed the independence of the Mameluke Syro-Egyptian State, he did not destroy the Mamelukes. They, and other ruling Arab groups, were left in power. Over them and beside them was placed a thin Turkish military bureaucracy. The local governors were chosen by the Sultan. Taxes were paid to the Sublime Porte. The Sultan was recognized as sovereign. In time of war the Arab provinces provided troops for the central army.

As long as the Empire remained strong, the Syrian-Egyptian areas remained loyal to the Sultan.† But it was becoming obvious in the eighteenth century that the Empire's strength was ebbing. What made this obvious was the steady retreat of the northern border before the arms of Austria and Russia. From the beginning, the advance of European powers on the north and the revolt of Arab areas in the south were to some degree linked. In 1768 they become definitely linked.

\* A list of the vessels can be found in Anderson *Naval Wars in the Levant* (Liverpool, 1952), 279.

† There is one obvious exception, Fakhr ed-Din II, who set up an independent state in western and central Syria at the beginning of the seventeenth century.

In Syria, the eighteenth century had witnessed a definite weakening of Ottoman power. At this time Syria was divided into five major provinces: Aleppo, Damascus, Tripoli, Sidon and Jerusalem. Mount Lebanon was more or less independent of all the provincial governors, with various Druze Princes in control. The most important governors were those of Aleppo and Damascus, but these governors were not very firmly controlled by Constantinople. They had enormous internal problems, being constantly embroiled with the inhabitants of their own cities, as well as with the Druze and raiding Bedouins.

In what is now Northern Palestine, a certain 'Umar was established as the local ruler by the governor of Damascus at the beginning of the century. His area of control was spread by his son, Dahir al-'Umar, to include the contemporary Southern Lebanon and, most important, the port of Acre. Although Dahir did not have the rank of a governor, his organization of the area under his control, particularly Acre, made him as wealthy and as strong as one. Indeed, by 1768 only the pasha of Damascus exceeded his power. Dahir always paid the taxes to the Sublime Porte; he maintained order within his realm; he maintained the Sultan as sovereign. Before 1768 he was not considered as a revolutionary by Constantinople, but as a man of some power who should be watched.

In Egypt, the Mamelukes still controlled the land of the Nile Valley. A council of Mamelukes held most of the political power and could control the Ottoman-appointed Pasha. In the 1760's one Mameluke in particular became dominant. Ali Bey was in 1768 the most powerful man in Egypt. There is no doubt that he had thoughts of throwing off most of what little Ottoman power remained and establishing a more independent Egyptian Mameluke State; we are not certain that Dahir in Syria had similar thoughts about independence.

Whenever the Sultan declared war, he ordered his various provincial governors to supply him with fixed numbers of troops. In 1768 the declaration of war on Russia provided Ali Bey with the opportunity he sought. The Sultan ordered Ali to provide him with a detachment of soldiers. Ali immediately began to gather the soldiers, but for what purpose and for whose benefit? A number of Mamelukes who feared Ali believed that as soon as the troops had been gathered and equipped they would be used not against Russia, but against the Mamelukes who opposed Ali and against the Sultan, that the troops would be used to support Russia and make Ali the independent ruler of Egypt.

Ali's accusers were correct. In the autumn of 1768, Ali declared Egypt independent. He ceased paying taxes to the Sublime Porte, ended the sovereignty of the Sultan by ordering that the latter's name be deleted from the Friday service, and by coining money in his own name.

The central government involved with the Russian offensive in the North was in no position to crush this revolution. Normally it probably would have ordered the Governor at Damascus to invade Egypt. But it could not do so because it could not support him with either the Ottoman army or navy and, very important, because no one knew which side Dahir al-'Umar would take. If the latter were to support Ali, a military expedition at that time would be impossible.

Ali Bey's revolution is directly connected with the Russian war begun in 1768.\* He could decree his independence only because of the Sublime Porte's involvement with Russia. Ali was fully aware of this and determined to assure his independence immediately, while the Porte was deeply involved with Russia. He decided to ally himself with Dahir al-'Umar and seize Syria. With Syria under his control Ali would either be in a favourable position to defend himself against any future Ottoman attempt to reconquer Egypt or he could force the Sultan to recognize his independence.

Dahir readily agreed to Ali's proposals of an alliance. They agreed in the spring of 1771 that Dahir was to join the army of Ali's general and son-in-law, Muhammad Abu-Dahab. The Mameluke-South Syrian army of Ali and Dahir was supposed to defeat the forces of the Pasha of Damascus and destroy the Ottoman power in Syria. Militarily it was eminently successful. In 1771 Damascus fell almost without a fight. The Pasha of Damascus fled and all Syria seemed ready to fall into Mameluke hands.

But appearances were deceptive, particularly in a world of deceit, bribery and unbridled ambition. Ottoman representatives reached Abu-Dahab just after his arrival in Damascus. Flattery and promises were combined with suggestions that he return to Egypt and replace his father-in-law. Immediately Abu-Dahab ordered a precipitous retreat, which stopped only when every Egyptian soldier had left Syria.

Dahir's consternation and downright fear must have been considerable. One day he was the left wing of a triumphant army; the next a small force which would have to face the combined forces of five pashas. When Abu-Dahab returned with his army to Egypt, Ali Bey was strong enough to maintain his power in Cairo. He was not capable of disciplining his disobedient son-in-law, nor was the latter capable of replacing Ali. It was only a matter of time, however, before the two would come into open conflict over the control of Egypt.

### III

Although up to this time the fortunes of Egypt and Syria were only indirectly connected with the moves of Russia, as early as 1769 it was generally assumed in European capitals and in Constantinople that some direct secret alliance did exist between Ali Bey and Russia.† Such was not the case.‡ Catherine II was joyous at the news of Ali's revolt, but neither

\* The French Consul in Aleppo wrote in 1771, "the rapid progress of the Muscovite up to now is the principal (cause) of the insubordination of the provinces of the Ottoman Empire", as quoted in François Charles-Roux, *Les échelles de Syrie et de Palestine au XVIII<sup>e</sup> siècle* (Paris, 1928), 104.

† Auriant, "Catherine II et la Méditerranée," *Acropole*, Paris (V, 1930), 196, 201; see also Giovanni Mariti, *Istoria della guerra accesa nella Soria l'anno 1771 dalle armi di Ali-Bey dell'Egitto e continorazione del successo a detto Ali-Bey fino a quest'Anno 1772*. (Firenze, 1772), 87, 113.

‡ Auriant presents material from Catherine's correspondence with Voltaire showing the complete lack of any direct connection between Ali and the Russian government before 1772, Auriant, 196 ff.



her government nor her naval command in the Mediterranean took any steps toward arranging an alliance.\*

His plan for the conquest of Syria having failed, and faced with a powerful internal enemy, Ali decided that he could defeat Abu-Dahab and retake Syria only with the assistance of the Russian army. Therefore, on December 2, 1772, he dispatched an Armenian by the name of Yaqub on a French ship to visit Alexis Orlov at the Russian fleet headquarters on the Ægean island of Paros.† Yaqub was told to offer to Orlov "every kind of provision for his fleet and army and money if wanted."‡

Unfortunately for Ali, Orlov was in Livorno, and the vice-commander of the fleet, Spiridov, replied that he had no power to make an alliance but that he would pass on the Egyptian request immediately. Yaqub went to Livorno and thence to Russia, where Orlov passed the matter on to Catherine herself. The Empress definitely subscribed to the idea of an alliance, and from the spring of 1772 Russian squadrons were continually moving to Egypt or Syria in support of Ali Bey or his ally, Dahir al-'Umar.§

Ali actually did not learn of the favourable reply to his proposal until May 1772. By this time he was no longer in Egypt, for in April 1772 Abu-Dahab forced him to flee to his only remaining friend, Dahir, who meanwhile had been successfully warding off small Ottoman punitive expeditions. Dahir's victories incensed the Pasha of Damascus to such a degree that the latter gathered in May 1772 a massive but undisciplined force of 30,000 men to crush Dahir once and for all. This army, with units from all the Syrian provinces and from the Druzes, was concentrated on the coastal road north of Sidon, a town of great importance at the time, which had been occupied by Dahir's forces during the winter 1771-72. Dahir's army, numbering something about 6,000 men, appeared doomed. At this moment the first Russian squadron under the command of the Greek, General-Adjutant Rizo, reached the Levantine coast. The squadron, consisting of two frigates, five half-galleys, four xebecs and four polaccas—only a very small part of the total Russian Mediterranean fleet—was Catherine's and Orlov's reply to Ali's request for an alliance and assistance against Abu-Dahab and the Ottomans. The squadron had sailed to Damietta only to discover that Ali Bey had fled to Syria. Therefore Rizo sailed to Acre to find the Egyptian. At the moment of the arrival of the Russian fleet in Syrian waters, the Ottoman forces were attacking Sidon and had almost taken the city. It was agreed that the squadron and

\* In November 1771 a small Russian squadron—the first to appear off Arab coast—was seizing Turkish vessels off the Nile Delta. Mariti, 124.

† Auriant, 209; Marcel places Ali's first request sometime during 1771, M. J. Marcel, *Egypte Depuis la Conquête des Arabes jusqu'à la domination Française* (Paris, 1877), 235; Lusignan agrees 1771 but is more specific, stating sometime after the beginning of Abu Dahab's Syrian campaign, S. Lusignan, *A History of the Revolt of Ali Bey* (London, 1873), 105; Lockroy states before Abu Dahab's campaign, E. Lockroy, *Ahmed le boucher* (Paris, 1888), 18; H. Shehab and Volney make the date in the spring of 1772, H. Shehab, *Lubnan fi ahn Umara Shehabin* (Beirut, 1933), 91; and C. F. Volney, *Œuvres* (Paris, 1860), 138; Combe writes the alliance was completed before Abu-Dahab's campaign began, E. Combe, *Précis de l'histoire d'Égypte* (Cairo, 1933), V. III, pt. 1, 46.

‡ Lusignan, 106.

§ Auriant, 212.

Dahir's forces should simultaneously attack the Ottoman army.\* On May 22 the attack took place. It was not long before the Ottoman army broke and fled. The sudden appearance of the Russian squadron off Sidon and its great fire power were probably the decisive factors in the battle.†

The Russian fleet then sailed to Beirut, the chief port of the Druzes, and began to bombard the town. It seems probable that Ali and Dahir had sent the squadron there to keep the Druzes busy and prevent their massing another army as well as to punish them for joining the Ottoman side.‡ The fleet began bombarding Beirut on June 18 and continued for five days. A landing attempt on June 21 failed, but the following day and night a continuous bombardment sent more than 500 balls into the town, and on the morning of the twenty-third the Russians landed and took the city. In a few hours the landing troops sacked and pillaged it, taking, according to Auriant, silk and other merchandise worth 500,000 piastres and 50,000 piastres in money.§

Emir Yusuf, the chief Druze prince at the time, agreed to ally with Ali Bey and the Russians for four months, and to pay the Russians the expenses of their expedition. The amount of the payment differs with each source, but 25,000 piastres' worth of merchandise appears to be the approximate sum.|| The payment was completed quickly

\* The question of payments made to the Russian fleets during their adventures along the Levantine Coast 1772-73 is one of some confusion. Certain French writers tend to overestimate the greediness of fleet commanders. For example, Lockroy and Volney say Dahir paid the fleet a figure of about 600 purses to support his defence of Sidon, Volney, 232; Lockroy, 64. Volney is an accurate writer, but his facts are based on hearsay a decade after the events. Lockroy, writing a century later, has created a highly romanticized work of doubtful historical value; particularly his apparent effort to picture the Russian squadrons as nothing more than a fleet of pirates. The French Consular reports on which Lockroy and Auriant are partially based are themselves strongly prejudiced against Russian activity in the Levant. No other sources mention that the Russian fleet received any payment from Dahir or Ali Bey for the defence of Sidon. The Russian squadrons were ordered to aid Dahir and Ali Bey against the Ottomans and they did so without any payment. However, when enemy towns, as Beirut was, were occupied the commanders willingly took whatever wealth they could through pillage and tribute. In their relations with the Druze princes they may be called pirates, but this is not so in their relations with Ali Bey.

† Mariti, Shidyah, Shehab, and Qustantin al-Basha all agree as to the decisive importance of the Russians. Auriant fails to mention the matter. T. Y. Shidyah, *Kitab akhbar al'ayan fi jabal lubnan* (Beirut, 1859). Shehab, 93; Qustantin al-Basha ed., *Tarikh ash-shaikh Dahir al-Umr az-zaidani* (n.d. Harisa), 113.

‡ Auriant writes that when Rizo arrived off Beirut he sent a twenty-four hour ultimatum to the town demanding that the Russian flag be raised and that the Christian and Muslim populace pay him the tribute normally sent to the Sultan, Auriant, 214.

§ Auriant, 215.

|| Shidyah, 391; Shaykhu says 25,000 riyals, Shaykhu, 88. Shehab sets the figure at 15 purses, Shehab, 94. Lockroy has a story that the people of Beirut offered the Russian captains 3 "charges" and a half of silk worth 14 purses to leave, Lockroy, 64. Auriant states the payment was made up of 600 cocoons of silk, various materials and food such as beef, biscuits, flour, and wine, Auriant, 216. Lusignan has an apparently fanciful story that the Greek Orthodox inhabitants of Beirut, dissatisfied with the Druze masters, had requested the Russians to come and relieve them of their bondage. The Russians made a certain Amir Mahamut (*sic*) governor of the town, with the understanding that he was to pay tribute to the Russian fleet. Lusignan dates the first Russian occupation of Beirut in April, Lusignan, 120-121.

and the Russian forces left the port area on June 28 and sailed for Acre.

While Rizo was at Beirut a Russian frigate arrived at Acre. Its most important passenger was Yaqub, Ali Bey's original ambassador to Orlov. The Armenian had a longer trip than he originally had thought. Now he returned with furs and other gifts from Catherine, as well as definite assurances of her active interest and friendship for Ali Bey. Ali, however, did not want assurances, he wanted men, ships and munitions to defeat Abu-Dahab and reconquer Egypt. Rizo's squadron was not strong enough and did not have enough infantry accompanying it to do this. So it returned to the Ægean with a new ambassador from the Egyptian.

The ambassador was to inform Orlov of the situation and to obtain artillery and men and the support of the Russian fleet in an attempt to reconquer Egypt. According to Lockroy, Ali offered the Russians Jerusalem and the Holy Places in return for this support.\* Orlov promised as much assistance as might be needed, but added that he could not do so immediately since he had just concluded a four month armistice with the Porte. He did send immediately token aid consisting of Russian officers and a few pieces of artillery.†

Meanwhile Ali and Dahir were tied up with the siege of Jaffa, a city which refused to accept Ali Bey's suzerainty after his expulsion from Egypt. The siege began during the summer of 1772 and was thoroughly unsuccessful. In September a Russian transport, carrying officers and artillery, arrived near Jaffa. The Russian officers landed artillery and joined the bombardment, as did the ship. But this added fire-power was insufficient to force the city to surrender, and after a month the transport left,‡ carrying from Ali Bey a new request for greater Russian support.

In November or December a small squadron—composed of a frigate and some polaccas arrived under the command of Lt. Alexiano—brought supplies to the besiegers and bombarded the city heavily but again unsuccessfully. Alexiano also brought more promises of future large scale Russian assistance. Orlov specifically promised that a large fleet was being prepared with ten to twelve thousand landing troops on board.§ In March 1773 another Russian ship arrived off Syria with even more definite promises that a large fleet would very soon arrive to take Ali to Damietta, but Ali lost faith in the Russian promises. Instead of awaiting the Russian fleet he attempted to reconquer Egypt by himself. Having heard planted rumours of defections in Abu-Dahab's army, he set out with a tiny force, only to be overwhelmed, captured and poisoned (April-May, 1773).

The Russians in the Ægean were not aware of this and in June 1773 dispatched to Acre the long-promised squadron (made up of five frigates, five polaccas, a schooner and six half-galleys—excluding the latter six vessels the squadron carried 222 cannon) together with a force of 1,200 Albanian mercenaries equipped with artillery. At the beginning of July this fleet arrived off Syria to find the situation very different from what had been expected. The squadron was supposed to reinstate Ali Bey,

\* Lockroy, 73.

‡ Lusignan, 218.

† Auriant, 217.

§ Auriant, 218.

but Ali was dead. Kozhuchov,\* the commander, had a large squadron with apparently nothing in particular to do.

#### IV

The general situation in Syria had changed somewhat during the winter and spring. Ali Bey was gone; but Dahir was stronger than ever. The territory under his control spread from Sidon to south of Jaffa and as far east as Lake Tiberias. The Pasha of Damascus had given up—for the moment—his attempts to destroy Dahir. The major change in the situation concerned the Druses. After the Russian occupation in 1772, Amir Yusuf determined to strengthen the defences of Beirut. He placed in command of the city the soon-famous Ahmad al-Jazzar who was to rebuild the fortifications. Al-Jazzar, now known for his defeat of Napoleon twenty-six years later, set to work with great energy. But instead of simply obeying his momentary master, Amir Yusuf, he began to act independently in Beirut. Al-Jazzar stated publicly that he did not recognize Yusuf as the sovereign of Beirut, he recognized only the Sultan. This was too much for the Druze prince. He contacted Dahir, his enemy of the previous year, and proposed an alliance with him and the Russians against al-Jazzar. Opportunely Kozhuchov and his squadron arrived just after Dahir had accepted the proposal. Instead of sailing to Egypt, the Russian fleet sailed to Beirut for the second time; now not as the enemy of the Druses but as their allies. Kozhuchov agreed to capture Beirut for a price. So the Druze princes were forced to promise 300,000 piastres for the capture and delivery of the city.† The Russians insisted on immediate payment, but the Druses refused, saying it would be forthcoming only after delivery of the city. The Russians became fore insistent and finally were offered Amir Musa b. Mansur as hostage until payment was received. This arrangement was accepted by the Russian fleet commander.

The fleet appeared before Beirut July 6, 1773,‡ and when the month-long financial arrangements just described were completed, a violent bombardment began on August 2. The shelling lasted all day and all night without pause. Arabic sources say that the firing was so loud that "the people thought that the hour of judgment had come and the mountains had fallen in."§ The same source states that the noise of the cannons could be heard all the way to the suburbs of Damascus.|| The French Consul in Sidon confirmed the intensity of the shelling:

\* Shidyah, Shehab and Lockroy report the Russian commander's name as Count Johanni. This results apparently from the confusion between the name of the real commander and the important Venetian officer Giovanni who had assumed the name Voinovitch, and who was one of the chief Russian officers. The French Consul in Sidon gives the name of the Russian commander as Lakiskoff, *cf.* Charles-Roux, 211.

† Shehab, 98; Shaykhu, 89; Shidyah, 394. Volney, Lockroy and Charles-Roux state the sum as 600 purses; Volney, 233; Lockroy, 89; Charles-Roux, 106. One purse contained 500 piastres which means the terms are synonymous.

‡ Actually five days before three Russian vessels had arrived to blockade Beirut, *cf.* Charles-Roux, 211.

§ Shehab, 98.

|| *Ibid.*; confirmed by Shidyah, 394.

There was a terrible noise and fire; Sidon, where the echo of each shot was heard, trembled.\*

The towers of the port area and the port itself were destroyed, as was much of the city. But the expected quick surrender did not take place. Al-Jazzar showed here that his spirit could withstand European artillery.

The Russian commander ordered his movable artillery to go ashore east of the city and began a simultaneous bombardment from land and sea. Numerous breaches were made in the walls, but the Druzes refused to storm the city, pointing out that the agreement called for the Russians to deliver it to them. Finding the Druzes adamant, Kozhuchov decided to starve the city into surrender. His fleet leisurely bombarded the town and prevented any sea-borne assistance from arriving, while the Druzes kept Beirut cut from the interior. After two months of isolation and bombardment al-Jazzar came to realize that further resistance was futile. The food situation grew worse and worse; the strain of continual bombardment greater and greater. However, al-Jazzar feared surrendering himself to either the Druzes or the Russians. He would surrender only to a less interested participant, who would be less likely to kill him. He wrote Dahir in Acre, offering surrender if he and his men were allowed to leave Beirut unmolested. He added that his small but highly disciplined forces would be a valuable force in Dahir's service. Dahir intervened with the Russians and Druzes. Beirut was surrendered to the Russian fleet while al-Jazzar and his personal troops marched to Acre to be enrolled in Dahir's service.

The Russians now delivered the city to the Druze princes and expected their reward. When a refusal came the life of Amir Musa, who had been given to the Russians as a hostage, was threatened. The Druze princes produced enough money to ransom the hostage, but this was not the full promised amount.† Kozhuchov and his squadron sailed back to the Ægean but left Beirut in control of three hundred Albanian mercenaries, who were to remain until the full amount was paid.

Whether they ever received full payment is vague.‡ During this period, October 1773 to February 1774, Beirut was effectively under Russian control. "During this time the Muscovite flag flew over Beirut, the portrait of the Empress [Catherine] was raised over the principal gate, before which passers-by were obliged to do reverence . . ."§ For five months the Russian flag flew over an Arab population.

## V

In July 1774 peace was signed by the Russian and Ottoman governments at Kuchuk Kainardji. Its provisions are important for this paper only as regards the fact that no mention is made of the Russian acquisitions

\* Quoted from Le Taulès in Charles-Roux, 212.

† Shehab, 99; Lockroy, 99; Charles-Roux, 212.

‡ Shaykhu and Shidyaq say it was finally paid in full, Shidyaq 395; Shaykhu 89. Masson state 100 purses were never paid, P. Masson, *Histoire du commerce français dans le levant au XVIII<sup>e</sup> siècle* (Paris, 1911), 291.

§ As quoted from the French Consul in Tripoli, Charles-Roux, 106.

in the Mediterranean.\* Russia made peace without consulting or even thinking of her Arab ally in Syria. The withdrawal of the Russian Navy left Dahir at the mercy of Ottoman retaliation. Within a year Dahir was defeated by a coalition of the various Ottoman Governors and the still independent Abu-Dahab of Egypt. In 1775 Dahir's semi-independent state was returned to the control of officials more willing to listen to the command of the Sultan. The possibility of a Russian sponsored State in southern Syria was forsaken by the Russian diplomats at Kuchuk Kainardji. The alliance with Ali Bey and indirectly with Dahir had been a purely war-time expedient which for the moment seemed to have no effect on Russia's long-range political aims in the Mediterranean. After 1774 Russia idly sat back and watched her Arab ally destroyed.

Why were the Empress and her ministers so uninterested in the maintenance of pro-Russian, or at least anti-Turkish, States in the Eastern Mediterranean? Would it not have been expedient to support an anti-Ottoman power on the southern frontier of her major enemy? Could not they have insisted at Kuchuk Kainardji that no punitive measures be taken against Dahir?

The only answer to these questions is that the Russian government was not interested in maintaining or supporting anti-Ottoman States in Arab areas as a peace policy. To win the war begun in 1768 the Russian government willingly supported Arab or Mameluke revolts.† But this was a purely war-time policy. Russia's Empress and statesmen were not quite as far sighted as some historians credit them on the basis of the Treaty of Kuchuk Kainardji. A golden opportunity to establish a Russian-sponsored State in Syria was lost when the Russians signed a unilateral peace and left Dahir to the mercy of the full forces of the Sultan.

In 1775 a Russian consul was established in Alexandria, Baron de Thonus by name, whose mission was "to inspire the Mameluke Beys to make themselves independent of the Porte and to place themselves under the protection of his sovereign."‡ He had Russian youths introduced as young Mamelukes.§ He arranged to pass on correspondence and to transfer money from Russian, Georgian and Circasian Mamelukes to their relatives in Russia and in the Caucasus.|| He succeeded in gaining the confidence of both Ibrahim Bey and Murad Bey, the two most powerful personalities in Egypt in the mid-1780's. Through de Thonus's instigation the French merchants in Egypt were forced to pay a very heavy tax in 1786.¶ His overtures came to a dramatic end in 1787 when the Ottoman

\* The Treaty did mention the acquisitions in an offhand way, *i.e.* Russians were to be permitted to make pilgrimages to the Holy Places and the Christians everywhere were to be protected by the Sultan. Also a promise of better government, etc., was made for Christian areas. Finally the Russian government was given the right to establish Consulates wherever they pleased in Ottoman areas.

† Besides the Russian fleet had little better to do than occupy itself off Syria after the Battle of Chesma.

‡ G. Hanotaux, *Histoire de la nation égyptienne* (Paris, 1931), V, 194. Masson states that de Thonus was "newly established" in Egypt in 1788; the earliest date he mentions of the Russian consul's activity in Egypt is 1786; Masson, 311, 579, 580.

§ Hanotaux, V, 194-195; Masson, 311.

|| Masson, 311.

¶ 300,000 écus, *ibid.*, 580.

government sent a naval expedition to re-establish direct control of Egypt. He presented to the Mamelukes letters from Catherine offering an alliance and protection for an independent Mameluke State. Ismail Bey, pro-French and probably fearing the approaching Ottoman forces, threw the Russian consul in prison and, after the outbreak of the Russo-Turkish War of 1788-92, had him strangled.\*

De Thonus's activity in Egypt appears to show that the Russian Foreign Ministry realized at least partially the value of the Ali Bey-Russian alliance; yet his mission seems somewhat naive so soon after Russian diplomacy had forsaken Dahir al-'Umar. Obviously the maintenance of Dahir, even if not completely independent, as an anti-Ottoman ally was a better policy than forsaking him and then sending a mission to try to create a pro-Russian Mameluke State. It would seem that a wiser Foreign Ministry would have tried both policies: to maintain a semi-independent pro-Russian southern Syria and to secure a pro-Russian Mameluke State in Egypt.

## VI

The importance of the Russian occupations of Beirut should not be overestimated. Beirut in the 1770's was neither a large nor a major Levantine city. Its population was little more than 5,000. In size Tripoli, Sidon, Acre, even Deir el-Qamar, exceeded it. Its commerce was as yet slight. The French, who had posts in every important Levantine port, had none in Beirut. Beirut was in 1770 "a charming small city of a certain prosperity, above all peaceful, which distinguished it from the rest of Syria."†

Beside the relative unimportance of Beirut at the time, both Russian occupations were not planned efforts of the central command of the Mediterranean fleet. In both cases the squadrons had set out with purposes other than seizing Beirut. In 1772 and 1773 it was the squadron commander—with squadrons of comparatively minor size—who originated the order to bombard and seize the city. In both cases the city was given up as soon as booty or payment had been collected.

What is important as regards the seizures of Beirut is the alliance with Ali Bey and Dahir. This is the precedent which was to be repeated. For the first time in many years Arab areas sought independence from the Ottomans through the support of a foreign non-Muslim power. The occupations of Beirut are important because they are the results of the mutual interests of Russia and Ali Bey and Dahir el-'Umar. At a later time the same pattern was repeated. Just as Ali Bey sought Egyptian independence when the Sultan was involved in war with Russia, so also did Muhammad Ali, who proclaimed his independence when the Sublime Porte was at war with Russia. Ali Bey sought Russian support against the Turks. Similarly Muhammad Ali attempted to get European support against the Turks. If Ali Bey had not foolishly rushed to Egypt so unprepared in 1773, Kozhuchov's fleet and troops might have established the Egyptian State a half century before Mohammad Ali.

\* *Ibid.*, 311.

† Charles-Roux, 210.

The whole episode, 1768-75, strengthens the basic generalization concerning Russian political policy toward Arab Middle East. Russia's main aim at this time was the acquisition of the Straits. It was not the acquisition of the Holy Places, or Egypt, or Syria. Russian influence in these areas was desirable, but only as a means toward the great aim, the great end. This aim blinded the Russians to such a degree that it took them another century before they fully realized the importance of Russian political and cultural influence in the Arab areas of the Ottoman realm.

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## REVIEWS

**Saudi Arabia.** By H. St. John Philby. London: Ernest Benn. 1955. Pp. 393 + xix. Ill. 30s.

In this book the man who has many claims to be regarded as the greatest Arabian of all times chronicles a period of Arabian history which has recently ended with the death of a man universally recognized as the greatest Arab of at least modern times. The story of the Saudis and its culmination in the reign of the late King Abdul Aziz Ibn Saud is that of the second great epoch of Arabian history, and in view of the very special part which Mr. Philby has had in it, a study of it by him is in a unique way an indispensable primary source for the future historian. Mr. Philby has clearly been conscious of his responsibility and it is surely for this reason, no less than for reasons of modesty, that he has eliminated all reference to his own share in the story. Nevertheless, though one finds no reference to Philby the explorer and student and Philby the confidant of the King, the book is redolent of Philby the Arabian. It is inevitably in large measure a subjective book and no born Saudi-Arab could have done the task better even if one qualified had been available.

Ten out of the book's eleven chapters describe the rise of the Saudis. As was to be expected, this is done with great thoroughness and in scholarly fashion. It must, however, be confessed that the general reader cannot expect to find his attention closely held by them because the subject has little universal appeal. It is essentially local and detailed in character and is reminiscent of the works of the great Arab chroniclers of the past, translations of whose works remain unopened save by those devoted to an obscure subject. The story of the Saudis and their greatest King remains an epic of the deserts of little consequence outside them and it differs only in degree from those of other great rulers of the past, like Seiyid Said of Uman, who have from time to time stridden like giants across the Arabian stage. In this lies the clue to the eventual unimportance of the work they do. They build empires and die and leave their domains to crumble. The essential thing about them is that their rule is personal and unless they are succeeded by personalities as great collapse is inevitable. Indeed it is doubtful if the son of such a ruler often has much chance of becoming more than a pale shadow of his father. Arabs who amass fortunes as merchants and no less as kings frequently allow their sons to grow up in a luxury which allows no room for learning self-discipline, and the fortunes and the kingdom are too often quickly dissipated.

The rise of the Wahhabis must necessarily rank second in importance to the rise of Islam in Arabian history, for that was, and in its consequence has remained to this day, of world significance. The last chapter of Mr. Philby's book details the beginning of the third decisive era of Arabian history, that marked by the discovery of oil. It is the overlapping of the two eras—the final years of the great desert King's reign and the devastating effects of sudden wealth—which gives by far the greatest claim to attention. The subject is not only important but it is poignant in its tragedy. King Abdul Aziz is necessarily the last of the great personal rulers in Saudi Arabia and perhaps anywhere in the peninsula. The conditions in which personal rule of this kind can really flourish have gone for ever. The tragedy is that Ibn Saud could do nothing to prepare his people for anything else: he "came to the problems of the modern world as an amateur . . . without a single trained administrator." Inevitably, with the impact of wealth, "the brine of corruption . . . permeated every branch of the public life of the land." Rightly the King himself took blame for this. "The fault lies not with others, but in myself. If it were in my power to choose, I would have doomsday now."

It is too early to prophesy what the outcome of this era will be, let alone pass judgment on it. Happily Mr. Philby himself is not without hope and pays tribute to the Americans for what there is of undoubted good in the changes they have wrought. Certain it is, and he himself is certain, that the whole spiritual and material climate of Arabia has undergone a permanent change. No country was ever less prepared for such a shock to its body politic. Wealth applied in such a way

can well destroy the virtues of a desert society: it can destroy even the desert itself from which they so largely derive. The world will be the poorer for their passing. The period may even prove as great a portent to the world as was that of the rise of Muhammad, for it may sap the very roots of the faith he established as a world religion. Materialism is now deeply entrenched in the Hedjaz, which as the essential focus of the pilgrimage is inescapably the spiritual centre of Islam. Furthermore, Islam is in its very nature a revelation of the desert and from the desert it derives its continuing strength. Can the Arabia of oil foster, let alone produce, the same inspirations?

One is too easily tempted to say that less harm would have been done to the virtue of Arabia, and more good achieved from the new wealth, had it been possible to apply something of the methods of the trustee spirit of British colonial policy. Unhappily the mere suggestion affronts the susceptibilities not only of the beneficiaries, but of those who are in great measure responsible for the potential benefits. If the heritage of the former can prove eventually equal to the strain, something great may emerge. Whether that or the disaster which the old King feared is the outcome, independent studies by skilled observers are much to be desired and will be as indispensable to the future student of Arabian history as to those concerned in the future development of backward areas.

Mr. Philby is perhaps too deeply absorbed into the true Arabian way of life to be able to provide this. In the former edition of his work he looked forward to the spread of the Saudi rule and its accompanying strengthening of Islam over most if not all of the peninsula, and in this he can do little more than echo the Ichabod of the departed friend to whom he gave so much devoted admiration and affection. The ring wall of which Lawrence spoke, and behind which Arabia was to work out her own fatal destiny, has been irreparably breached.

HAROLD INGRAMS.

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**Representative Government in South-East Asia.** By Professor Rupert Emerson. Institute of Pacific Relations. 1955. Pp. 192. Index. \$3.50.

This very readable and thought-provoking summary of the position which the development of democratic institutions has reached in South-East Asia is, as Professor Emerson himself would doubtless be the first to admit, but the superficial treatment of a transient phase in the history of this vast region. It is impossible to deal exhaustively with so large a "canvas" within the compass of under 200 pages, nor is it perhaps the time to attempt to do so—when future events are hidden round corners which we have not yet turned. The "unknowns" immediately ahead of us are the outcome of the first elections to the Malayan Federal Legislative, to be held in a few weeks' time, and the outcome of later elections due in Vietnam and in Indonesia. Moreover the advent of the Labour Front to power, as a result of the recent elections in Singapore, was still in the future when this book was written.

American writers tend to have an innate distrust of anything that smacks of "Colonialism" and rather "starry-eyed" views about the onward march of democratic institutions in colonial dependencies. Professor Emerson, however, almost succeeds in overcoming his own not entirely concealed preferences, and in his Introduction sets out clearly the many pitfalls and uncertainties lying in the path of representative institutions in South-East Asia. We can certainly endorse two of his major points—that the political influences of the Colonial Powers in the Region are rapidly disappearing, and that this process was greatly hastened by the Japanese invasion of the area which indeed "served as a sharp sword to cut the new order loose from the old." The writer also stresses how the national revolutions themselves use the political techniques and dogmas of the Colonial Powers in the hands of an intellectual élite trained in Western ways of thought. He comes to the conclusion that any adaptation of the old indigenous cultures to the tempo of the Modern World is not now likely, and that, therefore, the alternatives are development along Western democratic lines, or a relapse into Fascist or Communist

totalitarianism. In commenting on the struggle with Communism in South-East Asia he allows himself some feelings of optimism because only in the one case of Indo-China are Nationalism and Communism so inextricably intertwined that it is possible that there Communism may prove to be the only viable alternative to Colonialism. But it has been a pretty "close-run thing" in Burma, and Indonesia is not "out of the wood" yet.

In his concluding chapter the writer arrives at some rather pessimistic conclusions from events in Thailand—significant as the only one of these countries in South-East Asia which has always been a free and sovereign state. He concludes that a democratic future is by no means assured to this country, whose populace seems so indifferent to politics, and that a long-period dictatorship of the Right seems more than probable. He also draws attention to the position in the Philippines, where the Americans from the start wanted to retreat from the position of a Colonial power, and where a comparatively long period of freedom has not led to stable and truly democratic government, but to a state of affairs where the President is almost a Dictator.

The writer would do well to emphasize, more strongly than he does, the danger of Fascist solutions, based on control of the armed forces, in some or all of these countries. This tendency is apparent in the Federation of Malaya where the strongest political group—the Alliance between the United Malaya National Organization and the Malayan Chinese Association—is not only anti-Communist, but also intolerant of other legitimate political parties, thus tending to forget that a one-party system of government is a sure prelude to dictatorship.

It may well be true that French and Dutch rule was, before the war, over-tardy in carrying out a genuine policy of training the local inhabitants to take over the administrative machinery in Indonesia and Indo-China, but it is not fair to castigate the Dutch "police actions" in Java after the war merely as "roadblocks in the path of freedom." These police actions may have been mistakes in the long view, but at the time the Dutch were face-to-face with chaos and the fact that thousands of their fellow-countrymen, so long helpless in the hands of their Japanese captors, still lay helpless in the hands of Indonesian mob-rule. He should remember also that in 1945 President Soekarno to many people bore the guise of a Japanese Quisling. There is indeed little unity of thought and purpose in the vast Island realm whose different peoples distrust each other, and some of whom, in the Eastern Islands, remained loyal to the Dutch whose rule they might still prefer to that of the controlling Javanese oligarchy which has changed the once federal structure of Indonesia into a unitary system run centrally from Java.

The British provided more *carrières ouvertes aux talents* in the old India, and this no doubt accounts for the quick establishment—after the first tragic blood bath—of stable government in the new India, and Pakistan. But the record is not so good in Burma, and in Malaya there has been the great difficulty of a multi-racial society closely mingled in a small area. No representative institutions have a hope of being properly established until the foundations of a Malayan nation have been laid by real co-operation between the Chinese and the Malays. Professor Emerson points to the failure of the British Administration in Malaya a generation ago to establish a common code of education on a Malayan foundation. This is perhaps the greatest sin of omission committed by the Protecting Power. He quotes a number of British writers who voice strongly their impatience with the speed of advance towards representative government, but he fails adequately to appreciate the obstacles in the way of that advance and the dangers arising from undefeated militant Communism in the Peninsula. Those who advocate that Communism can be countered by liberal reforms and the universal use of the ballot-box must have had a rude shock from recent events in Singapore, where the establishment of Mr. Marshall's Labour Front Government was the signal for an outbreak of Chinese Communist rioting in the Colony. The writer fully appreciates the strong ethnic pulls upon the people of Malaya from the neighbouring "Colossi" of India and China, and the strong emotional and religious attraction of Indonesia on the Malays; he might have added that close co-operation with Britain is still essential if these stresses are not to tear apart the nascent Malayan nation.

W. S. CORRY.

July 1, 1955.

**Liang Ch'i Ch'ao and the Mind of Modern China.** By Joseph R. Levenson. Harvard University Press. 1953. (Harvard Historical Monographs XXVI.)

We have been provided by Joseph R. Levenson in his *Liang Ch'i Ch'ao and the Mind of Modern China* with yet another scholarly product of the Harvard School, for whose inspiration acknowledgment must also be made to John Fairbank.

The name of the subject of this short but able and interesting biographical and literary study is, unfortunately, not well known to most Western readers but this is not really surprising since his main calling was to interpret Western thought to China and his writing was in Chinese. Almost all his prodigious literary output was directed towards his task of trying to bridge the unbridgable cultural and intellectual gap between China and the Western world. Here was a brave and single-minded attempt contending with a legacy of detachment which had lasted for centuries and a deep and entrenched conservatism. When one considers the extreme convention and sterility of most Chinese scholars of his period whose attitude was primarily diacritical, and in comparison, the forward sweep of the thought of this passionate reformer, the contrast is truly surprising.

In order to achieve his object, not only did he have to re-educate himself into European ways of thought but he had also to reform the Chinese language and evolve a new literary style in order to transmit the ideas which, for most of his life, he was convinced were to save his own civilization from catastrophe. This impulse might be said to have first represented itself really openly in a memorial which he sent to the emperor about the immediate necessities of China. This act was prompted by the bitterness and desperation which he felt in company with most other Chinese at the time after the humiliation of the national defeat in the Sino-Japanese war.

Many others joined in these protestations and brought about the "kung-chü" movement in which K'ang Yu-wei was especially active and which was asking the emperor to introduce reforms. It is to be noted that Liang and his ilk were strictly advanced liberals and reformers and not revolutionaries. There was among them intense educational and journalistic activity resulting in the "Ch'iang hseh hui" or "Society for the Diffusion of Enlightenment" called by the "foreigners" in Peking the "Reform Club." This was suppressed and subsequently replaced by other groups.

Inevitably, the political activity of K'ang Yu-wei in his efforts to produce positive action by the throne brought him and his associates into difficulty and exile when the Empress Dowager finally put away her adopted son and proscribed the reformers.

This situation only made the more inevitable the violent breakdown of the Confucian world which these scholars had been trying to avert. Indeed, in spite of the most stubborn attempts of Liang to rationalize the situation by seeking to prove that the Chinese classics had been re-written and that, in part, China's ossification was due to falsification of ultimate truths still of universal application if only the country would heed them, the fatal process continued.

Liang's periods of exile brought him, as might be expected, in touch with unusual foreign influences such as the Japanese "pan-asiatics" Miyazaki and Hirayama who were sponsors of Sun Yat Sen who was then also "on his travels" and at whose suggestion they had been rescued. It is interesting to note that, in spite of the revolutionary attitude of Sun and others of his kind, neither K'ang or Liang were fundamentally affected in their loyalty to the throne as such although they disagreed in their views regarding the degree of support which they would accord it.

Like the "Philosophes" and "Encyclopédistes" of the French Revolution such as Condorcet or Helvetius and who were fundamentally not of the revolution themselves, just so was Liang a pioneer in the latent attitudes and ideas which became later the subconscious arguments for action when sufficient young progressives had imbibed them, and they had sufficiently undermined the traditional mould of thought.

When, in fact, the Revolution of 1911 brought the first of the cycle of changes in which perished the empires of Turkey, Prussia, Russia, and Austria, we find Liang being drawn into the inevitable tide of events and ultimately, strangely enough, accepting office as Minister of Finance under Yuan Shi-kai, then later, towards the end of his life, he returned to teaching. He died in 1929.

One of the lessons of this life and its aims, and Mr. Levenson mentions it, is Liang's view that "a nation dies when its national culture is obliterated." In saying this he was perhaps predicting the failure of the Kuomintang which was vainly trying to set its course against history by trying to reinstate some forms which had already gone, while neglecting others which might have saved it. Also one is left with the compelling question as to whether in their imperative need to save their self-respect which has now been largely achieved, the Chinese have availed themselves of an alien philosophy and method which they now must reject in order to retain it.

It now remains to be seen whether his conviction that China's own values and spiritual approach to understanding which was an eternal part of her culture and message would survive any materialistic inroads, however seemingly necessary these might be, in the march of progress, and come back full-circle by means of Mencius' doctrine of "eternal return."

One is constantly reminded when thinking about Liang's philosophy and his hopeless mission of the words of Po Chu-I when writing the *Harper of Chao*:

"Alas, alas that the ears of common men  
Should love the modern and not love the old.  
Thus it is that the harp in the green window  
Day by day is covered deeper with dust."

A. H. S. C.

**Chinese Calligraphy. An Introduction to its Aesthetic and Technique.** By

Chiang Yee. 2nd edition, with a Preface by Sir Herbert Read. London: Methuen. 1954. Pp. xvi + 230; 6 plates and 155 text illustrations. 30s.

The chief, but by no means the only, value of this book lies in the fact that the author stands spokesman for the art. Mr. Chiang Yee is a Chinese artist who has had a solid training in traditional painting and calligraphy.

Chinese calligraphy is essentially a composition of dots, lines and splashes organized and executed in such a way as to present a rhythmic beauty which is most abstract in nature. The art is very difficult for Western people to understand because they do not have the opportunity to acquaint themselves with the traditional discipline. In this brief introduction Mr. Chiang approaches the problem in a very systematic way. Most of the essential elements which form the foundation for the understanding of this unique art of China are being discussed, and I do agree with Sir Herbert Read that Mr. Chiang "writes simply and clearly about matters which are subtle and difficult to understand."

Mr. Chiang begins his book by describing the functions of calligraphy in Chinese life. He illustrates how the art has become a national instinct, nourished by the Chinese from their childhood days. The functions of this art are stressed further by the fact that it is one of the most important elements in other forms of Chinese art. In his concluding chapter, Mr. Chiang loses no time in showing the parts played by calligraphy in painting, sculpture, architecture and seal engraving. The art can only be a most characteristic product of the Chinese people.

The chapters on the origin and construction of characters and the styles of writing are brief, but concise. These are described against the historical background, showing a reasonable accuracy in scholarship. The illustrations are carefully selected from well-known sources and many of them are famous masterpieces. They are enough to impress any strangers who are sensitive enough to respond to this artistic form of rhythmic movement.

For the stranger the best part of the book, however, may be found in the chapters on technique, strokes, composition and training. Here the author describes the material, discipline and tradition of the art which are really the foundation for building up a sense of line-movement and a knowledge of the structure, essential for its appreciation. Being an artist himself, the author writes with intimacy and authority. His description of the brush, how it may be manipulated, how the various types of strokes may be written, and how the strokes in each character may

be constructed is based on the standard practice of the art. It may be recognized as a manual of Chinese calligraphy.

The chapter on the abstract beauty of the art is most interesting. There is no doubt that Chinese calligraphy is a beautiful form, beautifully executed. It embodies rhythm, line and structure. Chinese critics throughout the ages have stressed the importance of the rhythm to be found in the strokes and the structure. This is the basic requirement for the artistic calligraphy, known as *ch'i-yün*, literally "spiritual rhythm." It would be almost impossible to describe this in Western terms, because this beauty can only be felt by a sensitive and understanding mind. In order to put this theme across to the Western reader, the author ventures, like Walt Disney in his *Fantasia*, to interpret it in the visual form. Hence, the character *yu*, in *chuan-shu*, by Têng Shih-yü is compared to a human figure supported by the left hand and balanced by the left foot; the character *i*, in *hsing-shu*, by Su Tung-po, to another human figure seated at ease; the character *sui*, in *ch'ao-shu*, by Wang Hsi-chih, to the contours of a dancing girl with her floating draperies; *yee*, the author's signature, to the shape of a stork standing on one leg, and so forth. From the Chinese point of view, this is rather unconventional. Very few critics would conceive such visual images for any good calligraphy. Sir Herbert Read's reference to this chapter in his Preface seems to show, however, that this new interpretation of Chinese calligraphy does strike a chord agreeable to the Western ear.

In maintaining repeatedly that his book is not for sinologists, I think the author is a little bit too modest. A few sinologists who specialize in philology and etymology may find the chapter dealing with the origin and construction of the characters brief and elementary, but the book may rightly be called the most comprehensive study on the subject in the Western language. Many sinologists will find it most enlightening. And for those who, after years of training in Chinese, still find themselves unable to write the characters in the Chinese fashion, this book would serve admirably as a manual of instruction.

CHENG TÊ-K'UN.

### Western Enterprise in Far Eastern Economic Development: China and Japan.

By G. C. Allen and Audrey G. Donnithorne. George Allen and Unwin, Ltd. 1954. Pp. 253.

After being shut off from the rest of the world for centuries by the circumstances of her geography, assisted at times by an earlier Iron Curtain, China was opened up to foreign trade and travel for a century and then almost completely sealed off again. Now it is again becoming possible to visit and, with certain restrictions, travel in the country, and returning travellers are naturally relating their experiences on their journeys in the country and—with more, or less, objectivity—the conclusions they have drawn from what they have seen there. Of these the most useful, perhaps, and the most unexpected, was Mr. Attlee's to the effect that he saw little prospect of any great increase of trade between China and this country.

This book, an analysis of foreign trade with the Far East by a well-known expert on the subject, largely gives the answer and the explanation of this dictum in that it shows that the whole foreign trade of China was built up artificially by foreign (largely British) firms with little encouragement and often definite obstruction from the Chinese; and now that this structure has collapsed, owing to the short-sighted policy of killing the goose that laid the golden eggs, it remains to be seen whether, and, if so, how, new machinery for carrying on foreign trade can be created. The section relating to Japan is equally interesting and pertinent to the problems of the present and immediate future, since it shows that Japan's amazing rise to economic prosperity and, to a great extent, its hopes of recovering from the depths to which it fell in 1945, depended and must depend on assistance from the West and from China.

It is a text-book on Far Eastern economics that should be in the hands of anyone who proposes to travel to China or who wishes to speak intelligently and usefully about Far Eastern problems.

A. G. N. O.

**Shanghai: Key to Modern China.** By Rhoads Murphey. Harvard University Press. 1953. Distributed in U.K. by Oxford University Press. Pp. 246, and maps. 36s.

This book is in some respects a companion volume to the above and carries the study of Far Eastern trade a stage further. It shows, for instance, why it was that Shanghai, which hardly had a place on the map before it was opened as one of the first Treaty Ports, inevitably developed into the central mart of China and, in spite of certain geographical drawbacks, into one of the first five or six ports in the world. Much of the data given are, no doubt, superseded by recent political events and they may or may not recover their importance when (or should one say "if"?) China resumes ordinary commercial relations with the Western world. But the author feels (and this reviewer agrees with him) that it would not be possible to carry out the policy of destroying Shanghai and setting up a centre of foreign trade elsewhere, as has been proposed by the more fanatical among the country's present leaders, without doing lasting damage to the life of the country. Such a course was proposed by the more violently anti-foreign elements in 1927, but the scheme (for sidetracking Shanghai and building a new port at the mouth of the Yangtse and on its north bank) came to nothing. It goes, however, a good deal further than that: if China is to do anything of the task she has set herself—to industrialize herself and become a Great Power—she cannot afford to neglect the resources of Shanghai, and her statesmen would do well to study this book and discover for themselves why it was inevitable that the centre of China's trade should be there and how it could be rebuilt. Their Russian advisers would no doubt recommend developing Manchuria and others would favour Canton and Hongkong, but—for reasons amply explained in this book—the only really satisfactory site is Shanghai.

A. G. N. O.

**The Prospects for Communist China.** By W. W. Rostov and others at the Centre for International Studies, Mass. London: Chapman and Hall. 1954. Pp. 400; inside cover maps and index.

Mr. Rostov has set out to attempt a "kind of trial balance as of mid-1954" of the position of the Chinese Communist regime and of its prospects. This undertaking, difficult enough under any circumstances, is rendered formidable by the lack of reliable information from inside China and by the misleading nature of Chinese Communistic statistics. The author has nevertheless produced a remarkably complete and sound picture of present-day China, its position against the background of Chinese history, and the strains and stresses likely to affect it in the future.

The book opens with a survey of Chinese history from 1840 to 1949, showing how certain elements, notably the longing of the peasants for land and social reform and the ferment among the intelligentsia, stimulated by the challenge of the Western world, helped to prepare the way for the acceptance of Communism. Here as elsewhere Mr. Rostov stresses the extraordinary impact that the success of the Soviet Revolution had on Chinese leaders and the immense appeal of Communism in war-torn and desperate China, and argues that Leninism was well suited to Chinese tradition: an intellectual élite, a centralized despotism, and insurrection as the correct response to weak or corrupt rulers. There is nothing alien to the Chinese in the idea that "bandits in the hills might have a legitimate role in history, overthrowing bad, weak dynasties and founding new dynastic lines."

Mr. Rostov then traces the growth of the Chinese Communist Party and the structure of the present Communist government. Mao Tse-tung's supremacy emerges clearly in these pages. It is Mao who holds the conflicting strands of power in his hands. And it is most unlikely that any serious dissension in the Party, any conflict between civil and military strength, or conflict with Moscow, will arise during his lifetime. *The Prospects for Communist China* was completed before the recent disgrace and suicide of Kao Kang, one of the top Party men. But in fact Kao's fall reinforces the author's point that Mao's death might be followed by schism. Kao did not challenge Mao's leadership, but his pressing for power against other top leaders when he did may well have been influenced by Mao's serious illness in 1953.

Later chapters review the attitude, past, present and possible future, of the Chinese people to the Communist regime; Sino-Soviet relations; and the Chinese economy under Communist rule. These are all well reasoned and convincing. They give an interesting picture of the apparent shift in Communist policy, which, prior to 1949 concentrated on the seizure of power in China (opposition to the Japanese being primarily a means to that end), then turned to military expansion short of a major war, and has now withdrawn to concentrate on domestic problems, especially the problem of building up heavy industry. This new priority "does not imply that the Chinese Communists have even temporarily abandoned efforts to expand their power in Asia. . . . It may well reflect a decision to avoid techniques of expansion which require important outlays of economic resources; that is, there may well be increased reliance on diplomatic, political and subversive (as opposed to formal military) techniques."

Another point is one too often forgotten in the West: the great surge of Chinese feeling, among non-Communists as well as Communists, at the performance of their forces in Korea—"a heartening national spectacle to a people long incapable of coping with modern armies." But perhaps most interesting of all is his discussion of the conditions under which the Sino-Soviet alliance might be weakened. He argues that this cannot be accomplished by seductive offers from the West alone. Yet on the other hand the Free World's objective cannot be unconditional surrender or military liberation. "There must be a clear Free World concept of a Chinese future that would meet the basic, continuing, still unsatisfied aspirations of modern China."

But no review can possibly touch on all the points raised by this excellent book. It should be read by everyone interested in China, Communism or the modern world.

The conclusions of the book are hopeful. Two disturbing factors might perhaps have been given greater emphasis. These are the extraordinary effectiveness of Communist mass-indoctrination at all levels; and the familiarity of the Communists with the use of violence, so that violence is regarded as a legitimate political instrument and even the thought of a major war does not inspire the same horror that it does in the Free World. But one must agree with the conclusion that the Communist victory is not yet won and that in the long run even Communist technique and mass-indoctrination may not prevail against the "age-old, generous, humane, moderate tradition" of the Middle Kingdom. And one must also agree that the test of Communism in Asia is not being carried out in a vacuum; its success or failure may depend largely on the success or failure of the policies of the Free World in the rest of Asia.

Although Mr. Rostov, who is Professor of Economic History at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, is the principal author of *The Prospects for Communist China*, he gives full credit to his collaborators, Richard W. Hatch, Frank A. Kierman, Jr., and Alexander Eckstein. There is also an excellent and extremely useful Bibliography in Western Languages compiled by Martha T. Henderson.

B. L. C.

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**Government and Administration in Communist China.** By S. B. Thomas. Institute of Pacific Relations, New York. Pp. 196.

This volume is one of a series of studies of the development of Communism in Asia commissioned by the Institute of Pacific Relations. It was originally produced in 1953 and in this revised edition chapters have been added covering the major developments during the years 1953 and 1954.

Its value and importance lie in the fact that the methods used in the establishment of a Communist government in China may serve as a pattern for other Asian territories. It therefore merits the closest study by those whose interests lie in combating the extension of Communist influence in that highly strategic area.

The author begins with an account of the factors which favoured the rise of the Communists to power and of the means employed. These are in essence described in the words "use, restrict and transform," which are applicable equally to the phase of military conquest and to that of the consolidation of administrative power.



It is exemplified in the plans for the socialization of agriculture, starting with the redistribution of the ownership of land and ending with collectivization, and in the early encouragement given to private capital in industry and commerce, to be followed in due course by full state ownership. The process is still going on, despite inevitable setbacks and difficulties. The Marxist line is still the guiding principle, but whereas Mao Tse Tung himself in the early years of the rise to power established the principle of deviation when circumstances made it necessary, it is clear that the cumbersome administrative machine which has been built up is much slower to perceive the need for adaptation and to take the appropriate corrective measures.

Mr. Thomas has, of course, been handicapped in the preparation of this account by the lack of independent critical observation of events in China. He has therefore had to rely in the main for his factual information on material published in China to which numerous references are given. This does not detract materially from the objective value of the work since in this respect China has been much less restrictive than Soviet Russia in the release of speeches and statements dealing with internal affairs.

This is a work of real value to the historian and to the student of Communist methods.

H. J. C.

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**The Wise Man from the West.** By Vincent Cronin. Rupert Hart-Davis. 1955. 300 pp. Ill. 18s.

Of all missionary stories that have been published Matteo Ricci's is one of the most fascinating.

As his mission started in 1582 it is certainly one of the earliest to the Middle Kingdom.

Marco Polo's stories excited his imagination and as a boy at Macerata his desire was to become an enrolled member of the Society of Jesuits, doubtless with the ultimate design of Eastern travel and missionary work. Born in 1552, he left Rome for the East in 1573 but only succeeded in getting as far as Goa. He learnt the Portuguese language and spent a year in Cochin. His years in the Indian sub-continent did not seem to have made a great impression on him and it was not until 1582 that he heard that he was to go to Macao at the request of Michael Ruggieri, through his superior Valignano, thus realizing the prophecy of Rudolph Acquaviva.

Macao then numbered ten thousand souls, of which only one tenth were Portuguese. Here Ricci was at the gate of the country of his desire. Entry to it still seemed a chimera, but in the midsummer of 1583 a Chinese soldier arrived from the governor of Shuiking, the mandarin Wang P'an, bringing an invitation to Ruggieri and Ricci to visit him in China. At last Ricci's goal appeared to be in sight and a start was made for Canton. Here the two Italians were interviewed by the Haotai and were lodged in a building with the high-sounding name of the "Palace of the Ambassadors." This in fact was a rat-haunted barn, unfurnished but deemed worthy of any foreigner who wished to be received by the all-important, all-powerful Chinese. Here they were lodged like coolies until permission was received for them to proceed to Shuiking.

On arrival there a petition was made to be allowed to buy a small piece of land on which to build a small house and "pagoda."

The governor appeared to be satisfied with their quality and granted permission for them to look for the land they wanted. A piece of land was found, but here Ricci and Ruggieri's troubles began. They were told to wear Chinese garments and were classed as Bonzes, or Buddhist priests—a class which was held in little respect. Much opposition was forthcoming against the foreigners, but the gifts they brought to the Viceroy impressed him very much, chiefly a prism of Venetian glass showing the eight colours of the spectrum.

Gradually the scholarship and good behaviour of the Italians impressed the learned men of the province and their residence was tolerated if not encouraged. But always there was the intense desire to proceed to the capital, where Ricci had visions of converting the Emperor. Suffice it to say he achieved this object, and

many fascinating chapters follow telling of his arrival at the Forbidden City. His knowledge of the Chinese language and of their complicated ritual of living grew daily and he was able to take part in long discussions with the learned men of the time. Respect increased, almost to veneration, generated by Ricci's wonderful mnemonic feats of repeating whole pages of Chinese poems after having read through them only once.

The Emperor Wan-li was told of these feats, and though no audience was granted for a long time, the story proceeds with his entry into the Palace.

The closing years of Ricci's life crowned his work and left in the minds of the best of the Chinese an admiration for his learning and character which lasted until the arrival of the Communist era. If his conversions were not measured in large numbers, those privileged to know him respected, admired and loved this Western representative of the "Adorers of the Cross."

This is a *great* book and is written in a style which absorbs and delights.

H. St. C. S.

**Stalin's Russia and After.** By Harrison Salisbury. London: Macmillan. 1955. Pp. 329. 21s.

Mr. Salisbury's book is a re-hash, with additional material dealing with his experiences and travels throughout the Soviet Union, of articles he wrote from Russia as correspondent of the *New York Times*. At the time Mr. Salisbury wrote these articles they were "news"; but his book can hardly lay claim to this category, as it was out-of-date before it saw the light of publicity, which is not surprising seeing that the development of events in Russia is such that what happens today may be diametrically reversed tomorrow.

The picture that Mr. Salisbury paints of Russia is not a happy one. No doubt he describes things truthfully as he found them; and, in doing so, he reveals a discerning, although critical, mind. He was certainly handicapped in his task by the fact that the relations between his country and Russia were strained; moreover his stay in the country was marred by constant persecution by the Russian security police, a factor not conducive to his seeking silver linings to Russia's threatening clouds.

Like most foreign correspondents in Russia, Mr. Salisbury found himself forced to scrape together what information he could from a vicious circle of press colleagues and from occasional talks with foreign diplomatists, by no means the best informed in a country where foreign missions are as isolated as leper settlements. Although he deals with such dramatic events as Stalin's death, the "Doctors' plot," the resurgence in Russia of a latent but omnipresent anti-Semitism and the revival of the influence of the Red Army, he tells us little that has not been reported by others. Thus he hints at Stalin's "unnatural" death, but gives no inkling as to the identity of his assassins; neither does he explain why Beria was liquidated, or by whom. Moreover, he admits that in the absence of personal contacts with Russia's political leaders, he was reduced to the doubtful expedient of trying to gauge their confidence in holding their jobs by a study of their facial expressions at public functions.

Of particular interest is Mr. Salisbury's account of his peregrinations in Russia's Central Asian Republics, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Khirgizia and Tadkikistan, seeing that it is not generally realized in the West on what an extensive scale the Soviets have developed these countries, although at the cost of enormous human sacrifice.

Mr. Salisbury's trip to Siberia\* seems to have been profitable, as it "taught him more about the Soviet Union than years spent in Moscow; and had shown him the real price that was still being paid in human suffering, toil and hardship in what seemed to be an endless task—that of pulling Russia up abreast, industrially and technologically, with the West."

Whilst in Siberia, Mr. Salisbury went to Barnaoul, alleged to be the centre of the great new drive to plant grain on virgin soil. But, instead of visiting Khrushchev's new virgin land venture, he was treated to the unedifying but nevertheless illuminat-

\* See also R.C.A.S. JOURNAL, Vol. XLII, Pt. II, P. 128.

ing spectacle of the whole staffs of collective farms in a state of inebriated prostration, in celebration of TROITZA (Trinity Sunday) the great traditional Church holiday of the Russian peasants of Tsarist days.

Mr. Salisbury's summings up are neither complimentary to Russia nor encouraging for the Free World. He categorizes Russian pros and cons by strength and weaknesses. Under the banner of strength he cites the enormous power of Russia's armed forces and her alliance with China; although he describes the latter as "somewhat mysterious," on overhearing, at a Russo-Chinese reception, some extremely uncomplimentary references to the Soviet Union made, in the English language which few Russians understood, by Chou En-Lai.

Russian weaknesses Mr. Salisbury attributes to two things—Russian history and the Communist method, which he exemplifies as follows: Siberia; convict labour; the grim life of the exiles (including Volga Germans) in Central Asia; poverty and deprivation in rural life; the stench and drunkenness of the cities and the hatred of the apathetic masses towards those responsible for these abominations. But Mr. Salisbury found that the system worked, seeing that, for generations, Russia's rulers had solved every problem by the knout.

Of the post-Stalin régime Mr. Salisbury found that they had the same goal as Stalin but that their tactics were more flexible and, therefore, more dangerous.

After five long years in Russia, Mr. Salisbury found that he had made no Russian friends. He is not likely to suffer from Russian nostalgia.

T. H. PRESTON.

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**The Red Carpet.** By Marshall MacDuffie. Cassell and Co. Ltd. 1955. Pp. 330. Ill. Index. 18s.

The author of this readable and lively book is an American lawyer who spent six months in the U.S.S.R. in 1946 as Chief of an U.N.R.R.A. mission and revisited it for two months in 1953. During his second tour he travelled some 10,000 miles by rail, road and air.

He visited Leningrad, Moscow, and the Ukraine, and finished up with Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and the Caucasus. He did not leave the beaten track and he is careful to disclaim any special qualifications as an economist, technician, or linguist. Nevertheless, the book is remarkable for its fairness, objectivity and humour and for the fact of the author's previous acquaintance with Khrushchev, of a long conversation with whom he gives an interesting account. His descriptions of Russian justice and court cases are absorbing.

Three chapters are devoted to the author's impressions of Central Asia and Kazakhstan, but these do not add greatly to existing knowledge. He did not penetrate to the rural districts and noticed that the towns, factories, schools and other institutions were all very much like those in other parts of the Union. There was everywhere a preponderance of Russian and Ukrainian over native executives; and there were fewer non-Party members in important posts than in the R.S.F.S.R.\* Like other Western travellers, he deplored the absence of oriental glamour in Samarkand and Bukhara, a criticism which always irritates the Russians—perhaps rightly.

So long as the Soviet Government withholds the ordinary means of enquiring into the life of a people, such as prolonged private residence, unrestricted travel and intercourse with all classes, and free literary activity, the reports of lightning tours such as that made by Mr. MacDuffie remain the only way of acquiring even an approximate notion of the living conditions and current opinions of the Soviet people, short of a painstaking and highly discriminating analysis of Soviet publications. The number of such accounts written so objectively and convincingly as *The Red Carpet* is very limited. Most readers will find themselves involuntarily persuaded by Mr. MacDuffie's final conclusion, which he quotes from a British visitor, that the Soviet Union is "better than most Englishmen think it is, but not nearly so good as most Russians think it is."

G. E. W.

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\* Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republics.

**Muhammad's People. A Tale by Anthology.** By Eric Schroeder. The Bond Wheelwright Co., Portland, Me., U.S.A. pp. 838. \$10.00.

This is a remarkable book from several points of view. It is an important contribution to history; and it explains in a very readable form the part played by the Arabs, their "religion and politics, poetry and violence, science, ribaldry and finance—from the Age of Ignorance before Islam and the Mission of God's Prophet to sophistication in the eleventh century." (It is thus—and aptly—described in a second sub-title.)

The author is Keeper of Islamic Art at Fogg Museum, Harvard, and a lecturer at the Iranian Institute in New York City. An English parson's son, as the publishers tell us, he has a background of archæological excavation at Kish; and of travel in Syria, North Arabia and Kurdistan.

His "tale by anthology" consists of a series of translations from original Islamic texts woven together with great skill. The form is not an easy one from the point of view of artistic unity; but he has triumphed over the difficulties inherent in it—most markedly in the translations from the Koran and the story of Muhammad Rasul Allahi—God's Apostle.

The book opens with a short chapter on the period of Arab chivalry before Muhammad; and this and the account of the struggles of Muhammad and the early Caliphs have an epic quality. The evidence as translated brings out in a masterly way the greatness of Muhammad and his teaching with its central doctrine of submission to God.

The passages from the Koran are deliberately cast in "somewhat archaic" language "not far removed from our Scripture, so that solemn reversion in later times to Scriptural phrasing, as characteristic of them as of us, might sound right." This is very effective. The passages are well chosen for this purpose as well as to invite the interest of Western readers. They bring out, incidentally, Muhammad's respect for Jesus and suggest that he was, to no small extent, influenced by Christian traditions. He accepts, for instance, the Virgin Birth: "He said, I am only a messenger from thy Lord, to bring thee a gift, a faultless son. How should I have a son, said Mary, when no mortal man hath touched me? . . . but he said: Even so . . . it is a thing ordained. And she conceived a son—such was Jesus, Mary's son."

There are, perhaps, other passages in the Koran which might have been included, if Western interest were an important object, such as that which relates the turning of the money-changers out of the Temple at Jerusalem.

The author's main purpose, however, is to let the Muslim documents set forth the story of a Muslim civilization. He shows how, while Muhammad preached submission to God and peace among the Islamic brethren, he made war on unbelievers who opposed his teaching; and how the Caliphate was established to fill the void of his bereavement. Then followed the early conquests, which, though this is not expressly stated, would seem to have been due in part to the superior weapons and armour contributed, in Muhammad's lifetime and later, by wealthy adherents in Medina. After a period of misrule and civil war the scene moves to Baghdad and the temporal glories of the Abbasid Caliphs and the famous name of Harun Al-Rashid.

If there are large gaps in regard to the conquests from Spain to Sind and to the accomplishments of the Arabs in following up the Greek developments in the sciences, notably in mathematics, geography and astronomy, and in philosophy, it may also be objected that the story is told at too great length (except in so far as it furnishes the materials of history).

As the author says in his introduction, the difference between the sublimity of the theoretical Caliphate and the brutality of the actual Caliphate appals. It does, indeed, illustrate the terrible consequences of temporal power unrestrained by the rule of law.

The story of the gradual decline of the Arab civilization until land went out of cultivation as a result of misrule and power passed out of the hands of the last of the Arab Caliphs furnishes an instructive and enthralling commentary on the strength and weakness of mankind.

There are frequent references to the Hadis, the traditional sayings of Muhammad, and the translation of this by the word "Traditions" does not, perhaps, completely satisfy.

J. C. CURRY.

**The Economic Development of Japan.** By Professor W. W. Lockwood. Princeton University Press. (London: Geoffrey Cumberledge.) Pp. 592 and Index. 63s.

When asked to review this book, the writer protested that he was no economist, and had no recent experience of Japan. He now confesses to the pleasure he found in being over-ruled.

Professor William W. Lockwood was born in Shanghai (in 1906). He gained his A.B. at Depauw in 1927, and after instructing, and later an Assistant Professorship, at Baldoyno College, became Secretary to the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations 1935-43, except for the period 1940-41 when he was Secretary to the American Committee of International Studies. In 1947 he was appointed a trustee of both the American Institute of Pacific Relations and of the Princeton Yenching Foundation. He was appointed Assistant Director of the Woodrow Wilson School of Economics of Princeton University in 1946, and Associate Professor in 1949. It is under the auspices of the Woodrow Wilson School that he wrote this splendid book.

Professor Lockwood tells us that his book has two aims—one to show the importance to Japan of the international order her militarists did so much to destroy, and which must be re-created if she is again to prosper; and the other to challenge the view that Japan's economic growth was confined to foreign trade and factory industry, whence its benefits were drained in imperialist wars and zaibatsu profits. In defiance of all the best teaching, he achieves both aims, and those responsible for teaching how to write could learn a very great deal from the skilled architecture of his book. The seeker is told at the outset that his path may be uphill, but it is never allowed to be tedious. He is first of all given a narrative sketch of the whole edifice to be examined; the background of the Meiji restoration is drawn in, with the reminder that the dramatic character of its events did not substantially change the way of life of the common people for many years; there follows a general description of the rise of modern industry and trade in Japan until the First World War, and this in turn is followed by a general survey of the transformations made in Japan by the new forces of trade and technology. The explorer is then invited inside, where the sticks and stones of the whole composition are laid bare for examination in detail. One's path is constantly buttressed by copious footnotes, but even here the guide shows his skill and may brief his pupil before taking off on "a somewhat laborious task" on his reasons for doing so (Chapter 7), or point short cuts for those "who do not care to be detained with these details" (Chapter 9). And when one perhaps begins to plod, perspective is restored from the strain of examining detail, or Japan alone, by some expansive and refreshing statement: "Poverty makes poor customers and inefficient suppliers"; "the grievances within modern society have grown with its comfort"; or "innovation is getting things done; it requires a doer." And the proposition that land is an article made by man, with the concurrent suggestion that dynasties in China, past and present, fall and rise with cycles of neglect and care of land.

Wary of arithmetic, scared of statistics and properly to be numbered among the author's "economically illiterate" I was delighted to find an economist who can say "these figures do not prove much" and "bare statistics tell little." How often has one been damned for querying some algebraic dogma! Yet "here one must be cautious about generalization" says Professor Lockwood; and pursues this to bring down by diligent examination some of the blind walls which have surrounded so many of the problems of the expansion of the economy not only of Japan, but of other nations in the Far East; population pressure in Japan, where he finds the rapid growth in population to have been a decided deterrent to economic progress; or tardiness in industrial expansion of Indonesia and of India which, he gently suggests, may be due to the fact that, in the lack of their independence, other countries creamed off the benefits as well as the profits.

A critic has to find faults somewhere, if only so that praise shall not cloy. The book mentions geographical features, railways and ports many times, but contains only one page-size map, which merely illustrates the paucity of Japan's crop areas: it has no scale, so that distances cannot be gauged, nor does it well show Japan's relativity to Asia. Secondly, Japanese words are often left untranslated: mostly this

is done in footnotes where reference is to Japanese sources, but strings of words in *romanji* must dazzle one who does not understand Japanese even in "roman script"; there is frequent mention of the "zaibatsu" before the word is first translated on page 214.

But this is to quibble. Professor Lockwood set himself out to present the changes which took place in Japan between 1868 and 1938 in terms of the organization of wealth-producing activities. His presentation is admirably designed, his theses humanistically maintained by facts widely drawn and expertly mustered. He demonstrates the interconnection of events, yet is never pragmatical. A sincere believer in the sensibleness of private enterprise, he admires (as everyone) the enterprise and energy of millions of the small businessmen, farmers and workers who by their consensus and co-operation laid the foundations of Japan's economy, "only to have it jeopardized by military expansionism." He discounts Japanese acceptance of State control, and, interest increased because of this, I would ask him soon to publish his analysis of Japanese economic development since 1938, with its trends for a future shadowed by neighbourly totalitarianism.

Professor Lockwood fully achieves his aim of presenting the experience of Japan as a lesson for the study and planning of economic developments in Asia; and Princeton contributes to the art of understatement when he writes "in any case the lessons of Japan are worth pondering."

H. T. B.

**The Art of Asia in the Francis Hopp Museum of Eastern Asiatic Arts in Budapest.** By Tibor Horváth. Budapest. 1954. 112 plates.

The Museum of Eastern Asiatic Arts in Budapest owes its origin to the generosity of the collector Francis Hopp (1833-1919) who bequeathed his collection of Far Eastern antiquities, together with his house, to form the nucleus of a National Museum of Asiatic Art. Founded in 1919, the Museum was enriched by transfers of Oriental antiquities from the Hungarian National Museum, the Museum of Fine Arts, the Museum of Industrial Arts and the Museum of Ethnography, as well as by donations from private individuals including the well-known dealer, Imre Schwaiger. The Museum was fortunate in having as its director during the formative years Zoltan Felvinczi Takáts, who not only extended the collection but also contributed important studies in the field of early Chinese art. Since 1948 Dr. Tibor Horváth has been the Museum's director and with an annual budget at his disposal has been able to make some important acquisitions.

This beautifully produced volume contains a selection of excellent photographic reproductions of 107 objects from the Museum's collection grouped under their respective countries. They include painting, bronzes, stone sculpture, colour prints, lacquer and ceramics. Dr. Horváth, who contributes an introduction summarising the stages in the Museum's development, also provides essential information about each object in a series of notes.

All the objects are worth recording and many are of great beauty, interest and importance. A bronze wheel hub (illustrated on plate 3) is a remarkable example of Chinese bronze casting in which the decoration is admirably adapted to the form. The bronze arrow holder in the form of a seated bear on plate 33 might well deserve a Han rather than a Ming attribution. Plates 92-94 do justice to a superb head of Vishnu of the Pala period carved in black stone. The figure of Surya on Plate 95 should be dated twelfth-century Sena period rather than Bihar ninth-tenth century. Two Nepalese bronze figures donated by Imre Schwaiger are of exceptionally fine quality. The bronze covered vase (on plate 105) with engraved decoration which is Persian and not later than 1300 A.D. must be the earliest example of a shape which reappears in bronze vessels produced by the Muslim craftsmen working in Venice in the second half of the fifteenth century. Equally interesting is an octagonal tile reproduced on plate 109 which combines the graceful drawing of the earliest wares of Isnik painted in underglaze blue with the polychrome palette of the second half of the sixteenth century. This is a rare piece of the transitional period and could hardly be later than 1550 A.D.

R. H. PINDER-WILSON.

**Treasures of Indian Miniatures in the Bikaner Palace Collection.** By Basil Gray. Bruno Cassirer, Oxford. Distributed by Faber and Faber. 1955. 12s. 6d.

The collection of paintings in the possession of the Maharaja of Bikaner, amounting to some six thousand, has been studied by Dr. Herman Goetz, who has assessed their importance in his *Art and Architecture of Bikaner State* (Oxford, 1950). The present publication is a re-issue of the ten paintings reproduced in colour in Dr. Goetz's volume.

It is probable that the foundations of the collection were laid by Maharaja Anup Singh (1669-1698) who served with the Imperial forces in the Deccan and was for some years governor of Southern Bijapur. Certain of the paintings are recorded as having been acquired by Anup Singh while on campaign in the Deccan. But it is likely that some had been in the palace for at least a century before this; for Bikaner emerged as a political power towards the end of the sixteenth century under Raja Rai Singh (1571-1611), the marriage of whose daughter to Prince Salim, afterwards Jahangir, brought the State into the orbit of the Imperial Court and so to Mughal painting. His service with the Imperial troops in the Deccan brought him into contact with the vigorous schools of painting in the Kingdoms of Ahmednagar, Bijapur and Golconda.

Some of the paintings reproduced here reveal the effect of these formative influences on an indigenous Rajput tradition of painting. A portrait of Rai Singh's uncle, Rao Bhoj Rathor (plate iv) is in Deccani style adapted to Rajput taste. The equestrian portrait of Maharaja Anup Singh (plate viii), here dated about 1690, is Mughal in conception, while the painting of Raja Kesri Singh, brother of Anup Singh, (plate ix) mounted on a horse and at grips with a lioness, reveals a monumental quality and landscape features far more characteristic of Rajput art.

Three Deccani paintings are reproduced; two from the Ragini series, here dated about 1570 and tentatively attributed to Bijapur, and a superb full-length portrait (plate iii) in the most developed Deccani style, identified by Mr. Gray as that of Ibrahim Adil Shah II, ruler of Bijapur, with attendants. Equally important is the illustration to the Rasikapriya of Kesava Das, a purely Rajput painting with only insignificant borrowings from Mughal painting.

R. H. PINDER-WILSON.

**A Glossary of Chinese Art and Archæology.** By S. Howard Hansford. London: The China Society. 1954. Pp. 104. 15s.

The considerable number of persons who are interested in Chinese Art, whether as collectors or students, and the still larger number of those who might be interested if they knew how to set about it, will find in this little book a veritable treasure-house of information on the subject. It contains a comprehensive list of the names, in English and Chinese (with romanization), of all the commoner terms used in each branch of art—bronzes, jade and other stones, sculpture, painting, ceramics, and other miscellaneous items—classified under different headings and cross-indexed. Finally there are eight plates showing, in 112 drawings, the shapes of the various bronze and porcelain vessels, of bronze weapons and other articles, and of typical jade ritual instruments. Invaluable to a student in the early stages, it will be equally useful to the more expert as a convenient work of reference for practically all the technical terms he may come across.

A. G. N. O.

**Elizabethan and Yuan: A Brief Comparison of some Conventions in Poetic Drama.** By James Liu. London: The China Society. 1955. Pp. 12. 3s.

The Yuan, or Mongol, Dynasty (of approximately the thirteenth century) has always been regarded by the Chinese—and indeed by most foreign scholars—as having been very poor in artistic achievement, especially in comparison with the Sung and T'ang which preceded, and the Ming which followed, it: the one branch of art that may be regarded as an exception is that of drama, in which—perhaps as a form of escapism—it excelled.

This little book, one of the occasional papers of the China Society, is a monograph comparing the conventions of the Yuan dramatists with those of the First Elizabethan Age, especially Shakespeare and Marlowe. The parallel is interesting and it at least whets one's appetite for more information on the Yuan drama.

A. G. N. O.

**Wild Flowers of Kuwait and Bahrain.** By Violet Dickson, M.B.E., F.Z.S. London: George Allen and Unwin. 1955. Pp. 143; maps. Ill. 25s.

It is fortunate that an Englishwoman, who for twenty-five years has made her home in Kuwait, should have found herself interested enough in desert plants to have made an intensive study of them. Violet Dickson has presented her knowledge in the interesting book entitled *The Wild Flowers of Kuwait and Bahrain*. Primarily of interest to botanists, it may well appeal to those who travel in the desert.

Previous collections of desert plants have been made, but by no one with the unrivalled opportunities of this collector. What makes Mrs. Dickson's an outstanding contribution is that she made her collection over a long period, and so has added considerably to the knowledge of previous students of the subject.

In her opening paragraph the author refers to the erroneous impression most Europeans have of North-Eastern Arabia when they hear it described as a desert. Such it is indeed, but those who know it appreciate the thrilling transformation which can take place following a period of good Autumn rains. Unfortunately such rains cannot be depended upon, and so an eager student of desert flora may spend weeks in Kuwait, only to leave entirely unrewarded because during his sojourn the merciful gift of rain had been denied.

But Mrs. Dickson can quickly travel out as soon as the rains have done their good work and the miracle of growth begun. Then she can make her observations and drawings, many of which are reproduced, and, as on one happy occasion, her discovery (*Horwoodia Dicksoniae Turrill*).

This book cannot fail to interest those wishing to study the flora of the desert. It is well compiled; each specimen listed alphabetically under its Latin name, with a careful description of the locality where each plant was found, in its season. The author speaks knowledgeably, not only of Kuwait but of the immense stretch of desert traversed by Tapline (map 2) where she found specimens of note.

Mrs. Dickson's knowledge of Arabic has enabled her to record the Arabic names of over half the plants in her collection. Europeans who talk with the town Arab only will never learn the names of desert plants and flowers, because of these the town dweller is profoundly ignorant. It must be from the Badawin that these names are learnt, because he, for his very existence, and that of his flocks, depends on the plants.

Many examples are enlivened by notes as to their particular uses. How delightful to find Badawin women using rouge from one plant and a hair shampoo from another, and to know that a kind of chewing-gum can be enjoyed by Badawin children who know which plant produces the gum.

J. C.

**The Waterless Moon.** By Elizabeth Balneaves. Lutterworth Press. 1955. Pp. 175, with 15 plates and a map. 15s.

Coming so soon after Mr. Ian Stephens' *Horned Moon*, one might perhaps overlook Miss Balneaves' *Waterless Moon*, or even be tempted to ignore it. To those who have served in Pakistan her book is exceptionally interesting, but even for those who have never been in Pakistan, but who realize the importance in the political set-up of the world today of the largest Islamic state, which by its alliance with Turkey has definitely linked itself with the West, this short book gives in easy narrative style a great deal of miscellaneous information on life and conditions in a large part of the Western wing of Pakistan. The sub-title of the book might well be "Introduction to Pakistan." Facts and figures are very few, and the author has



wisely omitted all reference to political questions and confined herself entirely to the story of her travels.

Miss Balneaves, who is nothing if not versatile, being trained nurse, artist, journalist, and mother of six children, had already paid one visit to Pakistan for a year before returning in 1952 to gather material for her book. Pakistan was not therefore entirely new to her and she knew what to look for.

Miss Balneaves begins her story, at Karachi. Her account of her meeting with the King of Baba Island is the most interesting and "off the beaten track" part of her sojourn in the Federal capital. From Karachi she goes to Bahawalpur State, and describes her trip to the historic Derawar Fort. Then on to Lahore, where she officiated as Principal of the College of Arts and Crafts of the Punjab University. She paints an attractive picture of the Punjab capital and the surrounding country. But her real interest is the Frontier, whither she takes us next.

Except for a diversion to Samli, in the Murree Hills, where Miss Balneaves worked as a Staff Nurse in the Sanatorium, exactly half her book is devoted to the North-West Frontier Province, including Swat State. And who can blame her? Like most of us, she has come completely under the spell of the Frontier and its people, and here she is at her best. The "cottage industry" of small arms making in the Kohat Pass, camel riding, the fascination of the bazaars of Peshawar City; they are all there. Miss Balneaves and her photographer collaborator were apparently commissioned to do two "features" in Peshawar, and these she incorporates into her book. One is of the celebrated Peshawar Vale Hunt, whose history over the past century is briefly described, and the meet that was staged for the "feature" is well portrayed. The other is the R.P.A.F., whose pilots appear to have put the author through a full course of aerobatics, to her undisguised delight.

Two small errors may be pointed out. On page 44 it is stated that the Karachi Yacht Club is "still rigidly and exclusively British." This is not so. On page 102 it is implied that there are crocodiles in the Kabul River at Nowshera. This reviewer, at any rate, never heard of this during several years' residence there. There is an obvious misprint on page 116, where "sixteen thousand" should read "sixteen hundred."

The book contains many delightful photographs by the author and Mr. Ronald Ziar, and the map is adequate.

C. T. H. H.

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**Take These Men.** By Cyril Joly. Constable. 1955. 8" x 5½". Pp. x+357 and maps. 15s. net.

Though a novel in form, this book is really the story of the tank struggle in North Africa 1940-1943. More than 300 pages are devoted to the personal problems of a tank squadron officer and squadron leader, an extraordinarily vivid narrative. Only a novel could portray these human agonies and triumphs of men in daily contact with death in its more terrible forms, knowing all too often that they were outnumbered, outgunned and outarmoured, and that there were few reserves in support. The Italians with all their advantages in numbers and equipment simply could not take it. Nor was this surprising as one realizes the vitality and sheer guts needed to keep going at all under such appalling conditions. Comparisons with the battle in other areas are not possible, but it is hard to imagine any circumstances more exacting than those so ably described in this volume—the daily duel with an efficient enemy, where the survival of the tank or squadron depends not only on quick thinking but thinking first.

The title is a quotation from Pericles, "Take these men for your example," in the cause of freedom. Here in the narrow confines of the tank the reader can study the mutual confidence of officers and crew. And it is hard to believe that such relations can be achieved by other nations. Whether, for instance, the natural comradeship of the British can be equalled by the rigid discipline of the Germans.

Taking the book as merely a novel, Col. Joly has proved himself a really able writer with convincing powers of description. Not a bedside companion for a romantic schoolgirl, but tuned to those likely to be interested. To such readers the

stark details of last moments are necessary to place the battle atmosphere in perspective.

Since this volume has its value, and interest, as a history, certain additions seem required. The opening map should show by a red line, with dates, the various journeys. The preface should include a one-page summary of the circumstances of our efforts in the Western Desert and the general course of the campaign from the Italian entry into the war to El-Alamein. It would be useful, too, if a foreword could be added by a retired senior tank officer as to how and why these British tanks were below enemy standards, and how and why our tank strategy during this period might have been improved.

G. M. ROUTH.

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**This is Kashmir.** By Pearce Gervis. Cassell. 1954. Pp. 330; 2 colour plates, 24 pp. of photographs, and a map. 25s.

This book might be described as a Kashmir Omnibus, or even a Kashmir Encyclopædia. There are many books on the Switzerland of Asia, as it used to be called, but no recent one which covers in one volume the history, topography, arts and crafts, and customs of the whole country.

Kashmir has now been in the forefront of the news since 1947, and a good deal has since been written on the political and legal aspects of the "Kashmir Question." It is for the reader, on the evidence placed before him, to form his own opinion. As a basis from which to proceed to a more detailed study, *This is Kashmir* can hardly be improved upon.

The author was the guest of a retired British officer on his houseboat on the Jhelum, and from there he explored the highways and byways of Srinagar and the surrounding waterways. He notes the appalling poverty, and makes a trip to Baramulla, the place at which Pathan raiders attacked the convent.

Two chapters are devoted to a summary of the tangled history of Kashmir from earliest times, a sorry tale—almost without a break—of battle, murder, and sudden death. Mr. Gervis states that the Kashmiris divide their history into four periods: (a) the Hindu Kings, (b) the Kashmiri Muslims, (c) the Moghuls, and (d) the Pathans, though, as he says, the list should be preceded by the period of pre-Hindu rule, and the Sikh and Dogra periods added to it. More often than not Kashmir was under alien rule, the appanage, albeit the favourite, of some foreign conqueror; and the local governor, subject to an Imperial capital such as Delhi, Kabul, or Lahore, several hundred miles away, merely used his position for self-aggrandisement and self-enrichment. The account of the events leading to the notorious treaty of Amritsar, by which Maharajah Gulab Singh of Jammu acquired the State, its history up to the partition of the Sub-continent, and the procrastinating accession of Maharajah Hari Singh to India, is fairly and objectively told.

One of the many differences between the two main cultures in the Sub-continent is the fondness of the one for, and the almost complete indifference of the other to, flowers and gardens. The Muslims have inherited a fine tradition of gardens from their Moghul ancestors. Mr. Gervis takes us on a conducted tour of the Moghul gardens around Srinagar, and faithfully captures the atmosphere of these celebrated favourite haunts of the Emperors.

The more noteworthy Kashmir industries—the making of carpets, shawls, papier mâché and paper-making, wood carving, furniture making, sericulture and silver-ware—are described, with the different versions of their origin, history and the details of their manufacture.

Apart from the Vale of Kashmir, with Srinagar as its capital, Mr. Gervis gives a full description of the rest of the State. The summer resort and winter sports centre of Gulmarg; Amanarth, the holy place of pilgrimage; the Buddhist East of the country in Ladakh; the Muslim North, with the giant Karakoram Range culminating in the recently conquered K2; Muslim Poonch and Hindu Jammu—Mr. Gervis visited them all.

The very different characteristics of the various races and religions within

Kashmir State are described. The Buddhist Ladakhis, by the practice of polyandry, keep their numbers down, whereas the neighbouring Baltis, being Mussulmans, are permitted four wives, with resultant overpopulation, which is greater than the land can maintain, and many Baltis must leave their barren country or starve. This, no doubt, explains the numbers of Baltis working as servants, coolies, etc., in Pakistan today.

On page 254 Mr. Gervis states that Ramzan falls during the hottest time of the year. It is, of course, a movable fast, commencing about ten days earlier each year, though it was doubtless at the hottest time when the author was in Kashmir. He is also somewhat confused as to the relative importance of the different Muslim festivals.

This is an excellent book on the subject. The colour plates and photographs by the author are good; but the map is inadequate. An index might have been added.

C. T. H. H.

**Man of Everest.** By James Ramsay Ullman. G. G. Harrap: London, Toronto, Sydney and Wellington. 1955. Pp. 320. 8½" × 6½". 18s.

This is an interesting and undoubtedly true-to-life portrait of the great mountaineer. Beginning with a charming description of his earlier homeland—Solo Khumbu—and of his own race, the narrator, Tenzing, takes his readers to the many regions of High Asia travelled in during the twenty years of his "second life," as porter and mountain-man centred mostly in Darjeeling—Everest pre-war, Garhwal, Chitral (in war-time), Garhwal again and the western flanks of Kangchenjunga. In an amusing and intimate chapter, "To the Holy Land," he tells of his visit to Lhasa with Professor Tucci, "a strange man whom I grew to like very well." In accounts of the two post-war Everest expeditions the fullest credit is given to the magnificent achievements of both Swiss and British. The book ends with the beginning of his "third life," as (more or less) one of the "elder brethren" in Darjeeling.

Here and there readers will be inclined to wonder who is actually telling the story: hero, interpreter or writer. For it is not easy to understand how Tenzing has been able, despite having been practically illiterate for many years, to marshal so clearly and cleverly his impressions of mountains and men of various nationalities. He has obviously tried to be fair to all and one cannot criticize him for having his preferences.

Mr. Ullman is to be congratulated on having produced, rather under difficulty, a fine book with fine illustrations.

H. W. T.

**An Innocent on Everest.** By Ralph Izzard. London: Hodder and Stoughton. 1954. Pp. 256. Ill. Bibl. 16s.

Any good reporter would have jumped for joy at being assigned to cover the 1953 Everest Expedition. But Ralph Izzard can have had but few illusions as to the difficulties of his task. It was perhaps the most thankless and unsatisfactory mission ever imposed on a newspaper man. Nevertheless, starting from scratch, at very short notice he managed to reach Khatmandu, travelling by pure coincidence in the same plane from Delhi as the leader. The terms of *The Times* copyright naturally prohibited the imparting of inside information, but John Hunt remained, as always, scrupulously courteous but firm. And, as was only to be expected, little journalistic help was forthcoming from British officialdom at the capital. From Tenzing he got help, advice and useful copy (not of course relevant to the current expedition). The British Ambassador had been adamant about *The Times* copyright—an attitude of which Mr. Izzard could not see the ethics. He seems to ignore the fact that when

contributing the major part of the funds required to launch the expedition *The Times* acquired the sole press rights from expedition sources for a stated period. Officials of the Nepal Durbar, being unhampered, could be, and were, very helpful. From rival reporters and other channels he obtained a good deal of relevant copy, not always strictly accurate. But in Khatmandu camp equipment was unobtainable, while in Calcutta he found even the Himalayan Club cupboard bare. It took an ill-spaced week to scrounge the kit, and when inspecting it he "felt more like a clown than a climber." However, he set off with his harum-scarum gang only a week behind the expedition and got to Namchi Bazar in only a fortnight, by good fortune stumbling on to the expedition's headquarters just below the ice-fall. He had done extremely well thus getting to the head of the Khumbu Glacier at all, and more so just as the expedition was about to pass out of sight beyond the reach of gate-crashers. Two of these were trying to do better than the *Daily Mail* man. And two other correspondents, of reputable papers, got no farther than New Delhi. Although Ralph Izzard never got a chance of obtaining any sensational copy, he has written his story of frustration with praiseworthy restraint and has produced a very readable chronicle. He waited for three weeks more in Khatmandu and witnessed the outburst of wild and rivalling nationalism which marred, for a period, the tremendous success of the expedition. His analysis of the causes shows understanding and a degree of sympathy and he has dealt tactfully and factually with the two Tenzing controversies. The book is well illustrated.

H. W. T.

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**Kanchenjunga Challenge.** By Paul Bauer. London: William Kimber. 1955. Pp. 202. 12 illustrations.  $9\frac{1}{2}'' \times 6\frac{3}{4}''$ . 18s.

Paul Bauer's book, dealing with what may, in fact, turn out to be the second highest summit in the world, appeared at a convenient time, just as the since successful British expedition was under way. For parts two and three are, virtually, revised editions of his previous narratives affording the opportunity of comparing the now politically barred eastern approach with the recently opened up south-western. Except for Farmer's hazardous adventure the latter had not been examined since the tragic Guillard-Crowley-Pache attempt in 1905. And the Swiss in 1949 went further north, on a rather more exploratory mission.

Study of the Germans' attempts seems to indicate that their route was the longer and more difficult. Bauer's comments on three approaches are interesting: "After the experiment [1930 International Expedition] the north-western side had to be written off as impracticable." "We had left the west ridge out of account because no one could discern whether it was possible to get on to it. The Swiss Expedition of 1949 was also unable to find any way of climbing the west ridge." "In short the north-east spur definitely offers a possibility of reaching the summit; perhaps the only possibility." But it imposes greater burdens on individuals than any other known climb in the Himalaya. It should be remembered that they did not carry oxygen. The crucial steep snow slope which could not be circumvented was, in September 1931, of a suicidal nature, though earlier in the year it might have been surmountable. He remarks that "at a corresponding season the final slopes of Mont Blanc from the Péterôt ridge or those of the Dent Blanche are, on account of new snow, no longer practicable." At the same season, however, fine ascents were made of lower peaks in the Sikkim Himalaya, as witness part four: "Triumph on Siniolchu." Incidentally, Siniolchu, 22,600 feet, and Nilkanta, 21,640 feet, may be said to transcend in beauty all other peaks in the Himalaya. On account of the title parts, two to four have been dealt with first in this review. But the first part, "Bavaria and the Caucasus"—in 1928—is delightful, though all too short. And it is a pity that politics have prevented him from recounting some experiences when raining and leading mountain troops in the said Caucasus between 1939 and 1944.

Lastly, the accepted name of the mountain is Kangchenjunga, *kang* being the Tibetan word for snow,

H. W. T.

**The Savage Mountain.** By Charles Houston and Robert Bates. Collins. 1955. Pp. 192; 23 illustrations; maps and line drawings. 8½" × 6". 25s.

The title is apt although K2's victims total far fewer than those of Nanga Parbat—which is not unjustifiably stigmatized as the "vicious goddess." For successive climbers have been forced to adopt the sole apparently practicable route up the Southern Ridge. On it they are persistently and savagely bombarded by rock falls. The narrowness and technical difficulties of this, the "Abruzzi Ridge," strictly limit the choice of camp sites to those nearly vertically above and below each other. The same narrowness creates and enhances the danger to those camping or climbing below, from stones or boulders inadvertently dislodged from above.

The story of this attempt as related by Captain Streather (recently one of the four highest on Kangchenjunga), was published in Vol. XLI of the Society's journal; so there is no need to recapitulate at any length. But reference must be made to the prolonged ordeal, stormbound, at above 24,000 feet, which sapped the strength of all, caused Gilkey's collapse with thrombophlebitis and wrecked the very favourable prospects of success. And to the all but fatal accident during the descent when only the strength and skill of Peter Schoening took the strain of five falling men and saved them from death. It should be noted that above Camp II the climbers, despite the eagerness of the Hunza porters to carry higher, did it all themselves up to Camp XVII at 25,500 feet.

As Charles Houston remarks: "No mountain is climbed by one or two. Behind them stand the shades of those who tried and hoped and failed." He begins his book with the story, in brief, of Dudley Wolfe, who lost his life on K2 in 1939, along with the Sherpas Pasang Kikuli and Tsering, who climbed 7,000 feet in one day to his aid, up rock and snow. Art Gilkie joined his countryman and those splendid Sherpas in the "shadows behind" Desios successful team of last year.

The book is fittingly dedicated to Art Gilkie.

H. W. T.

**The Narrow Smile.** By Peter Mayne. John Murray. 1955. Pp. 254. Ill. 18s.

There must be many members of the Royal Central Asian Society who have pleasant memories of service on the old North-West Frontier of India, and who have often as they hoed the cabbages idly speculated on what it would be like to return to their old haunts. They need not bother to do so. Peter Mayne has done it for them. By reading *The Narrow Smile* they can save themselves much trouble and expense.

Let not, however, anything said deter others who have no experience of Pathans from reading this amusing travel story. It is easy to read; there is nothing bogus in it. The author has a useful knowledge of Pushtoo, and sufficient enthusiasm for Pathans to visit their habitat in the middle of the hot weather. Moreover he did so as a very ordinary person without the motor-car and revolver which are the insignia of importance in those parts. In the past, relationships between Briton and Pathan could never be entirely spontaneous. Any Briton might in process of time climb to the seats of power. The Pathan, who is nothing if not a realist, never forgot that fact. But from Peter Mayne there was nothing to hope or fear. The tribesman knows nothing of authors. He transacts his business by word of mouth, and for his knowledge of the wide world depends upon his radio, to which he is a careful listener. His dealings with the author were, therefore, on a basis of disinterested friendship.

It is nice to find that this wandering Briton was received with kindness wherever he went. He travelled widely: visited the Mahsûd battalion in the Kagan Valley of Hazara District; stayed with the Wali of Swat; toured in the Kurram and North and South Waziristan Agencies, and spent a few weeks in Kabul. With an economy of description he manages to convey the authentic flavour of each.

At Kabul he heard the Afghan case for the creation of a homeland for Pathans—Pushtunistan; and learned that the Afghans do not contemplate that their Eastern and Southern Provinces which have a Pathan population should know the blessings of inclusion within its borders. This Promised Land is supposedly to be created at

the expense of Pakistan, and is to comprehend, beside the North-West Frontier territories, Baluchistan, where over vast tracts the people are not Pathan and the language is not Pushtoo.

The author's hopes that he might be allowed to visit the Pushtoo-speaking areas of Afghanistan were disappointed. He suffered a second disappointment when he was prevented from touring in the highlands of Waziristan. The first was due to Afghan appreciation of the damage his pen might do to their pet cause; the second was attributable, it would seem, to Mahsud inability to believe that so humble a traveller—he had not even an enamel shaving mug, that emblem of sahibdom, until his self-appointed orderly bought him one—could be worth bothering about. But they are a clever tribe. In ten years' time, when the author visits them again, they will know better.

One point of detail puzzled the reviewer. Pathans are said by the author to describe the noise of a bullet as "Tak-Tooong!" In the good old days they did so by making, to British ears, the irrelevant noise of "Duz."

G. C. S. CURTIS.

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**September Monkey.** By Induk Pakh. Victor Gollancz. 1955. Pp. 283. 15s.

This book is the story of a remarkable life. Induk Pakh was born at the turn of the century in Korea, of village parents who were Buddhists. After her father's death her mother became a Christian, which radically altered her own life and her daughter's. The first part of the book is particularly gripping, telling of the courage of Induk's mother in the face of great difficulties of poverty and widowhood.

We meet the author as a very small girl walking back from her first church service, after which, being Christmas-time, the children were given little presents—hers a writing pad and pencil. "You are not going to waste that pad and pencil. You are going to use it in learning to read and write," said her mother—an almost unheard of aim for village girls in Korea of that day. To start schooling at all meant disguising the little girl as a boy. Later her mother had to trek hundreds of miles on foot carrying on her back bales of cloth which she had woven during the winter, and which had to be sold to meet school expenses.

But the success of the venture can be judged by the fact that when we leave the author at the end of the book she has accomplished a twenty months' tour in America, in which she gave 642 lectures in English and travelled 80,000 miles. Mrs. Pakh is unstinting in her gratitude to Americans individually, and to America in general for their help to herself and to her country.

Her main themes are the impact of Western ideas on the age-old traditions of Korea during its war-torn history of the last fifty years and the development of Christianity in the life of mother and daughter, vitally affecting their lives. The deepening of this faith comes in part through mistakes squarely faced and the lessons learnt, which gives it an authentic ring. The guidance of God becomes increasingly real to them as they continue. But Mrs. Pakh also sees that an experience of personal change alone will not outbid Communism. A better ideology, based on that experience, is needed to win over those of another ideology.

As a piece of writing, there are parts of this book which are open to criticism. But in reviewing a work of such sincerity, by an author whose mother-tongue is not English, it would be churlish to emphasize this. Suffice it to say that the travel diary portion is weaker than the rest, that there is an occasional *non sequitur* in some places and an excess of detail in others.

The name *September Monkey* alludes to the astronomical signs under which Mrs. Pakh was born.

There is much to learn from this book about Korean ways, past and present, for readers not already versed in them. And the author's philosophy of living, though known in theory to most English readers, would, if applied more widely and simply, save many a case of nervous breakdown.

M. E. ROWLATT.

**My Several Worlds.** By Pearl S. Buck. Methuen. 1955. Pp. 467. 21s.

Of the many books this talented authoress has produced this is perhaps the most important. Apart from the revelation of the writer's character, the story of her several worlds is a fascinating one. China naturally predominates, and her observations on the Chinese people, particularly the peasants, are authoritative and absorbing.

When writing on India she is not on such sure ground—appears to have been unduly influenced by an incident on an Indian railway station in which an English captain is alleged to have beaten off some encroaching food sellers. Truly an unpleasant incident, but does it weigh very heavily in a scale in which there are two hundred years of selfless devotion to duty by numberless officials whose only thought was the betterment of the people they governed?

Philip Mason's *The Rulers of India* and Katherine Mayo's *Mother India* should balance Pearl Buck's judgment of India. Your reviewer is tempted to relate that during the last war he met an American official who decided, on arrival in India, that British Government was thoroughly bad and that America would have done it so much better. Six months later I met the same official in Delhi, who said: "I had a terrible nightmare last night." "What was that?" I replied. "Oh, I dreamed that all the British had cleared out of India and we were left to run it."

The author's pronouncements on Sun Yat Sen and Chiang Kai Shek are balanced statements, though her criticisms of the latter's government may annoy the upholders of "McCarythism." Perhaps one may dare to hope that that unpleasant complaint is disappearing in the U.S.A.?

Pearl Buck's work on behalf of the underprivileged, of the children of mixed parentage, is beyond praise; time, energy and money she has expended on their behalf. Her lifetime of divided loyalties has produced a deep sympathy which is described with affection and understanding and will perhaps be better understood and appreciated by her Chinese rather than her American readers.

The descriptions of Peking will arouse an acute nostalgia in the minds of readers who knew that heavenly city.

In conclusion, no one who has any interest in the problems, passions and differences of East and West should hesitate for a moment to read this remarkable book.

H. Sr.C. S.

**Mandarin Red.** By James Cameron. Michael Joseph. 1955. Pp. 287 approx. Ill. 15s.

James Cameron has taken every possible advantage of his journey "behind the Bamboo Curtain." His observations are those of a keen observer and are strengthened by the facts that he was "nobody's guest, nobody's delegate."

It is clear to the unbiassed mind that the Chinese citizen is better off *materially* today under Communism than he was under Tutchuns, or Chiang Kai Shek. This advantage is tempered by the fact that a dead level of mediocrity in life and being seems to have been arrived at. Those of us who remember Peking as a dirty, dusty, charming and delightful city would find it difficult to recognize it today, freed from flies, with spotless streets.

The people have gained greatly in many ways, but how vastly must they be missing the intangibles of culture and beauty which distinguished one of the most interesting capitals of the world, Eastern or Western.

It is not everyone who has the good fortune to meet a living Buddha, in a few months' journey, and to meet him twice, as did the author. He also met peasants, poets, State officials (many of these), even political prisoners and Shanghai capitalists.

There seems to have been little effort on the part of the Chinese to prevent the author from seeing and talking to anyone of the classes mentioned above. He was even permitted to talk *alone* with prisoners from America and Great Britain who were apparently remaining in China of their own free will.

He wisely refrains from conclusions about these people, whom one may imagine were misfits in their former surroundings, but who might forget their Communistic induction were they back amongst their own folk.

To everyone interested in the China problem this book is strongly recommended.

H. Sr.C. S.

**One Man in His Time.** By N. M. Borodin. Constable, London. 1955. Pp. 343-21s.

This is the story of a Don Cossack, born in humble circumstances, who grew up in the Revolution of 1917 and passed through the famine of 1921-22. He fought for survival and his own advancement, and as a result of his efforts achieved the scientific education he so keenly deserved. After military service he qualified as a microbiologist and, while still young, became the Director of important scientific establishments, specializing in anti-virus veterinary research. He travelled extensively in western Russia, especially in the Caucasus and the trans-Caucasian provinces, and his descriptions of these journeys and people he met are remarkably vivid. During the last war he was awarded the Order of Lenin and after it he was sent on government missions to the U.S.A. and Great Britain. At last, as he says, the time came when he could no longer refrain from expressing his opinion of the State ideology, and for this reason he could not return to the Soviet Union, where at any time he could expect to be chopped off like the rotten limb of a tree. He informed the Russian Ambassador in London and the head of the Soviet Trade delegation, and so started a new life, but here the book ends.

It is an enthralling book and Dr. Borodin has been able to describe his own life and conditions in Russia as they appeared to him at the time, without tingeing his comments with his later opinions. He does not excuse himself for his earlier ideas or actions; nor does he in any way indict the Russian system for any errors or wrong beliefs. He gives a factual account of events as they occurred and of their effect upon him and his friends. He describes very clearly the conditions under which they lived and gives a lively picture of the various people he met and with whom he worked. He has a fluid pen and is able to make his characters live. Only when he writes of the topmost officials does his descriptive powers fail him somewhat, though his account of an interview with Mikoyan is very effective.

His attitude towards life and all that happened around him is a valuable indication of why the Soviet régime continues to flourish. He and his colleagues do not question the wisdom of decisions made by the Party and they accept purges as right and necessary. They do not even appear to doubt that certain persons and classes are entitled to more food and better living conditions than others. In his youth he condemned those who lost their lives for deviationism, sabotage and wrecking. He never imagined that he would himself one day come into that category and be liable for attention from the Political Police. He was indeed proud when he was enlisted in that body as a voluntary and semi-official member. It is this complacency and lack of criticism that is the strength of Soviet Russia. "It cannot happen to me" seems to be the surprising attitude of the majority, although one would think that the disappearance of friends and colleagues would at least be unsettling, and the sudden change from being loyal and faithful supporters of the régime to criminal saboteurs would give rise to doubts. Only travel beyond the Iron Curtain seems likely to disturb this state of mind.

The account of continual purges, first of "old intellectuals," then later of senior officials of previously unblemished red records and the fact that their places were taken by young men of little experience are all the more interesting when one realizes that despite the continual upheavals and the loss of knowledge and skill which they entailed, the Soviet machine continued to work. This is all the more surprising when it is realized that the basis of the whole system is a bureaucracy beside which even our own would seem the height of freedom. Decisions are made on no better basis than a civil servant's view of the position. Allocations of supplies are based on theory and not on local needs. Quotas are calculated according to plan and are not based on capacities or supplies. From Dr. Borodin's descriptions of government offices it would seem that the proportion of civil servants to productive workers in Russia is perhaps even higher than in Britain or the U.S.A.

This book can be recommended to anyone who wishes to learn at first hand how the Russians live and think. It is easy to read and at no time does it deviate from its purpose of being an account of an intelligent man's life during the most critical periods of his country's history in modern times.



## NOTICES

THE principal objects of the Royal Central Asian Society are to maintain in England a centre for the provision and dissemination of information concerning Central Asia and adjoining countries, and to further international friendship.

The Council welcomes applications for Membership from those whose work, studies or military service are connected with one of the countries of Central, Western, and South-east Asia in which the Society is interested. Such Members are of the greatest help in keeping the Society up to date in its information. Members also can maintain their existing interest in these countries by keeping in touch with fellow Members.

Persons who desire to join must be proposed by one Member and seconded by another, and must then be balloted for by the Council. Ladies are admissible. The Annual Subscription is £1 10s. (£2 for residents in the London area.) There is an Entrance Fee of £1 payable on election.

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